Hello! I have been following you on Reddit. Your comments have been of great understanding in which I must thank you for. I would like your opinion in regards to the controversial "loan" of Jingzhou. You might be aware of Xiahou Mao who argues in favor of Shu (or from a Shu standpoint) and believes that Lu Meng's and Wu's betrayal was throwing out the balance of power in the recent Southland post. I would like to gain more perspective on the topic.
Ah, the Jingzhou question.Â
For starters, the âloanâ itself was almost certainly a face saving spin put on by Sun Quan after the plans to conquer Yizhou fell through. Liu Bei had gotten de facto control of most of the Jingzhou territory south of Jiangling following the battle at Chibi, a position that Sun Quan originally confirmed due to his need to maintain a united front against Cao Cao. The death of Zhou Yu shortly before had also weakened Sun Quanâs hand in in the west, and his position within Nan and Jiangling ended up incredibly exposed from both north and south. Liu Beiâs visit to Sun Quanâs court to request the remainder of Jingzhou in 209 may have actually contained a veiled threat that if Sun Quan didnât turn over these territories, Liu Bei would take them. If there was any agreement about the timetable of ownership, both sides almost certainly understood it to be farcical in nature. Liu Bei certainly had no intention to give up any land he acquired, and Sun Quan probably had no expectation that he would.
That being said, Liu Beiâs claim on the province therefore rested on the fact that Sun Quan had acknowledged it in some respect. Whether made permanently or temporally, Liu Bei had no other authority backing him except his own, which meant that if Sun Quan ever withdrew his support, the question could only really be answered by force. There was the question of the alliance, but the whole thing had been on shaky ground almost immediately after Chibi, especially since it was obvious that Sun Quan was not gaining nearly as much out of it as Liu Bei was. In reality, the spirit of the alliance was broken long before the letter of it was.
So on the topic of force, was the Wu takeover of Jingzhou a strategic error? The answer relies on the question of what Wuâs aims were.Â
If they were merely trying to remove Cao Cao from his power over the Han imperial court (as Liu Bei was), then thereâs a decent argument to be made that attacking Liu Bei was counterproductive. Though Liu Bei was an untrustworthy ally at best, he wasnât quite the same immediate threat that Cao Cao was. Going to war with the only other warlord to share your goals just to improve your own personal position would be cutting off your nose to spite your face.Â
I would posit however, that who controlled the Han court was of not a factor in Sun Quanâs larger plans. Rather, the majority of his work seemed to be dedicated to making the south an independent entity from any force to the north. So long as Cao Cao couldnât project power south of the Yangtze, there wasnât a need to destroy and replace him. Sun Quanâs recognition of Cao Caoâs suzerainty shortly after the Ruxu campaign in 217 very much shows this. In this situation, the balance of power changes. Sun Quanâs aim becomes not to strike north, but to consolidate the south against the north. This is where Liu Beiâs hold over Jingzhou becomes a problem.
Simply put, thereâs no scenario where Liu Bei holding Jing works out well for Sun Quan. If Liu Beiâs northern offensives are successful, Sun Quan will eventually have to either fight or submit to a much stronger Liu Bei who is on his doorstep and has inroads into his lands. Liu Bei would have had no more inclination to let him be independent than Cao Cao would have, especially since their relation ended up strained almost immediately. If Liu Beiâs northern offensives arenât successful, then thereâs a very good chance that a counteroffensive by Cao Cao will allow him to invest south of the Yangtze, providing a base for him to strike east against Sun Quan while bypassing Sun Quanâs biggest advantage. If Sun Quan wants to be secure in his holdings, he needs to hold as much of the southern bank of the Yangtze as possible. Any stalemate would just prolong the question and raise the chances that one of the two would turn on him first.Â
Finally, Sun Quan has a massive diplomatic advantage in flexibility. He could reasonably align himself with either side and still come out on top. Liu Bei and Cao Cao would never unite against him, partially due to their competing claims about the Han, partially due to their personal enmity. Liu Bei especially had very little hope of taking on both Cao Cao and Sun Quan for long. His Yiling campaign was founded on fortuitous timing with the deaths of Sun Quanâs senior commanders in 219 and of Cao Cao in 220, but even that would have been near impossible to keep rolling for long enough to conquer the gargantuan territory of Sun Quan before Cao Pi threw his hat in the ring to the west and north. Ultimately then, no matter the outcome of the Jingzhou attack, Sun Quan could maneuver his way at least back to his original position, if not stronger, because Liu Bei and the rest of Shu needed him far more than he needed them.Â
So in summary, given what Sun Quan was trying to achieve, itâs hard to see what balance of power was at risk with this âbetrayal.â Almost any reasonable outcome would at least end with Sun Quan back where he started, if not even stronger. Historically of course, we know that it paid huge dividends for him. Seeing it as a setback requires looking at it from Liu Beiâs perspective of removing Cao Cao and reuniting the Han under himself, but that was almost definitely counter to Sun Quanâs goals.