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In a fatal Four-Way match, rank from 1st to 4th, who you would root for to win
Please consider taking a few minutes to answer this survey for my math class. I need 100 votes on it to do a project on voting methods. It shouldn’t take more than a minute, thank you!
Some lawmakers in Colorado tried so-called quadratic voting—and it worked.
I like it. I want some more of it.
Final Rankings
The results have been calculated! Here are the rankings:
1: Mixed-Member Proportional Ranking: 10/11
2: Approval Instant Runoff Voting 8/11
3: Condorcet Method 6/11
4 + 5: Borda Count and Disapproval Instant Runoff 5/11
6: First Past the Post 3/11
According to this chart, Approval IRV and Mixed Member Proportional are the best systems!
An explanation of the Mixed Member Proportional system.
These videos brought to you by C.G.P. Grey (http://www.youtube.com/user/CGPGrey?feature=watch)
Mixed Member Proportional Ranking
This method, used in multi-winner elections, is a way to directly use a proportional preference list to find a set of winners that are not only local, but also proportional to the preferences. There are 2 parallel rounds of voting: Round 1, a FPTP vote, and Round 2, a preference list of political parties. The first half of the seats are decided by Round 1, and it shares the same problems with FPTP. However, Round 2’s preference list reveals the preferences of political parties, and the other half of seats are filled in according to how over- or underrepresented that political party is. This is meant to fix all problems that arise due to the Round 1 votes. These results are interpreted as a whole, so no problems arise from this. However, the representatives for the Round 2 seats are determined by a Round 2 ranking for each political party. These rankings determine the order in which the Round 2 candidates are awarded seats.
Majority Criterion: A true majority will win a majority, as a majority can still be underrepresented.
Condorcet Criterion: Generally preferred candidates always win a seat!
Pareto Criterion: Pairwise preferred candidates would also win, and be ranked higher on the runoff-repair stage.
Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IIA): Political parties that drop out are filled in by the runoff-repair rankings.
Monotonicity Criterion: More votes will not hurt anyone, as they increase the chance of the candidate or party winning either election.
Spoiler Effect Prevention: The elections allow preferences to be equally ranked, and can be a tool to allow smaller parties to grow.
Minority Rule Prevention: Although a minority may win, a majority will be filled in with the Round 2 seats.
Preference Proportionality: The second stage is introduced solely to fix proportions.
Gerrymandering Prevention: Gerrymandering only influences Round 1. The runoff-repair round, Round 2, is a generalized ranking!
Political Diversity: This method strongly encourages smaller political parties.
Definitive Outcome: Although this works perfectly with a multi-winner election, this method does not work if the seats can not be divided or doubled, or if there can only be 1 winner.
Ranking: Alpha
Borda Count
This method takes a ranked ballot, assigning values to each rank, then counting which candidate has the most points. Last place is 0 points, second-last 1 point, and so on, where first place has X points, where X is 1 less than the number of candidates.
Majority Criterion: Majorities would have many first place rankings, and thus would win.
Condorcet Criterion: General comparisons do not occur, causing the problem of a Condorcet candidate, or a generally preferred candidate, to lose.
Pareto Criterion: Pairwise comparisons occur, and work through the point decisions.
Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IIA): Dropping out can change the number of points a candidate gets, and pushes another up.
Monotonicity Criterion: All extra favorable votes increase the points a candidate gets!
Spoiler Effect Prevention: The spoiler effect still draws points away from similar candidates.
Minority Rule Prevention: A minority still can receive the largest number of points, as there may not be a majority candidate, and this method does not simulate elections until a candidate is preferred by a majority.
Preference Proportionality: This method ranks winners proportionally with multi-winner elections.
Gerrymandering Prevention: The points should carry through districts, and thus gerrymandering is prevented!
Political Diversity: This method still trends towards 2 political parties.
Definitive Outcome: Candidates can have the same number of points!
Ranking: Zeta
This video explains Disapproval IRV, also known as the French system and the Alternative Vote.
Condorcet Voting
This method is also called “instant pairwise voting,” or IPV. IPV starts off like Approval IRV, where a ranked ballot is filled out. However, afterwards, each member is compared to the others, and if one wins a majority with every one of the pairwise simulations, the member wins!
Majority Criterion: Majorities are both pairwise and generally preferred.
Condorcet Criterion: The IPV method is designed to satisfy pairwise and general preferences.
Pareto Criterion: IPV, as stated before, satisfies pairwise and general preferences.
Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IIA): Dropping out would retain the same values, as this wouldn’t change the opinion stated in the ranked ballot.
Monotonicity Criterion: Any voters switching to the winner would increase the preference ratio, helping the winning candidate.
Spoiler Effect Prevention: Introducing new parties still can cause another to lose! There is no runoff function in this method.
Minority Rule Prevention: A minority could not possibly be preferred by a majority!
Preference Proportionality: With this method, the pairwise comparisons may still result in a slim majority (around 51%) to win all seats in a multi-winner election. A different function is needed to fix this problem...
Gerrymandering Prevention: This method still would require districts, which are a main deciding factor of the winner.
Political Diversity: This method does not strongly encourage new political parties, and still trends towards a bipartisan system.
Definitive Outcome: This voting method may not return a winner, due to the Condorcet Paradox. Candidate A can be preferred to Candidate B, Candidate B is preferred to Candidate C, but Candidate C is preferred to Candidate A! An example occurs with 3 voters and 3 candidates: Candidates A, B, and C, with voters X, Y, and Z. X’s preferences are A, then B, then C. Y’s preferences are B, then C, then A. Z’s preferences are C, then A, then B. The Condorcet paradox occurs in this situation, as explained before!
Ranking: Epsilon
