Lidia Poët: A disciple of Themis

Welcome to my comprehensive legal blog, dedicated to the compilation of case digests categorized by topic, meticulously curated for law students, legal reserchers, (and lawyers). Here, we delve into the intricate realm of PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE, providing concise summaries of notable court decisions and their implications across Philippines legal domains.

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I want to scream at the top of my lungs because I can’t stand the negativity I face every time I come home.

The constant negative comments are driving me to the edge, and it’s overwhelming.

This place doesn’t feel like home anymore—it feels suffocating, and I don’t know how much more I can take.

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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165545             March 24, 2006

Civil law; subsequent marriages before the effectivity of the Family Code.

ISSUE: May the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque be terminated by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon? (answers are rulings of the Supreme Court) after the facts

FACTS: Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz got married in 1955. Over 15 years later, Bailon filed a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead, and the court granted it in 1970.

In 1983, Bailon married Teresita Jarque. Bailon, a retiree pensioner, passed away in 1998. Teresita filed claims for funeral and death benefits, which were granted by the Social Security System (SSS).

However, Cecilia Bailon-Yap, claiming to be Bailon's daughter, contested the claims, stating that Alice was still alive and that Teresita's marriage to Bailon was void. The SSS recommended canceling Teresita's benefits and refunding the amount paid to her.

Various parties filed claims for Bailon's death benefits, and the SSS ordered Teresita to refund the benefits she received. Teresita protested and filed a petition with the SSS.

Later, Alicia P. Diaz, claiming to be Bailon's widow, submitted an affidavit contradicting Bailon's representation of Alice's disappearance. The SSC declared Teresita as a common-law wife, ordered her to refund the benefits, and directed the SSS to pay Alice her rightful death benefit.

Teresita appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the SSC's decision, stating that the SSS lacked the authority to nullify the court's findings and that Teresita was not given a fair opportunity to present evidence. The motions for reconsideration by the SSC and the SSS were denied.

ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): YES!

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Social Security System (SSS). The SSS argued that the Court of Appeals (CA) failed to consider the findings of the Social Security Commission (SSC) regarding the prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice, disregarded the authority of the SSC to determine the beneficiaries of the death benefits, and claimed that the SSS did not provide the respondent with due process.

However, the Supreme Court held that the SSC exceeded its authority by reviewing and overturning the decisions of regular courts.

The court emphasized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the marriages involved is the Civil Code since they were solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the first spouse is considered illegal and void unless certain exceptional circumstances exist or it is declared null and void by a competent court.

The court further explained that the burden of proof lies with the party challenging the validity of the second marriage.

In this case, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which was not even required for purposes of remarriage at that time. Additionally, the court cited legal opinions stating that if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages arise.

Therefore, since no steps were taken to nullify Bailon's and respondent's marriage before Bailon's death, the court concluded that the respondent is the rightful dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. As a result, the Supreme Court denied the SSS' petition.

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Morigo v. People

G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004

Civil law; Family Code; Applicability of Article 40

NOTE: A mere signing of the marriage contract by the parties, without the presence of the solemnizing officer, there in no marriage to speak of because there is no actual marriage ceremony that was performed by the duly authorized solemnizing officer. There is no need for Judicial Declaration of Nullity. No crime of bigamy is committed.

ISSUE: Did Morigo need to file a declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to avoid the bigamy case? answers are rulings of the Supreme Court, after the facts.

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were former boardmates in Bohol and lost contact when their school year ended. However, they reconnected through a card from Lucia while she was in Singapore, leading to constant communication and the development of a romantic relationship.

Lucia eventually returned to the Philippines in 1986 but left again for Canada to work. Despite the distance, they maintained regular communication. In 1990, Lucia returned to the Philippines and proposed to petition for Lucio to join her in Canada. They agreed to get married and had their wedding on August 30, 1990, in Bohol. Lucia went back to Canada for work, leaving Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed for divorce against Lucio in the Ontario Court, which was granted on January 17, 1992, with an effective date of February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint to declare the nullity of his first marriage, claiming that no actual marriage ceremony took place.

ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): NO!

Morigo's marriage with Barrete is considered void ab initio because no formal marriage ceremony was conducted by a solemnizing officer; instead, they merely signed a marriage contract. Therefore, the petitioner is not required to file a declaration of nullity for his first marriage when he entered into his second marriage with Lumbago. Consequently, he did not commit bigamy and has been acquitted in the filed case.

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SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 159218             March 30, 2004

Civil law; Family Code; Bigamy

ISSUE: Has the petitioner been adequately informed about the nature and grounds of the accusation against him, specifically regarding his alleged contracting of a subsequent marriage while his first marriage was still valid? answers are rulings of the Supreme Court) after the facts)

FACTS: On September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño in Manila. In 1988, Narcisa went to Japan to work but returned in 1992 after discovering Salvador's affair and his departure from their home. She later found Salvador cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato in Quezon City and learned that he had contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Biñas on January 10, 1989.

Salvador admitted to marrying Zenaida in 1955 and having four children with her before their separation in 1966. However, there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage, so they remarried in 1989 to meet military commission requirements for their son.

On January 19, 1995, Salvador filed for annulment against Narcisa, and on May 18, 1995, Narcisa filed a bigamy case against Salvador and Zenaida. On May 18, 2001, Salvador was convicted of bigamy and sentenced to imprisonment. Zenaida, on the other hand, was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with a modification in the penalty. Considering Salvador's age of 76 and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term ranging from two years, four months, and one day to six years and one day.

The petitioner is presenting a petition for review, claiming that the Information in his case was flawed. He argues that the Information incorrectly stated the year the bigamous marriage was contracted, stating 1995 instead of the actual year, 1989.

According to the petitioner, being properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is his right. The content of the Information should include all the acts and omissions that constitute the offense, as this determines the true nature of the crime charged. The title or designation of the offense in the Information's caption is not as important as the facts alleged within it. The Information should include all the necessary facts and circumstances in accordance with the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes involved.

ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): YES!

The petitioner argues three main points in his case. Firstly, he claims that there was a typographical error in the Information, which stated the wrong year for the bigamous marriage. However, the court finds this argument untenable, as the correct year was clearly indicated elsewhere in the document and the error was obvious.

Secondly, the petitioner asserts that the consent of his first wife absolves him of criminal liability. However, the court agrees with the lower court's ruling that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the claim of condonation. Furthermore, the pardon by the offended party does not extinguish the criminal action, as bigamy is considered a public offense.

Thirdly, the petitioner argues that his petition for the annulment/declaration of nullity of his marriage should have suspended the proceedings in the bigamy case. However, the court states that a prejudicial question can only suspend a criminal case if it involves facts that determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In this case, the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage was irrelevant, as the crime of bigamy had already been committed before that declaration.

Lastly, the petitioner claims that the imposed penalty was improper. The court explains that for the offense of bigamy, the penalty of prision mayor is prescribed. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court has the discretion to determine the minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, while the maximum penalty is based on the prescribed penalty for the offense.

Considering that the petitioner is over 70 years old, which is a mitigating circumstance, the court affirms that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals is proper.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals' decision finding the petitioner guilty of bigamy and imposing an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as a minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as a maximum, is affirmed.

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LETICIA A. RAMIREZ, petitioner, VS. FELOMINO ELOMINA, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN­FACT, FEDERICO ELOMINA,*, respondent.*

G.R. No. 202661, March 17, 2021 

Remedial Law: Right to appeal; due process; certiorari is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction

The right to appeal is not inherently a natural right or a component of due process. Instead, it is described as a privilege established by statutes, subject to specific procedures and regulations outlined in the law. In order to exercise the right to appeal, individuals must adhere to the requirements specified in the applicable Rules. Failure to comply with these requirements can result in the forfeiture of the right to appeal.

The responsibility lies with anyone seeking exemption from the time limit for submitting an appeal to demonstrate the presence of highly deserving circumstances that justify deviating from the usual rules.

ISSUE: Was the appellate court's denial of Ramirez's Motion for Reconsideration, on the grounds of being filed after the deadline, and subsequent issuance of an order for the entry of judgment, an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction, causing undue prejudice to the petitioner? (answers are rulings of the Supreme Court) after the facts

The subject of this appeal is the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated May 25, 2012, which ordered the issuance of an Entry of Judgment for its October 12, 2011 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 92374. The said decision declared Felomino Elomina as the rightful owner of the property in question and directed Leticia Ramirez to reconvey the property to Felomino. The May 25, 2012 Resolution was issued in connection with the Court of Appeals' December 21, 2011 Resolution, which rejected Ramirez's Motion for Reconsideration due to its untimely filing.

FACTS:

Ramirez was granted an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) for a piece of land in Cabuyao, Laguna, on May 11, 1994.

However, Felomino protested the issuance, claiming that the patent was transferred to Ramirez by one Delfin Torinos and that Felomino himself had been in possession of the land since birth. As a result, an investigation was conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), leading to the cancellation and revocation of Ramirez's free patent and OCT.

Felomino then filed a lawsuit seeking reconveyance of the title and damages. Ramirez attempted to have the case dismissed, citing forum-shopping and raising various affirmative defenses, including that the action is barred by prescription and Felomino's lack of real party-in-interest status.

In March 2008, the trial court dismissed Felomino's complaint, stating that he lacked a valid cause of action. The court found that Felomino failed to sufficiently prove his ownership of the disputed property and that he had not filed any application for a patent on the land when Ramirez obtained her title. Even if there was misrepresentation by Ramirez, the court ruled that Felomino was not the real party-in-interest to file the case, as the DENR recommended the State to initiate reversion proceedings. Additionally, the court held that Felomino's action was barred by prescription since he filed the case more than 10 years after Ramirez obtained her title. Felomino sought reconsideration, but the court denied it, reiterating the reasons for dismissal and emphasizing that he was not the real party-in-interest. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also advised that Felomino, as the intended beneficiary and alleged owner, should be the one to file a complaint for cancellation of the patent and title.

In October 2011, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. The court recognized that Felomino and his family had been in continuous possession of the land for more than 70 years, and there was no evidence of Ramirez's possession or any structures on the land. The court acknowledged that the land occupied by Felomino was part of the alienable portion of the public domain, and the issuance of a patent to Ramirez was based on misrepresentation and fraud. The court concluded that Felomino had the right to file an action for reconveyance to recover the title from Ramirez. The appellate court held that the four-year prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance resulting from fraud did not apply in this case since Felomino was in possession of the property. Therefore, the court declared Felomino as the lawful owner of the land, ordered Ramirez to reconvey the property, and directed the Register of Deeds to cancel Ramirez's title and issue a new one to Felomino.

✨⭐️Ramirez filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court due to late filing. The court issued an Entry of Judgment, indicating that its October 2011 decision had become final and executory in January 2012. Despite this, Ramirez filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to challenge the appellate court's decision.✨⭐️

ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): NO!

Based on the information provided, it appears that the petitioner, Ramirez, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the appellate court, but it was dismissed as belatedly filed. Ramirez requested the relaxation of the rules, citing her old age and forgetfulness as the reasons for the late filing. However, the court was not persuaded by her arguments.

The court referred to the relevant sections of the Rules of Court, which state that a party may file a Motion for Reconsideration within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final resolution. In this case, Ramirez received a copy of the appellate court's decision on October 17, 2011. The 15th day fell on November 1, 2011, which was a holiday, so Ramirez had until November 2, 2011, to file her motion. However, she filed it on November 3, 2011, one day late.

Ramirez explained that she entrusted the filing of the motion to her son, who encountered difficulties in filing it on time due to various reasons, including the need to find a lawyer and complete certain requirements. The court acknowledged that procedural rules should not be used to frustrate the cause of justice but emphasized that they should be followed, except for the most persuasive of reasons.

The court found no compelling reason to relax the rules in this case and stated that Ramirez failed to prove the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation. It further noted that the filing of the petition was beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal, as the appropriate recourse would have been to appeal the denial of the motion within the prescribed time.

The court concluded that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court. It reiterated that certiorari is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors in judgment. Even if there were errors in the interpretation of the law and appreciation of evidence, they should be corrected through an appeal and not through certiorari. The court emphasized that certiorari can only strike down an act done with grave abuse of discretion.

Since Ramirez's motion was belatedly filed, the appellate court's decision had become final and executory. Once a judgment attains finality, it cannot be disturbed, altered, or modified. Therefore, the court dismissed the instant petition and affirmed the appellate court's resolution ordering the issuance of an entry of judgment.

NOTE PERTINENT PROVISIONS INVOLVING THIS CASE:

Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides for the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration: Section 1. Period of filing. - A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within 15 days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.

Rule 36, Section 2 of the same Rules also provides that a judgment or final order shall become final unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed, to wit: Section 2. Entry of Judgments and Final Orders. - If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and executory.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, V. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, respndent.

G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018

Civil Law: Family Code, Article 26 (Mixed Marriages)

ISSUE: Does a Filipino citizen have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry? (answers are rulings of the Supreme Court) after the facts

FACTS: On January 10, 2012, Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition to cancel her marriage entry in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila. She based her petition on a divorce judgment issued by a Japanese court. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, specifically Branch 43, found the petition to be valid both in form and substance. The court scheduled an initial hearing on April 25, 2012, and published the petition and hearing notice in a newspaper for three consecutive weeks.

During the initial hearing, Manalo's counsel presented documentary evidence, including the court's order, an affidavit of publication, and newspaper issues from February and March 2012. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appeared on behalf of the petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, and authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to represent them. The OSG filed a motion challenging the title and caption of the petition, arguing that it should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

In response to this challenge, Manalo requested to amend her petition. The court granted her motion to admit an amended petition.

In the Amended Petition, which now included a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, the following allegations were made:

Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoru, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.

Manalo filed for divorce in Japan, and after due proceedings, a divorce decree was issued by the Japanese Court on December 6, 2011.

As a result of the divorce decree, Manalo and her former Japanese husband no longer live together, and she and her daughter are now residing separately from him.

It is necessary to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, where Manalo's marriage to her Japanese husband was registered. This cancellation is sought to avoid any implication that Manalo is still married to him, especially if she decides to remarry in the future.

The petition is primarily filed to request the cancellation of the marriage entry, in accordance with Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, since the marriage has already been dissolved by the divorce decree.

Manalo also prays for the restoration and use of her maiden surname, Manalo, along with the cancellation of the marriage entry.

Due to Manalo's scheduled departure to Japan for employment reasons, she was allowed to testify in advance.

During the proceedings, several documents were presented and admitted as evidence. These documents include:

Court Order dated January 25, 2012, which confirmed that the petition and its attachments were sufficient in both form and substance.

Affidavit of Publication, which served as proof that the petition and the notice of the initial hearing were published in a newspaper of general circulation.

Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012, which were published to fulfill the requirement of publication.

Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband, validating their previous marriage.

Divorce Decree issued by the Japanese court, officially dissolving the marriage.

Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan, confirming the notification of divorce.

Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce, indicating that the divorce was recognized and accepted.

It is worth noting that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) did not present any evidence contradicting or challenging the allegations made by Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court issued a ruling denying the petition of Manalo for lack of merit. The court's decision was based on its interpretation of Article 15 of the New Civil Code. According to the court, Philippine law does not grant Filipinos the right to file for divorce, regardless of whether they are residing in the Philippines or abroad, and regardless of whether they are married to Filipinos or foreigners or where the marriage took place. The court also emphasized that unless Filipinos acquire citizenship in another country, Philippine laws maintain authority over matters related to family rights and obligations, as well as the determination of their legal status and capacity to enter into contracts and civil relationships, including marriages.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The CA ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable in Manalo's case, even though she was the one who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband. The CA based its decision on the understanding that the divorce decree obtained by Manalo rendered her former husband no longer married to her, thus enabling him to enter into a new marriage.

In line with the ruling in Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al., which emphasizes determining the intent of lawmakers, the CA concluded that considering Manalo as still married to her Japanese ex-husband would be unjust, especially when he is no longer married to her. The fact that Manalo initiated the divorce case was deemed inconsequential by the appellate court. The CA cited the case of Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr., which involved the dissolution of a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner through a divorce filed by the Filipino spouse abroad, as a similar precedent.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied, leading to the filing of this petition.

ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): YES!!!!

The interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code focuses on its plain and clear language, which states that the provision applies to a divorce validly obtained abroad, without specifying whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The purpose of this provision is to avoid the situation where a Filipino spouse remains married to an alien spouse who is no longer married to them due to a foreign divorce decree.

There is no substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the initiative of their alien spouse. Both scenarios involve Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by the operation of the latter's national law. Both individuals are considered Filipinos with the same rights and obligations in a foreign jurisdiction.

A restrictive interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would have negative consequences. It would require Filipinos who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce to first avail of the existing mechanisms under the Family Code, leading to issues of illegitimacy for any subsequent relationships they enter into. This would harm both the parent and any children born out of such relationships.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that a Filipino can initiate divorce against a foreign spouse. However, in Marelyn's case, the court remanded it to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to allow her to present evidence on the relevant Japanese law regarding divorce.