When I’m accompanying a group of visitors in the European Parliament.
Work!
★
The Bowery Presents

PR's Tumblrdome
Lint Roller? I Barely Know Her
Sade Olutola
ojovivo
The Stonewall Inn
No title available
cherry valley forever
official daine visual archive
Monterey Bay Aquarium
🪼

roma★

@theartofmadeline
No title available
Claire Keane
EXPECTATIONS
The Bright Sessions

No title available

Product Placement
seen from United States
seen from United States
seen from France
seen from Ecuador
seen from Brazil
seen from Mexico

seen from Peru
seen from Nepal

seen from United Kingdom
seen from United States
seen from Vietnam
seen from Maldives

seen from Russia

seen from United States
seen from Netherlands
seen from United States

seen from United States
seen from Brazil

seen from New Zealand

seen from United Kingdom
@bitandbods
When I’m accompanying a group of visitors in the European Parliament.
Work!
A propaganda film about propaganda wrapped up in a propaganda campaign
Abraham Lincoln is acknowledged as one of America’s greatest presidents. Here is a brief summary of his career: Failed in business: 1831 Defeated for legislature: 1832 Failed in business again: 1833 Elected to legislature: 1834 Sweetheart died: 1835 Had nervous breakdown: 1836 Defeated for...
The Cosmopolitans vs. the Neo-cosmopolitans
A case study on the arguments of Rawls, Beitz, Pogge, Caney, Barry, Wenar, Miller, Blake and Nagel
Cosmopolitans tend to argue for universal duties of fairness and equality by taking domestic theories of justice and applying them on a global scale. Along the way, they also establish universal duties of minimal wellbeing.
Cosmopolitans usually take the best arguments for duties of fairness and equality in the domestic arena, and use them to argue for universal duties of fairness and equality in the global arena. Thus for example, Beitz and early Pogge take Rawls’s argument for his Difference Principle in the domestic arena (i.e. the original position), extend the parties involved in the original position to include everyone around the world, and use it to argue for something similar to Rawls’s Difference Principle in the global arena. Caney also does this when he argues for his global norms of distributive justice, which include subsistence rights, equality of opportunity, a principle of equal remuneration for equal work, and a priority for the poor.
“… I now want to introduce a general claim about the character of the arguments employed to defend cosmopolitan principles of justice… the scope claim: the standard justifications of principles of distributive justice entail that there are cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. The latter maintains that the very logic that underpins most domestic theories of justice actually implies that these theories of distributive justice should be enacted at the global, and not (or not simply) the domestic, level”.
The difference between Beitz’s and Pogge’s positions is just that, while Beitz contends that the resulting universal duties of fairness and equality are exactly the same as Rawls’s Difference Principle in the domestic arena, Pogge contends that they would be less stringent than their domestic analogues.
Against the cosmopolitans, the neo-cosmopolitans argue that arguments for duties of fairness and equality in the domestic arena cannot and should not be seamlessly moved into the global arena to argue for universal duties of fairness and equality. Some of their arguments target a specific cosmopolitan. For example, against Beitz, Barry argues that trading in the global arena is not the relevant kind of cooperation that grounds Rawls’s arguments for his Difference Principle in the domestic arena. Thus Beitz cannot just use Rawls’s argument to argue for a Difference Principle in the global arena.
There are also arguments targeting certain approaches that cosmopolitans widely use. For example, against the prospect of extending Rawls’s theory of justice, i.e. the two principles of justice, from the domestic arena to the global arena, Wenar argues that the global public political culture is different from the public political culture of a liberal democratic society.
While the latter supports Rawls’s theory of justice in the domestic arena, the former does not support it in the global arena. Against those he calls the ‘global extrapolators’, Richard Miller argues for a view similar to Barry’s, that the mere fact of economic interdependence in the global arena does not sustain a demanding duty to help the disadvantaged. This is because what primarily ground this duty in the domestic arena are not facts of economic interdependence, but facts of political interaction. Finally, there are arguments targeting cosmopolitans in general. For example, Blake argues that there are duties of fairness and equality in the domestic arena, i.e. states that coercively impose property laws. This is because those duties are required to justify this kind of coercion. But this kind of coercion does not exist in the global arena. Thus there are no duties of fairness and equality in the global arena. Nagel also argues for something similar. According to Nagel, there are duties of fairness and equality in the domestic arena, i.e. the arena of sovereign states. This is because sovereign states impose coercion in the name of their subjects, and those duties are required to justify such an imposition. But there is nothing in the global arena that imposes coercion in the name of the individuals around the world. Thus there are no duties of fairness and equality in the global arena.
I believe that the main difference between Blake’s and Nagel’s position is how they understand the kind of coercion that is at stake here. For Blake, it is the coercive imposition of property laws by states. While for Nagel, it is the coercion imposed by sovereign states in the name of their subjects.
David Miller also offers arguments against the cosmopolitans. According to his first argument, there are duties of fairness and equality in the domestic arena because justice involves establishing the conditions under which individuals within a domestic arena can continually act as free and equal citizens. In contrast, nothing in the global arena is equivalent to that. Rather, individuals relate to each other in the global arena “... as citizens of independent national communities, where each citizen body has a collective interest in determining the future of its own community”.
In his second argument, Miller argues that as long as the cosmopolitans argue for their case by arguing that nationality is a morally arbitrary feature of individuals, then the cosmopolitans can be refuted by showing that nationality is not a morally arbitrary feature of individuals.
This debate between the cosmopolitans and the neo-cosmopolitans runs deep and from an epistemological point of view it is impossible to dichotomize. However we can observe, based on the arguments that we have analyzed, that cosmopolitans and the neo-cosmopolitans agree that there are universal duties of minimal wellbeing.
Furthermore, this relation that is specified in terms of fairness and equality is determined by the form of that cooperation. This is how I think the debate between the cosmopolitans and the neo-cosmopolitans can be resolved
Sources
Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations
Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights.
Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy
Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders
Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice
Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice
Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
Leif Wenar, Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian
However, these “theories” about the sovereignty of the people and about delegation and representation reflect something more than an ideological postulate and a few pieces of legal technique. They complement a sociology or social philosophy of the body politic that, partly under the influence of the revival of Greek speculations on the subject, partly under the influence of the events of the time,¹⁸ took shape and reached its apogee toward the end of the eighteenth century and actually tried to solve the problem. Though such general terms are never adequate or strictly correct, I will risk describing it—in the usual way—as fundamentally rationalist, hedonist and individualist: the happiness, defined in hedonic terms, of individuals endowed with a clear perception—or amenable to education that will impart clear perception—both of this end and of the appropriate means, was conceived as the meaning of life and the grand principle of action in the private as well as in the political sphere. We may just as well designate this sociology or social philosophy, the product of early capitalism, by the term introduced by John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism. According to it, behavior conforming to that principle was not merely the only rational and justifiable but ipso facto also the “natural” one. This proposition is the bridge between the otherwise very different theories of Bentham and Rousseau’s contrat social….
Schumpeter - Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 219
How utilitarianism is connected to social contract theories. It’s refreshing how dismissive Schumpeter is about classical political theory, as in his footnote:
¹⁸: This is particularly obvious in England and especially in the case of John Locke. As a political philosopher he simply pleaded, in the guise of general argument, against James II and for his Whig friends who made themselves responsible for the “glorious” revolution. This accounts for the success of a line of reasoning that without this practical connotation would have been beneath contempt. The end of government is the good of the people and this good consists in the protection of private property which is why men “enter into society.” For this purpose they meet and make an Original Contract of submission to a common authority. This contract is broken, property and liberty endangered and resistance justified when, to put it frankly. Whig aristocrats and London merchants think they are.
(via fuckyeahpierosraffa)
Utilitarianism as a moral conduit
Jeremy Bentham’s (1748-1832) principle of utility is open to the objection that it may well sacrifice the rights of the minority for the sake of the happiness of the majority. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), himself a utilitarian, sought to rescue utilitarianism from this and other objections. In his essay Utilitarianism, Mill argues that respect for individuals’ rights as “the most sacred and binding part of morality” is compatible with the idea that justice rests ultimately on utilitarian considerations. But is Mill right to be confident? Can the principle of utility support the notion that some rights should be upheld even if doing so makes the majority very unhappy?
Consider the example, of the Romans throwing Christians to lions in the Coliseum. If enough cheering spectators derive great pleasure from this violent practice, are there any grounds on which a utilitarian could condemn it?
Utilitarianism is by definition ' the greatest good for the greatest number'. What the situation above brings into question is what is 'good'. In that moment in time did the Romans consider morale justification, or the Christian's feelings, or where they just in the moment enjoying an event which had become a social norm at the time? Now times have changed and such actions look relatively ludicrous, but are they? Still now groups of people get together and form a crowd to watch various forms of contemporary entertainment - boxing, wrestling, and ultimate fighting - whether it be at a local, national or international level. These events although seldom result in deaths encourage the beating and contest between two or more human beings for 'entertainment'. Is that morally reasonable, surely that is worse than watching an animal do the damage as these are two human beings, or are the spectators who watch thinking at this level, or are they in the moment, maybe with their family, enjoying what they view as harmless entertainment? Times have changed but enjoyment and pleasure in physical contests are still prevalent but take different forms, it is with belief that I feel no utilitarian could argue against the situation described as in that instant it truly is providing 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. Had the question brought in John Mill and his humanitarian side to the debate then this, in my opinion, would no longer be the case as types and standards of pleasure then begin to be quantified and we would have to approach the question in a different manner.
The enlightenment and Utilitarianism recognized the significance of human emotion and experience in their impact on judgment about public policy and morality rather than unquestionable dogma derived from claims about God's laws. Prior to late 17th century, happiness was considered a matter of luck or virtue or divine favor. After the enlightenment the pursuit of happiness became a liberating concept that enabled us to improve our lot in life, individually and collectively.
Utlitarianism was a great leap forward in moral thinking after over a thousand years of Aristotilian Scholasticism whereby the Catholic Church was the embodiment of moral thinking. Scripture and the finality of God's word according to the Pope trumped considerations from observation and experience before the scientific method and the enlightenment.
Considering the basic beliefs of Utilitarians, the simple answer would be no, they would not condemn the actions of the Romans. That is just the simple answer, based on the most basic beliefs of people who claim to be Utilitarian. However, by inserting a few conditions, I can be devils's advocate and make the case for Utilitarians. 1. The crowd who gains pleasure marks less than 50% of the entire population of the society 2. The number of people who would feel sadness, guilt, or any negative emotions and feelings from the death of Christians is greater than 50% of the entire population of the society. 3. Pleasure or displeasure of an entity, regardless of it's size, is measured equivalently to the pleasure or displeasure of other entity composed of same number of indivisuals. (In other words, a person who feels happy from getting a free meal at Denny's is equivalent to that of a person who won a lottery. Displeasure of a person who lost his lunch money is equivalent to that of a person who lost a loved one.) 4. Pleasure and displeasure cancels each other out in the calculation of happiness as a soceity, regardless of its size. 5. Each and every indivisual, regardless of the social or economical status of the indivisual, is calculated as one indivisual in the calculation of society's happiness. If these conditions are met, than Yes, the utilitarians can condemn the action of throwing Christians to the lions.
The greater good doesn't have to be the "majority" good. we should always thrive to achieve well-being for every individual in the society. Maximizing utility is premised on virtue, morality, compassion, the will to see better life for everyone. In the Romans case, they were not obviously thinking about the greater good, they were just engaging in brutality and disregard of life that would create profound displeasure and instability in the long run which was no good to the society. In short, minority rights don't have to be sacrificed for the greater good. For example, a community in a city has to be relocated to make way for the construction of a highway. The highway would provide benefits for commuters of the city except those would be relocated. How should we deal with that? Well, the obvious option is to provide them with adequate compensation so they would not be put into a more disadvantaged situation before their relocation. With that, there would be less objection to the construction plan. That's a win-win scenario. That's greater good for all.
Remove the label of Christianity or Roman. Men thrown to the lions for an excruciating death for the pleasure of other men. Is it ok? Let’s analyze a case, where this happens, daily, in western society. Men are killed in wars in the East (whether justly or unjustly) such that the major watching masses of the West can feel more secure (their pleasure is enhanced at the expense of those that die). Different situation; but there is a parallel. Men thrown to the lions; men thrown in to war. Killed by lions; killed by war. Pleasure for the Romans; security for the West. That’s just one issue; we would say the latter (many in the west would condone it) that it is done to eliminate any further state to the United States of America. However, it has a price. To enhance utility; you pay the price of those men.
Reason why I stated to remove the labels: Let’s put them back on. In Western society, it doesn’t necessarily have to extend to the East. This is in parallel with the Roman society; does not need to extend to Christians. On this premise, the society of the West and, in retrospect, the Romans enjoy a utility for the price of another society's men. Boundaries are inherent in this example. Many Romans at this time would not have given a Christian the same rights, as they would have to a Roman. Once again parallel to the fact that millions have died in the West's wars, regardless of the few thousand that died in 9/11. Cultural boundaries exist and I guess for someone could use this argument to un-demonize utilitarianism.
Another prospect to emerge; if Romans were throwing Romans to the lions, or the same thing if the Christians were throwing their own it. Would that be justifiable? I do not know, now. Utility may be enhanced but who chose those were the ones to die. Had they done something wrong? Did they have less relatives or academic/financial worth to society and thus killing was justifiable if it provided pleasure to the rest of society? Just some of the questions that can come from this.
Foucault and social media: life in a virtual panopticon
You start the day bleary-eyed and anxious. You stayed up late last night working on a post for your blog, gathering facts and memes from about the web and weaving them into an incisive whole. Has it produced a spike in the stats? You sign in on your iPhone as you brew the coffee. But it’s too early to slip into the professional headspace – you decide that you don’t want to know. Someone has messaged you on Facebook, so you check that instead. Japanese manga mashup! Killer breaks off the cost of Lombok. Lady Gaga is a man and we have photoshopped evidence to prove it! A friend will appreciate that one, so you share it with her directly. Perhaps not something that you’d want to share widely. Two new contact requests on LinkedIn. Your profile needs updating. Should you include details about the design work you completed for the local event the week before? You are not sure. You are building your profile as a graphic artist and looking for quality clients. Perhaps this is a part of your person that you will let incubate for a while longer. You jump on HootSuite and start sharing targeted content: Facebook for friends, tweets for professional contacts. The day has barely started and already you are split into half a dozen pieces. How did we ever get by without social media? In under a decade, free online services like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn have utterly transformed how we work, play, and communicate. For hundreds of millions of people, sharing content across a range of social media services is a familiar part of life. Yet little is known about how social media is impacting us on a psychological level. A wealth of commentators are exploring how social media is refiguring forms of economic activity, reshaping our institutions, and transforming our social and organizational practices. We are still learning about how social media impacts on our sense of personal identity. The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) has a set of insights that can help clarify how social media affects us on a psychological level. Foucault died before the advent of the internet, yet his studies of social conditioning and identity formation in relation to power are applicable to life online. Seen from a Foucaultian perspective, social media is more than a vehicle for exchanging information. Social media is a vehicle for identity-formation. Social media involves ‘subjectivation’. A Foucaultian perspective on social media targets the mechanism that makes it tick: sharing. Sharing is basic to social media. Sharing content is not just a neutral exchange of information, however. Mostly, when we share content on social media services, we do it transparently, visibly, that is in the presence of a crowd. The act of sharing is a performance, to an extent – it a performative act, an act that does something in the world, as J.L. Austin would say. This is important. The performative aspect of sharing shapes the logic and experience of the act itself. There is a self-reflexive structure to sharing content on Facebook or Twitter. Just as actors on stage know that they are being watched by the audience and tailor their behaviour to find the best effect, effective use of social media implies selecting and framing content with a view to pleasing and/or impressing a certain crowd. We may not intend to do this but it is essential to doing it well. Unless we are sharing anonymously (and the radical end of internet culture, Anonymous, favours anonymity), all the content we share is tagged with an existential marker: ‘I sent this – it is part of my work. You shall know me by my works’. Foucault understood how being made constantly visible impacts on us psychologically. Foucault was fascinated by Jeremy Bentham’s model of the ideal prison, the Panopticon, which has been incorporated in the architecture of prisons, schools, hospitals, workplaces, and urban spaces since Bentham designed it in the eighteenth century. In Benthem’s design, the Panopticon is comprised of a ring of cells surrounding a central guard tower. The prisoners in the cells are perpetually exposed to the gaze of the guards in the tower, yet since they cannot themselves see into the tower, they are never certain whether or not they are being watched. Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault argues, functions to make prisoners take responsibility for regulating their behaviour. Assuming that they care about the implications of bad behaviour, prisoners will act in the manner prescribed by the institution at all times on the chance that they are being watched. In time, as the sense of being watched gets under their skin, prisoners come to regulate their behaviour as if they were in a Panopticon all times, even after they have been released from the institution. This, Foucault claims, is ‘the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’ (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 201). ‘Conscious and permanent visibility’…’ Apparantly this is what Mark Zuckerberg thinks social media is all about. By making our actions and shares visible to a crowd, social media exposes us to a kind of virtual Panopticon. This is not just because our activities are monitored and recorded by the social media service for the purposes of producing market analysis or generating targeted advertising. For the most part, we can and do ignore this kind of data harvesting. The surveillance that directly affects us and impacts on our behaviour comes from the people with whom we share. There are no guards and no prisoners in Facebook’s virtual Panopticon. We are both guards and prisoners, watching and implicitly judging one another as we share content. In sharing online, we are playing to a crowd. On some level, we acknowledge this. The crowd consumes the content that we share and, if we are favoured, it passes it on. The crowd honours the identity that we create by sharing this content. Sharing online is not solely a matter of self-affirmation and self-creation. For many people, the sharing impulse stems from a sincere desire to empower and inform their tribes and communities. We may be genuinely committed to getting the word out, or passing the word along, or just playing a part in keeping the conversation going by commenting on or liking what others have shared. The point is that whatever action we take, we make a personal statement in doing so: ‘I affirm this; I share it; I like it’. We speak to a crowd of our personal preferences, and we like nothing more than for the crowd to affirm those preferences in return. No doubt this satisfies a deep psychological need for recognition. Whatever it is that drives it, it draws us back to share and share again.
Political Science for nerds!
Prophetic 1995 Student Internet PSA (by RackFocusFilms)
If we let the door shut on internet freedom, it’s gone forever. We can’t imagine longterm cost to democracy.
Sandy Garossino, Founder and CEO of Intellex Legal Project Management Inc. speaking at CreativeMornings/Vancouver (*watch the talk)
(via TumbleOn)
Direct-ish democracy
When speaking of direct democracy, most political thinkers are invoking the Athenian example. As we all know, this was a political system that allowed citizens to benefit from those few liberties that define direct democracy: they could all meet in the legendary agora, they were all granted the freedom of expressing their opinions, they could all vote for or against any decision regarding the problems related to their community’s welfare. The actual representative form of democracy is almost always criticized in the light of this ideal situation, without any consideration for the historical conditions that made this exceptional political system possible. There were only a few citizens living in Athens, they could all meet, they could all discuss public matters. The historians prove that this is only an idealized version of what Athenian democracy was really like. So, why is this ideal image, this political myth, still haunting us? The answer is quite simple: we feel the need of invoking this type of system as the actual democracy, the representative one, proves to be disappointing in many respects.
The distance between us and our elected representatives is constantly growing. We feel the people we vote for always have a personal agenda, far more important that the public agenda, they were elected for. We feel betrayed by the fact that the important problems concerning our society’s welfare are left behind and the public debate is dominated by cheap political scandal. We feel that the laws are mere instrument of personal benefit. And the list could go on indefinitely. As hope dies last, the new mass communication technologies are regarded as the instrument that could bring us closer to a form of purified democracy. That is, by using state of the art communication media we should get closer to the political power. The decision would be literally in our hands, as the practices of direct democracy(the referendum, for instance), could be used on a daily basis.
In this show we interview Tim Berners-Lee (the inventor of the Web), James Wells - one of the founders of RealAudio and explore how to set up dial-up networking in Windows-95. This show was originally taped in 1996.
TEDxObserver - Rick Falkvinge - The Pirate Party - the politics of protest (by TEDxTalks)
WHEN SOMEONE UNFOLLOWS ME.
The Internet is redistributing political influence; it is broadening the public sphere, increasing political participation, involving citizens in political activities that were previously closed to them, and challenging the monopoly of traditional elites.
WHEN I HEARD ABOUT THE FACEBOOK IPO FAIL.
Sinan Aral - TEDxColumbiaEngineering - Sinan Aral - 11/29/11 (by ColumbiaSEAS)