On Monday, December 9, 2019, The Washington Post released an article and revealed that they had accessed more than 2,000 pages of documents that reveal the truth about the more than 18-year war campaign in Afghanistan.
More than 775,000 U.S. troops were deployed, with 2,300 U.S. military personnel dying and 3,814 U.S. contractors dying, with another 20,000 wounded. The U.S. reports that 64,124 Afghan security forces, 42,100 Taliban insurgents and more than 43,000 Afghan civilians have been killed. In addition, 67 journalists, 424 humanitarian workers and 1,145 NATO and coalition troops have died. According to the U.S. military, 157,000 have died in total. And what for?
In the article, “At War with the Truth,” The Post accessed more than 400 interviews over the past several years to get to the bottom of the lies that have been pumped out over the United States’ longest war to date. It began in 2001 under George W. Bush and continues today. The war (or, as it has been spun, “conflict”) was declared after 9/11, which is noted was perpetrated by 15 Saudi Arabian nationals along with two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Lebanon and one from Egypt. No one from Iraq, Iran or Afghanistan.
“With most speaking on the assumption that their remarks would not become public, U.S. officials acknowledged that their warfighting strategies were fatally flawed and that Washington wasted enormous sums of money trying to remake Afghanistan into a modern nation.”
Roughly $1 trillion has been spent on this never-ending, bloody war (though the numbers are not all public).
For 18 years, the three presidents (Bush, Obama and now Trump) of this war have asserted there was “progress” and that the war would be quick and we would withdraw.
“Everyone at ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] just wanted to hear good news, so bad news was often stifled. There was more freedom to share bad news if it was small — we’re running over kids with our MRAPs — because those things could be changed with policy directives. But when we tried to air larger strategic concerns about the willingness, capacity or corruption of the Afghan government, it was clear it wasn’t welcome and the boss wouldn’t like it.” — Bob Crowley, U.S. military adviser and retired Army colonel
In the beginning, nearly three-quarters of Americans were in favor of the war as of March 19, when it officially started. Internally, though, it was much more bleak.
Yet the interviews show that as the war dragged on, the goals and mission kept changing and a lack of faith in the U.S. strategy took root inside the Pentagon, the White House and the State Department.
Bush’s Defense Secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, made more than 59,000 memos between 2001 and 2006 that were accessed by the National Security Archive, a nonprofit run out of George Washington University. These documents have been shared with The Post.
On April 17, 2002, just six months into the war, Rumsfeld wrote:
“We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave.” (x)
On that same day, here is what the public was told:
“The history of military conflict in Afghanistan [has] been one of initial success, followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure. We’re not going to repeat that mistake.” — President George W. Bush, in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute
Military leaders were not even made aware of who the “enemy” was. It appeared to be an ever-changing shadow. Troops were not sure who was friend or foe, and the Pentagon gave no answers. It appeared they themselves did not know who they were fighting.
“I have no visibility into who the bad guys are. We are woefully deficient in human intelligence.” — Rumsfeld complained in a Sept. 8, 2003, memo.
“The days of providing a blank check are over…It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.” — President Barack Obama, in a speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. on Dec. 1, 2009
Mass amounts of aid — in the hundreds of billions — was allocated by Congress during the peak of fighting in 2009-2012. These billions were spent recklessly, with little direction or plan in place. The rush to modernize failed, and led to an even more corrupt government that was stealing funds.
Another issue was that of opium. Afghanistan produces 82% of the world’s supply of opium, and U.S. forces tried and failed at their many attempts to constrain the opium use and production.
At first, Afghan poppy farmers were paid by the British to destroy their crops — which only encouraged them to grow more the next season. Later, the U.S. government eradicated poppy fields without compensation — which only infuriated farmers and encouraged them to side with the Taliban.
The documents, public opinion and parallels to the Vietnam War
These documents broadly resemble the Pentagon Papers, which The Post released to the public, detailing the Vietnam War and lack of reason for occupying.
Unlike the Pentagon Papers, none of the Lessons Learned documents were originally classified as a government secret. Once The Post pushed to make them public, however, other federal agencies intervened and classified some material after the fact.
The documents were majorly anonymous, but The Post was able to identify many through research and cross-referencing information and documents. Some of these interviewees included former foreign ambassadors, White House staff and generals.
John Sopko, the head of the federal agency that conducted the interviews, acknowledged to The Post that the documents show “the American people have constantly been lied to.”
Beginning in 2016, The Post had to take the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction to federal court twice to gain access to these previously unpublished documents and interviews. The Post finally won under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The Post is publishing the documents now, instead of waiting for a final ruling, to inform the public while the Trump administration is negotiating with the Taliban and considering whether to withdraw the 13,000 U.S. troops who remain in Afghanistan.
The parallels drawn to the Vietnam War do not end with a long, expensive war with little direction or objective. Officials used tricks from Vietnam to manipulate public opinion.
Over 18 years and three administrations, the talking points have remained consistent: progress is being made. In a seemingly endless war that has drained $1 trillion dollars and thousands of U.S. lives and one hundred thousand Afghani lives, progress is being made.
“…We don’t invade poor countries to make them rich. We don’t invade authoritarian countries to make them democratic. We invade violent countries to make them peaceful and we clearly failed in Afghanistan and in Somalia and in several others.” — James Dobbins, former U.S. diplomat to Afghanistan.
During the Vietnam War, the Pentagon notoriously highlighted the number of enemies killed as a sign of progress. They even inflated the numbers of enemies killed.
“It was impossible to create good metrics. We tried using troop numbers trained, violence levels, control of territory and none of it painted an accurate picture. The metrics were always manipulated for the duration of the war.” — Anonymous Senior National Security official interviewed in 2016
The piece ends with a new spin, and some truth.
“I do think the key benchmark is the one I’ve suggested, which is how many Afghans are getting killed,” James Dobbins, the former U.S. diplomat, told a Senate panel in 2009. “If the number’s going up, you’re losing. If the number’s going down, you’re winning. It’s as simple as that.”
Last year, 3,804 Afghan civilians were killed in the war, according to the United Nations.
That is the most in one year since the United Nations began tracking casualties a decade ago.
