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Steven Lukes (1974) Power: A radical view - Summary

Summary: In the 1960s Dahl and the other pluralists proposed a view of power, wherein a person has power over another person, if the first person can get the second person to do something she or he would not do otherwise. They generally focused on the exercise of actual power, at who brought up and supported which alternatives, at the actual disagreement, and at which alternatives were finally adopted. Their prototypical situations are decision-making processes in groups. This view of power, the 1D view, is a liberal view, it focuses on issues, on how those issues are decided, and on which observable conflict of interests exists. In 1962, Bachrach and Baratz criticised this view as superficial and self-serving, as America celebrating its pluralism. There is another side to power, the power to prevent issues from being discussed or decided upon. In political organisations, some issues are foregrounded, others are hidden from view, benefiting specific groups in a systematic way. In this sense, non-decisions, that is suppressing challenges to the interests of those making decisions, are themselves decisions. This view, the 2D view, is a reformist view, it focuses on potential issues, determined by observable conflicts of interest, and how they can be prevented from becoming actual issues. But I believe this is still not enough: Agenda-setting and exclusion of potential issues, ultimately influencing what another person thinks, wants, and desires may be the height of power. In this sense, socialisation, mass media, and controlling the information flow are forms of thought control: The most effective form of power is preventing conflict. If agenda-setting is successful, the political public is prevented from even hearing minority opinions, which thus remain minority opinions. This view, the 3D view, is a radical view, it focuses on agenda-setting, and includes covert and latent conflicts over real interests, which may differ from self-perceived interests. Talk about real interests always opens one up to charges of paternalism. But Gramsci realised one can learn from how people behave in abnormal situations, where the apparatus of power is less strict. In such situations, the words and effective actions of persons may not fit, and one can learn something about their real interests, about what they would do in the absence of power. This is a really hard problem to overcome, but it is not inherently impossible.

Source: Steven Lukes (1974) Power: A radical view. First published as a small 64page-volume. New York: MacMillan, 1974. Second edition includes the full original text, supplemented by two new chapters. New York: MacMillan, 2005.

(Full text [PDF, 160kb] at chula.ac.th, English) 

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

[1] The way of identifying power I am going to propose is theoretically and politically radical.

This way is necessarily evaluative. It is always contested.

It can be applied empirically.

In describing power, I will deal with methodological individualism, behaviourism, and the roles values play in explanation, false consciousness, and the bias of pluralism.

In the 1960s Dahl and the other pluralists championed a view of power that traces its roots back to Weber.

In 1962, Bachrach and Baratz criticised this view. It was both superficial and it was self-serving, America celebrating its pluralism.

The pluralists attacked Bachrach and Baratz in return.

I believe Bachrach and Baratz were essentially right, but they did not go far enough.

In the following, I will present three views.

I will call the view of the pluralists the one-dimensional view of power.

I will call the view of Bachrach and Baratz the two-dimensional view of power.

I will present a third view, which I will call the three-dimensional view of power.

[2] I believe calling Dahl, Polsby, Wolfinger, and their colleagues pluralists is mistaken.

They do want to show that power is pluralist, but this is just the conclusion they are aiming for.

Their methods and approaches can be employed for other projects, and can lead to other non-pluralist conclusion.

Dahl: A person has power over another person, if the first person can get the second person to do something she or he would not do otherwise.

Dahl mentions both ability and success, potential and actual power. But the pluralists generally focus on the exercise of actual power.

Dahl looks at who brought up and supported which alternatives and which alternatives were finally adopted.

The observable or reconstructed behaviour of participants is the object, from which power can be measured. Their prototypical situations are decision-making processes in groups.

Power, influence, control, and other related terms are often used as synonyms by the pluralists.

The pluralists believe open conflicts to be best-suited, as it is easy to see who backs which alternative, and which alternative wins out in the end.

For Dahl, "actual disagreement in preferences" is a necessary condition for power research.

Dahl, in one case, mentions the possibility of a proposal encountering no opposition.

However, the framework of the pluralist can not handle this possibility.

Without an observable conflict between conscious preferences manifested in behaviour, they see no power.

For pluralists interests are preferences, conflicts of interests are conflicts of preferences.

Pluralists reject the idea that people can be unconscious or mistaken about their interests.

Polsby: If the researcher can know the objective interests of a class, and the class disagrees, the researcher can call this "false class consciousness". This method can never fail, it is metaphysical, not empirical.

The 1D view of power focuses on how those issues are decided, on which observable conflict of interests exists.

[3] Bachrach and Baratz, in contrast, believe there are two sides to power.

The first side is analogous to the 1D view of power.

The second side considers the power to prevent issues from being discussed or decided upon.

Schattschneider: "Organisation is the mobilisation of bias." In political organisation, some issues are foregrounded, others are hidden from view.

B&B: Values and institutional procedures benefit specific groups, often but not always an elite minority, in a systematic way.

Power is control over another person's behaviour. 

Coercion is power by means of threats.

Influence is power without any threat.

Authority is power by means of values held by the controlled.

Force is power by removing the choice of non-compliance.

Manipulation is force, without the controlled noticing control.

According to B&B, the 1D view of power is too focused on conscious behaviour.

Non-decisions (conscious or unconscious) are themselves decisions.

A decision is "a choice among alternative modes of action".

A non-decision is a decision suppressing challenges to the interests of those making decisions.

Dahl: The attention of the political class is necessary for something being a political issue.

There are potential issues, which are not actual issues due to non-decisions.

B&B: A key issue is an issue challenging the power, authority, or the decision-making process.

B&B also focus on observable conflict, though it may be overt.

B&B: Without conflict, the presumption should be consensus. Political science is unable to determine how this consensus came about.

Conflicts are found by observing grievances, overt or covert. Thereby the interests of those outside the political system can be considered.

The 2D view of power is a critique of the 1D view's focus on behaviour.

Decisions on potential issues, determined by observable conflicts of interest, can be prevented.

[4] The 2D view is much better than the 1D view, as it includes agenda-setting into its considerations.

However, the 2D view of power is still too limited.

The 2D view is still too behaviour-focused.

The bias of the political system is not simply the result of individual decisions and actions.

Agenda-setting and exclusion of potential issues are often the result of group behaviour. 

Weber: Power is "individuals realising their wills despite the resistance of others".

A group can act in a certain way, and the action is not the action or decision of particular individuals.

The specific form of organisation of a group may itself have effects.

Marx: "Men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."

The 2D view is still too focused on observable conflicts.

Even some of B&B's own concepts (manipulation and authority) can do their work without conflict.

Influencing what another person thinks, wants, and desires may be the height of power.

Socialisation, mass media, and controlling the information flow are forms of thought control.

Dahl: "leaders also shape preferences"

The most effective form of power is preventing conflict.

The 2D view seems to believe that an absence of grievances points to an absence of contrary interests.

It is not quite clear what a grievance actually is.

It is possible to shape thoughts and preferences to make the status quo appear natural, beneficial, unalterable, or without alternative.

There may be latent conflicts between the interests of those making decisions and the "real interests" of the excluded, of which they may or may not be conscious.

1D view: behaviour, decision-making, issues, conflict, interests. participation

2D view: critique of behaviour focus, (non-)decision-making, (potential) issues, (covert) conflicts, interests, grievances

3D view: critique of behaviour focus, decision-making, agenda-setting, (potential) issues, (covert) (latent) conflicts, (real) interests

[5] Power is "ineradicably value-dependent".

How to look at power is always disputed, and this dispute is already politics.

The most basic idea is someone affecting someone else in a significant way.

We thus need to think about what makes a way of affecting significant.

All three views share the idea that "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests."

Parsons connects power to institutionalised authority and consensus and disconnects it from force and coercion.

Parsons: Power is "a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society"

Arendt: Power is a feature of groups, of people's coordinated action. Power is consensual, it is "the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act in terms of the means-ends category."

Madison: "All government rests on opinion."

In both cases, violence, conflicts, and struggles for power are re-defined as not being power at all.

Arendt: "Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent."

Both see power as an ability, not a relationship. Both definitions exclude what is most interesting to students of power.

Everything that Arendt or Parson can express about power, can also be expressed by the 3D view of power.

In my opinion, cases of persons or groups affecting one another without conflict of interests qualify as influence, but not as power.

I am unsure whether rational persuasion counts as power and/or influence. One person significantly affects another, but the resultant behaviour is caused by the autonomous decision of the second person to accept the reasons of the first. This may well be related to the Kantian antinomy of causality and reason.

Is it possible for one person to exercise power over another, thereby advancing the other person's real interest?

We could think of short-term power as self-destroying once the second person recognises their real interests. This can be abused in the form of paternalism.

We could also think of the second person's autonomy as their supreme interest, which means a violation of autonomy can never be in their interest. This will lead to most cases of influence becoming cases of power.

If we can find an empirical way of finding a person's real interests, I prefer the first view.

[6] Interest is also inherently evaluative.

Liberals tend to identify interests with what people actually prefer, as seen by political participation.

Reformists agree, but allow for indirect and concealed preferences.

Radicals believe preferences can result from a system contrary to people's interests. Thus real interests are what people "would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice."

The 1D view is broadly liberal, the 2D view broadly reformist, and the 3D view a broadly radical view.

[7] The pluralists, in their 1D view of power, "studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence".

Their studies mirror the biases of their object of study.

Dahl shows us diversity, different people making decisions regarding different issues.

Dahl: Voters use elections as an indirect kind of influence on politician's decisions.

Dahl: The dissatisfied will find another political representative.

If power can really set the agenda, this diversity is an illusion.

Pluralism in decision-making is consistent with unity in agenda-setting.

The 1D view is unable to recognise this possibility.

Dahl only studies successful interventions by the dissatisfied, and concludes the dissatisfied can intervene.

If a powerful group can not accept an issue, there might be indirect cases of agenda-setting.

The 2D view can show cases of systematic bias, but only in cases where observable grievances are prevented from becoming issues.

B&B's study on poverty and race in Baltimore is superficial, because it focuses on individual decisions and actions.

The real exclusionary forces at play are inaction and institutional inertia.

The 3D view can give a sociological explanation of how demands are prevented from being voiced or from becoming dangerous.

How can we study what does not happen?

Polsby: For any event, there are an infinity of alternative non-events. Which are significant and which are not?

Polsby: We should only accept answers which refer to the desires of community members.

Wolfinger: If we apply an external theory of expected behaviour to such non-events, we can not distinguish between actual exercises of power and errors in the theory. 

These counterarguments claim difficulties to actually be impossibilities.

In everyday understanding, an exercise of power is a conscious, intentional act of individual persons.

I believe we can speak of "exercise of power" even in the case of groups, or if it happens unconsciously.

The operative sense of "exercising power": If two agents are both exercising power, they both affect another person simultaneously, and the person really does change behaviour, this behaviour is overdetermined. Both exercised power, but neither of them individually made a difference.

The effective sense of "exercising power": If there is no other force intervening, one person exercises power over the other, if the other person really does change their behaviour as a result. The exercise of power makes a difference.

A person may change the behaviour of another person in many different ways, with only some of them being what the first person actually wants. Only in such cases is an exercise of power successful.

How can we find an exercise of power?

An exercise of power is conceptually reliant on comparison with the counterfactual situation of what would have happened without the exercise of power.

In observable conflicts, where the alternatives are publicly spelled out, the counterfactual is obvious.

If there is no observable conflict, we need to justify the counterfactual in another way. This will not be easy, but it is not, in principle, impossible.

A good example is Matthew Crenson (1971) The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities. This book operates in between the 2D and the 3D view of power.

Crenson assumes "the proper object of investigation is not political activity but political inactivity." He compares two communities in Indiana, similar geographically, demographically, and pollution-wise.

Crenson shows that the town with a single company and a strong party took 13 years longer to act on air pollution. The company, US Steel, without ever becoming an overtly political actor, at first successfully prevented pollution from becoming an issue, and then influenced the resulting decisions.

The company did nothing, and in verbally agreeing that air pollution was a problem, they even prevented a political conflict from arising.

In comparative studies, Crenson shows that an industry reputation for power, combined with their silence and inaction on the problem, greatly decreases the likelihood of air pollution becoming a political issue.

Clean air is a diffused common good, with no direct benificient. However, the costs of maintaining clean air mostly fall on industry. There is thus only weak and diffuse support, but strong opposition.

Crenson further shows that issues do not arise independently, but are connected: If one collective issue arises, other collective issues are much more likely to also arise.

Decision-making is directed by prior non-decision-making.

The Crenson study basically takes a 2D approach.

It surpasses B&B's 2D view by looking at inaction, by looking at institutional power, and by looking on how raising an issue can be prevented.

Crenson: "there is something like an inarticulate ideology in political institutions [... promoting] the selective perception and articulation of social problems and conflicts"

If agenda-setting is successful, the political public is prevented from even hearing minority opinions, which thus remain minority opinions.

Crenson succeeds in presenting the counterfactual: We can assume that people would rather not be poisoned by the air they breathe, even if they do not publicly state so.

Crenson also shows how the inaction of institutions prevents the matter from becoming a political issue.

[8] Identifying the right counterfactual is a problem specific to the 3D view. 

The 3D view also needs to show how power is exercised in such cases of inaction.

It seems hard to decide whether an injustice is accepted due to an exercise of power or whether it actually reflects a consensus based on a different value system than ours.

But in some cases, we can find evidence for a consensus being the result of power silencing dissent.

Gramsci notes that sometimes the words and effective actions of a person do not fit.

Gramsci: If the masses show such a mismatch between words and actions, this is the expression of a social contrast. The masses see the world one way, and sometimes, in special circumstances, act accordingly. But the masses also see the world another way, the way of their oppressors, and they talk and normally act according to this other way.

One can learn from how people behave in abnormal situations, where the apparatus of power is less strict.

Gramsci: The church is constantly influencing its adherents. If this connection is interrupted, e.g. during the French Revolution, the church loses its influence.

When, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the apparatus of power was relaxed the people acted quite differently than before.

The reaction of people to perceived opportunities of advancement in hierarchies can also tell us a lot.

Some people consider the Indian caste system to be consensually accepted, even by the lower castes.

Srinivas: While it is theoretically forbidden for a lower caste to emulate Brahmins, this has happened frequently. If a lower caste succeeds in adopting a vegetarian diet and Sanskritizing its rituals, it can change its position in the hierarchy. 

If a caste is economically successful, it often tends to do this, in order to increase its status.

If there is a possibility to rise in the caste system, it is often taken.

In theory, the positions of the castes in the hierarchy are unchangeable. But in effective action, castes attempt to change their position.

The introduction of universal suffrage changed the acceptance of the caste hierarchy by the lower castes.

The lowest caste, the Untouchables, have often used conversion to other religions as a way to escape the caste system.

This evidence is always, by its very nature, indirect and thus non-conclusive. But using such evidence, exercises of power, and the counterfactuals needed, may be identified.

According to the 3D view, an exercise of power can be a case of inaction, it can be unconscious, and it can be exercised by groups. All of these present problems for the 3D view in identifying such exercises of power.

If inaction leads to a potential issue not arising, this is a double non-event. But a non-event may still leave traces. Those who refrain from acting may still have considered acting and its consequences.

In a Freudian fashion, people may be unconscious as to their motives for action. This is not specific to power analysis, and it is a widely discussed problem.

Alternatively, people may be unconscious of the perception and interpretation of their actions by others. This, however, does not obscure identification of an exercise of power.  

Still alternatively, people may be unconscious of the results of their actions. This is the real problem for analysis of power.

If people are unable to know what the results of their actions on others will be, it seems wrong to classify these as exercises of power.

However, if people do not know the effects of their actions because they did not try to find out, these might well be exercises of power.

If people could have taken steps to learn about the effects of their actions, but did not, and are thus ignorant about the effects of their actions, they might well exercise power.

It seems also quite hard to determine whether an institution is exercising power or whether observed effects are due to structural determination.

In Marxism, this is the fight between voluntarism and determinism.

For Althusser and Balibar the capitalist totality and its structure determines its elements.

Poulantzas: Miliband sees class, the state, etc not as objective structures, but as reducible to interpersonal relations. He is looking at subjects as social actors, he is, in the end, simply doing sociology.

Miliband: Poulantzas sees the structure as so strict, individual persons, even heads of state, are doing nothing but executing what is already determined by the system. He is thus unable to understand the dialectical relation between the state and "the system".

There are other possibilities besides structural determinism and methodological individualism.

Social research has to look at the relations between individual actors and structures.

Individuals act as part of groups, and not just due to their individual motivations.

Individuals act within the limits of structures, but they have at least some autonomy, they can at least somewhat act differently from how they actually do.

"The future, though it is not entirely open, is not entirely closed either (and, indeed, the degree of its openness is itself structurally determined)."

A system that is totally determined by structural relations is a system without power.

One could redefine power alternatively, as Poulantzas did.

Poulantzas: Power is "the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests"

Power then becomes an effect of structure on the practice of class struggle.

I believe this to be misleading.

If we call something an exercise of power, we believe the person exercising power could have acted differently, or the group could have organised differently and thus acted differently.

Saying something is an exercise of power is also saying the person/group exercising it is at least partially responsible.

Responsibility is the result of the action or inaction of a person or group.

This is not the place to discuss the boundaries between structural determination and exercises of power.

C.W. Mills: Sociological fate refers to events that can not be controlled by an identifiable group with the power to decide and able to predict the consequences of their decisions.

Those who can change the world to the benefit of (large parts of) society, but do not, exercise power and can be held accountable for their (in)actions.

[9] The 1D view of power reproduces the bias of the system it studies.

The 2D view of power can critically reflect this bias, but it sees it too narrowly.

The 3D view of power understands that latent conflicts can be suppressed. It has a number of serious difficulties, but it can overcome them.

We can understand power in a deeper way.

[txteo]

Martin King (1963) I have a dream - Summary

Summary: While slavery has been abolished, segregation and discrimination still persist, damaging black lives. Black people are very angry, and rightly so: The constitution and the Declaration of Independence gave us rights to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness", and we are here to claim these rights. Justice is for everybody, and we need to achieve racial justice now. If we ignore this, it will blow up, we might see revolts. "There will be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights." But we need to be disciplined, we need to be creative, we may not be violent. We need to realise that a lot of white people are here today, a lot of white people know their freedom and our freedom are connected. The status quo can change, and it will change. I have a dream, which is based on the American dream. A country of equality, of brotherhood, of universal freedom and justice, where people will "not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character." In my dream, everything that is wrong is right, and we all see god's greatness together. With this dream, our nation can be united. And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true. All humans, whatever their race or religion, can come together and sing together: "Free at last! Free at last! thank God Almighty, we are free at last!"

Source: Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963) I have a dream. Speech given at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, on August 28, 1963 at the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, Washington D.C.

(Full text at bbc.co.uk, English)

[Personal note: Reading MLK in summary is not a good idea. Read the full text to enjoy a master of rhetoric, among the very best in all of history.]

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

This is the "greatest demonstration for freedom in the history of our nation".

The Emancipation Proclamation was signed in 1863.

We ended slavery, which for black people was the best!

But in 1963, black people are still not free.

Segregation and discrimination persist, they damage black lives.

Black people are generally poor, in a very rich country.

Black people are not accepted and respected in American society.

These are the problems of someone in exile, but these are American ctizens.

The constitution and the Declaration of Independence gave us rights to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness", and we are here to claim these rights.

The justice system has failed to guarantee these rights.

We demand that our rights, our security, our freedom, are recognised.

This is an urgent problem. We can not do this slowly, step by step.

We need to achieve racial justice now. We need to become brothers [and sisters]. Justice is for everybody.

Black people are very angry and they should be. 

And this is just the beginning. If we ignore this, it will blow up, we might see revolts.

"There will be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights."

But I have also an important message for black people.

We need to be disciplined, we need to be creative, but we may not be violent.

We can counter "physical force with soul force".

We should not distrust white people by default.

A lot of white people know that we have a shared future.

They know that their freedom and our freedom are connected.

A lot of white people are here today.

We may never retreat from our positions, ever move forward.

Black people suffer from police brutiality, discrimination, segregation, voter suppression and a white political elite. 

Black children develop in an environment that damages their identity and dignity. 

As long as these problems persist, we can not be satisfied.

Many of us here are active in the struggle.

Some of us here have been in jail, beaten by police.

We have suffered creatively.

But suffering without desert is redemptive.

The status quo can change, and it will change.

We need to go back to our struggles, we need to go back to the Deep South, to the slums, and continue our work. 

Everything really is very difficult, but we should not despair.

I have a dream.

It is based on the American dream.

In my dream, America will be a country of equality, of brotherhood, of universal freedom and justice.

In my dream people will "not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character."

In my dream, children will grow up in racial harmony.

In the Deep South all this is hardly thinkable at the moment.

In my dream, everything that is wrong is right, and we all see god's greatness together.

I will return to the south with this dream, with this hope I find in my despair.

With this dream, our nation can be united.

With this dream, we know "that we will be free one day".

And knowing this, we can fight our struggles for freedom together, and go together to jail, if we must.

"My country, 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing. Land where my fathers died, land of the pilgrim's pride, from every mountainside, let freedom ring." And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true. 

This song will have a wholly new meaning.

Let freedom ring from everywhere.

All humans, whatever their race or religion, can come together and sing together.

"Free at last! Free at last! thank God Almighty, we are free at last!"

[txteo]

Raymond Geuss (1981) Ideology - Summary

Summary: Ideology is a term used to answer very different questions, and accordingly has many meanings. In a descriptive sense, ideology is one part of the socio-cultural sphere of any group, it is distinct from the economy and the group's social structure. Ideology usually includes the rituals, art, values, desires, attitudes, and dispositions share within the group, or by some members of the group. In this sense, having an ideology is just a statement of fact, it is not a normative evaluation. Discursive elements of ideology are beliefs, ideas, concepts, and the like. Non-discursive elements of ideology are attitudes, certain activities, rituals, and the like. One may further classify ideological phenomena as implicit/explicit or sophisticated/unsophisticated. In christianity, baptism or the eucharist are clearly rituals, not beliefs, they are non-discursive. These rituals are highly formalised, backed by an explicit theological system of beliefs, and their performances are very similar, even at very different times and at very different locations. However, there may be a number of additional habits, beliefs, and attitudes associated with these rituals, which may vary widely in explicitness and sophistication and how common they are. Habermas sees ideologies as sets of beliefs, and distinguishes their "manifest content", what they are about, from their "functional properties", how they influence actions. In some cases, the differences or relations between the manifest content and the functional properties of an ideology will be illuminating. Some authors speak about "the" ideology of a group. For Plamenatz, this means all normative beliefs; for Cohen, only beliefs which do not directly further material production. Ideologies understood as worldviews are the widely-shared set of beliefs of a group, which connect to form a system, concerning the central issues in life, which are strongly-held by and important to the group members, and thus have wide influence on their behaviour. According to Daniel Bell, an ideology is "a way of translating ideas into action". I will call an ideology in the programmatic sense a plan for action, which is based on a model of society.  In a pejorative sense, ideology is used to criticise a society or groups in a society. In this view, those who have an ideology are deluded, they have a "false consciousness", and they may even act against their own interests. How can a set of beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, that is a form of consciousness, be ideologically false in this sense? A form of consciousness may be false epistemically, if it contains value beliefs which are mistaken for descriptions, or if self-fulfilling beliefs are mistaken for ordinary beliefs. People may falsely belief some social phenomenon to be a natural phenomenon, or confuse some particular interests with the general interest. In all these ways, the epistemic status of the belief is misidentified, the form of consciousness is ideologically false. A form of consciousness may be false functionally, if it furthers domination, especially "surplus domination", that is domination beyond any social or historical necessity (if one believes in such necessity). A form of consciousness may form a barrier to the development of productive forces, or it may mask important social contradictions. In all these ways, the function of the beliefs are criticised, the form of consciousness is judged to be ideological. A form of consciousness may finally be judged false by virtue of their genesis or origin. But why should the origin of a form of consciousness be a reason for its rejection? One would suspect a specific history to warrant suspicion, but not directly give reason for rejection. But the Frankfurt School emphasis on psychoanalysis might lead one to understand ideologies as "collective rationalisations", held for reasons their holders can not admit. In this sense, we can understand ideology as a form of consciousness which necessitates ignorance of the reasons (and perhaps the origin) for believing it. Using ideology in the pejorative sense will thus be a criticism of a form of consciousness, criticised for containing false beliefs, for the way it functions, or for its origin. A criticism of a form of consciousness as ideological may rely on one of these dimensions, or on several of them. The Frankfurt School, for example, often tries to look at the way in which the truth or falsehood of a belief is connected to its function, its history, and its origin. In a positive sense, ideology is understood as the world-view best fitting a a group or society. A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live, it thus aids the human need for identity, meaning, and participation in a culture. The socio-cultural structure of a society may thus satisfy or frustrate a number of human needs. Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology. Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation. An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests. Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class.

Source: Raymond Geuss (1981) Ideology. Chapter 1 in Geuss (1981) The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

(Full text at autodidactproject.org, English)

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

Ideology is a term with many meanings.

Part of the reason is that ideology has been used to answer very different questions.

In the following, I want to identify three different ways of how ideology is used.

The first use came about in the empirical study of human groups.

Such a group will feature some socio-cultural phenomena, like technology, values, institutions, beliefs, traditions, and so on.

For any group, we can describe these phenomena and their changes over time.

We can also look at phenomena that are universal among different groups, or look at which phenomena do appear together.

We can then try to classify human cultures.

The socio-cultural sphere can be subdivided further.

Vulgar marxism differentiates between economic base and ideological superstructure.

20th century anthropologists often differentiate between technology/economy, the social structure, and ideology.

In this sense, ideology is a part of the socio-cultural system of a group.

It usually includes the rituals, art, values, desires, attitudes, and dispositions of the group.

In this descriptive sense, all groups have an ideology.

Ideology, so understood, will also include beliefs, attitudes, and the like, that are shared by only some members of the group, but not by others.

There is always some conflict, variety, and diversity in human groups.

In this sense, having an ideology is just a statement of fact, it is not a normative evaluation.

Such a descriptive ideology can further be divided into discursive and non-discursive elements.

Discursive elements of ideology are beliefs, ideas, concepts, and the like.

Non-discursive elements of ideology are attitudes, certain activities, rituals, and the like.

Whereas discursive elements can be exobviously plicit or implicit, it is harder to imagine implicit non-discursive elements. However, it might be possible for, e.g. attitudes to be implicit, in some cases.

Neither the discursive/non-discursive nor implicit/explicit distinction are the same as Plamenatz's sphisticasted/unsophisticated distinction.

In christianity, baptism or the eucharist are clearly rituals, not beliefs, they are non-discursive. These rituals are highly formalised, their performances are very similar, even at very different times and at very different locations.

However, the beliefs and attitudes associated with them may vary widely.

Thus, besides the sophisticated, explicit theological system of beliefs, there might be a number of habits, attitudes, and beliefs associated with the ritual, which vary in explicitness and sophistication.

There are many different ways of further subdividing ideology in the descriptive sense.

One might only call the discursive elements an "ideology", to keep the connection between "idea" and "ideology".

Habermas, breaking with earlier Frankfurt School tradition, uses ideology primarily for beliefs held by social agents.

For him, ideologies (as sets of beliefs) may be classified by what they are about, their "manifest content". We will thus find religious and economic ideologies by looking at whether the beliefs feature economic or religious concepts.

Ideologies (as sets of beliefs) can also be classified by how they influence actions, their "functional properties". We will thus find religious and economic ideologies by looking at whether the beliefs influence economic or religious practices.

Often ideologies which are about some matter also influence behaviour regarding that matter.

Furthermore, religious behaviour may at the same time be economic behaviour, or vice versa.

There might be further differences between an internal and an external evaluation of behaviours or concepts.

While there will often be a connection, we should keep the two senses separate. In some cases, the differences between the manifest content and the functional properties of an ideology will be illuminating.

In this narrower Habermasian sense, groups may have multiple different ideologies at the same time. Also, groups lacking certain phenomena will likely lack ideologies regarding these phenomena.

Sometimes, authors speak about "the" ideology of a group.

For Cohen, this means beliefs which do not directly further material production.

For Plamenatz, this means all normative beliefs.

For Marx, in Deutsche Ideologie, this means beliefs the group's members have about themselves as agents.

Often, ideology is just meant to be synonymous with world-view.

The beliefs held by a group are usually coherent in some way.

Ideologies understood as worldviews are thus the set of beliefs which are widely shared among the group, which connect to form a system, which concern the central issues in life, which are strongly-held by and important to the group members, and thus have wide influence on their behaviour.

These criteria are very loose, and there is no way of weighting them against each other.

Which method one uses to determine groups, and how strictly the criteria are applied will determine whether every group has an ideology as world-view.

According to Daniel Bell, an ideology is "a way of translating ideas into action".

A total ideology, in this sense, is a plan for action, which is based on a model of society, which wants to radically transform the whole society, and is held with a confidence exceeding the available evidence.

The last part about the evidence makes this definition pejorative.

The part about the transformation allows for liberals to deny their having an ideology.

An ideology in the programmatic sense is thus a plan for action, which is based on a model of society.

Ideology is also used in criticism of a society or groups in a society.

Some persons or groups are "deluded" about the nature of their society, their position in this society, or their own interests.

This research program may want to enlighten the deluded, or it may just want to understand the forces causing this delusion.

Such delusions may cause people to act against their own self-interest.

Ideology, in this sense is used negatively, critically, pejoratively.

Ideology is delusion or "false consciousness".

How can a set of beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, that is a form of consciousness, be ideologically false?

The answers given to this question usually single either epistemic, functional, or genetic properties of the form of consciousness.

[I] A form of consciousness may be false epistemically. This may be the case if its beliefs lack support from empirical evidence, or if descriptive beliefs are taken to be normative beliefs, or vice versa.

[1] Early positivism held only empirically verifiable claims were meaningful claims. Granted this view, all of theology is meaningless. Thus forms of consciousness based on theology believing in the possibility of meaningfully discussing theological questions are mistaken in the epistemic status of their claims, they are ideologically false.

Religious beliefs not claiming to be meaningful knowledge are not mistaken about the epistemic status of their claims, they are thus not ideology in this sense.

One need not rely on positivism and verificationism, instead one may believe in a deep epistemic rift between evaluation and description. Then, those confusing a descriptive claim for a value claim, or vice versa, may be suffering from ideology.

[2] People may falsely belief some social phenomena to be natural phenomena. People may even perceive their own actions as being a natural process.

[3] People may further confuse some particular interests with the general interest.

[4] Some beliefs are self-fulfilling or self-validating. Beliefs that are self-fulfilling may falsely be understood to be ordinary beliefs. The form of consciousness relying on such a mistaken epistemic status is ideologically false.

[II] Forms of consciousness may be judged ideological for their functional properties.

[1] Habermas sees Ideology as a "world-picture" legitimising domination. Forms of consciousness can be ideologies if they justify unjust social relations and practices.

Beliefs that justify domination also support or stabilise domination. But not all beliefs supporting or stabilising domination also justify it.

Stabilising can mean "contributing to stability" or alternatively "successfully establishing stability".

None of these mean the same as ideology being a "socially necessary illusion".

When Habermas uses "Herrschaft" (domination), we need to distinguish this further.

[A] Domination means forcibly frustrating human preferences. But given that some preferences need to be legitimately frustrated, a form of consciousness supporting domination in this sense may be an ideology, but not in a critical sense.

[B] Domination takes place within the context of a social or political order. It is a normative form of repression, in that it claims at least some legitimacy. If domination is actually legitimate, there is no reason to criticise it.

[C] Domination is domination of someone over someone else, it is a relation of inequality. Egalitarian societies might be very repressive, but they are not societies of domination. But some form of inequality may also be legitimate, so supporting inequality as such is not a reason to reject a form of consciousness.

Marxism believes in historically necessary forms of inequality. It also believes that legitimacy is always dependent on actual historical context. Thus it might be futile to reject forms of consciousness because they support historically necessary forms of domination.

[D] Habermas calls repression beyond social necessity, which is needed for the reproduction of society, "surplus repression". We can thus slightly alter the definition in (c) and call "surplus domination" domination beyond social or historical necessity.

Ideology, in this sense, could then be a form of consciousness supporting, stabilising, or legitimising surplus domination.

Perhaps there is surplus domination that is legitimate for some reason.

[2] A reading of Marx suggests an interpretation of ideology as a form of consciousness that forms a barrier to the development of the productive forces of a society. There is an obvious connection to "surplus repression".

The only motivation to impose surplus repression in such a situation would be to privilege some over others, leading to "surplus domination".

[3] Ideology may be a form of consciousness that masks social contradictions. Such masking need not necessarily include any false beliefs.

If one supposes the primary social contradiction to be the one between productive forces and relations of production, this definition becomes very similar to the one in (2).

Ideologies in the functional sense can be rejected for their being delusions, or for their being false.

The non-discursive elements of ideologies may be hard to classify as true or false.

Ideologies may be rejected for other reasons than being false, for example for their immorality or uglyness.

An ideology is a delusion in that in some way my ignorance is a pre-requisite for holding it.

[III] Forms of consciousness may also be ideologies by virtue of their genesis or origin.

Runciman claims Engels believed ideologies to result from specific social situations and thus have a specific relation to the interests of those who hold them.

Mannheim held that ideologies express class positions.

The Frankfurt School might understand ideologies as "collective rationalisations", held for reasons their holders can not admit.

Why should the origin of a form of consciousness be a reason for its rejection?

A specific history may warrant suspicion, but not directly give reason for rejection.

If ideologies reflect class positions, some ideologies may be appropriate for some class but not for another. This is different from falsehood. Also, while we may reject such an ideology because it is inappropriate for us, this is not a genetic property.

By knowing the genesis of something, we have not learned anything about truth and falsity.

The psychoanalytic sense, beliefs that one (or a group) can not admit, is also not yet direct reason for rejecting something. One may act correctly or belief the right thing, but for the wrong reasons.

However, we can understand the "can" of "can not admit" in a stronger sense. Some beliefs may be held for reasons, which once admitted, lead to the belief being abandoned.

This notion is not very clear and needs to be further elucidated.

But, in this sense, we can understand ideology as a form of consciousness which necessitates ignorance of the reasons for believing it.

Using ideology in this pejorative sense will thus be a criticism of a form of consciousness. It will be criticised for containing false beliefs, for the way it functions, or for its origin.

We need to analyse criticisms of a form of consciousness in which of these three dimensions serves to ground the critique, or in which proportion these three dimensions are employed.

The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School tries to look at the way in which the truth or falsehood is connected to its function, its history, and its origin.

To be part of and participating in a culture is connected to the human need for identity and a meaningful life.

A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live.

The socio-cultural structure of a society may satisfy or frustrate a number of other human needs.

We can thus search for the most fitting ideology for a group, which ideology will serve them best in furthering their interest and satisfying their needs.

We can thus speak of an ideology in a positive sense.

Whereas ideologies in the descriptive or pejorative sense are the result of investigation and analysis, ideology in the positive sense is of the future, it still needs to be constructed.

Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology.

Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation.

An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests.

But one might have to restrict some interests or desires that are harmful, or disallow blatant falsehoods. Without such restrictions the distinction between the pejorative and the positive sense becomes unclear.

Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class. The bourgeoisie might profit from holding a form of false consciousness, as their objective prospects for the future are hopeless.

Historically, oppression has been linked with satisfaction of self-interest, identity, and false consciousness. Perjorative ideologies have utilised human needs and aspirations to bring them to accept the repressive ideological form of consciousness.

In reality, the interests, needs, and desires of people are not really fixed, and they are hard to isolate.

A newly created ideology may influence needs and desires, or it may be a reaction to changing needs and desires. Inversely, it might lead to needs and desires being rejected or repressed.

Christianity, for example, both furthered and led to the repression of certain pre-existing needs and desires.

We are probably unable to imagine an abstract or normal person in a particular society at a particular time, and then look in how far different ideologies can satisfy the person's needs and desires.

[txteo]

Isaiah Berlin (1958) Two concepts of Liberty - Summary

Summary: Negative liberty demands a private sphere around the individual in which nobody may interfere, in which one is free. There must be some limit to freedom, to protect our other goals, which might be very important, but some sphere may never be violated. The extent of this is the great political problem of modernity. Positive liberty demands self-government, being a cause, not an effect. Proponents often distinguish between a real, true, rational self and lower urges and desires. Some even identify the true self with external phenomena, like race, state, or humanity. But the common idea is that some people do not know their true goals, and we can (and should) force them to be free. A related idea is isolation and autarky, negating desires that can not be realised. But ultimately this is the principle of sour grapes: I do not want what I can not have. Asceticism may increase integrity, serenity, or spirituality, but not liberty. In rationalist metaphysics, freedom is understanding of what is necessary and what is not. Marxism, for example, identified the market, property, and classes as human products, and thus contingent. Rational self-direction is the one true purpose of all humans. The purposes of all rational beings perfectly fit into one universal pattern, and conflict is thus a sign of irrationality at odds with reason. Once all are rational, all will follow the same rational laws and be thereby free. This belief in the harmonious cosmos gives license to force the irrational to be free, for "No one has ... rights against reason" (Fichte). Freedom becomes despotism. A related idea is lack of recognition: Humans want to participate in determinining their lives, and identification with one's rulers is a way to do this. Rousseau believe freedom to be the universal sharing of public power, but liberalism sees the idea of "absolute sovereignty" as inherently tyrannical. Rights should be absolute, but power should not. This is the essence of pluralism: Human values are multitude, they conflict and rival one another. In this, freedom of choice becomes an end it itself.

Source: Isaiah Berlin (1958) Two concepts of Liberty. Held as the Inaugural lecture of the Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory, Oxford. 31 October 1958. Published in Berlin (1969) Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969.

(Full text [PDF, 2MB] at colorado.edu, English)

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

Social and political theory are based on disagreement as to the ends of life.

Political questions are about ends, questions of means are technical.

Marx and Engels, and others believing in radical world-transformation, believe at the point of transformation moral and political problems will turn into technical problems.

Those who believe such perfect social harmony to be unlikely call these ideas utopian.

Many philosophers in Anglo-American universities are focused on the fundamental problems of politics.

Social and political doctrines influence the lives of more people than ever before.

Ideas can take power over people; if they are not criticised early enough they can grow to become resistant to criticism.

Heine said: "philosophical concepts ... could destroy a civilisation", Kant killed deism, Rosseau (via Robbespiere) the ancient regime; Fichte and Schelling would be used to damage western liberalism. [possibly "Heine - Die romantische Schule"]

Philosophers do not seem to know this, and they do not seem politics worthy of their attention.

To exclude politics from philosophical criticism, because it does not fit its strict methods, is to give political ideas undue power.

Only vulgar historical materialism believes ideas have no power, or that ideas are simply material interests.

But social forces and political ideas depend on one another, each is powerless without the other.

Political theory belongs to moral philosophy.

Understanding historical political conflicts as more than natural events requires an understanding of the ideas involved.

Political ideas can not be understood without the context in which they are used.

The central question of politics is that of the limits of obedience and coercion.

Two systems of ideas fight an open war over the answer to this question; it is the greatest issue of the contemporary world.

[I - Negative Freedom] Everyone likes and praises freedom, and it has more than 200 meanings.

I will look at the two central meanings of "freedom".

Negative liberty answers the question "What is the area within which the subject ... is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?"

Positive liberty answers the question "What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?"

One is free, or one has political liberty, if one's activities are not interfered with.

This does not apply to inability in general - not being able to fly or not being able to understand complicated texts is not coercion.

Being coerced or unfree in the political sense implies other human beings which hinder one.

Talking about poverty as being deprived of economic freedom implies a background theory of human actions being the cause of this situation.

Hobbes: "A free man is he that ... is not hindered to do what he has a will to."

The classical English political philosophers believed there must be some limit to freedom in social contexts as not to interfere with other's freedom, and to protect "other goals, such as justice, happiness, or culture, or security, or varying degrees of equality".

Thus the law must limit freedom, but there also must be a sphere of personal freedom that may never be violated.

It is a source of constant discussion, where this sphere of personal freedom is to be located and what its outer limits are.

For the hungry, the ill, and the destitute, food, medicine, and education might be more important than freedom from government intervention.

But they still need some minimum of freedom, and once they have fulfiled their more basic needs, they will need freedom as described.

Individual liberty is an ultimate goal for humans in general, so everyone should have it; and noone should be free because others are unfree.

Equality of liberty, that is universal justice, is the basis of liberal morality.

It might be right to sacrifice freedom for another goal, like justice, equality, or loving others; but sacrificing freedom in this way is not gaining freedom, it means a loss in freedom.

"Liberty is liberty, not equality, or fairness, or justice, or culture, or human happiness, or a quiet conscience."

What principle should govern the limits of freedom?

Optimists, like Locke, Smith, Mills on the one hand, and conservatives and reactionaries, like Hobbes, agree that, to prevent despotism, there must be some personal sphere outside of social control.

The optimists believe that sphere should be larger, the conservatives it should be more restricted.

Constant, Jefferson, Burke, Pain, Mill all listed individual liberties that may not be limited.

In all these cases liberty means always liberty from something, or non-interference.

Mill: "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way"

For liberalists the function of the state and the law was to prevent conflicts of the kind, which limits individual freedom.

Mill believes without protection of individual liberty, there will be no genius, and no advancement.

Forcing others to do what you believe is good for them is disrespecting them as human, as beings with their own lives.

Mill wrongly conflates negative freedom or non-interference, with a type of human character, "critical, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity".

But empirical evidence shows that severely disciplined or millitary communities also display integrity, genius, and a search for truth.

Individual liberty is a modern idea; the Romans, Greeks, Jewish, Chinese and other ancient civilisations did not know it.

Privacy, that there is such a sacred personal sphere, is also a product of Rennaissance and Reformation.

The decline of privacy "would mark the death of a civilisation, of an entire moral outlook".

Liberty in the negative sense of non-interference is compatible with monarchy (think Frederick the Great of Prussia) as much as with democracy.

[Long footnote:] The degree of freedom depends on (a) the number of options I have open, (b) how easy or hard it is to act upon them, (c) the importance of these actions for my goals and life plans, (d) how much the actions of others restrict or open these options, (e) the value of these options in the estimation of the individual and of society as a whole.

Once we stop asking "What am I free to do or be?", and start asking "Who is to say what I am and what I am not, to be or do?" we move over to the realm of positive liberty.

Desiring self-government and autonomy is not the same thing as desire for privacy and non-interference.

These two questions have come head to head in "the great clash of ideologies that dominates our world".

Positive liberty is "not freedom from, but freedom to - to lead one prescribed form of life".

For proponents of negative liberty it looks like tyranny.

[II - The notion of Positive Freedom] People want to control their own lives, they want to be self-directed, they want to be cause not effect.

Responsibility for one's choices is a form of freedom, and it seems it is not that far removed from "negative freedom".

But these two concepts of freedom developed historically in different ways, and are now opposed.

Platonists and Hegelians ask whether one driven by passions and natural urges may not also be called unfree.

They distinguish the self from itself, and elevate a rational, higher self over our base irrational impulsive nature.

The higher, real self may also be understood as a social phenomenon, "a tribe, a race, a Church, a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn".

The underlying idea is that some people are too ignorant to understand their real, true goals, and that they thereby are unfree.

If I know how others would act if they were enlightened or freed from their irrationality, I am justified to force them towards this, for their own good.

One may even believe that their "true" self desires this, even though their baser nature is mistakenly resisting.

We are now, by reference to their "true" selves, ready to override any wishes actually voiced, and force them.

In this way any move towards the real purpose of humanity, whatever this may be, becomes identical with freedom.

All political ideas of self-realisation are based on this identification of what others would want if they were better versions of themselves.

William James chided the Hegelians for this "sleight of hand".

The same movement is also possible for negative freedom, but historically it is much more prevalent with positive concepts of freedom.

The definition of what a person is has direct implications on what we understand freedom to be.

The wish to become true to one's real self has taken two forms: independence by retreat into the self, and self-realisation, that is the identification with an ideal or principle.

[III - The retreat to the inner citadel] There are many forces I can not control, and some of them will hinder me from reaching my goals.

One option is to limit my goals and desires to those I can realise.

Not desiring property makes one safe from poverty; not desiring movement makes one safe from imprisonment.

Withdrawing into the self, into the "inner citadel", makes one secure from outside forces.

This idea of not caring for outside values and thus being freed from their influence is prominent in the tradition of asceticism, of the Stoics, and of Buddhism.

The attitude forming the basis of the political ideas of autarky and isolationism is very similar.

This is really a quest for security, but it is sometimes seen as a quest for freedom.

Kant understands freedom as control over one's desires; freedom is autonomy.

Rosseau says freedom is obedience to self-imposed laws.

This is contrasted with heteronomy, where I am influenced or even determined by outside forces.

Because natural laws can not be controlled, freedom can exist only beyond causal forces, beyond the empirical world.

These "notions of freedom as resistance to (or escape from) unrealisable desire, and as independence of the sphere of causality" are powerful forces in both political and ethical discourse.

Given that autonomy is the central quality of humans, manipulating them is the worst one can do.

Kant believes paternalism to be "the greatest despotism imaginable".

Helvetius and Bentham, the utilitarians, believed in imposing rewards and punishments in order to make others happier; in other words, they believed in paternalism and the power of heteronomy.

Kant believes that the individual is the highest value; humans are ends in themselves.

To use humans as means for some other end, treating them as objects or instruments, or using conditioning and mind-control, are forms of degradation; it is believing their personal goals are inferior to mine.

Kant understands the individual to transcend natural laws and causality.

But in the liberal humanism following Kant and Rousseau this was a type of "secularised protestant individualism", with god replaced by rationality.

It is an identification of the person with the rational and critical parts of the self; and all talk of "not being in control" is based on this idea.

In indivualist ethics, this also means that only motives count, as they are the only thing I can control.

Historically, this idea became prominent in times when the external world set up new barriers to the individual: the fall of the Greek polis to Alexander, the end of the Roman Republic, 17th century Germany.

Ultimately, the principle that eliminating desire is as good as satisfying it, is that of sour grapes: I do not want what I can not have.

Thus negative liberty can not be (with Mill) "the ability to do what one wishes".

If it were, a dictator could liberate his subjects by brainwashing them, by changing their wishes.

This will make people feel free, but it actually is the opposite of freedom.

Asceticism may increase integrity, serenity, or spirituality, but not liberty.

Defeating an enemy is something different than fleeing, reaching a goal is not the same as renouncing it.

Schopenhauer found the culmination of this view: Only death is total liberation.

Proponents of "negative" freedom believe removing one's goals is inferior to removing the obstacles to one's goals, be it by action, persuasion, or force.

This may very well be unjust or cruel, or otherwise morally problematic, but it is a real increase in individual freedom.

Let us now look at the metaphysical foundations of "positive" freedom.

[IV - Self-realisation] Freedom is, by this school, achieved using critical rationality, the ability of distinguishing between the necessary and the contingent.

In mathematics, the theorems, axioms, and rules - when fully understood - are no longer obstacles, but they become part of the rational self and its workings.

When a musician plays the work of a composer, the score ceases to be a constriction, but becomes part of the activity of playing the music.

From Spinoza to the Hegelians, this is the idea of enlightened rationalism.

What you know to be necessarily so, you can not rationally wish to change.

Myths, be they personal or social, are a form of heteronomy, of being directed by external forces.

18th century scientific determinists believed that the social sciences could be modeled after the natural sciences.

Epicurus said, knowledge liberates by neutralising the fears and desires of irrationality.

Herder, Hegel, and Marx had vitalistic models of social life, and emphasises the role of growth and change, and most of all history.

A failure to understand history and its laws, possibly dialectical conflict, brings about an erroneous, static view of human nature.

Hegel created a new model of institutions, their workings, and their effect on human actions.

Marx introduced the idea that social institutions, which were created in the past to fulfill a particular purpose, have now become obstacles to progress.

These institutions, like supply/demand, property, and classes, always were and still are the product of human thoughts and actions, but they became to be understood as "independent forces, as inescapable as the laws of nature".

Understanding their social, and contingent character was a necessary prerequisite to changing them.

Marx believed understanding to just be appropriate action.

Making plans is imposing rules on oneself, but - as long as they are rational - these are not oppressive or decreasing my freedom.

"To understand why things must be as they must be is to will them to be so", acting otherwise is to be irrational or even insane.

What is necessary, what I understand to be necessary, becomes part of me and my will, just like mathematics above.

This, the notion of freedom as rational self-direction, is the metaphysical basis of rationalism.

[V - The temple of Sarastro] Freedom, understood as rational self-direction, can also be applied to society and social relations.

Rational laws are those that all rational persons would consent to.

What is rational and right for one person must be rational and right for all other rational persons.

There must be a true and rational solution to political problems.

If this is true, a just and rational order is one where each has exactly the freedom fit for a rational being.

Because truth can not be incompatible with truth, there can be no conflict between such freedoms. There will thus be no conflict between rational persons enjoying rational freedom by living under rational law, and not even a wish for domination.

In contemporary practice, not all are rational, and we thus need some oppression of the irrational.

Nature can be shaped to the will of humans.

If freedom is self-mastery, coercion can not be freedom; but if there are rational rules which will make irrational beings develop into rational ones, this is not coercion, but guidance towards self-mastery.

A life that is planned in the true correct rational way, will, for rational beings, be identical with freedom.

Educating children is ordering them to do as they would if they were already rational, and this is how they learn rationality.

In a rational society, the common interest includes the interest of each individual; thus obeying the common interest is freedom.

Locke: "Where there is no law there is no freedom"

Montesquieu & Kant: Liberty is not doing what we want, but doing "what we ought to will".

Our rational selves must fit together perfectly. If they do not fit, that is a sign of irrationality.

Freedom can not be the freedom to do what is wrong or irrational.

Rosseau: "In giving myself to all, I give myself to none"

Kant: Freedom is subjection to the law, as given by ones rational self.

Bentham was perhaps the only one who insisted that laws always impinge on freedom, even if this increases total freedom.

Freedom and law, autonomy and authority, become one.

If everyone were rational, and all laws were rational, noone would break any laws, they would become superfluous.

The anarchists saw this to its logical conclusion.

Any liberalism based on rationalist metaphysics contains this idea.

Education is making people rational, even if they do not understand this yet. They will understand, once they have become rational.

Fichte: "Compulsion is also a kind of education"

You can not truly wish what is irrational, and not truly wish to be irrational, so to prevent you from acting irrationally, and to make you rational is following your wishes, whether you know this or not.

Fichte: "Compulsion is justified by education for future insight"

The more rational part of society must rationalise the less rational part, even if by coercion.

Obeying the rational person is obeying reason, it is thus obeying ourselves.

The dictator may, alternatively, believe to be an inspired artist, shaping humanity into an aesthetic whole.

The gist is always this: "I must do for men (or with them) what they cannot do for themselves"

Fichte: "No one has ... rights against reason" ... "to impose Right on them by force, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has both the insight and the power to do so"

Comte: If there are political truths, just as there are scientific truths, why should we allow freedom of opinion?

The truth liberates, so imposing the truth on others is liberating them.

This Fichtean argument is the direct antipode of the Kantian vision. We have moved from "individual responsibility and individual self-perfection" to an "authoritarian State obedient to the directives of an elite of Platonic guardians".

Kant believed morality was not a matter of knowledge, but of practical use of a "universal human faculty", and freedom is knowledge of why one should act a certain way and not another..

But the doctrine that rational laws can not restrain the freedom of rational beings, laid the groundwork for the "rule of experts".

Disapproval with a rational law is, by definition, irrational.

Kant: "The greatest problem of the human race, to the solution of which it is compelled by nature, is the establishment of a civil society universally administering right according to law. It is only in a society which possesses the greatest liberty ... - and also the most exact determination and guarantee of the limits of [the] liberty [of each individual] in order that it may co-exist with the liberty of others - that the highest purpose of nature, which is the development of all her capacities, can be attained in the case of mankind" (from Universal History)

This sounds very much like orthodox liberalism, but Kant and the rationalists do believe in the supreme rule of "reason" and thus need to limit liberty to what is rational.

"I have never, I must own, understood what 'reason' means in this context"

If freedom turns out to be despotism, and despotism freedom, something must be wrong with the argument.

The argument is this: (a) rational self-direction is the one true purpose of all humans, (b) the purposes of all rational beings perfectly fit into one universal pattern, (c) conflict is a sign of irrationality at odds with reason, (d) once all are rational, all will follow the same rational laws and be thereby free.

From Socrates on, it has been said that virtue is knowledge. Perhaps this is wrong, and perhaps both are independent of freedom.

[VI - The search for status] Another aspect of the problem is the confusion of liberty with equality and fraternity.

Since the 18th century we are looking for what "an individual" really is.

All my actions are affected by others and also affect them, all may benefit and/or harm others.

The boundaries between private and social life are not clearly demarcated.

In identification with a group, I am what others think me to be, belonging to the group and being recognised as such can not be separated. My self-image, my socio-moral identity is dependent on my social network.

"I am not disembodied reason", I am the result of social forces. This is an anti-Kantian idea, seeing oneself in terms of one's social position is heteronomy.

I am materially dependent on the work of and interaction with others.

Lack of recognition , being patronised, taken for granted or even ignored, is a form of degradation.

I want to be understood and recognised as "a responsible agent" by members of the group to which I belong.

Paternalism is wrong as it damages my of self-image as someone who has independent purposes who need to be recognised.

People have purposes and needs as group members, they are parts of social patterns.

Groups also want to be recognised as "an independent source of human activity".

If a group as a whole may be unrecognised; its members will wish for emancipation of their group as their own emancipation depends on it.

One may even prefer being harshly ruled by members of the own group, over ignorant tolerance by those of another group.

This is the source of contemporary peoples in Asia and Africa feeling free under authoritarian rule, and of their preferring it over just and gentle colonial rule.

While this wish for recognition is sometimes calls "social freedom", it is actually more about solidarity, faternity and association, it is a longing for union and integration.

Freedom always and essentially includes some "holding off of something or someone".

Groups are not persons in any literal sense.

The groups one wishes to be recognised by needs some minimum of negative freedom for the recognition to count.

These desires are closely connected to the reasons Mill gives us for liberty: The value of original non-conforming behaviour, of owns own values as such.

An answer of "my own" to the question "Who is to govern?" is what is being sought for, whatever actually is being identified with this "my own".

This is not the same as an understanding of history or society shaping oneself in inescapable ways, as given by Burke or Hegel.

Humans are virtually always willing to sacrifice their negative liberty for one or another of "security, status, prosperity, power, virtue, rewards in the next world, justice, equality, fraternity".

Humans want to believe they are participating in determinining their lives, and if only by the rulers being in some way like oneself, or by the common belief in some set of doctrines.

[VII - Liberty and sovereignty] The French revolution liberated the French as a nation, in the sense of collective self-determination, at the same time as it restricted their individual freedom.

For Rousseau liberty was the universal sharing of public power, irrespective of its intrusion into citizens life.

Mill highlighted the differences between government of the people and universal freedom, with recourse to "the tyranny of the majority" and of "the praviling opinion and feeling".

Constant saw the problem of the reach of authority as far surpassing the problem of who is in authority, for the primary danger for freedom was "accumulation of power" itself, not who yields that power. Even completely equal democracies can oppress individuals, though this oppression might be preferable. But consent to oppression does not lessen such oppression.

Hobbes' sovereign enslaved the subjects for good reasons, but at least he did not call it freedom.

19th century liberals attacked "absolute sovereignty" as inherently tyrannical.

For freedom needs some limits to authority, whatever their source: "natural rights, or the world of God, or natural law, or the demands of utility, or [...] the permanent interests of man".

Democracy is logically independent of negative freedom.

A despotism where the slaves see themselves as free is a despotism that has triumphed.

Positive freedom, participation in government, is a means for attaining negative freedom, individual spheres of non-interference.

Costant, Mill, Tocqueville and other liberals believed a free society to be one, where rights are absolute but power is not, and where the limits to power have become part of the meaning of being human.

There are some limits as to how much can impose upon another: torture, genocide, forced betrayal, punishment without trial exceed these limits and cause moral horror.

It is not the legal form, but the effectiveness of such limits, which is important.

There are two distinct notions of freedom, which both are "among the deepest interests of mankind", but which often are at odds with one another, and which may not be confused: Being an authority oneself, positive freedom, and absolute limits on what authority can do, negative freedom.

[VIII - The One and the Many] The belief in the cosmos as harmony, that there is one "final solution", in which the totality of human values are compatible, is the source of the greatest slaughter. For if there were such a perfect state, free of conflicts, any method to attain it would be justified.

Condorcet believed in "an indissoluble chain" of truth, happiness, and virtue, of liberty, equality, and justice.

We find that individual liberty, political equality, social justice, and the demands of efficient organisation are often in conflict with one another.

The generalisation of this is the understanding that "total human fulfillment is a formal contradiction".

Plato, Hegel, Marx, and other rationalist metaphysicians, see this as the wrongful abdication of reason to empiricism.

If we reject such a priori guarantee of harmony, we have to fall back to empirical observation, which reveals a world full of difficult choices with imperfect solutions.

If conflict, individual and social, will always be a part of human life, freedom of choice becomes an end it itself.

The search for positive freedom is at the heart of "the most powerful and morally just public movements of our time".

But the belief in an ultimate social principle can be shown to be false.

There are many criteria for social action, and individual freedom is just one among them.

We are thus right to restrict freedom for some other values, like justice, happiness, security, and public order, and which these are exactly is dependent on our understanding of what makes a life a fulfilled one.

Burke was always arguing for balance, reconciliation, and compensation; Mill wanted "experiments in living"; these are based on the realisation that there is no one true answer.

Kant: "Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made."

Monism of principle or criterion is satisfactory to both intellect and emotions, but to raise our ideals over actual human lives is acting against science and against history.

Pluralism is realising that human values conflict and rival one another, it is to recognise humans as free agents, it respects their choices among such ultimate valies as part of their identity as humans.

Bentham: "Individual interests are the only real interests..."

Perhaps the ideas of negative freedom, pluralism of values, and of choice are historical products of capitalism, but this does not negate their values.

Schumpeter asks us to "realise the relative validity of one's convictions", but nonetheless "stand for them unflinchingly".

Perhaps we will always wish for more than this, but this wish may not determine our practice.

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Hillary Clinton (2016) I'll look for common ground - Summary

Summary: With a new president, things will change. Do we want a more inclusive economy, or one with more inequality? Do we want to keep America safe, or abandon our allies and befriend our enemies? Do we want an America that is strong and fair, or one that is fearful? We will invest in infrastructure, manufacturing, and renewable energy, and lessen regulation, to create more jobs with good wages. We will make rich corporations and individuals pay higher taxes. We will reform immigration and secure the border. We will remove the influence of secret money in politics. We will pass comprehensive criminal justice reform. Donald Trump's campaign was built on fear and dividing the nation. Do we want an America that is divided and further drifting apart? Or one that is stronger together? I want to be a president for everyone.

Source: Hillary Clinton (2016) I'll look for common ground. Op-ed for USA Today, November 7, 2016.

(Full text at usatoday.com, English) 

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

With a new president, things will change.

What kind of change do we want?

Do we want a more inclusive economy, or one with more inequality?

Do we want to keep America safe, or abandon our allies and befriend our enemies?

Do we want an America that is strong and fair, or one that is fearful?

All my working life, I have been listening and looking for common ground.

We will invest in infrastructure, manufacturing, and renewable energy, to create more jobs.

We will reduce regulation to make entrepreneurship easier, for even more jobs. 

We will make rich corporations and individuals pay higher taxes.

In my presidency, we will create good jobs with good wages.

We will reform immigration. I will work with Republicans to secure the border, and gives illegal immigrants a "path to citizenship".

We will remove the influence of secret money in politics. We will change the law to neutralise the Citizen United ruling.

Citizen have a right to vote which needs to be protected. 

We will pass comprehensive criminal justice reform.  Everyone needs to respect the law, but the law also needs to respect everyone.

We will do much more, and we will do it together.

I want to be a president for everyone.

Donald Trump's campaign was built on fear and dividing the nation. 

We know who Donald Trump is. Who do we want to be?

This is an election not just about politicians, but also about issues.

Do we want an America that is stronger together? Or one that is divided and further drifting apart.

I love America and I believe in its people.

If we work together, we can do anything.

[txteo]

Donald Trump (2016) We must clean up this corruption - Summary

Summary: Under the banner of "Make America Great Again", I have traveled the country, met a great number of Americans, and heard about their dreams and problems. Politicians are out for themselves and for special interests, they are not held accountable. We need to make a clear cut with the past to fix our problems and enable a future for all. We need to end corruption in government. We need to cut taxes, lessen regulation, renegotiate trade deals, stop offshoring jobs, and instead create millions of new jobs with good wages. We need to replace Obamacare and allow for school choice. We need to bring back the rule of lawn and secure the border. Every American child will grow up in peace and safety. Vote for me. I will "be your champion in the White House." Let us, together, defeat the special interests.

Source: Donald Trump (2016) We must clean up this corruption. Op-ed for USA Today, November 7, 2016.

(Full text at usatoday.com, English) 

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

I have traveled the country, met a great number of Americans, and heard their dreams.

We came together in the belief that it is possible to make America great again.

Obamacare needs to be immediately replaced. It has many problems.

We need to renegotiate our trade deals. We have lost wealth and gained unemployment.

We need school choice. Schools are failing children.

We need to end corruption in government. Politicians are out for themselves and for special interests, they are not held accountable.

Hillary Clinton was investigated by the FBI. If she were elected, the president would be under criminal investigation.

We have many problems which we need to fix. We can not accept any more corruption and criminal investigation.

We need to make a clear cut with the past to enable a future for all.

I have published an action plan called "Contract with the American Voter".

I will create 25 million new jobs with good wages.

I will cut taxes for the middle-class by 35%.

I will lessen regulation.

I will replace Obamacare to give you real choices, lower costs, and better service.

I will end our jobs moving abroad.

I will secure the border to end illegal immigration and terrorist infiltration.

Hillary Clinton wants open borders, amnesty for illegals, and she wants to bring a great number of Syrians into the country.

I will bring back rule of law. The new Supreme Court will help me.

Every American child will grow up in peace and safety.

We will revitalise the inner cities of America.

Vote for me. I will be "your champion in the White House."

Let us, together defeat the special interests.

We will make America great again.

[txteo]

Huntington et al (1975) Current Pessimism about Democracy [Introduction] - Summary

Summary: In the industrialised countries of North America, Japan, and Western Europe, we have freedom of speech, political parties competing in elections, and universal suffrage. Today, we see not only a rethinking of military and economic policies, but a more general question: Are the current forms of democracy in the industrialised countries still viable? There is a fear of collapse of civil order and discipline, collectively caused by inept leaders and alienated citizens. We identified three types of challenges: External or contextual challenges are brought upon democratic governments from outside. This may be a military or diplomatic failure or defeat, it might be a global economic crisis. Their danger is highly variable among countries. A military or diplomatic event could come as a serious shock to the United States, whereas Japan is very vulnerable to an economic shock. Social or structural challenges are brought upon democratic governments from the inside. This might be a highly unequal society or polarisation among (e.g.) ethnic lines. In the past virtually all classes have posed challenges to political democracy, among them fascism and communism. Currently, we are seeing the rise of intellectuals less interested in policy and technocratic rule and more in criticising authority and delegitimising political institutions. This, combined with the decline of manual labour and the rise of individualism in young people, has led to increased skepticism of the political process. In this, we see potential challenges for governments needing both popular support for their policies, and the necessary discipline to implement them. Intrinsic challenges are brought upon democratic governments by developments within democracy itself. Democracy has no internal correction mechanism. It might give rise to forces threatening democracy, but there are few methods to control these forces. This danger increases with a society becoming ever more democratic. Recently, we have seen "a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority." The real problem for democratic governments, however, is a possible combination of the three types of challenges. Government, in such a situation, needs to act in a coherent fashion with regards to broad long-term goals. But, at the same time, government becomes less able to do so. While the abilities of governments have peaked, demands are still rising.

Source: Huntington et al (1975) Introduction. First Chapter of Huntington et al (1975) The Crisis of Democracy. Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York, New York University Press, 1975

(Full text [10MB PDF] at trilateral.org, English) 

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

[1] The United States, Japan, and Western Europe have common intrests in democracy, economic development and security.

They are cooperating both militarily and economically.

The middle classes are growing in these countries.

In all these countries, we have freedom of speech, political parties competing in election, and universal suffrage.

They need to rethink their military security and economic institutions, which have not adapted to changed circumstances.

Governments deal with military and economic problems with policies, which are adapted to the environments government find themselves in.

But today, political democracy is questioned as well.

Are the current forms of democracy in the industrialised countries still viable?

Willy Brandt: In 30 year, Europe will slide into dictatorship.

British Official: Britain might become a dictatorship.

Takeo Miki: Japan's democracy might collapse.

We see, in these and other comments, a fear of collapse of civil order and discipline, caused by inept leaders and alienated citizens.

We are recently hearing of the "Vietnamisation" of America.

There have been 20 years of continuous economic growth.

But economists are suspecting that 1971 was the beginning of a long-term recession.

Western thought often has general phases of optimism and pessimism.

We do not know whether pessimism is justified here.

In this report, we want to find and explore the challenges for democracies and their governments. 

From this we can learn whether to be optimistic or pessimistic and what do to to strengthen democracy.

[2] Democratic government can be challenged by outside context, without anything being wrong internally.

The development of democracy in Czechoslovakia is hindered by an external force.

Military or diplomatic failure is challenging or even destructive to a government.

Conversely, the Law of Political Inertia will often keep a system working if there is no external shock. 

Another external challenge may be a global economic crisis.

A great number of factors come together to determine the context or environment, and how much of a challenge it is.

Thus, 19th century America had nearly none; Weimar Germany had several.

We are currently seeing a shift in power and in the relations between the world's countries.

All industrialised countries have to deal with inflation, shortages, and how to deal with economic interdependence.

The United States is especially vulnerable to foreign policy defeats.

Relatively, the military, economic, and political influence of the United States is in decline.

A military or diplomatic event could come as a serious shock to the United States.

Economically, the United States is well positioned to absorb shocks and challenges.

Japan, on the other hand, is vulnerable to such economic shocks.

Even in the best of times, contextual challenges can become real problems for democratic institutions and their policies.

But a political democracy can also be challenged by social trends and the country's social structure.

A highly unequal society is itself a challenge for a democracy.

Also, regional or ethnic polarisation might be a major issue.

In most Western countries democratisation and industrialisation occured together. In Germany and Japan democracy was late.

But with the growth of the cities and the bourgeoisie, and conversely the decline of the aristocracy, power was diversified, and government became a better representative of society.

Fascism appealed to lower-middleclass nationalism and economic fears, and with the help of traditional authority successfully challenged democracy.

Communist parties became popular among the working classes, and they still are in France and Italy.

So, virtually all classes have, at some point, posed challenges to political democracy.

Further social changes will produce further challenges.

Currently, it is mainly intellectuals challenging democracy, by decrying the corruption and inefficiency of government. They believe government is actually governed itself by monopoly capitalim.

Schumpeter: Intellectuals have language-power, but no political responsibility.

A great number of intellectuals are interested in policy and technocratic rule.

But "value-oriented intellectuals" criticise authority and try to delegitimise political institutions.

Their students and, via the mass media, the general population are potential audiences.

Combined with the decline of manual labour, this discourse might challenge democratic governments as much as communist or fascist forces.

The industrialised countries are also seeing a rise of individualism in young people, with increasing importance of leisure, belonging, and self-fulfillment. These same people are often skeptical of the political process, some have left it behind.

These values are likely the result of these societies getting richer.

A recession or supply shortages might end the popularity of these values.

But if these values survive, they are barriers for government, especially when it comes to popular support for policies, and the discipline needed to implement them.

There are finally challenges which are intrinsic to democracy.

Democracy has no internal correction mechanism.

If democracy itself gives rise to forces threatening democracy, there is little defense.

This is a fear common to Tocqueville, Schumpeter, and Lippmnn.

Intrinsic challenges are common to all democracies, and their danger increases with a society becoming more democratic.

Recently, we have seen "a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to respond."

Contextual, social, and intrinsic challenges have appeared within the past few years.

Democratic governments are uniquely threatened by the combination of the three challenges.

Government, in such a situation, needs to act in a coherent fashion with regards to broad long-term goals. But, at the same time, government becomes less able to do so.

While the abilities of governments have peaked, demands are still rising.

This is the central problem for governing the democracies in industrialised countries today.

[txteo]

Sunday Art:

Charles Demuth (1928) I Saw the Figure 5 in Gold. Oil, graphite, ink, and gold leaf on paperboard, 90 x 76 cm. New York: The Met Fifth Avenue.

This artwork is contempary to Siegfried Kracauer (1927) The Mass Ornament.

Enjoy your sunday!

[txteo]

Emmett Rensin (2016) Young Minds in the Era of American Depravity - Summary

Summary: Quite a few young Americans are non-enthusiastic about the 2016 election, they will either vote third-party, or they will not participate at all. The pundits are shocked, claiming this to be an exceptional, high-stakes election. But the description of Trump as a dangerous outlier debasing American traditions is ignorant of American history. The United States has toppled democratically elected regimes, tortured its enemies, funded right-wing extremists, and dropped nukes on civilian cities. Also, contemporary America is in a state of depravity, featuring mass incarceration, decades of stagnant wages, college debt, and racism. The financial crisis of 2008 has not really been dealt with, and there is fear of another financial shock. About 10% of the population has neither health insurance nor adequate nutrition. The United States are militarily engaged in 6 foreign countries, dropping 23'000 bombs each year. Climate change is quickly progressing, and catastrophe seems hard to avoid. The world is getting better in some measures of global poverty and health, but these are signs of how horrible the past has been, not how great our present is. Finally, all achievements are in constant danger of humans simply destroying what makes the planet habitable. Pundits ask if young people do not see the present crisis of this election. And young people see a crisis; catastrophe and moral failure are staring them in the face. Looking at the world, they see that something is radically wrong. But looking at the media representation, all political solutions given are wholly inadequate. Young people are revolting in many different ways. Revolt "is a symptom of intolerable pressure", and in looking at this world, revolt is a rational reaction. The situation and the reactions to it are not new. We have seen it before, generation after generation: Young people revolt, until they get older, and try to keep their children from revolting. The power structure is changed just a little bit to address the most obvious problems, allowing for all others to persist. The system is constructed in such a way that it constantly reproduces itself. The great majority of (young) people will go and vote, and Hillary Clinton will become president. But we are still quickly moving towards global destruction. This is mad, it makes us feel mad, and it will get worse. When, finally, our food crops fail, and the ocean is flooding the land, there will be further revolts. The pundits will, once again, try to keep it quiet. This is the way the world works, and this is exactly the problem.

Source: Emmet Rensin (2016) Young Minds in the Era of American Depravity. Published in Newsweek on 19th of October 2016.

(Full text at newsweek.com, English)

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

Quite a few young Americans are non-enthusiastic about the election.

Some of them will vote third-party, some will not participate at all.

The pundits are shocked, claiming this is an exceptional, high-stakes election.

Pundits believe undesirable behaviour is caused by a lack of information or rationality. This shows they are emotionally disconnected from human life. Their world can be described with facts and statistics.

America is in a state of depravity.

Roughly 10% of the population has neither health insurance nor adequate nutrition.

There is enough food. American food-production practices policies are causing the rise of antibiotic-resistant infections.

Black people are constantly harassed, sometimes even murdered.

2 million people are incarcerated.

College graduates are saddled with enormous debts.

It is hard to find a job.

Labour productivity is rising, but wage growth is lagging behind.

The financial crisis of 2008 has not really been dealth with. There is fear of another financial shock.

The "share economy" is creating a new type of precarious job, to the applause of Democrats.

Climate change is quickly progressing, and catastrophe seems hard to avoid.

The United States are currently militarily engaged in 6 foreign countries. They drop 23'000 bombs each year.

Nuclear war is once again becoming a real possibility.

The common rebuttal to this: The world is better than it ever was. Global poverty is down, medicine is making great advances.

But these are signs of how horrible the past has been, not how great our present is.

Individual human beings do not live in historical abstractions.

All the improvements mentioned are in constant danger of humans simply destroying what makes the planet habitable.

All political solutions given are wholly inadequate.

The presidential elections features "a parody fascist". His opponent's main quality is her "not being an incompetent or a rapist".

The choice seems to be between "vulgar racism" and "barely bridled corporatism".

One candidate wants to bomb the shit out of the Middle East, go back to isolationism and start a trade war.

The other wants to occupy the Middle East, and promotes a form of free trade subjecting the population.

One does not believe in global warming, the other is doing far too little.

Less poverty can be achieved by either starving, or highly restrictive welfare payments.

The parties to this election seem to not realise the problem at hand.

The pundits ask if young people do not see the crisis.

If we look at the world, and all of us do it in some way, we see that something is radically wrong.

Many (young) people see this, and they are terribly anxious about it. The world seems to have lost coherence, and the adults in the room seem to not be in control.

Catastrophe and moral failure are staring us in the face.

But looking at the media representation, and statements by politicians, they seem unaware or uninterested.

We are told "Liberalism is Working".

We are told of civility and the dangers of political correctness.

When Trump is described as a dangerous outlier debasing America, history is forgotten.

The United States has toppled democratically elected regimes, tortured its enemies, funded right-wing extremists, and dropped nukes on civilian cities.

Richard Nixon broke into the HQ of his political enemies and tried to clean the executive from Jewish influence.

Obama holds the deportation record for any president.

But Trump, it is said, is unique and exceptionally dangerous. The Russians are behind it all.

Pundits make a lot of money in ridiculing anyone proposing solutions. Perhaps this is their way of coping with catastrophe.

Young people have very different responses among themselves.

Some claim to believe it is just about avoiding Trump, then everything will be fine.

Some claim the whole system is corrupt.

The usual answer is condescending, telling them the unique situation demands falling in line behind Clinton. Their demands will be adressed later, once the election is over. Minorities have made this expereince before: Liberals like them and promise to look at their demands, if they keep quiet just for now. 

Young people are revolting in many different ways. It is not clear how their revolt will change the world.

But revolt "is a symptom of intolerable pressure", and in looking at this world, revolt is a rational reaction.

A great number of (young) people simply stopped taking part, living private lives, sometimes depressive ones. 

It should be clear why young people are so worried, why they don't do what is expected of them.

We need to ask why so many do what is expected, in the face of evidence that it is not working.

Young people will not grow up in the future they were promised, but, at best, in one that narrowly avoids disaster.

So, why are the pundits so angered by this behaviour?

The situation and the reactions to it are not new. We have seen it before, generation after generation.

Again and again, suffering is answered with insufficient effort, leaving everyone feeling dreadful.

Young people revolt, until they get older, and try to keep their children from revolting.

The power structure is changed just a little bit to address the most obvious problems, which allows for the others to persist.

The problems of today are the problems of the past few decades.

The default reaction of power to complaints is to do nothing, to let the bureacracy and the momentum of a running system neutralise them.

And because the criticisms has been the same for decades, it can be dismissed as unoriginally rehashing what everyone knows already.

The system is constructed in such a way that it constantly reproduces itself. So what can we do anyway?

I am a socialist, but I know that we won't have American socialism for quite some time.

The current state of the world demands actions, and all politically feasible options are wholly inadequate. 

The great majority of (young) people will go and vote, and Hillary Clinton will become president. 

The national political arena will be saved from immediate destruction.

But we are still quickly moving towards global destruction. This is mad, it makes us feel mad, and it will get worse.

We have played this game for a number of generations now. The planet will not wait.

When, finally, our food crops fail, and the ocean is flooding our land, there will be further revolts.

Then, again, the pundits will try to keep it quiet.

This is the way the world works, and this is exactly the problem.

[txteo]

Siegfried Kracauer (1927) The Mass Ornament - Summary

Summary: We can learn a lot by looking at surface phenomena, which are created unconsciously, and today we see the tastes in body culture changing. This is most clear in the stadium revues of the Tiller girls, who are no longer individuals, but have become clusters of "sexless bodies in bathing suits" with precisely coordinated movements to form a regularly patterned ornament. The ornament is geometric, it consists of lines, circles, waves, and spirals, but there is no organic form, there is none of the meaning of spirituality. The girls produce patterns of parallel lines, with little consciousness of their constituting it; their star formations have no meaning or purpose but themselves. These patterns are visible only to the audience, the masses, also regularly arranged in the stadium. The mass ornament is without content, it is "an end in itself". Capitalism is also an end in itself. When it produces, it produces for limitless profits, not for any need. Capitalism needs calculability, it is interested in neither personality nor community. The individual needs to become part of the mass in order to be an efficient part of the machine. The process works by itself, without any real content. It is this capitalist rationality, which is reflected aesthetically in the mass ornament. Intellectuals see these revues as a distraction. But the reality of aesthetic presentation always depends on how it deals with non-aesthetic reality. The masses at the stadium events see things clearer, they acknowledge reality and the control of capitalist rationality over their lives. In the Tiller girls revue, the masses see the same formal principles expressed, which are working on them, everyday in the offices and factories. In this sense, the mass ornament is a lot more real than the artworks expressing old sentiments in old forms. The process of history is one of conflict between the forces of nature and of reason. In the French enlightenment, reason battled the mythologies of religion and politics. The bourgeois revolutions defeated and demythologised the church, the monarchy, and feudalism as representatives of nature. Capitalism itself is part of this demystification, it understands nature as an object, allowing for its domination and exploitation by means of capitalist rationality. But capitalist reason is not reason itself: As the production process is not concerned with human needs, as the organisation of social structure is not based upon human beings, so capitalist rationality is not human rationality. Accordingly, critics often wholly misunderstand capitalism: Capitalism is not too rational, but instead not rational enough, it does not reach the heights of human reason. Rationality carried to its end, would reveal human essence. But capitalist rationality does not reflect the increasing independence of humans from natural conditions. Only in this independence, reason can intervene and oppose nature, and justice can come into the world. Truth can prevail, and the good can triumph over blind natural forces. But when abstraction blocks reason and knowledge, it re-subjects humans to nature. Capitalist rationality is wholly marked by abstraction, but we can not move back from abstraction into mythology, we need to move forward and overcome abstraction. But capitalism and abstraction are closely intertwined, the specific form of contemporary thought is not accidental. The rationality of the ornament is strong, it can create the mass, but it is not strong enough. Reason can dissolve organic forms and unity to re-constitute humans according to truth. But in the mass ornament, reasons stays silent. This kind of rationality, in its abstraction, allows for uncontrolled nature to multiply, and, at the same time, hide behind masks of rationality and abstraction. It it thus rationality falling back into mythology. It is in this way, that ornamental patterns are a way of distracting people from their task, to change the status quo. Like in the Roman circus, the masses, spellbound by the mythological cult, will be more resistant to reason. Only if thought limits nature and thereby produces rational humans, will society change.

Source: Siegfried Kracauer (1927) Ornament der Masse. Chapter in Kracauer (1963) Ornament der Masse. Translated by Thomas Levin as The Mass Ornament. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995.

(Full text at monoskop.org, English)

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

[1] We can learn more about a time and its place in history by looking at its surface than by listening to its self-description.

The surface phenomena are created unconsciously, and thus give us some access to how things really stand.

[2] The tastes in body culture are changing.

The Tiller girls at the revues are no longer individuals, but clusters with precise coordinated movements.

These revues always take place at the same stadium, whether it is in Australia or the US.

Thousands of "sexless bodies in bathing suits" combine to form a regularly patterned ornament.

The masses are also geometrically arranged in the stadium.

We can now see many variations on this theme, all over the world.

These ornaments are not just shapes and forms, they are the effects of community, and this is what gives them meaning.

Strict individualists are unable to create these patterns and ornaments, one would always be able to discern the individuals.

In the revues, the girls are no individuals, they form a mass of human beings, being used as building blocks to create a figure.

The ornament is "an end in itself".

Ballet also created ornaments, but they were an expression of eroticism.

The masses of girls instead form a system without erotic meaning.

Military discipline also features strict regularity, in marches and parades. But these were means to an end, increasing patriotism.

In contrast, the star formations produced by the Tiller girls have no meaning or purpose but themselves.

The girls produce patterns of parallel lines only to create these patterns, or to increase their size.

The ornament is without content.

Actors consciously take part in the experience of the whole stage.

But the stage of the Tiller girls has no coherence beyond lineraity, its members have little consciousness of their constituting it.

The figure is visible only to the audience, the masses, who sit in front.

The ornament is geometric, it consists of lines, circles, waves, and spirals. There is no organic form, none of the meanings of spirituality.

The performance of the Tiller girls can not be understood in terms of persons, instead the compositional parts are arms, legs, and other body segments.

We can see the ornamen reflecting the status quo, our current situation.

For capitalism, organisms are either material or obstacles.

Capitalism needs calculability, it is interested in neither personality nor community.

The individual needs to become part of the mass to be an efficient part of the machine.

The masses of workers could be interchanged all over the world.

Capitalism is an end in itself. When it produces, it produces for limitless profits, not for any need.

Producers do not work for their own benefit, but to grow their businesses.

Consumption of values by labour is now a sideshow.

The process works by itself, without any real content.

Everyone works in their own specialised job, nobody understands the totality.

The organisation, like the Tiller patterns, hover above the masses.

Taylorism is only the ultimate form of rational organisation.

Whereas in a factory, the exact movement of hands is planned and optimised, here it is the legs of the Tiller girls.

By now the sould is calculated with the help of psychological tests.

Capitalist rationality is reflected aesthetically in the mass ornament.

Intellectuals see these revues as distraction.

But "the aesthetic pleasure gained from ornamental mass movements is legitimate".

The masses see the same formal principles working on them everyday in the offices and factories.

Large parts of reality have become invisible. Art has to work with what is left.

The reality of aesthetic presentation depends on how it deals with non-aesthetic reality.

The mass ornament is a lot more real than the artforms expressing old sentiments in old forms. 

[3] The forces of nature and reason are in conflict in the process of history.

The gods are not gone, we still find mythological thinking affirming all-powerful nature. It is based on the organism, it projects nature everywhere, it can not resist fate. 

This mythology can be found in organic sociology, and in nationalism.

Reason is unconcerned with nature, it wants to bring truth.

Fairy tales are stories about justice coming into the world. Truth prevails, the good is triumphant over natural powers.

Reason of the 18th century saw the fairy tale as its equal.

In demythologisation, the natural is deconstructed.

In the French enlightenment, reason battles the mythologies of religion and politics.

[4] Capitalism is part of the demystification.

Nature is understood as self-contained and then dominated and exploited, by means of capitalist rationality.

But more important than exploitation is the increasing independence of humans from natural conditions. In this, reason can intervene and oppose nature.

The bourgeois revolutions defeated and demythologised the church, the monarchy, and feudalism as representatives of nature. 

But capitalist reason is not reason itself.

As the production process is not concerned with human needs, as the organisation of social structure is not based upon human beings, so capitalist rationality is not human rationality.

Often, capitalism is criticised for destroying the human element, and an older form of community is glorified.

But this wholly misunderstands capitalism.

Capitalism is not too rational, but not rational enough, it does not reach the heights of human reason.

Capitalist rationality is marked by abstraction.

But the mythology of concrete form is no better option.

We need not move back from abstraction, but instead, we need to overcome abstraction.

Abstract generalities in economics, sociology, politics and so on are without content, they can be applied to and for anything. It has little to do with natural life.

The natural sciences use abstraction to liberate themselves from the naivety of mythological nature.

But abstraction, at the same time, is also empty formalism preventing reason to attack the natural.

Demythologisation has not yet cme to an end.

Contemporary thinking can either open up to reason or fight it.

But the current economic system is dependent on the specific form of contemporary thought, any change would bring about structural changes in the economic system.

Capitalist growth furthers the growth of abstraction.

Abstractness leaves humans behind, without the help of reason.

When abstraction blocks reason and knowledge, it re-subjects humans to nature. Only reason can keep natural forces in check.

[5] Rationality carried to its end, would reveal human essence.

In the mass ornament, humans move from organism and individuality to the anonymity fitting for truth and knowledge.

In the mass ornament, the substance of nature is removed. Only those parts of nature that can be subjected to reason remain.

What remains are laws of composition, which are not laws of nature, but laws of knowledge and truth, and thus laws of their time.

In the mass ornament, human parts are combined by reason; unconcerned about humans as organic unities.

The mass ornament is a mythological cult, with abstraction as a facade.

In the ornament inferior nature is manifested, especially given that capitalist rationality is detached from human rationality.

The mass pattern is rational, but it gives rise to nature.

Even though the organic body of humans has disappearead, human essence is not revealed.

When the legs of the Tiller girls swing in parallel, they are abstractions of their bodies.

Reason can dissolve organic forms and unity, and re-constitute humans accoding to truth. But in the mass ornament, reasons stays silent.

The rationality of the ornament can create the mass, but it is not strong enough to find humans in the mass, it is too weak to make the figures created accessible to knowledge. 

This kind of rationality, in its abstraction, allows for uncontrolled nature to multiply, and, at the same time, hide behind masks of rationality and abstraction.

The symbolic power of religion is absent from the mass ornament, rationality has stripped it of meaning.

It it thus rationality falling back into mythology.

Intellectuals have been, so far, unable to see the mass ordnament. The art they considers remains insulated from reality.

The masses at the stadium events see things clearer, they acknowledge reality and the control of capitalist rationality over their lives. 

Body culture is glorified, the physical is given supreme importance.

Physical education is a way of expropriating energy from persons.

The ornamental patterns are a way of distracting people from their task: To change the status quo.

Like in the Roman circus, the masses, spellbound by the mythological cult, will be more resistant to reason.

[6] Rhythmic gmynastics promotes personal hygiene, but it also adds a specific world-view: They try to impart meaning to the organic body, and thus to nature. This may be spiritual, but it is without any reason.

The mass ornament shows us nature without any superstructure.

Rhythmic gymnastics uses mythology to further strengthen the dominance of nature.

There are many romantic attempts to rise above mass existence, and of linking humanity and nature.

But any higher sphere discovered in this way comes from mythology, not from heretofore unrealised reason

Reason can destroy anything that tries to hide from it.

Depending on humans as they no longer exist is a way of fleeing from reality, instead of engaging with the shallowness of the ornament.

The process can only move forward, if thought limits nature and thereby produces rational humans.

Then society will change.

If this happens, the mass ornament will end. Human life will be confronted with truth and thus become another type of ornament.

[txteo]

Michel Foucault (1978) What Are the Iranians Dreaming About? - Summary

Summary: The situation in the Middle East, its location of geo-strategic importance, and oil are the reasons most Iranians believe the Americans, or rather the Shah's secret police, will not let them decide their own future. There really are plans for more violent repression, but they are backup plans. Instead everyone wants to try "accelerated internal liberalization", but nobody knows quite when, how, and who will lead the country. The political movement of millions wants Islam, wants Khomeini, and wants to see the Shah dead. Powerfully, the Shah is cast as an armed despot, and Khomeini as the exiled saint, beloved by the people. Khomeini has no political programmes, but he calls upon Muslims, the army, and the students to oppose compromise offers. Shiites have no hierarchical or centralised clergy. They believe in a holy light being carried down from Muhammad through the Imams to the present day. The law should, with this light, release its hidden spiritual meaning. Islamic government is seen as an ideal, a glorious return to the time of the prophet; at the same time to a future of new fidelity. The people believe in Islam's creativity, but they do not believe in legalism. Persia invented the state; and it was a model for the early caliphate. At the same time, Islam gives people resources to fight state power. How do these two ideas combine in Islamic government? We can not derive everything from the Quran, but we know some things: Islam values work, and it has an idea of common goods. If minorities and liberties are not harmful to others, they are respected. Majority rule and the responsibility and accountability of leaders to the people are prized. The natural difference between men and women will be reflected in legal differences. The Iranians believe these ideas predate the West and they will survive the West, they are ideas of the Quran. Islamic government will place the traditional structures of society into the center. Religious centers are not just points of resistance, they are forces of political creation. The people of Iran are looking for political spirituality, a political movement opening a spiritual side to politics, and politicising religious structures. This is the dream of Islamic government, which is more a political will than an ideal. But is this political will strong enough to prevent a westernised parliamentary government? Is this political will deep enough to survive the end of the Shah?

Source: Michel Foucault (1978) What Are the Iranians Dreaming About? Article for Le Nouvel Observateur, 22nd of October 1978. Republished in Afar/Amderson (2005) Foucault and the Iranian Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

(Full text at uchicago.edu, English)

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

Iranians believe America will not let them go.

The situation in the Middle East, and Oil are the reasons.

The US has given Lebanon to Syrian, and thus Soviet influence.

The Iran is a location allowing for intervention from the East.

The situation is now such that the American might bring the Iranian secret police to repeat the Black Friday massacre of 8th of September 1978. It is not clear if the army would go along with such a plan.

This is not likely to happen, noone want this to happen, it is a backup plan.

There is no communist threat in Iran, neither from inside nor the outside.

The Soviets are feared by Iranians.

Everyone wants to try "accelerated internal liberalization", which is modeled on the end of the dictatorship in Spain.

Nobody knows quite when, how, and who will lead the country.

While Spain had substantial economic growth, Iran is lacking this. Iran is lacking the basis for a westernised state.

Instead there is a political movement of millions.

They want Islam, they want Khomeini, and they want to see the Shah dead.

We can see the powerful image of the Shah as an armed despot, and Khomeini as the exiled saint, beloved by the people.

Only by integrating or neutralising this movement can liberalisation proceed as planned.

Khomeini, from Paris, asked all Muslims, the army, and the students to oppose all compromise offers.

The political opposition see Khomeini's speech positively, it makes them look better in contrast.

Khomeini has no political programmes.

All political parties in Iran are repressed, since 1963.

The political opposition believes Khomeini will be forgotten, once the Shah is ousted.

But there is a durable belief in Khomeini and his connection to the people.

Everyone says the protesters know only what they hate, not what they want.

So I went out into the streets of Qom and Tehran, and asked them. I talked to intellectuals, religious leaders, students, and former guerillas.

Noone says they want a revolution.

Nearly everyone says they want an islamic government.

Iran has a large muslim majority.

However, they are neither Sunni, nor are they Arabs.

Shiites have no hierarchical or centralised clergy, instead a number of relatively independent clerics, dependent on donations.

In this climate the clergy must echo and guide the population.

Shiites believe that a holy light is carried down from Muhammad throught the Imams to the present day. The law should, with this light, release its hidden spiritual meaning.

Shiites believe the power of the Imam is good, all other power is bad.

An Ayatollah told he they are awaiting the return of the Imam.

Islamic government, in Iran does not mean the clergy supervising politics.

Instead islamic government is seen as an ideal, a glorious return to the time of the prophet; at the same time to a future of new fidelity.

People believe in Islam's creativity, but they do not believe in legalism.

The Quran is silent on a great number of topics, it would take time for scholars and experts to set up such rules.

Islam values work; what one produces belongs to oneself.

Some things (like water) belong to everyone and can not be taken away.

Liberties are respected if they do not harm others.

Minorities may not injure the majority, but are otherwise free.

The natural difference between men and women will be reflected in legal differences.

Majority rule and the responsibility and accountability of leaders to the people are prized.

The West has repeated the same basic ideas about democracy since the 19th century.

The Iranians believe these ideas predate the West and they will survive the West, they are ideas of the Quran.

The Iranians on the street are active agents, they thus have a specific view on the reality they are themselves shaping.

Islamic government will place the traditional structures of society into the center. The political centers in mosques will continue after their goal, the end of the Shah, has been reached.

I head a story about the peasants and artisans of Ferdows, who, after an earthquake, and with the help of the religious community re-founded their city by themselves. 

Religious centers are not just resistance, they are forces of political creation.

This is the dream of Islamic government.

There is also the dream of a political movement that does not hinder, but enhance spirituality.

When Ali Shariati died two years ago, he became "the invisible Present, the ever-present Absent".

Shariati, in Europe, had read Fanon and Massignon, and was in contact with socialists, left-wing Christians, and Algerian revolutionaries.

Back in Iran, in a mosque near the university, he preached to thousands on social justice and equality.

He died in prison, and most believe he was murdered, he is a martyr.

At today's protest marches the only names shouted are Shariati and Khomeini.

Islamic government is more a political will than an ideal. In reaction to current problems, it wants to open a spiritual side to politics, and politicises religious structures.

Is this political will strong enough to prevent a westernised parliamentary government? Is this political will deep enough to survive the end of the Shah?

Persia invented the state, and was a model for the early caliphate.

Islam gives people resources to fight state power.

How do these two historic ideas combine in Islamic government?

Iran is geo-politically important.

The people of Iran are looking for political spirituality.

France has forgotten this possibility.

[txteo]

Herbert Wells (1909) The Possible Collapse of Civilisation - Summary

Summary: Most people think progress and growth are natural and inevitable. Many people expect America will only ever advance. New York will continue to grow, it will become a city of gardens and Marble, spanning multiple states, it will rule the globe. But we might be overconfident, great societies have collapsed before. 300 years ago, labour was local and mostly agricultural, property was real, trade was unimportant, and everyone used cash. The living standard was about that of contemporary China. Since then, we have built "the most chancy and insecurely experimental system of conventions and assumptions about money" imaginable. Borrowing and lending has exploded, and so has the stock market. Prices in general are constantly in oscillation. Looking at the 1907 crisis, we have to ask: If an oscillation becomes too large, might its downturn lead to a collapse of the whole system? Stock market panics are easy to start, they are hard to stop. A large, global stock market panic will lead to bankruptcy and massive unemployment, rippling through and destroying the economy. Our organisational structure in peace is a mass of slow, self-interested companies. But when it comes to war, we have centralised, scientific, and commonly-financed planning of supply and demand. We use uncounted resources, both intellectual and material, to produce and further improve deadly weapons. Soon, new, expensive, armoured aircraft will shoot us from the sky. We are spending great amounts of resources which could be used for civilisation. "Modern warfare is an insanity, not a sane business proposition." We need a global council for peace. Humanity still has some things to learn: Honesty, brotherhood, and social collectivism."

Source: Herbert George Wells (1909) The Possible Collapse of Civilisation. Published in New York World on January 1, 1909. Republished in Wells (1914) An Englishman Looks at the World.

(Full text at online-literature.com, English)

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

I was asked to write about the future.

I already predicted New York will continue to grow.

Most people think progress and growth are natural and inevitable.

We might be overconfident. World history is full of failed cities.

Thinking about what can go wrong, I am most worried about modern finance and modern war.

300 years ago, labour was local and mostly agricultural, property was real, trade was unimportant, and everyone used cash. The living standard was about that of contemporary China.

Since then, we have built "the most chancy and insecurely experimental system of conventions and assumptions about money" imaginable.

Borrowing and lending has exploded, and so has the stock market.

I own shares in a New Zealand Bank, in a power plant in London, and in railways in Canada, Cuba, and Brazil.

Looking at share prices, indeed all prices are constantly in oscillation.

With regard to the 1907 crisis, we have to ask if these oscillations have a limit.

If an oscillation down is too large, and not prevented, the whole system collapses.

The only answer ever given to this: It has never happened before.

But previous civilisation have collapsed, why not ours?

Looking at 1907, we see how it might pan out.

Stock market panics are easy to start, they are hard to stop.

A panic will bankrupt business, and push people out of employment.

One can easily imagine a panic twice or thrice as large, and international in scope.

The newly unemployed will be angry.

The railways will cut back or be hit by strikes.

Wholesalers and retailers become suspicious, and stop giving credit.

At some point supplies run low. 

The police might not be paid for a while.  

Modern people have a 300-year old sense of security. This is not a lot of time.

Things that oscillate may, given the right factors, go steadily down for some time.

An economic depression might become a chronic problem.

War is over-developed.

Our organisational structure in peace is a mass of slow, self-interested companies.

We do not perform population control measures.

People's minds are shaped by tabloid newspapers.

People's well-being is dependent on drug manufacturers. 

But when it comes to war, we have centralised, scientific, common planning.

We use uncounted resources, both intellectual and material, to produce and further improve deadly weapons.

Looking at Britain, we find 50-year-old houses, railways, and fireplaces everywhere.

High technology, like the electric light and the telephone, is met with caution.

But of the British war ships none is older than 25 years.

Progress in general is rather slow, but military progress is very fast.

The states of Europe now resemble badly built boats, on which enormous guns have been mounted. When such a gun fires, it may hit or miss, it surely will sink the boat it is mounted on.

"Modern warfare is an insanity, not a sane business proposition."

We are spending great amounts of resources we could use for civilisation to prepare for war.

The destructive capability of the modern military is overwhelming. 

We now live in an age of air travel.

This means we can spend enormous sums to build up air forces.

Our means of destruction have further multiplied.

But, in the future, we will see much larger, armored aircraft, able to carry big guns.

Of course, they will be very expensive.

We can imagine a world with "such monsters" floating above a "wild financial panic".

Many people expect America will only advance, only grow. New York will become a city of gardens and Marble, spanning multiple states, it will rule the globe.

But the possibilities of financial panic and war should temper our expectations a bit.

It is possible that the wealthy 19th is followed by a simpler 20th century.

We still have some things to learn: "honesty and brotherhood, social collectivism".

We need a global council for peace.

[txteo]

Friedrich Hayek (1968) Competition as a Discovery Procedure - Summary

Summary: Competition is a method for discovering previously unknown facts. If we knew winners in advance, a race and the medals awarded for winning the race would be wholly absurd. However, what economics calls perfect competition is a state in which everyone knows everything that they need to know, thus competition as an activity ceases to be worthwhile. The theory of competition can not be "empirically verified for those cases in which it is of interest". We can, however, empirically verify that some societies better realise outcomes than others. All structures in macroeconomics are only the result of microeconomic phenomena. But the relevant data is far too numerous, diverse and complex. Macroeconomic theorems are thus non-scientific rules of thumb we can use to predict patterns and regularities, but never individual events. The common objective of competition is the creation of a market order. A true economy can only exist in an organisation where all efforts are directed toward a single set of goals. The knowledge of the managers determines decisions, and organisation members need to explicitly coordinate their efforts. The market, however, creates a catallaxy, an order in the complex structure of individual economies. Here, the knowledge of all participants is aggregated, it preserves the individual objectives of participants. A catallaxy, or market order, can help to realise individual objectives, but it does not guarantee satisfying the most important needs first. It allows for a randomly selected individual to pursue their objectives with effectiveness, without being able to predict which concrete individuals will actually benefit, and which will not. Socialism is the attempt to transform catallaxy into a true economy. A market is orderly in that participant's expectations of transaction outcomes are realised to some degree. But this is the result of some expectations being disappointed (negative feedback), with plans and expectations being adjusted accordingly. Through competition, we can discover which things are goods, which of them are scarce, and how scarce they are. The market leads the most efficient producers of particular goods, those that can produce at a low price, to actually produce the goods. And while the combination of goods actually produced is at least partly the result of chance, for each combination of goods a market order produces as much or more than any other method we know of. It also produces a maximum of opportunity for an abstract, randomly chosen person, while actual individual shares are partly due to chance. A centralised computer system with full information could theoretically surpass this, choosing the most desirable combination of goods/services to produce, producing them most efficiently, and distributing the product. But we should not compare the market with such an unreachable ideal. Circumstances change, and human actions in total need to adapt to the new circumstances to allow for growth or even stability of average income. If changes are necessary, but their necessity can not be shown in each case, a democratic society can not justly bring about these necessary changes. But competition is a powerful discovery procedure for opportunities. It both shows possible improvements, and forces everyone to imitate improvements that have been made, it is a kind of "impersonal coercion" to change individual behaviour. The price mechanism gives information to individual persons as to which of their actions are changing in importance by changing individual incomes. The reasons for these changes are generally unrelated to individual persons. The merits or demerits of the people involved are simply not accounted for. If some are disadvantages by these changes, we can only compensate them if the system as a whole grows considerably. In some countries social justice policies actually hinder the changes that would improve working class conditions to a point where these policies would become superfluous. In societies with developed knowledge of productive forces and techniques, small adjustments to changed circumstances are constantly needed just to maintain the current level of welfare. But the less a society knows about and realises its opportunities, the more potential for growth it has. Planning for social justice can perhaps be afforded by the rich, but poor countries need to rapidly change in order to grow. Public power should be limited to protecting individuals from social pressures, through private property and rule of law. The greatest problem of contemporary economic policy is wage rigidity; wage levels and structure are becoming independent of market conditions. Labour productivity depends on how workers are distributed among different occupations, which is determined by relative wages. A rigid wage structure will prevent a society to adapt to changing circumstances. Thus, the average wage level at full employment is likely below that of a society with flexible wages. We need to convince labour that allowing for flexible relative wages will increase average real wages.

[I am seriously thinking about making an even shorter summary based on this summary.]

Source: Friedrich Hayek (1968) Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren. Lecture at the Institute for World Economics at the University of Kiel. Translated as Competition as a Discovery Procedure by Marcellus Snow. The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 5:3, Fall 2002.

(Full text at mises.org, English) 

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

[I] For perhaps the last 50 years, economics has looked at competition using assumptions that would make competition itself superfluous.

If everything taken as data by economics were actually known to market participants, competition would not be needed.

From this, some have concluded, we can do without competition.

However, in reality, the utility of competition is based on our ignorance of what influences the behaviour of our competitors.

If we knew the winner in advance, a race and the medals awarded for winning the race would be wholly absurd.

I will thus treat competition as a method of discovering previously unknown facts.

The importance of competition is solely based on the unpredictability of its outcome.

The theory of competition can not be "empirically verified for those cases in which it is of interest". Where we can verify it, that is where the facts are known in advance, it is of little interest.

We can, however, empirically verify that some societies better realise this outcome than others.

Competition shares the property of either being unverifiable or uninteresting with scientific discovery principles in general. Scientific procedures are recognised only for their superior results compared with other procedures.

However, while science wants to discover more general facts and regularities, economics discovers the facts of a particular situation, at a particular time.

Neither science nor economics can predict what it itself will discover.

The theory of the market can only predict a general abstract structure, not particular events.

[II]

Scientism is a flawed criterion of method for economics.

It is a major reason for economists rejecting microeconomics in favour of macroeconomics.

However, I believe all structures in macroeconomics are only the result of microeconomic phenomena.

We should require of our theories only the following: Once we input relevant data, we can use the theories to derive conclusions, which we can check against reality.

The data relevant to economics is far too diverse and complex to use them all. But this is not a problem of the theory.

But nonetheless, this leads us to being only able to predict patterns, not individual events.

In statistics, using aggregates and averages, we tend to summarise things with very different "causal meaning". We are thus unable to find clear relationships between all these things.

Production, prices, investment, and national income are variables, but they do not play a role in their own determination. [?]

The best we can do is finding regularities.

In many cases we only have broad statistical data. Then macroeconomics allows us to approximate and predict, even without knowledge of the microeconomic phenomena.

Macroeconomic theorems are rules of thumb we can use when we have too little information. But, strictly speaking, they are not scientific.

Schumpeter introduced "methodological individualism" into economics.

Schumpeter: The notions of social capital, national wealth, national income are obscure and difficult, and they produce no really valuable theorems.

[III]

The common assumption of a "given" quantity of scarce goods inhibits our understanding of competition.

What competition can accomplish is discovering which things are goods, which of them are scarce, and how scarce they are.

In a society based on division of labour, knowledge is widely distributed.

Individual persons usually do not exhaustively know how the objects they have access to can be used.

Prices for goods and services on the markets are markers for where to look.

Some skills and abilities can be listed and reported to an agency.

But there are abilities of detecting conditions, which are based on market signals for which goods and services are in demand.

What economics calls perfect competition is a state in which everyone knows everything that they need to know. But in such a state, competition as an activity ceases to be worthwhile.

We still need to talk about what the discovered information is used for.

The order produced by a market is not an economy, in the strict meaning of the word.

In a true economy all efforts of the organisation are directed toward a single set of goals.

Instead, the market creates catallaxy, order in the complex structure of individual economies. This spontaneous order often behaves not like an economy.

The market order does not guarantee satisfying the most important needs first.

Socialism is the attempt to transform catallaxy into a true economy.

In a true economy, only the knowledge of the managers determines management decisions. All members need to act as to further the objectives of the economy.

A catallaxy, in contrast, can employ the knowledge of all its participants, and it preserves the diversity of objectives held by its participants.

As the market order has no definite objectives, we can not understand its total output as the sum of its individual outputs.

The market order can help to realise individual objectives.

Only an orderly world enables individual rational action and allows it to be successful.

The conditions created by the market allow for a randomly selected individual to pursue their objectives with effectiveness. We can not predict which concrete individuals will actually benefit, and which will not.

A good discovery procedure improves the chance of success for abstract, general persons, but it says nothing about the prospects for actual persons.

The common objective of competition as an such an activity is the creation of such a market order.

[IV]

I do not like calling the result of competition an equilibrium, I prefer order.

A true equilibrium would mean that competition has ended, and all facts are known. It is more of an ideal type.

Order can have degrees; and order can persist through changes.

Order exists in that expectations of what the outcome of transactions might be are realised to some degree.

Individual plans are mutually adjusted by negative feedback.

Long before cybernetics, Smith's invisible hand expressed the idea of negative feedback.

Because some expectiations are disappointed (negative feedback) and plans and expectations are changed, most expectations are satisfied.

The market further brings those to produce particular goods who can produce them most efficiently. The prices of goods are so low that those who do not produce the goods can not produce them for this price.

If one producer can produce something at much lower cost than their next efficient competitor, they make a larger profit.

By this process, for each combination of goods as much or more is produced than by any other method we know of.

If all we know could be centralised in a computer, we could produce even more.

Thus, competition as a discovery procedure has considerable cost.

But we should not compare the market with an unreachable ideal, but with the other methods we actually have available. Compared with methods preventing competition, the market is very performant.

In economies with efficient competition, it is very difficult to find ways to produce better or cheaper goods than are currently available. Those that can be found usually are blocked by a larger power (government or a powerful private actor).

There are many different possibilites of combinations of goods and services that can be produced in theory.

The market can only ever approximate any such combination. 

The combination of goods actually produced is at least partly the result of chance.

Smith: The market is a game based partly on skills and partly on luck.

The total payoff of the game is maximised, but the share of each individual is partly the result of chance.

A centralised system with full information could theoretically choose the most desirable combination of goods/services to produce, and then distribute the product.

But in reality, the best procedure we know, competition on a market, produces a maximum in the sense that it gives an abstract, random person the greatest opportunity. Actual individual shares are partly due to chance.

Because there is no single set of objectives, we can not evaluate the outcome in this way. This is the reason the market order is not an economy, but a catallaxy.

[V]

Because the market order is wrongly seen to be an economy, we have political efforts at determining prices to achieve social justice.

Social justice always means the protection of some groups from having to lower their standards of living beyond some absolute or relative value. However, we can not do this without destroying the market order.

In some cases, growth or even stability of average income requires a change in individual incomes. This is true even though individuals are usually not responsible for these changes.

The price mechanism gives information to individual persons as to which of their actions are changing in importance. Circumstances change, and human actions in total need to adapt to the new circumstances.

The reasons for this are generally unrelated to these individual persons. The merits or demerits of the people involved are not accounted for.

We often use the term incentive to suggest that they lead people to work harder.

However, the primary function of prices is to show individuals what they should work, not how much.

If the world changes, we need to change what we do to maintain a given standard of welfare. What people do will be effected by the relative compensation for different types of activities.

If some are disadvantages by these changes, we can only compensate them if the system as a whole grows considerably.

Price changes are a decisive factor in microeconomic processes. All macroeconomic aggregates are just the result of these microeconomic processes. Thus macroeconomic stability can be the outcome of great microeconomic dynamism.

If some person does not fufill the expectation of a third party, someone else has an incentive to jump in.

All macroeconomic indicators are the result of competition as a process. We can thus not derive from them the price or income changes necessary.

If changes are necessary, but their necessity can not be shown in each case, a democratic society can not justly bring about these necessary changes.

A democratic direction of the economy would try to achieve fair prices, which means a preservation of the existing structure of prices and incomes.

If everyone received what others believe is deserved, the system would be both tyrannical and inefficient.

Any political decision of incomes or prices is more likely to prevent than to bring about the changes necessary due to unforeseen changes in circumstances.

Paradoxically the capitalist countries are more concerned with "social justice" than the communist ones.

In some countries the policies hinder the changes that would improve working class conditions to a point where these policies would become superfluous.

[VI]

Competition is a powerful discovery procedure for opportunities in any developed country. It is, however, much more important in underdeveloped societies.

Until know, I have talked about societies with developed knowledge of productive forces and techniques. In such societies small adjustments to changed circumstances are constantly needed just to maintain the current level of welfare.

A society with a great number of unknown opportunities, because there was little competition before, has a much greater need for competition.

The further development of a highly developed society can to some extent predicted and controlled. 

But in underdeveloped societies, where the basic questions of which productive forces are present is still not answered, we can not predict the consequences of our actions, or the future development of such a society.

Changes in customs will be the result of a few people experimenting, with others then imitating their successes. If experiments can be prevented, this process will not take place.

Competition both shows possible improvements, and forces everyone to imitate improvements that have been made.

Competition is a kind of "impersonal coercion" to change individual behaviour.

Perhaps, planning for social justice can be afforded by rich countries, but poor countries need to rapidly change in order to grow.

The less a society realises its opportunities, the more potential for growth it has. Thus growth is often a sign of how bad previous policies have been, not of how good current ones are.

The growth rate of a highly developed society is generally lower than that of a less developed society whose resources are imperfectly used.

The share of people willing to experiment is roughly the same in each society.

Entrepreneurial spirit is available everywhere, it is just not expressed everywhere.

Thus, controlling the actions of individuals has very negative effects, especially in less developed countries.

Public power should be limited to protecting individuals from social pressures, through private property and rule of law.

[VII]

When competition between private enterprises is suppressed, it usually comes back in some way or another.

However, with respect to human labour, competition has become ineffective in the western world.

The greatest problem of contemporary economic policy is wage rigidity, that wage level and structure are becoming independent of market conditions.

Most economists see wage rigidity as a given, and are solely looking for ways to deal with the problems arising as a result.

But this is just treating the symptoms, sooner or later we will have to face the actual problem.

Seeing wage rigidity as unavoidable increases it and legitimises them. 

Wage rigidity is the cause of antisocial and destructive effects.

I personally do no longer care about contemporary monetary policy, as it avoids dealing with the major problem.

The current theories are the result of 1920s Britain, where real wages were too high, compared with the rest of the world. This led to exports being lower than necessary, which caused unemployment.

Britain had the oldest and most universal trade union movement in the world. It had conserved a wage structure for reasons of "justice", with no respect for economics.

Relative wages were more or less fixed. Though the situation continued to change, this could not be reflected in wage differences.

In order to achieve full employment many real wages would have to be lowered. However, it is unclear what the effect on the average level of real wages would have been.

Labour productivity depends on how workers are distributed among different occupations. How workers are distributed is determined by relative wages.

With a rigid wage structure, such a society will be unable to adapt to changing circumstances.

Thus, the average wage level at full employment is likely below that of a society with flexible wages.

With circumstances continuing to change, a rigid wage structure thus tends to decrease the real wage level at full employment.

I know of no empirical work on the relationship between growth and wage flexibility. I expect there to be a high correlation.

Growth is both the result and the cause of changed circumstances, and thus should lead to changes in relative wages. 

If wage structure determines real wage level at full employment, wage rigidity in the face of changing circumstances will result in a lower real wage level at full employment.

Thus "incomes policy" or monetary policy thus can only fight the symptoms, but never solve the real problem.

Wage rigidity as caused by trade union policy thus actually depresses the real wage level.

John Stuart Mill: The ideal is “full employment at high wages to the whole labouring population”.

This ideal can be realised only if labour is utilised economically, which only happens with flexible wages.

The prevailing opinion [Keynesian] wants to lower real wages by decreasing the value of money, and thus achieve full employment.

The individual trade unions defend the relative positions of their members, to the detriment of labour as a whole.

We need to convince labour that allowing for flexible relative wages will increase real wages.

A really free labour market is an illusion for the foreseeable future.

I believe employers as a collective need to guarantee the average real income of their employees.

Such a guarantee of average real wages seems the only way to convince labour to allow for flexible relative wages.

Once people are seeing the benefits, we can dismantle this apparatus in favour of a free labour market.

Employers as a collective would guarantee their employees, for a year, the real wage of the previous year plus a share of additional profits.

Each individual worker would receive 5/6th of the previous wage as a paycheck each month. The remainder (plus the share in profit) would be distributed at the end of the year and once books for the year are closed. However, these additional payments are not based on previous real wages, but instead are based on the profits in their respective industry or company.

The next year, the average real wages of the first year would be guaranteed, but distributed among the workers by the same method.

By this method, the free labour market would be effectively restored, but labour would be sure average real wages could not decrease.

This indirect market would lead to large increases in average real wages, but a decrease in the real wages of some groups.

I see no other way than this to escape wage rigidity.

Wage rigidity is itself a cause of economic distress, but it also leads to more economic regidity indirectly through attempts to deal with the symptoms.

While labour could only gain from this proposal, trade unions would lose their power. They are thus likely to reject it.

[txteo]

Alf Hornborg (2006) Animism, fetishism, and objectivism - Summary

Summary: Traditional societies see the non-human world, that is their environment, in social and thus moral terms. Amazonian Indians see animals as persons under animal masks, living things are, at root, subjects. In contrast, most Europeans think of humans as biology under cultural masks, living things are, at root, objects. Modernism is then primarily the introduction of the nature/culture distinction, separating the world of objects and the world of meanings. Nature is understood as being just material, without symbolic or social or moral relations. The meaningless, but knowable material object is an invention of modernity. This perspective allows for a freer manipulation of nature, which is important for capitalist modernity. But everyone is born pre-modern, we are all capable of relatedness, and children constantly form social bonds with inanimate objects. Our detached, objectifying Cartesianism is learned, but it is also a reflection of disembeddedness, alienation, and commodification as social conditions. We are all still able to relate, but only for a limited time in specific contexts: Professionals are trained to act detached in their profession, in order to freely manipulate objects, but in private, our remaining relatedness to favourite objects acts as an anchor for our identity. But modernity has not just taken our embeddedness and relation, we all experience reflexive uncertainty, we are unsure about our own knowledge. In post-modern thinking this chronic skepticism finally leads to resigned gullibility: Any pretense is as good as all others. Instead, we need to take a clear look at our epistemological options. Cartesian objectivism sees knowledge as decontextualised, disinterested, detached, as pure representation of the object. Relativism is the post-modern mirror of this, instead focusing on the construction of knowledge by the subject. But we do have a third option: We can see knowledge as a relation influencing both knower and the known, and acknowledge this relations and the resulting responsibility. Curiously, after spending centuries learning that nature lies beyond morality, we have now begun introducing "environmental ethics". But we actually need new metaphors to relate us to the biosphere. Marx saw the phenomenon of social relations, relations between people, being understood as and treated as relations between things. He called this ideological illusion "fetishism". In this sense, fetishism is another inversion of objectivism: Objectivism subtracts agency and subjectivity from life, fetishism adds them to non-life. Animism then becomes the mid-point on this scale: All living things are subjects, they have at least some perception, communication, and agency. Finding or defining the boundary between persons and things is a universal human problem. Animism, fetishism, and objectivism are three solutions to this problem. With all this in mind, we can now look at technology once again: Technology is quite obviously a tool for a rich minority to appropriate resources from the rest of the world. But at the same time, it is depicted as a gift of the wealthier regions to the rest of the world. Technology is presented as the innocent combination of human creativity and pure nature. Technology as object can not be politically critiqued; its power is the result of objective natural laws. All these claims make sense only because we have internalised the nature/culture and object/subject distinctions. If these distinctions were to collapse, technology would no longer be purely object, it would acquire agency. Productive forces are transformations of human agency. Machines are really machinations. By becoming animists for a moment, we can ask: "What manner of creatures are these things, part mineral, part mind, that serve the few to enslave the many, while fouling the land, the water, and the air?" Revisiting our pre-modern attitudes may be a revolutionary act.

Source: Alf Hornborg (2006) Animism, Fetishism, and Objectivism as Strategies for Knowing (or not Knowing) the World. Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, 71:1, March 2006.

(Full text at scribd.com, English) 

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

Modern people are interested in animism.

Modernism is based on a boundary between the categories of nature, the world of objects, and society, the world of meanings.

Nature is understood as being just material, without symbolic or social relations. This allows for a freer manipulation of nature.

The antithesis to this objectification can be seen in animism.

The relational stance to the environment, seeing plants and inanimate matter as subjects, is still alive in contemporary peoples.

Latour: A symmetric anthropology can use cultural analysis to look at both pre-modern and modern life.

Do modern people in the West animate objects?

Does the objectifying stance come from personal experiences, from education, from social organisation?

What are the results of the objectifying stance?

Why do we ask these questions now?

Latour: We have never been modern. The object/subject separation was always an illusion. 

We attribute agency and personhood to our favourite cars and the like.

Latour: Modernity creates quasi-objects (ozone hole, GMOs) that are both objects and subjects, that are both culture and nature.

We are learning that half of nature and technology is politicaly constructed.

Latour: We should take the agency of objects seriously, but understand its political nature.

Both Latour and Ingold problematise and culturalise the culture/nature and person/object distinctions.

In some spaces, we are all animists in practice: We engage with and relate to the objects.

Buber and Merleau-Ponty want us to continue to relate to things.

The modern phenomena of social disembeddedness and alienation hinder our ability to relate.

All of us are born pre-modern. 

Our modernist objectification is learned and it is contextual: Professionals are detached in their profession to freely manipulate objects, but they keep some relatedness in private.

Modern society in total has no moral concern, but each individual has.

de Castro: Europeans think of humans as biology under cultural masks, living things are, at root, objects. Amazonian Indians see animals as persons under animal masks, living things are, at root, subjects.

The cartesian perspective on nature is counterintuitive: We need to cut the relation to things before we can treat them as objects.

Latour/Descola: Traditional societies see their environment in moral terms.

Descola: Animism is seeing the non-human world in social and thus moral terms.

Europe, having cast off this constraint, created the nature/culture distinction, liberating capitalist modernity.

We have spent centuries to argue that nature lies beyond morality, only to now introduce "environmental ethics".

The moral concerns over nature are not invalid, but irrelevant to modernity.

Uexküll: All organisms with sensory abilities live in their own subjective world. Ecosystems are not just energy or material flows, but also communicative flows of signs.

Bateson: Organisms are shaped by their communicative relations. The crisis of the environment is a crisis of communication.

Western science views their ideas as interesting and quirky, but with little potential for application.

We can hardly imagine modern societies re-learning "subject-subject relatedness".

New age spirituality is a post-modern symptom of collapse, not a way forward.

We need to analytically look at our epistemological options.

The meaningless, but knowable material object is an invention of modernity.

The pre-moderns did not need to worry about epistemology. Their methods of interpretation had immutable authority. Only modern people have reflexive uncertainty, being unsure about their own knowledge.

In post-modern thinking chronic skepticism finally leads to resigned gullibility: Any pretence is as good as all others, and signs regain their status as identity index.

Objectivism understands knowledge as decontextualised, disinterested, and detached representation, as not being part of a relation. 

However, objectivism serves instrumental rationality, and thus the powerful.

Relativism is the post-modern mirror of objectivism, equally resting on the subject/object distinction.

Whereas realism focuses on the represented object, constructivism on the subject, but neither acknowledges their recursive relation.

Animism sees knowledge as a relation influencing both knower and the known, and acknowledges this relations and the resulting responsibility.

Objectivism and relativism are both contrasted with relationism.

We need new metaphors to relate us to the biosphere.

We are born pre-modern, capable of relatedness. We only become detached, objectifying Cartesians by suppressing childhood experiences and learning to disembed ourselves. We are all still able to relate, if only for a limited time in specific contexts.

Objectivism is based on recursivity between "individual existence and socio-technical power structures".

Through and in Descartes emerged alienation as a social condition.

Through ever increasing alienation and commodification, anxieties over the person/thing distinction amplify. The self is dissociated from the non-self.

Our remaining relatedness to favourite objects acts as an anchor for our identity. Relatedness still comes about through long-time immersion in and experience of a place. Relational ontologies may emerge from here.

Marxian fetishism, as ideological illusion, understands relations between people as relations between things.

Animism, as phenomenological experience, understands relations to things as relations to people.

Narrowly-defined animism animates living things, fetishism animates non-living things.

Thus fetishism is an inversion of objectivism: Objectivism subtracts agency and subjectivity from life, fetishism adds it to non-life. 

Animism then becomes the mid-point: All living things are subjects, they have at least some perception, communication, and agency.

Finding or defining the boundary between persons and things is a universal human problem. Animism, fetishism, and objectivism are three solutions to this problem.

Boundaries can be drawn either analytically or ontologically.

Latour's remark invalidate ontological Cartesianism.

However, the analytic distinction of pre-symbolic nature and symbolic society is the basis for understanding and disentangling the hybrid quasi-objects of technology.

We can not analyse thermodynamics and oil prices using the same tools.

I have the intuition that "there is something mysterious about technology", something we can't quite grasp.

Technology is obviously a tool for a rich minority to appropriate resources from the rest of the world.

At the same time it is seen as the innocent combination of human creativity and pure nature.

Technology is depicted as a gift of the wealthier regions to the rest of the world.  

Only through the nature/society and object/subject distinctions can these two views be kept apart.

Technology as object can not be politically critiqued; its power is the result of objective natural laws.

Latour: Economic rationality, scientific truth, and technological efficiency are seen as outside the social.

If these distinctions were to collapse, technology would no longer be purely object, it would acquire agency. 

Productive forces are transformations of human agency. Machines are really machinations. The technical is not neutral, it is at least potentially moral. 

We have to ask as animists: "What manner of creatures are these things, part mineral, part mind, that serve the few to enslave the many, while fouling the land, the water, and the air?"

Animism and relationism open up possibilities of rage and horror.

Our cartesian suppression of relatedness is ideologically useful for industrial capitalism. 

Thus, revisiting our pre-modern attitudes may be a revolutionary act.

[txteo]

Sunday Art: Edward Manigault (1916) Vorticist Landscape, War Impressions. Watercolor on Paper, 50 x 51cm. Minneapolis: Curtis Galleries.

This painting is contemporaneous to Leacock (1916) Are the Rich happy? 

Enjoy your sunday!

[txteo]

Mills (1957) The Structure of Power in American Society - Summary

Summary: Modern democratic states, by their structure, need a real public, an independent civil service and intelligentsia, national parties in open debate, and free associations for the aggregation of opinion and the public will. But actual modern history is the history of constantly growing and increasingly centralising means of power, centralised in military, political, and economic institutions. We have arrived at a "triangle of power", a military-political economy. The family, education, religion, and other areas of society are either controlled and shaped by these institutions, or they are marginalised. Politics was formerly a weak federation of a great number of states, it is now a powerful centralised executive apparatus, influencing all of society. The economy was formerly a great number of small enterprises, holding each other in balance, but it is now a complex of a few closely interrelated corporations, a permanent war economy with private interests. The military used to be a small established elite mistrusted by civilians, but now it is a huge bureaucracy, fiscally the largest part of government. Global military threats have become permanent, and military-corporate interest shaping the reality in which politics and economics operate. The elites have access to means of power of inhuman scale and consequence. A few people are able to transform the globe into a nuclear desert in mere days. The hierarchies of the three domains have similar structures, their closely interconnected elite is of a similar social type, with similar backgrounds, education, and careers. This power elite cooperates formally and informally to advance their interests, but they are not a conspiracy or a plot: "Institutional trends may be defined as opportunities by those who occupy the command posts". It is easy and common for a member to move between the three domains, and lobbying. Because political scientists and journalists are themselves in and thus mainly focused on the middle level, and because as it is here that political news originates, this level is often mistaken for the whole power structure. Here, unions, associations, parties and other interests are somewhat in balance, they compete for the distribution of resources, but their scope and vision is regional. Actions on this middle-level are merely nuisances for the top level decision makers. Political campaigns are focused on local issues, they largely are distractions from the major issues of national and international scope. The most fundamental questions are never publicly discussed, neither in Congress, nor in election campaigns. Farmers are subsidised and thus dependent on the state. The new white-collar middle class is dependent on large corporations. Organised labour has adapted to business, it has become part of the administration of society. The lobbies once thought of as an "invisible government" are now an established part of the government bureaucracy, both legislative and executive, itself. Liberal hopes usually rest on the public and public opinion, while conservatives are suspicious of the masses. The power and influence of the masses is decreasing with the rise of centralisation. Mass media is the primary form of communication, it becomes a tool of distraction for the masses which are their markets. The public are the unorganised and unrepresented people. Standing in for them are experts, which are open-minded, reasonable, and tolerant; without own opinions. The public has no instruments for decision or realising their will. Accordingly they have lost faith in old allegiances, and never taken up new ones. They have become disinterested and indifferent. In many cases, specifically in international relations, decisions appear as accomplished facts, there is no need to persuade the masses. Neither the rulers nor the ruled need moral beliefs or intellectual convictions for power to exist.

Source: Charles Wright Mills (1957) The Structure of Power in American Society. Lecture at the Beatrice Webb House, Surrey, on 2nd of March 1957. Also held at the University of Frankfurt, 3rd of May 1957. Published in The British Journal of Sociology 9:1, March 1958.

(Full text at wordpress.com, English) (PDF at JSTOR) This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

[I] Power is about people deciding on their living arrangements and on historical events.

There are of course events and changes in arrangements that do not result from human decision.

But looking at cases, where decisions are made, the question of power is the question of who participates in decision-making. Or if decisions are not made, who fails to do so?

Government is not, in the final analysis, always government by consent of the governed.

Power today includes the power to influence and manage the consent of others.

We do not know the limits of this power, but we hope there are some.

We need to distinguish three forms of power.

Coercion is the type of power of the last resort.

Authority is power, "justified by the beliefs of the voluntarily obedient".

Manipulation is power, "wielded unbeknown to the powerless".

In contrast to medieval time, power has become less authoritative. Governors can often exercise their power without ideas that justify this power.

In many cases, specifically in international relations, decisions appear as accomplished facts, there is no need to persuade the masses.

Ideologies of power often are reactions to oppositions to power. In the US, at least recently, there has been no effective opposition to power.

A great number of people have lost faith in old allegiances, and never taken up new ones. These people are inactionary, without any interest in politics.

The greeks called the fully private person an idiot.

Ideologies are frequently absent from politics.

The masses are often indifferent to politics.

Neither the rulers nor the ruled need moral beliefs or intellectual convictions for power to exist.

This situation is a major reason for modern politcal bewilderment and the troubles of political intellectuals.

We do not know how much of history actually is the result of conscious decision-making.

The answer is dependent on the means of power available in each situation.

A great number of actions of a great number of people can alter their milieux, and thereby, step-by-step, change the structure of society iteself. While the result of human action, these changes happen without conscious decision for or against them.

Marx: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; the do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves..."

However, in the contemporary United States and Soviet Union, a few select people can make decisions that seriously affect the structure of society.

These elites also can not do as they please, they as well do not chose their circumstances, but their decisions are significantly less limited than those of other people or people in other times.

To make history today, one needs access to power and decision-making processes.

Ordinary people do not make history in this sense, they are becoming the tools of those who do make history.

Modern history is the history of constantly growing and increasingly centralising means of power. They are centralised in military, political, and economic institutions.

Economic institutions have risen with industrial society, military and political ones with the nation state.

In the West, these changes have happened slowly, and their development was somewhat controlled by older cultural traditions. 

The Soviet Union has seen similar, but much more rapid changes, as the discourses of Reformation, Rennaissance, and Enlightenment were not deeply rooted in society and thus unable to control these development. As a result, the means of power have become even more centralised and co-ordinated.

But despite their differences, both in the US and the SU, power has now similar forms and international reach.

The economic and military power of either of these two has grown beyond any comparison.

A few people are able to transform the globe into a nuclear desert in mere days.

The elites have access to means of power of inhuman scale and consequence.

I will focus on the United States in the middle of the 20th century.

In studying a society we often confuse its contemporary reality with images from its past. We must study history to avoid this mistake.

In the early 19th century, the American state was limited and comparably weak. Economic organisations were widely distributed, and mostly independent from each other.

The militia has no central command, and consisted of men with rifles.

Tawney: "no more excellent social order than that in which the mas of the people were the masters of the holdings which they ploughed and the tools with thich they worked ... It is a quietness to a man's mind to live upon his own and to know his heir certain."

These are the images of the past, and they are irrelevant to our understanding of the contemporary United States.

[II]

Decision- and history-making is now concentrated in economic, political, and military institutions. 

The family, education, religion, and other areas of society are either controlled and shaped by these institutions, or they are marginalised.

The institutions have taken in, and are driven by a "fabulous technology", resulting in mutual influence between them and the technology.

The effect of each domain on the others has increased, as has their interactions.

We have arrived at a "triangle of power", a military-political economy.

The elites of each domain have joined, and now are the American power elite.

The political domain was once characterised by a great number of states, weakly federated.

It is now a powerful centralised executive apparatus, influencing all of society.

Its growth has not created an independent bureaucracy, but business people now staff the political directorate.

The economic domain used to consist of a great number of small enterprises, holding each other in balance.

It is now a complex of a few closely interrelated corporations, a permanent war economy with private interests.

The military and the corporations have overlapping interests, strong enough to make political interests mostly irrelevant.

The military domain used to be a small established elite mistrusted by civilians.

It is now a huge bureaucracy, fiscally it is the largest part of government. Military threats are permanent, shaping the reality in which politics and economics operate.

While the US has long focused on domestic policies, from the 1940s on, it shifted towards international relations. However, there are no established democratic traditions to deal with international relations, which are instead controlled by the power elite.

[(i)] The power elite is of similar social type, with similar backgrounds, education, and careers.

It is easy and common for a member to move between the three domains, and lobbying.

[(ii)] The hierarchies of the three domains have similar structures, and they are closely interconnected.

The unity (or similarity) of these institutions, and the situation they are located in led to the selection of similar persons, which explains the unity of elites.

[(iii)] The unity of the elite is the result of common social gatherings, similar lifestyles and attitudes.

The unity of the elite is also the result of their explicit coordination. 

"institutional trends may be defined as opportunities by those who occupy the command posts"

People from each domain predicted and actively promoted their coming together.

The elite cooperates formally and informally to advance their interests.

This idea of the power elite is an interpretation of the institutional trends described above, and the similarities between the people governing each domain.

[III]

A widely held liberal interpretation of power distribution in America is one of balance, competition and compromise between different interests. This idea is modeled on the market.

The image of unions, associations, parties and other interests in balance is true, but only of the middle level of power.

Political scientists and journalists are mainly focused on this middle level, as it is here that political news originates.

The top level of power decides on international questions of war and poverty. 

The interests that are competing and can be said to be in some kind of balance have no chance or ambition to reach these top positions of power. Instead their competition is about distributing the available resources to their respective advantage; their scope and vision is regional.

Actions on this middle-level are merely nuisances for the top level decision makers.

[(i)] The United States has no parties of national scope that formulate alternative policies on the major national and international questions.

The most fundamental questions are not publicly discussed, neither in Congress, nor in election campaigns.

The Formosa Crisis of 1955 and the Syrian Crisis of 1957 are examples where Congress and the public did not participate in any decisions.

Political campaigns are focused on local issues, they largely are distractions from the major issues of national and international scope.

Both major American parties are semi-feudal in their organisation, and with regard to major national issues they fail to show clear party lines.

Politicians focus on the interests of their local constituencies as far as re-election is concerned. This creates the impression of a different party in each state.

[(ii)] Today's political associations are mass associations, the influences of individuals on them are minor.

There are no political organisations effectively connecting the different levels of power.

In the 1930s, organised labour was set to become an autonomous national power.

Now, without the depression, it has ceased to lead political struggles, and has become part of the administration of society.

Labour has adapted to business, it merely fights for its share of available resources, and no longer questions the prevailing way of life.

[(iii)] The balance of power posited is based on the existence of a large middle class. 

The old, independent middle class of small business owners and farmers has declined since the Progressive Era.

Farmers are subsidised and thus dependent on the state.

The new white-collar middle class is economically dependent on large corporations, and it is not politically organised to any considerable degree.

The agrarian revolt of the 1890s, and the labour revolt of the 1930s failed to become autonomous political actors. They have become established interests within the corporate framework of the middle level of power.

The lobbies once thought of as an "invisible government" are now an established part of the government bureaucracy, both legislative and executive, itself.

Conflicts between political parties in elections have decreased in importance.

Most politicians in Congress are now part of the middle level of power.

Major decisions are now made in official secrecy.

[IV]

Liberal hopes usually rest on the public and public opinion. 

Conservatives, on the other hand, always suspect the power masses of leading to the triumph of barbarism. 

However, the power and influence of the masses actually decreases.

Mass media links the discussions of face-to-face publics to one another.

With the rise of mass media, it has become the primary form of communication. The masses or publics are simply the markets of the mass media.

The public are not those who identify themselves as labour, business or farmers.

The public are the unorganised and unrepresented parts of the middle class.

For the administration, the public is represented in committees by experts with information, but mostly without clear opinions.

In this representation, the public is open-minded, reasonable, and tolerant, all of which are synonyms for an aversion to clear positions.

The 18th century idea of public opinion is similar to the idea of the free market: The reason of individuals is aggregated through discussion, which leads to solution to the problems of the day. 

This idea is "a fairy tale".

Just as the large centralised organisations have grown, so the public has diminished in importance.

The mass media is a tool of distraction, they do not aggregrate but render ineffective the rationality of the masses.

The public has no instruments for decision or realising their will. Accordingly they become disinterested and indifferent.

Modern democratic states, by their structure, need a real public, an independent civil service and intelligentsia, national parties in open debate, and free associations for the aggregation of opinion and the public will.

This does not describe the situation in the contemporary United States.

The power of the elite has become hard to comprehend, the middle level is more in stalemate than in balance, the bottom level is fragmented, powerless, and disinterested.

I believe neither liberal nor marxian analyses can really understand these phenomena. Both were created to describe societies very much unlike the contemporary US.

Liberalism was always concerned "with freedom and rationality as supreme facts about the individual".

Marxism was always concerned with freedom and rationality "as supreme facts about man's role in the political making of history".

I hope to have described the reasons for why freedom and rationality have become so ambiguous.

[txteo]

Raymond Geuss (1981) Ideology in the positive Sense - Summary

THIS IS AN OLD 3-PART SUMMARY. PLEASE USE THE NEW MERGED VERSION INSTEAD. THANK YOU.

Summary: Ideology is a term used to answer very different questions, and accordingly has many meanings. In a positive sense, ideology is understood as the world-view best fitting a a group or society. A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live, it thus aids the human need for identity, meaning, and participation in a culture. The socio-cultural structure of a society may thus satisfy or frustrate a number of human needs. Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology. Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation. An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests. Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class.

Source: Raymond Geuss (1981) Ideology in the positive Sense. Chapter 1.3 in Geuss (1981) The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

(Full text at autodidactproject.org, English) 

This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.

Detailed Summary

To be part of and participating in a culture is connected to the human need for identity and a meaningful life.

A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live.

The socio-cultural structure of a society may satisfy or frustrate a number of other human needs.

We can thus search for the most fitting ideology for a group, which ideology will serve them best in furthering their interest and satisfying their needs.

We can thus speak of an ideology in a positive sense.

Whereas ideologies in the descriptive or pejorative sense are the result of investigation and analysis, ideology in the positive sense is of the future, it still needs to be constructed.

Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology.

Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation.

An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests.

But one might have to restrict some interests or desires that are harmful, or disallow blatant falsehoods. Without such restrictions the distinction between the pejorative and the positive sense becomes unclear.

Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class. The bourgeoisie might profit from holding a form of false consciousness, as their objective prospects for the future are hopeless.

Historically, oppression has been linked with satisfaction of self-interest, identity, and false consciousness. Perjorative ideologies have utilised human needs and aspirations to bring them to accept the repressive ideological form of consciousness.

In reality, the interests, needs, and desires of people are not really fixed, and they are hard to isolate.

A newly created ideology may influence needs and desires, or it may be a reaction to changing needs and desires. Inversely, it might lead to needs and desires being rejected or repressed.

Christianity, for example, both furthered and led to the repression of certain pre-existing needs and desires.

We are probably unable to imagine an abstract or normal person in a particular society at a particular time, and then look in how far different ideologies can satisfy the person's needs and desires.