Lessons on Terror from Nairobi
On the 21st September the terrorist network Al-Shabaab released the following tweet, 'The Mujahideen entered #Westgate Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall, fighting the #Kenyan Kuffar inside their own turf'. The tweet was a startlingly modern declaration of intention. Quickly the world's media caught on and for three days at the end of September the world's attention was fixed firmly upon the ongoing events from within the mall. The siege would go onto claim the lives of 72 (including five of the perpetrators) and made sure that terrorism remained on the minds of all who witnessed it.
Terrorism is a peculiar phenomenon. It has been, since 9/11, and arguably before, the most discussed international issue amongst politicians, professors and the public. Odd therefore that no one appears able to agree on what it is. It is usually deemed the illegitimate, indiscriminate use or threat of violence for a certain purpose. Such a definition is usual but not universal because terrorism is inherently subjective. It is obviously an object of interpretation when one classifies one's killing of the enemy's innocents as "collateral damage" and the killing of your own equivalent's as victims of "terrorism".
The failure to define it universally even exists within institutions belonging to the same side. In the United States the PATRIOT Act defines terrorism differently to the State Department which defines it differently from the Department of Defense. Perhaps then it is best to simply surrender to the belief: "I know it when I see it". If this is the only real option it is important to try and illustrate continuities and divergences when terrorism rears its head and identify lessons to be learnt about this continually evolving, adapting entity.
So what can be learnt from the attacks in Nairobi?
1. Shifting geographical focus
Throughout it’s history there have appeared so-called hotspots where terrorist activity has converged. The end of the previous and the beginning of the current centuries saw a shift to the Middle East. The PLO gained infamy from the Munich massacre in 1972 with Hamas and Hezbollah gaining prominence in the 1990s and 2000s. As is well known the attacks in 2001 originated in Saudi Arabia, and the War on Terror launched in response was conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Recent events however might suggest that there is a developing geographical shift away from the Middle East and towards Africa. In documents seized from his compound in Abottabad Bin Laden clearly recognised this shift, as he sought to conjure up ways in which his organisation could best utilise and develop the unfolding shifts and consequent unrest of the Arab Spring that began in North Africa. Before Nairobi the previous terrorist attack of note took place in the sands of Algeria, two examples might not make a rule but it is perhaps more than mere coicidence.
2. Shifting organisational focus
Since becoming the first International Terrorist Supergroup Al-Qaeda now appears to be on the decline. The obvious assumption is that after the removal of their figurehead this was always going to happen, in fact it is more complex. Al-Qaeda and other such organisations are supposedly organised horizontally not vertically, or to use a biological metaphor like a starfish that can regenerate a lost limb not a spider that will die if decapitated. In other words groups such as al Qaeda were meant to survive, and maybe even thrive, if one cell was destroyed. They managed to survive throughout the years when bin Laden was forced to take on an invisible, imaginary role due to the price on his head, and presumably they would continue to do just the same.
However as the Abottobad documents again showed in reality Al-Qaeda was run more like a spider-like, horizontally organised business. It was clear that Bin Laden was more than the ceremonial lynchpin. He was aware that other groups were diluting the message he wished to advance and was avidly against a merger with the perpetrators of the Nairobi attacks Al-Shabaab.
A study conducted on the history of terrorism suggested that a terrorist group has a maximum lifespan of ~10 years. This is arguably what is happening to Bin Laden's brainchild. Whilst they will probably always conjure up fear and terror through the memory of their actions it appears that al Qaeda's time in the spotlight might be over.
3. Propaganda of the deed dead?
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 those who were able to objectively remove themselves from emotional responses – understandably in America these were few – were able to rationalise, without condoning the events. It was clear that this was a statement not just simply violence for violence's sake. Terrorists, it is said, want a lot of people watching but not a lot of people dead, and 9/11 can be understood along this thought process. Bin Laden and his cronies did not predict the collapse of the World Trade Center, they did predict the media's response to the events, that would give them the platform to air their views.
This sort of attack, heavily loaded with symbolism, is known as Propaganda of the Deed. The terrorist looks to highjack agendas by staging shockingly spectacular, morbidly fascinating, almost artistic events.
However since 9/11 there seems to be a move away from this idea as attacks have, terrible though this might sounds, become less imaginative. The Nairobi attacks followed this trend. The statement of getting rid of the ‘Kenyan Kuffar’ seems hackneyed now; the location seems irrelevant, there are malls throughout the world's capitals even Islamic nations; and the careful selection of those to be killed - the attackers asked all inside to recite an Islamic prayer - doesn't strike well with terrorism historically indiscriminate nature. For the time being it seems terrorism is becoming violence with no message, which makes it even more cowardly than those who have something to say.
4. Terrorism still fascinates
The most worrying lesson that can be taken from the events in Nairobi is the continued fascination the media and the public have with terrorism. It is worrying because until this fascination is removed then terrorism will still remain a viable option for those desperate or depraved enough to use it. The only way to defeat terrorism is to stop being terrified by it. It is that simple. But it is hard to stop being terrified when the media report on the minute, every minute the same shocking scenes and graphic descriptions. Derrida understood this when he asked what 9/11 would have been without television. Maggie Thatcher understood this, and acted upon it, when she refused to allow the IRA to highjack the media by censoring them. In an increasingly liberalised world any mention of press censorship is problematic, but until terrorism is starved of the exposure it so desperately seeks then it is not going to disappear.