Impeachment Is Not a Reply to an Unpopular Judgment
By Manisha Anand Tiwari
The recent move by 107 Members of Parliament to initiate impeachment proceedings against Justice G.R. Swaminathan of the Madras High Court marks a deeply unsettling moment for Indiaâs constitutional democracy. While accountability of judges is essential in a republic governed by the rule of law, the manner and context in which impeachment is being invoked demand serious reflection.
The impeachment notice followed a judicial order passed by Justice Swaminathan in the Thirupparankundram hill dispute, where he permitted the lighting of traditional lamps near a dargah, citing historical practices and constitutional protections of religious freedom. The ruling generated political discomfort and public controversy. Soon after, the extraordinary constitutional mechanism of impeachment was set in motion.
At the heart of this episode lies a fundamental constitutional principle: disagreement with a judicial decision cannot be equated with judicial misconduct. Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution deliberately set a very high threshold for the removal of judgesââproved misbehaviour or incapacity.â This safeguard exists to ensure that judges are not punished for decisions that may be unpopular, inconvenient, or politically sensitive.
It is undeniable that misuse of power can occur in any institution, including the judiciary. Judges are not above scrutiny. However, the Constitution prescribes specific remedies for addressing alleged judicial excessesâappeals, reviews, curative petitions, and in-house judicial mechanisms. Impeachment was never intended to become a substitute for these processes, nor a political response to a controversial judgment.
The number of MPs supporting the noticeâ107âmay appear substantial, but constitutional morality is not determined by numerical strength. History repeatedly warns us that majoritarian impulses can undermine constitutional values if left unchecked. If judges begin to fear removal for their interpretations of law, judicial independence will be reduced to a fragile illusion.
Equally significant is the role of the Lok Sabha Speaker in this moment. The Speakerâs duty is not merely procedural but constitutional. Acceptance of an impeachment notice requires careful application of mind and preliminary scrutiny. The Speaker is empoweredâand obligatedâto refuse motions that do not meet the constitutional standard of âproved misbehaviour.â
Lowering this threshold risks setting a dangerous precedent. Tomorrow, any judge delivering an inconvenient verdict could face similar political retaliation. Such a climate would inevitably encourage judicial timidity, weakening the courtsâ role as protectors of fundamental rights and constitutional limits.
It is therefore noteworthy that several former judges and senior members of the Bar have expressed concern over this development. Their opposition is not a defence of an individual judge but a defence of an institution whose independence is vital for democracyâs survival.
A democracy does not thrive on institutional confrontation but on constitutional restraint. Parliament, the executive, and the judiciary are co-equal pillars, each bound by limits. When impeachment becomes a tool of political pressure rather than constitutional necessity, those limits begin to erode.
Impeachment must remain an exceptional remedy, not a reaction to an unpopular judgmentâbecause when judges are punished for their decisions, it is the Constitution itself that stands impeached.











