Cinquantenaire

@ragnarweilandt on European affairs

[jubelpark]

Brexit’s trifling impact on EU external affairs

With Britain leaving, the European Union is set to lose one of its only two member states that have global strategic ambition, relevant armed forces, a nuclear deterrent and a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, Brexit deprives the EU of a driver of key foreign policies such as enlargement, trade liberalisation and the fight against climate change. Yet Brexit also rids the EU of a member that routinely obstructs its attempts to create and strengthen common institutions or to speak with one voice on the world stage.

Despite these fundamental and contradictory roles, Brexit may not have a major impact on the EU’s external affairs or Common Security and Defence Policy. For starters, both Britain and France – their 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration having kick-started EU defence – long since lost their interest in the CSDP. Most current missions are rather unambitious, and as British contributions in terms of personnel and equipment have been marginal, the impacts of Brexit may not be noticed at all.

Other foreign policy tools are likely to be similarly unaffected. Enlargement, arguably the EU’s strongest means of influence beyond its borders, is on hold for the foreseeable future. With Britain having transformed from an enthusiastic supporter to a hostile opponent of enlarging the EU in recent years, a victory for ‘Remain’ would not have made a difference. Meanwhile, trade liberalisation and climate action have become second nature to the Union with or without British influence. Whether or not free trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are eventually concluded would in any case have depended more on public discontent in Germany or France than on the British government’s stance.

As for Britain’s obstructions, Brexit is also unlikely to enable, let alone entail, a rapid leap towards a more integrated and substantial EU foreign policy. It is true that the UK was a stumbling block for EU foreign policy. Having failed to prevent the European External Action Service (EEAS) emerging in its current form, the UK engaged in political guerrilla warfare against what it saw as ‘competence creep’. On various occasions, British ambassadors blocked EEAS officials from speaking at international organisations and from issuing joint statements on behalf of the EU. The UK government even challenged the Commission’s exclusive authority over trade negotiations, despite being completely in line with its approach to international trade. But the view that foreign policy should remain the prerogative of member states is by no means constrained to London. The eurosceptic climate across much of continental Europe would make any major step towards a more integrated EU foreign policy a definite surprise.

Even without changes to the institutions and policy preferences of EU external action, we can expect the British decision to affect both the UK’s and the EU’s global standing. The UK will lose credibility, as the Brexit vote is seen by much of the Western world’s foreign and security policy establishment as unwise, even irresponsible. Boris Johnson’s appointment as Foreign Secretary is hardly a step towards repairing Britain’s damaged reputation.

The EU’s international repute has already suffered as a result of its inadequate reactions to the eurozone crisis and the refugee situation. Brexit will now further hurt the EU’s soft power, which is its vital source of international influence. That the EU has ceased to be sufficiently attractive even for its own members undermines its ability to promote its model of integration, as well as its norms and values, to states worldwide.

This post was also published on Europe’s World.

[jubelpark]

From political prisoner to sultan: How Erdoğan took on the Turkish military

For decades, Turkish politics followed a similar pattern. The state was run by civilian politicians under the oversight of the secular Armed Forces that would occasionally intervene if conservative religious forces became too powerful. This last happened in 1997 when the military forced prime minister Necmettin Erbakan from the Islamic fundamentalist Welfare Party to resign. A year later, the Welfare Party was shut down by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the grounds of threatening the country’s secularism. Erbakan’s party colleague and then-incumbent mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was sentenced to ten months and banned from holding political office for inciting hatred by publicly reciting a nationalist and Islamist poem.

Erdoğan and his allies learned their lesson. By the time the military made its next move ten years later, the tables had turned.

Along with former Welfare Party colleague Abdullah Gül, he founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001 and started to cultivate a more moderate and pro-Western rhetoric. The 2002 elections brought a landslide victory for their new party. Having his ban from politics overturned by the AKP government, Erdoğan became prime minister himself in 2003. Over the next decade, he transformed the secular republic into an Islamic conservative state while gradually becoming more authoritarian. At the same time, he made Turkey a political and economic powerhouse. Particularly the Anatolian hinterland, whose largely rather conservative inhabitants had been neglected by the secular establishment for the past century, benefitted from the AKP’s economic reform.

Rather than providing an alternative, Turkey’s opposition parties did their best to become redundant. Social democratic on paper, the Republican People's Party (CHP) was hardly less nationalist and authoritarian than the AKP. What is more, its achievements for their core constituency compared rather unfavourably to the socio-economic improvements the AKP accomplished within a few years. Meanwhile, neither the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) nor the strong Kurdish Left credibly distanced themselves from the political violence committed by their affiliates. For Turkish liberals, the three main opposition parties were almost as unelectable as the Islamists.

In 2007, Erdoğan put forward Gül as candidate for the presidency, prompting the military to intervene again. Angered by the perspective of having a first lady who wears a headscarf, the Armed Forces published a memorandum expressing their concern and reiterating their determination to act as the guardian of Turkish secularism. However, with Erdoğan’s social and economic reforms having borne fruit in the meantime, the power balance had shifted in favour of the Islamists. Erdoğan called and won a snap-election, the AKP’s share of the vote went from 34% to 47% and the parliament elected Gül president. A year later, AKP-backed prosecutors claimed they had uncovered a plot against the Turkish government involving military officials, journalists, academics and politicians. Hundreds were jailed in the first of a series of rather questionable trials against the country’s secularist elites.

“Turkey is no longer a country where whoever gets up early in the morning can deliver a coup d’état”, Erdoğan would proclaim later, at a party congress in 2012.

Flash-forward yet another decade. It was night owls rather than early birds that made an entirely unexpected attempt to take over the country by force. By the time Erdoğan appeared in front of the cameras and his cheering supporters at Istanbul airport the next morning, the military coup had already been quashed. In his speech, he denounced it as an act of treason and announced to clean up the military. “Say it we die, say it we kill!” his supporters chanted. And “We want the death penalty!”

Some of them could not seem to wait. Shocking pictures emerged in the course of the day, showing angry mobs beating, torturing and murdering soldiers that looked as if they were barely old enough to vote. Whether these boys actually knew what they were doing when ordered to the streets remains questionable. Several reports indicate that many lower ranked soldiers mistook the coup attempt for a training exercise.

Meanwhile the coup itself continues to puzzle. With the military having been increasingly staffed with AKP loyalists in recent years, it was highly unlikely for the putschists to get the entire Armed Forces behind them. Moreover, taking control would have required the military to subjugate not only those 21 million Turks who voted for Erdoğan, but presumably also a great many others who prefer an imperfect democracy to a return to military rule. Most probably a “successful” coup would have plunged the country into a bloody civil war.

This raises questions. As do the amateurish nature of the coup and reported inconsistencies such as the rebel pilots of two F-16 fighter jets who had Erdoğan's plane in their sights but did not fire. In light of Erdoğan’s post-coup clampdown, various commenters and secular Turks liken it to the 1933 Reichstag fire, even suggesting that the whole coup might have been staged in the first place.

A direct involvement of the government seems unlikely for several reasons. First of all, one struggles to envisage Erdoğan voluntarily addressing the nation via FaceTime. Second, the coup attempt endangers the country’s unsustainable growth, which is the president’s Achilles heel. Moreover, perceived or actual chaos in the army risks encouraging Kurdish and Jihadi militants, a scenario the AKP government would be desperate to avoid. Finally, while the coup did indeed provide a welcome opportunity – or a “gift of god” as Erdoğan put it – to tighten his grip on power, it only speeded up a process that has already been under way.

As so often in the past, Erdoğan himself was quick to blame his former key ally turned nemesis Fethullah Gülen. The Pennsylvania-based Turkish imam and his powerful Hizmet movement play a rather murky role in Turkish politics and society. However, the coup did not look like something from their playbook and they had little to gain from an attempt that was bound to fail. Yet again, considering that the military was indeed the Gülenists’ last stronghold after having been purged from the police, judiciary and the media in recent years, their involvement might be less outlandish than it seems at first sight.

In light of previous arrests and unconfirmed reports on immanent further ones, another explanation has the plotters – whether Gülenist or secularist – thinking that it was their very last chance to stop Erdoğan. This would explain the coup’s rather hasty and premature execution. Yet another explanation sees the putschists as useful idiots who were led to believe that they had substantial support and might succeed. Operation Trust comes to mind, the fake anti-Bolshevik resistance organization set up by Soviet counter intelligence in the 1920s to identify, control and eventually eliminate their opponents.

However, as in 1933 Germany it matters far more what Turkey’s Reichstag’s fire leads to than who was actually behind it. Almost 20 years after Erdoğan and his allies were removed from government, they are now removing those factions within the once untouchable Armed Forces that they suspect of opposing their Islamist vision for Turkey. And they don’t stop at the military.

From the outset, it was to be expected that Erdoğan’s previous crackdowns on all kinds of freedoms and against any kind of criticism would pale against what was going to come. However, the ferocity of his purge against anyone mumbling the remotest word of dissent goes beyond the worst fears.

Much like the Reichstag fire, the military coup seems to have triggered measures that were planned long before. It appears unlikely that the lists containing thousands members of the army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service to be sacked were compiled after the coup. The government seems to have had them ready for a while, waiting for the right occasion that justifies their use.

In light of recent events, it is not particularly hard to make the case for security sector reform in Turkey. However, the government has so far failed to offer a satisfactory explanation why sacking 15,200 education ministry staff, asking all 1,577 university deans to resign and revoking the licences of 21,000 teachers is necessary to prevent further military coups. It has not convincingly explained how the closure of more than 100 media outlets as well as hundreds of schools and hospitals helps to safeguard democracy. It has not offered credible justifications for most of the more than 18,000 people that were detained and another 60,000 that were suspended in the past weeks.

Over the past days, even Turkish football got caught up in the purge. Just days after a mass resignation of executives of the country’s football federation, around 100 of its officials were sacked based on alleged links to the putschists yesterday. Himself a former semi-professional player, Erdogan seeks to get a tighter grip on football as Turkish supporters have proven quite effective in mobilizing for anti-government demonstrations, such as the 2013 Gezi Park protests.

Corresponding with 1933 Germany, it looks as if the coup attempt is now followed by a process of “Gleichschaltung”. The government is not just moving against its active opponents but against almost all societal actors whose loyalty to the AKP is not beyond doubt. The purge seems to target all those who are in a position to potentially influence people, notably the schools and universities as well as what is left of the independent media.

And thanks to the putschists, Erdoğan can – quite credibly in the eyes of his supporters – claim to do all that in order to protect Turkey’s democracy.

This post was also published on Your Middle East.

[jubelpark]

Why the Remain camp is also to blame for Brexit

The Leave campaign won the EU referendum based on racist incitement, audacious lies and unrealistic promises it never intended to keep. Remain campaigners and voters have to acknowledge that they played a major role in enabling Brexit.

David Cameron not only misused a referendum of historical proportions to try to pacify the Tory party, he also approached it with an irresponsible naivety. For his entire political life he had vilified the EU and toyed with the idea of leaving it. Before the “renegotiation” of Britain’s role in Europe, he indicated that he would support Brexit himself unless Britain was granted a “better deal”. Completely misjudging his fellow European leaders’ attitudes towards yet another act of British cherry-picking, he got but a few minor and rather symbolic concessions. Unsurprisingly, his attempt to sell them as a major win was met with ridicule. So were the doomsday scenarios he suddenly painted for Britain outside of the Union. And while one might criticise Leave voters for their ignorance of the EU, one can hardly blame them for not buying into Cameron’s sudden change of heart and tone.

However, the Leave campaign’s success has much deeper roots. For decades, British political elites have diverted anger and frustration directed at them and their policies towards Brussels and European legislation. Left-wingers have flirted with Eurosceptic stereotypes, creating the illusion that the lack of socialism in the UK is due to the EU – rather than the fact that no socialist leader has had a parliamentary majority in the past 40 years. They never explained how the EU protects the rights of workers, consumers and the environment. They never acknowledged that the EU has actually been a left-wing corrective to British neoliberalism.

Meanwhile right-wingers raged on and on about EU red tape allegedly suffocating the British economy, or EU migration allegedly straining the welfare state and increasing crime rates – claims that have been widely refuted. They never made an effort to explain how the introduction of common legislation for the entire EU market actually reduced red tape for British exporters. They didn’t remind voters how EU legislation made airline fares and roaming costs plummet. They never pointed out that individual examples of incompetence and silly legislative proposals can be found in any administration, including the British one. Nobody reminded voters of the BBC’s “Yes Minister” sitcom, whose hilarious tales about the British civil service were largely inspired by real events.

Few highlighted EU migrants’ net contribution to the welfare state. When individual problems linked to immigration hit the headlines, nobody dared to point out that hundreds of thousands of British retirees in Spain don’t make the remotest effort to integrate. And nobody dared to remind the public of the reputation young male English tourists and football fans have across Europe.

Behind closed doors, many British leaders spoke quite differently about Europe. But hardly any politician was willing to invest political capital on making the case for Europe. Few challenged the misperceptions, myths and outright lies that tabloids controlled by Rupert Murdoch, Paul Dacre or Richard Desmond spread and that determine the British debate. By the time the political elites realised that Brexit could actually happen, it was far too late to reverse the narratives that had evolved over the past decades.

Similarly, many other prominent voices discovered their enthusiasm for Europe only shortly before the vote. Such as celeb chef Jaimie Oliver, who came out for Remain days before the referendum. Speaking to a parliamentary committee a few years earlier he sounded rather different.

“I’ve got nothing nice to say about the EU at all. I really haven’t. I think it saps the life and icing off our farmers and common sense and clarity. You remember when the cucumber came in? If it’s over that much of a bend, then we can’t sell it. How dare they? How dare they?”

The British farmers Oliver was referring to receive up to £3 billion annually in EU subsidies. Months before his rant, the European Commission had proposed to abolish the infamous cucumber regulation. Much to the dismay of the member states and the farming industry. Because the cucumber standards might have sounded quite funny, but they were actually very useful. Thus they ended up surviving in various national laws and continue to be met voluntarily by most producers even after the EU abolished them. But this didn’t make for a catchy headline in The Daily Mail.

For years, the British debate on the EU has been shaped by badly-informed people with very strong opinions and better-informed elites instrumentalising misperceptions to score cheap points. Opinion leaders as diverse as Owen Jones, Alan Sugar or Jeremy Clarkson ridiculed or scapegoated the EU for years before eventually making spectacular last-minute U-turns.

Similarly, many Remain voters contributed to the mocking and scapegoating of Brussels. Few ever attempted to really understand how the EU works and what the UK’s membership actually involves. Few questioned, let alone countered the misrepresentations and lies promulgated by tabloids and consolidated by opinion leaders. Most Remain voters made their decision based on the notion that membership of an obscure, hyper-bureaucratic and slightly tedious European Union is some sort of necessary evil. Such narratives did not exactly help to win the hearts and minds of those on the fence.

You reap what you sow. Decades of misinforming and misrepresenting could not be undone within a short and lacklustre campaign. By letting ignorance and misperception of the EU flourish, campaigners and voters for Remain enabled a Leave campaign completely detached from reality to get away with its lies and false promises. And to eventually succeed.

This post was also published on EurActiv.

[jubelpark]

Brexit might provide an opportunity for genuine change in Europe

Britain’s history in post-war Europe is that of a rocky relationship. It stood on the side-lines when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951, and chose not to join the six states founding the European Economic Community in 1957. “I never understood why the British did not join the European Community, which was so much in their interest” the ECSC’s architect Jean Monnet once said. “I came to the conclusion that it must have been because it was the price of victory – the illusion that you could maintain what you had, without change.”

They eventually changed their minds. But although five of the six founding members supported British participation in the European project, French president Charles de Gaulle vetoed it twice. It took political change in France and a major effort in British diplomacy to make way for a third and finally successful attempt.

“Letting England in (…) would be for the six members to pre-emptively agree to all kinds of tricks, delays, and pretences that would attempt to mask the destruction of a structure that was built through so much hardship and on so much hope” Charles de Gaulle replied to a reporter asking for the motives of his veto. And: “For the British Islands to truly moor themselves to the continent, they will have to undergo another very vast, very deep transformation.”

De Gaulle’s reluctance towards British participation in the European integration process primarily stemmed from his ambition for France and indeed for himself to lead Europe. Ironically, he even shared the British opposition to supranational policy-making. However, half a century later one cannot but admit that his forecast on how British membership would affect the European Union was fairly accurate.

In contrast to most other EU member states, the UK’s expectations of the EU were always mainly transactional rather than emotional or ideological. The founding members created the ECSC to end centuries of war. Southern European countries joined the Common Market in order to stabilize their democracies. The central and eastern Europeans joined the EU to adapt the Western European political and economic system and to end decades of Russian domination. Most member states and their citizens cherished the Union’s promotion of peace, freedom, democracy and human rights. In contrast, British elites and citizens primarily cared about market access.

The UK’s transactional expectations influenced its action. Many great continental leaders were inspired by the European idea. While it did not always influence their daily policy and rhetoric, it often guided important decisions and major speeches. In contrast, British leaders were largely driven by a continuous assessment of short-term costs and benefits. Moreover, they frequently resorted to cheap populism at the cost of the EU for the sake of short-term gains in domestic politics.

Since the UK joined the Common Market, it has used its status and its power as a big member state to secure special treatment at the cost of its fellow member states. Moreover, it opted-out of many of the EU’s basic structures such as Schengen and the Euro. In doing so, the UK set a precedent for smaller states’ cherry-picking. Moreover, it spearheaded various attempts to slow down political integration. Hence, successive British governments contributed to the inadequacy of the European institutional set-up that caused the various crises the EU is currently facing as well as its institutional inability to deal with them. It even actively obstructed the EU’s crisis management, notably by trying to block the fiscal compact in 2011 or more recently by refusing to participate in the European system of quotas to resettle refugees.

And at a time when the EU and its members are struggling with these crises and therefore have more than enough on their plates, British voters decide to hand it yet another major crisis. A crisis that will not only take away major political and administrative resources desperately needed to fix the Union, but also one that undermines and potentially even endangers the European project as a whole. Much like Charles de Gaulle predicted.

The UK certainly made its fair share of contributions to European integration. Notably it pushed for completing the single market and made the case for Eastern and Southern enlargement. It is a sad historical irony that diffuse fears of immigrants from these countries ended up being the reason for many voters’ decision to back Leave. However, in terms of transforming the EU into a well-functioning political entity, the UK has become a major stumbling block.

A stumbling block that might now disappear. Of course Brexit is a major blow for the Union. It empowers populist right-wing Eurosceptic movements across Europe and changes the delicate equilibrium between the EU’s remaining member states. Yet it seems unlikely that the Union will retain fundamental damage. Continental European leaders seem to be showing considerable political determination to keep the Union together.

Euroscepticism might be on the rise across Europe, but the continental debate on the EU is not even remotely as detached from reality as it is in the UK. Except for those on the far right, Eurosceptics usually question individual aspects of the EU such as the euro or the recent austerity policy rather than membership. What is more, tabloids spreading lies and myths on the EU to the same extent as The Sun, The Express or The Daily Mail either don’t exist or are not quite as influential in other member states. Finally, the countries displaying the strongest degree of Euroscepticism tend to be those most dependent on EU funding, limiting both their incentive to leave as well as the impact their exit would have on the Union.

Brexit is a catastrophe. But a close win for Remain would not exactly have been a triumph either. Neither would it have weakened the likes of Nigel Farage, nor would it have strengthened the European idea. In contrast, Brexit will finally showcase what the European Union actually means for the well-being of its members. It will shed light on the benefits it entails – benefits that are largely taken for granted. And it will show in all brutality what it means to give up on them.

The current chaos in Britain does not go unnoticed. Neither will Brexit’s medium to long term impact on the UK. If the damage to continental Europe and its economy can be contained, Brexit might even reinvigorate sympathies for European integration.

The best option the UK can hope for now is to get a deal like Switzerland or Norway. If it wants to retain free movement of goods, services and capital, then it will also have to accept free movement of persons. Access to the single market will require adhering to much of the EU’s key legislation and paying into the EU’s budget. Hence there will be few savings to be spent in Britain, let’s say on the NHS. At the same time the UK will not be at the table when decisions on the EU legislation it will have to follow or the EU’s budget it will have to contribute to are made. Meanwhile, the UK might lose the passporting rights enabling London-based banks to operate freely across Europe’s financial markets and which would prompt financial institutions to relocate parts of their staff and operations to the Eurozone. Obviously experts predicted all that before the referendum. But then again expert opinion wasn’t very much in demand.

Continental Europe might develop more favourably. Brexit is unlikely to be followed by a leap towards federalism in Europe. However, the European Union will face far less political resistance to further integration and to the creation of economic governance able to deal more efficiently with the Eurozone crisis and potentially prevent further ones. Moreover, it will face less obstacles to developing its social dimension, offering the opportunity to win back trust within its populations.

Over the next one or two decades, the British public might realize that sitting at the table in Brussels were worth the few more directives and regulations that EU membership entails in comparison to the deal they will have by then. They may even realize that participation in Europe’s political integration is more than just a necessary evil. The UK’s demographic development will work in favour of such developments.

At some point, Britain could consider applying for membership again. It will face the same accession process as all other candidate countries. It will have to implement the entire Acquis Communautaire without getting any relevant opt-outs or rebates. And then one day, it might rejoin what has hopefully become a more integrated, more social and much better governed European Union. One that possibly already has Scotland as a member.

This post was also published on openDemocracy.

[jubelpark]

My 350 on BREXIT: An act of utter ignorance

As a UK resident for three years and an Anglophile whose biggest ambition in life is to acquire a British accent, I am devastated. A Malcom Tucker monologue best describes my immediate reaction when the results came in, an Adele song my current inner state.

I am disappointed over Brexit and saddened by what Britain seems to have become. But maybe it simply never was what I saw it as in the first place? Having recently tried to travel to London with my partner, who has the misfortune of having the wrong sort of passport, I experienced how British authorities humiliate citizens of those countries they screwed up in those good old days that many Leave voters long to return to. It infuriated me. It reflects what those behind the recent wave of hatred and racist abuse want the UK to be like.

Much has been written about how the Leave vote was some sort of working class revolt against the establishment.

It was not. It was really just a large number of people from very different parts of society doing something incredibly dumb. They fell for the racism and cheap scapegoating of a right-wing press that is everything but anti-establishment. They chose to blindly believe the lies and false promises of public school boys like Farage, Gove and Johnson. Calling this a rise of the working class is an insult to the labour movement. Last year’s general election was a good enough opportunity to revolt against those in power.

Many have claimed that it is high time for the establishment to start listening.

It is not. Rather, it is high time Leave voters start listening to those who offer slightly more complex, more challenging explanations of the world. To those whose expertise was so very much not in demand.

And it is time for these elites to speak up. Both the Left and the Right let Monty-Pythonesque discourses on the EU and on immigration flourish for too long. And in doing so they enabled a Leave campaign completely detached from reality to get away with its racism, lies and false promises, and for it to eventually succeed.

Tragically many Leave voters will be among those hit hardest by the consequences of Brexit. “Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard” quipped the great German-American writer H. L. Mencken a century ago. Getting it good and hard they will.

This post was also published on openDemocracy.

[jubelpark]

Leaving the EU Over Its Democratic Deficit? You’ve Got to Be Kidding...

Separating facts from fiction, many of the Leave campaign’s arguments are easily refuted. For example, their claims on the costs of EU membership are so blatantly wrong that the UK Statistics Authority felt compelled to clarify that its data was misrepresented. The fact that this did not stop Johnson, Gove and Farage from relentlessly repeating the wrong number and putting it on billboards and their campaign bus exposes them as pathological liars.

However, there is one argument for Brexit that deserves to be taken more seriously. It is true that the European Union’s political set-up raises questions on its democratic legitimacy and accountability.

Many Europeans see the EU’s institutions as distant and opaque, few know their MEP or indeed any senior EU politician. Voter turnout has been falling since the first European elections in 1979, reaching only 42.6 % in the most recent edition. Ever since Southern European sovereign debt forced the EU into a permanent crisis mode, national parliaments have regularly been asked to rubber stamp highly complex rescue packages involving major financial risks for some member states and tough austerity measures for others.

As bailouts remain the prerogative of national fiscal policy, national leaders’ marathon all-night summits behind closed doors in Brussels have shaped much of the Eurozone crisis management. Negotiations were usually dominated by those member states paying for the bailouts while those states on the receiving end had little choice but to acquiesce to the harsh austerity measures that these bailouts entailed. This created the image of a rather dictatorial EU - although the Union’s supranational institutions that run its day to day business were barely involved.

Contrary to Brexit supporters’ claims, EU policy is not made by unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. Much like laws in the UK, legislative proposals are drafted by an independent civil service. The Commissioners running this civil service - much like national ministers run their administrations - are appointed by elected national governments and confirmed by elected Members of the European Parliament. The European Parliament can even bring down the entire EU Commission as it did in 1999 when a vote of no confidence was only avoided by the Commission’s collective resignation.

In those policy areas in which member states have unanimously agreed to transfer legislative powers to the EU, the EU Commission proposes European directives and regulations. These legislative acts are then debated and amended by different iterations of the Council of Ministers as well as the European Parliament and eventually passed or rejected by them. Since the European Parliament is directly elected and as ministers in the Council represent the member states’ democratically elected governments, the claim that the EU is run by unelected bureaucrats is baseless. Its political system may have its flaws. But so does any other political system.

Including the UK’s very own version of democracy. In the 2005 General Election, the Labour party won 35.2 % of the popular vote. Although just little more than a third of the British people voted for Tony Blair, he managed to form a government based on a stable majority. In spite of only beating the Tory party by a mere 2.8 % of the popular vote, Britain’s first-past-the-post system granted Labour 157 MPs more than the Conservative party. Two years later Blair resigned, leaving the premiership to Gordon Brown who led the country for three years without having been elected.

With the exception of the 2010 Tory-liberal coalition, no post-war government has represented more than 50 % of the British population. Electoral injustice peaked in the last general election when UKIP won 12.6 % of the popular vote but only got one MP into parliament. At the same time, the Scottish National Party got 56 MPs with only 4.7 %. Hence it took a mere 25,970 SNP voters to send an MP to Westminster, whereas UKIP’s only MP represents 3.8 million voters. Ironically, the European Parliament is the only assembly granting Nigel Farage and his party democratic representation.

While the electoral system is the most blatant insult to democracy, it is not the only one. In the House of Commons, MPs from Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales continue to vote on matters that affect only England, while English MPs cannot vote on policy areas devolved to national parliaments and assemblies such as health, housing, schools or policing. Meanwhile Britain’s unelected upper house is full of party donors and cronies, complemented by 92 hereditary peers and 26 bishops. Most members of the House of Lords are old white men who went to the same handful of “public schools” and universities whose graduates also dominate the rest of British politics and society. Recently, a proposal asking them to share their catering with the House of Commons was rejected “because the Lords feared the quality of champagne would not be as good if they chose a joint service.“

Brexiteers’ outrage over perceived and actual problems with EU democracy is hypocritical considering how little they care for their own Union’s flaws. Even more so, as they criticize the EU for not living up to democratic standards that one might set for a federal political system while they at the same refuse and undermine any movement towards such a system.

From a democratic point of view, further strengthening the EU’s supranational actors such as the parliament and reducing the role of intergovernmental negotiations would be desirable. In practice, such developments are unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future as member states are unwilling to transfer power to Brussels.

However, even in its current form the EU is far more democratic and legitimate as well as much more efficient in serving its member states and their citizens than any other form of institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation. And the alternative to participating in such intergovernmental cooperation is standing alone in a world shaped by the survival of the fittest. As the UK has long ceased to belong to those, it is clearly much better off inside the European Union - imperfect as its system of governance might be.

This post was also published on The Huffington Post UK.

[jubelpark]

Left wingers for Brexit need to wake up to what they’re about to do

If you listen to some left-wing voices – proponents of what is being called Lexit – the European Union is an undemocratic, neo-liberal empire. It is ruled by Angela Merkel and an army of cold-hearted, faceless bureaucrats in Brussels who spend their lives plotting to privatise British public services and deliberately making life in Southern Europe as miserable as possible.

Listening to both left-wing and right-wing arguments for Brexit can be rather confusing. Similar to Schrödinger’s immigrant who lazes around on benefits while simultaneously stealing jobs, the EU seems to be at the same time both communist and predatory capitalist. It has transformed Europe into a fortress while at the same time opening its borders to mass immigration. The EU’s rescue packages for Southern Europe have been too stingy while at the same constituting an outrageous burden to British taxpayers.

You do not have to be an idealist europhile to find these accusations a bit harsh. As a project that’s main purpose is the creation of a single market, the EU is indeed an economically liberal endeavour. Its key purpose is to replace those national laws which hamper trade with common European legislation.

For some member states, such as France or Germany, this often amounts to deregulation, because EU laws tend to be more business-friendly than their national laws.

But that is not the case for the UK. Britain has been driven by neoliberal economic policy for the past four decades. The EU has actually brought back all kinds of protections for workers, consumers and the environment. Among other things the EU forced the UK to introduce the statutory right to paid leave. Before the implementation of the EU Working Time Directive in 1998, two million British employees did not receive any paid holiday at all.

European integration has clearly been a left-wing corrective to British neoliberalism. Meanwhile, it was actually the UK that has pushed many of those developments in the EU that the left opposes.

Successive British governments have been promoting neoliberal policies and torpedoing social interventions on the EU level. For example, the UK ended up challenging the EU Working Time Directive at the European Court of Justice – even though the British government had already managed to significantly water it down during EU negotiations.

Insisting on EU decision-making through such intergovernmental negotiations and hampering the empowerment of the European Parliament, it has also been working against any effort to make the EU more democratic. Moreover, it stubbornly clings to its rebate on the EU budget, leaving it to other EU states to foot the bill of European solidarity. More recently, the UK has failed to display even the most basic solidarity in response to the refugee crisis or to Greek sovereign debt.

Nor do arguments about the EU holding Britain back from re-nationalising public services and the railways stand up to much scrutiny.

The privatisation of British public utilities had a lot to do with British politics and very little with European integration. While the EU Rail Directive opened up the railways for private competition, it did not oblige member states to privatise state-owned service providers. In fact, the UK was the only big EU state to do so.

If a left-wing British government tried to renationalise the railways, or any other utilities, the EU would be the least of its worries. The main obstacles would come from within the UK, most notably from the private sector and, indeed, the electorate. British voters are – whether the left likes it or not – far more economically conservative than most of continental Europe.

Any British left wingers thinking of voting to leave the EU over these issues should perhaps instead consider leaving Britain.

What happens in practice

Brexit could only be in the left’s interest if it was followed up by consequential left-wing politics. It would require a Labour party that has significantly moved to the left to get into government very soon.

Giving up on the EU and the left-wing corrective it already provides in exchange for the slim hope of a genuine left-wing government coming to power in Britain is a rather risky gamble. In the short term, Brexit will empower the likes of Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, who have never made a secret of their Thatcherite fantasies.

In the long term, Brexit might render Labour completely impotent. If Britain leaves the EU against the will of the majority of Scottish voters, their appetite for independence will surge again. Needless to say the left’s electoral potential will diminish for generations without the Scottish vote.

The support for Lexit indicates that parts of the left are as ignorant of the EU’s set up, its decision-making processes and its impact on the UK as the right. Both forms of euroscepticism are rooted in misinformation, prejudice and fear. And both their expectations for a post-Brexit future are based on little more than wishful thinking.

With 44% of Labour voters supporting Leave in a recent poll, it might be the left that paves the way not only for major blue collar job-loss that is likely to follow a post-Brexit economic shock, but also for making neoliberals stronger than ever. And what about all those European workers who have come to Britain to make a living?

Nobody denies that the European Union is far from perfect. But actually, it has been successive British governments that have spearheaded those forces undermining all efforts to make the EU more democratic, more social and more geared towards solidarity.

So if you’re left leaning and vote for Brexit, you might actually do the continental left-wing cause a favour. Without Britain holding it back, the EU might stand a chance at progress. But Brexit certainly won’t help you.

This post was also published on The Conversation.

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Why Austria almost elected a fascist president

A few weeks ago, Austria narrowly avoided a far-right presidency in an election that marked the end of an era. For the first time, no candidate of Austria’s Social or Christian Democratic catch-all parties - or rather, former catch-all parties - had made it to the run-off.

The parties that governed in a grand coalition for much of the country’s post-1945 history were crushed in the first round of the election, their candidates placed a distant fourth and fifth. And while half of Austria and liberals across Europe heaved a sigh of relief when former Green party chairman Alexander van der Bellen narrowly defeated the Freedom Party’s Norbert Hofer, the result was a pyrrhic victory at best.  

“The effort in this election campaign is not wasted, but is an investment for the future” Hofer stated on his Facebook page after conceding his defeat. And the campaign was indeed an indication of what might come. With 34 % in the latest polls, the Freedom Party is leading by a large margin. The presidential election has shown that its potential to mobilise voters goes much further. A far-right president might have been averted. A far-right chancellor is more likely than ever.

In the presidential election, 49.7 % of Austrian voters voted for a far-right political agenda. The remaining 50.3 % primarily voted against this agenda rather than for a coherent alternative. The election of the liberal, progressive and Europhile van der Bellen should not be mistaken for endorsement of his political views. His victory is the result of the concerted effort of very different, very disunited political forces that wanted to prevent the Freedom Party’s grip on political power at any cost. Had it not been for the country’s polarisation, a candidate with van der Bellen’s profile would not have stood a chance.

How did all this happen? In the German cultural TV show Aspekte, the Austrian writer Robert Menasse recently explained why so many Austrians turned to the Freedom Party. He explained it to a German audience that – in spite of proximity, shared language and common cultural and historical heritage – is remarkably ignorant about the politics of its southern neighbour.

As is the rest of the world. Austria and its capital Vienna in particular have an excellent international reputation (only tarnished by the occasional bizarre crime involving young women and subterranean dungeons). A lovely little affluent Alpine country on the banks of the Danube River, a place to go for skiing or to enjoy its rich cultural and culinary heritage. Or its secretive banking practices.

But while the strength of Norbert Hofer’s presidential candidacy caught many foreign observers off guard, it was hardly unexpected. In a powerful 18-minute monologue, Menasse offers an explanation of contemporary Austria that sheds light on how past and on-going developments facilitate the flirt with fascism. Acknowledging the disruptions of globalization and the European Union’s multiple crises, he identifies three specifically Austrian factors that aided the Freedom Party’s instrumentalisation of voters’ anxiety: Austria’s previous catch-all parties’ reaction to the rise of the far right, the country’s “Austrofascist” heritage and its flawed constitution.

Since the rise of Jörg Haider who re-invented Austria’s Freedom Party as a pan-Germanic and far-right force in the 1990s, the party proves to have a potential of around 30% of the electorate. Panicking in the light of its electoral success and hoping to steal its thunder, the dominant Social Democrats and Christian Democrats systematically started to appropriate Freedom Party demands and rhetoric, and to translate them into policy.

Rather than providing actual solutions for those sectors in dire need of structural reform, the centrist parties borrowed the far right’s simplistic slogans and scapegoats. “So we don’t have problems with public finance and education or a crisis of the welfare state and the pension system. No, we only have a problem with foreigners.” Such arguments frustrated the centrist parties’ core constituents. Meanwhile supporters of the far-right and a range of swing voters found the Freedom Party’s views confirmed. And they started to feel that their demands could have become policy much earlier if the Freedom Party had been in government.

“Many voters say ‘Now the Social Democrats say what the Freedom Party has always said, the Christian Democrats say what the Freedom Party has always said and the Greens live on the moon. But the Freedom party has always said it, and therefore we vote for them now’. And this explains how a man like Hofer appears out of nowhere and suddenly manages to get the most votes in the first round, six million votes more than the runner up, while the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats have so few voters they can greet all of them with a personal handshake.”

But why did Austria provide such fertile ground for the rise of a far-right party in the first place? And why are even voters from the political centre susceptible to their ideas, rhetoric and demands? According to Menasse, there is a historical constant in Austrian politics whose presence has widely been overlooked: “There is a continuity in the desire for authoritarian politics, for a consequent right-wing nationalist politics, I would go as far as to say for fascist politics. This desire is widely spread in Austria, for reasons that all those looking to Austria from abroad, and the Germans in particular, always forget.”

In post-1945 Germany, it became absolutely clear to everyone including the most ignorant people that nothing good was to be found in the Nazi period and that its glorification was unacceptable. On a political level, it became impossible to translate fascist views into relevant and sustainable electoral success.

Austria did experience National Socialism as well. In fact, rather than provoking resistance comparable to other states annexed by Nazi Germany, the ‘Anschluss’ of Austria to the German Reich was met with significant popular support. However, although many argue that the review and reappraisal of National Socialism was inadequate, it was largely discredited in post-1945 Austria as well. What was not discredited, however, was Austria’s very own version of fascism created five years before its annexation.

Facing the loss of his parliamentary majority, the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss dissolved the parliament in 1933 and replaced the democratic system with a fascist corporate dictatorship. Supported by the Catholic Church and the Union of Austrian fraternities, the new regime eliminated the constitutional court, banned competing parties, established internment camps for political opponents, took control over the education system and reinstituted capital punishment for a range of offences including civil unrest and rioting.

And while Austria half-heartedly came to terms with its Nationalist Socialist period, there was never any serious reappraisal of Austrofascism. In fact, quite the contrary happened. Austria’s homemade fascist leader was romanticized as a resistance fighter because he had rejected the unification with Germany and was ultimately assassinated in a failed coup attempt by Austrian Nazis.

“Austrofascism was never questioned. In fact, Dollfuss was seen as a patriotic leader who stood up to Hitler. That he was also a fascist was conveniently ignored” says Menasse. “As a result, fascist ideas, mindsets and traditions derived from Austrofascism could live on, hidden under the label of patriotism. In Austria, patriotism is a synonym for Austrofascist attitudes. And this is also the reason for Austria’s political divide. The Left refers to the Freedom Party’s politicians and voters as Nazis. They, in turn, are outraged, because actually they are not Nazis. They are Austrofascists, which is bad enough.”

According to Menasse, this Austrofascist heritage has increasingly resurfaced in recent years. As in other countries, many Austrians are afraid of being left behind in a world that has started to move too fast for some. Globalization and its disruptive symptoms such as the financial crisis or the recent migration movements leave them worried about what they see as threats to their way of life and their economic well-being. In such a climate, the existing underlying fascist and nationalist currents gains traction again and many start to call for a strong man and a strong party that offers simple solutions and strong leadership.

These sympathies for authoritarian leadership go hand in hand with a deeply rooted scepticism towards democracy, which Menasse partly attributes to the rather peculiar role of the Austrian constitution: “The constitution has been violated on a daily basis since the very foundation of the Austrian republic. Because it has been replaced by what is referred to as the ‘Actual Constitution’. The constitution says that parliament makes laws. However, in reality most laws are made by the social partners who meet and negotiate behind closed doors. When these laws get to parliament their approval is a formality.”

Moreover, whenever the government wanted to implement a law that did not comply with the constitution, it was just declared a ‘constitutional law’ by a two-thirds majority in parliament. Obtaining such a majority was fairly easy as Austria was largely governed by grand coalitions. As a result, even laws that were in stark contradiction to Austria’s or indeed any country’s basic constitutional principles became part of the constitution and were thus taken out of the jurisdiction of the constitutional court. As Menasse put it, “this meant that the constitution was not only systematically violated but ended up as an utter ruin.”

The constant violation of the constitution and the secondary role of parliament did not overly concern the Austrians as it went hand in hand with increasing wealth. But it did lead to a rather strange understanding of democracy. “After finally getting a democratic republic and a parliament, what did the Austrians learn over the course of at least three generations? They learned that the parliament is irrelevant and that democracy manifests itself in increasing wealth – a rather strange definition of democracy. And on top of that they learned that the constitution does not matter either, because after all it was systematically violated.”

Ironically, it was the Freedom Party’s Norbert Hofer of all people who pledged to take the Austrian constitution seriously if elected president. Because although previous incumbents have interpreted the presidency as a largely ceremonial office, the constitution actually grants the president significant powers. He is entitled to dismiss the government, dissolve the parliament, nominate a chancellor and govern the country by emergency decrees for up to four weeks. Formally, he is even the supreme commander of the Armed Forces.

“This is a left-over of Austrofascism that somehow stayed in the constitution. Every president in the second republic said: ‘Well, I know this is in the constitution, but we are not going to do it that way.’ But then someone came along and said that he is going to do it that way. And as a result, all democratically minded people panicked. And rightly so. Because the Austrian constitution allows for fascism, and in the worst case only the violation of the constitution could have prevented it.”

We will never know what Norbert Hofer would have made of the presidency and the constitutional powers formally bequeathed to it. "You will be surprised what is going to be possible”, he said in a televised debate that set off alarm bells among his opponents.

It seems likely, however, that Hofer would not have taken any drastic action. And in all fairness, even some of the victorious Alexander van der Bellen’s campaign rhetoric sounded as if Austria was a presidential democracy.

A president Hofer would probably have made an effort to appear like a serious, respectable statesman. He would have been the Freedom Party’s friendly and trustworthy face. He would have done his best to appear acceptable to the political mainstream while carefully using the reputation and the resources that come with the office to gradually shift this mainstream further to the right. He would have used the presidential authority to make the Freedom Party and its agenda more acceptable to the political centre and thus to continue paving the way for its electoral victory. And if it had reached an all-time high in the polls at some point during his presidency, he would have called an early election.

The Freedom Party did not manage to get the presidency this time. But if one is to believe Robert Menasse, the potential for far right majorities is here to stay. One might not agree with all of his analysis, but he certainly provides a compelling explanation of contemporary Austria.

A rather worrying one.

This post was also published on openDemocracy.

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Platini Is Unlikely to Be Willing or Able to Substantially Reform Fifa

Former French international midfielder and Uefa boss Michel Platini seems set to replace Sepp Blatter as Fifa boss in next February's election. Having global football finally run again by someone who once excelled on the pitch himself is a charming idea. However, Platini is not the right man. Fifa needs change, and change looks different.

Platini's endorsements by some of Blatter's biggest supporters, such as the notorious Asia football chief Shaikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, highlight why he is the wrong man for serious reform. Meanwhile the fact that even some of Blatter's biggest opponents, including FA boss Greg Dyke, now put their hopes on Platini highlights the sorry state of global football. If Platini is football's only hope, then there is not that much hope at all.

Having been a member of Fifa's Executive Committee since 2002, Platini is far too closely associated with the organisation's past to shape its future. Most notably, he bears major responsibility for global football's worst decisions in decades. His role in awarding the world cup to Qatar raises questions that go far beyond whether a dictatorship with summer temperatures of up to 50 degrees is an adequate host.

In November 2010, Platini had a secret meeting with Nicholas Sarkozy, then president of France, and Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, then Qatari crown prince and the country's Emir since 2013. After this meeting, Platini dropped his support for the United States' bid and became Qatar's main cheerleader outside of Asia. His son Laurant Platini was later recruited as CEO of Burrda, a rapidly expanding Qatar-owned sports clothing brand. Qatari funds also bought the struggling club Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) and showered it with money. Since then, Sarkozy's favourite club has started to dominate the French Ligue 1 and became a serious contender for international titles again. Other major French-Qatari business transactions followed suit. The latest one is a $7billion arms deal with 24 Rafale warplanes at its core, a fighter jet France struggled to sell abroad for years.

Any serious investigation into the decision to award Qatar the 2018 world cup will at best be embarrassing for Platini. His interest in pushing it forward is thus going to be rather limited.

To make things worse, Platini and Blatter are rather similar in how they do business. Blatter's patronage network was based on sharing Fifa money with smaller countries' football associations, not looking too closely at how their officials used it and getting their votes in return. Meanwhile Platini pushed for bloating the European championship from 16 to 24 participating countries and for the introduction of the Nations League. While these moves are unlikely to lead to more attractive and exciting matches, they benefit small European football associations and helped Platini to increase his support base among them. By advocating to expand the world cup from 32 to 40 teams, Platini started to gather sympathies among smaller associations in the rest of the world as well.

"We have to clean here first" Blatter said in a recent press conference after an English comedian had showered him with fake dollar bills. He clearly missed the irony of his words.

However, cleaning up Fifa from the inside is unlikely to work. The question is not only whether Platini wants to substantially reform Fifa. The question is whether Fifa can be substantially reformed in the first place.

Any reform needs to be passed by the Fifa Congress, an assembly in which 209 member associations have one vote each. The tiny Caribbean island Montserrat with a population of 5,000 carries as much weight as China. With small associations concentrating a lot of power on a few functionaries, they are vulnerable to corruption. Moreover, they might be bribed rather cheaply.

Some African delegates' votes for Blatter's first election as Fifa president were allegedly bought with $50,000. His former ally Mohamed bin Hammam allegedly transferred up to $200,000 to the presidents of 30 African football associations to secure their support for the Qatari World Cup. When he ran for the Fifa presidency himself in 2011, his friend Jack Warner was caught on tape offering Caribbean delegates $40,000 per vote. These are small sums compared to the money involved in lobbying for bids, let alone organising world cups.

Beyond traditional bribes, those who control Fifa's funding for its member associations can also encourage specific voting behaviour. The Chinese football association is unlikely to be overly impressed by a few million dollars. However, the Montserrat Football Association and other smaller members probably are. They are also unlikely to face major scrutiny by local media on how they handle the funds they receive.

Hence the votes of those member associations most over-proportionally represented in the Fifa Congress are also most likely to be affected by either corruption or "encouragement" from the Fifa headquarters. At the same time, their officials benefit from the status quo and are therefore unlikely to support substantial reforms in the Fifa Congress.

Serious Fifa reform would require abandoning the "one country, one vote" principle and to replace it with a more proportional system of representation that factors in member associations' size and athletic relevance. However, such a move is unlikely to pass in the Fifa Congress unless it faces massive external pressure.

This pressure can only come from Europe. While the world's five leading football leagues only have five votes in the Fifa Congress, their potential influence is huge. It is time for them to make use of it.

Hardly any supporters would be interested in a Fifa World Cup without the main European national teams and without the global football elite that is largely signed by clubs in the main European leagues. Without them, the Fifa World Cup has no value to sponsors and television networks.

Prior to Blatter's re-election, various European officials raised the possibility of boycotting it. This is still a valid option. However, rather then merely boycotting Fifa, they could also launch an entirely new world football organization and host an alternative world cup. With all main European teams participating, such an event would easily secure lucrative television and sponsoring deals.

Organizing it would not be a big deal either. The 2018 edition could be played across Europe in the same mode as the Uefa European Championships in 2020. New stadiums or other large infrastructure projects would be unnecessary and venues are much closer to each other and much better connected than those venues envisaged in Russia. Such a world cup could be organized without the hosts being left with major debts. It could even serve as a blueprint for sustainable future world cups in other parts of the world.

Even if not all national football associations participated in such an alternative World Cup, it probably would not be less attractive than the last Fifa tournament. And few major national football teams would have an incentive to stick to Fifa. Because against the will of the five main European football leagues, hardly any of them could assemble a serious squad. These leagues' clubs could simply refuse to release their players for Fifa tournaments.

It is time for the main football associations to make use of their power and confront Fifa with a credible ultimatum: Immediate and drastic reforms, or the establishment of a new world football organisation and an alternative World Cup.

In addition to reforming Fifa's voting system, they should also insist on full cooperation with the authorities investigating the recent world cup awards. Finally, a larger share of the sponsoring and television revenues should be used to finance the world cup itself. The overall costs of organising it should be brought back to a level that makes sure that future editions can still be hosted by democratic countries where citizens have a say in how their taxes are used.

A credible threat might be sufficient to enforce major reform. Before deciding to run for the Fifa presidency, Platini had the pole position for such a move. His successor as UEFA boss, or indeed the main European football associations themselves could still go for it.

It is not likely to happen though. The football associations of France and Spain, whose leagues are highly dependent on Qatari money, even voted for Blatter's recent re-election. The others are unlikely to go ahead alone, particularly since some of their leading officials don't have entirely clean hands either.

Maybe any hopes for change are futile. Maybe all hopes rest on the shoulders of the US authorities investigating Fifa. Thanks to them at least Blatter is going to step down. Maybe further investigations will have similar drastic effects. Maybe the authorities of the only big country in which football never really caught on is going to be instrumental in saving it. A rather funny thought.

This post was also published on The Huffington Post UK.

[jubelpark]

The Greek Deal Is Not a Coup, It Is a Logical Consequence of Intergovernmentalism

Already before Eurozone leaders reached a final agreement on the third bailout package for Greece, the hashtag #ThisIsACoup had started to make its rounds on social media. Few hours after the Eurogroup's draconian list of demands was published, Economics Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman endorsed the hashtag in his New York Times blog, arguing that the deal amounts to a "complete destruction of national sovereignty".

As with past agreements, the new deal has once again prevented a Greek default and is likely to once again prevent the country's recovery. With previous measures having at best allowed and at worst caused the Hellenic economy's collapse, it seems unlikely that an even higher dose of the same medicine will turn it around. There is no alternative to less and better-targeted austerity and even the IMF advocates a haircut now. Particularly leaders and voters in Germany, itself a major beneficiary of debt relief and economic assistance, should acknowledge this sooner rather than later.

However, while the Greek deal is politically, economically and ethically questionable, those who used the hashtag #ThisIsACoup got it wrong. They should have a look at Egypt, where the military ousted an elected president in 2013 and has killed and jailed many of those opposing the new regime too loudly. This is not what happened in Greece.

Yes, the Greek population clearly rejected the austerity measures twice, once when putting Alexis Tsipras and Syriza in power and then again in the referendum. Yes, the Greek government has been pressured into accepting a deal that looks pretty much the same as the one refused by popular vote. Yes, this might lead to the fall of the Greek government. And yes, fellow Eurozone governments would not particularly mind if it did.

However, rather than being a coup, the Eurozone's leaders unwillingness to acknowledge the result of the Greek referendum and to compromise with the Syriza government is a logical consequence of the intergovernmental system through which large parts of EU affairs are governed.

If all those Eurozone states whose tax-payers' money was and is used for loans or guarantees to bailout Greece had asked their citizens, there probably would not have been any bailout at all. In that case, Greece might have defaulted as early as 2010, potentially triggering a financial crisis far worse than the one caused by the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers.

Germany faces a major backlash over the Greek deal now, including another hashtag calling for a boycott of its economy. However, actually some other Eurozone members are much harsher on Greece. "The feast time at the expense of others is over for Greece" Lithuanian prime minister Dalia Grybauskaite said in early July. "Eurozone countries are really not going to pay for the irresponsible behaviour of the new Greek government" she added.

In the Baltics, many of those who experienced enormous hardships during the post-1989 transition of their economies have little sympathy for Greece. Particularly since they are asked to provide financial support for a country whose wages, pensions and unemployment benefits are significantly higher than their own.

Ignoring Northern and Eastern European opposition to debt relief would not be less undemocratic than it has been to ignore the outcome of the Greek referendum. Those who single out the recent developments indirectly maintain that the popular will of Greek voters is worth more than the will of voters in other EU states.

In much the same way as many other undemocratic and ineffective deals that EU leaders have made, the Greek deal is a logical consequence of intergovernmentalism. What is essentially a domestic European issue has largely been handled through classic international diplomacy. And in this line of business, voters do not matter all that much. And voters in small countries hardly matter at all.

There is no such thing as democratic intergovernmentalism. If decisions are reached through international negotiations, you cannot take election results or referenda in all participating states into account. With 28 member states in the EU and 19 in the Eurozone, almost every decision would be blocked somewhere.

The problem is that there are no European legislative and governmental structures to deal with European domestic issues. This is what caused the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in the first place: Comprehensive economic integration was not followed up with comprehensive political integration. It is also the reason for the disastrous crisis management over the past five years, as measures were usually lowest common denominator compromises of member states' governments stubbornly pursing their egoistic short-term interests.

According to the Italian finance minister Pier Carlo Padoan, only Italy, Cyprus and France supported a compromise with Greece. This is hardly surprising. Northern and Eastern European governments were facing massive domestic pressure not to be too lenient. And after having prescribed austerity measures on their own citizens and being haunted by left-wing opposition, the conservative governments of Spain and Portugal had no interest in enabling Syriza to get its compromise either.

In Greece, austerity will not bring the desired results and there is no alternative to restructuring the country's debt. But this problem will either be left for future governments or it will be acknowledged step by step using the same salami tactics Angela Merkel employed to move from her categorical refusal to support Greece in 2010 all the way to agreeing on a third bailout package in 2015.

Intergovernmentalism has proven to be an inadequate system of governance to manage the European economy in general and the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis in particular. The failure is systemic, rather than just political. It is thus not only the current Eurozone leaders who are to blame for screwing up Greece. It is also all those who have been jealously guarding national governments' and parliaments' powers and opposed the transfer of competences on economic and fiscal policy to the European Commission and the European Parliament.

And in Germany's defence it should be acknowledged that it has traditionally been among the member states most supportive of such political integration.

This post was also published on The Huffington Post UK.

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Why the EU should mandate the use of Galileo

The release of two satellites into the wrong orbit by a Russian Soyuz launcher is just the latest in a long list of setbacks to Galileo, the European Union’s (EU) Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). The loss of the two satellites and the decision to wait before launching the next ones will further delay the completion of the EU’s alternative to the United States’ (US) GPS and Russia’s Glonass.

Losing a satellite is neither a rare nor a major event. Space technology requires perfection and perfection is expensive. In unmanned spaceflight, loosing a spacecraft every now and then is cheaper than using technology that is 100 percent reliable. The loss of two Galileo satellites will not have a major impact on the programme’s overall costs. However, the delays induced by the incident might cause major indirect costs. In fact, any further delays put the project’s overall success at risk.

The officially declared main rationale of the Galileo programme is to achieve European independence in civilian satellite navigation. According to the European Commission, about 7 percent of the EU’s gross domestic product relies on services provided by satellite navigation, including critical sectors and infrastructures. Major disruptions of these services would impact industries as diverse as agriculture, transport and banking. In some sectors such as aviation or maritime transport, disruptions might even put lives in danger. At the same time, existing systems like the US’ GPS or the Russian Glonass as well as those under development are under military control and their public service could theoretically be reduced or even switched off at any time.

Considering that switching of the public service of a GNSS would affect corporate and private users everywhere, including the operating states’ own territory, such a scenario might seem unlikely. However, considering the major impact disruptions would have, the unwillingness to take this minor risk is understandable.

However, merely building one’s own GNSS is insufficient to meet this challenge. For the EU to achieve true independence, European citizens and businesses have to be encouraged to use devices that are Galileo-enabled. In order for this to happen, such devices have to be manufactured in the first place. And this is where any further delays threaten the success of Galileo.

The EU member states’ failure to create workable management structures and guarantee the funding already delayed the launch of the first satellites until 2011, the year in which the entire programme was initially scheduled to reach full operational capability. Since the European Commission took over management and ownership of the system from a failed public private partnership in 2007, the programme is more or less back on track. However, in the meantime the competing Russian Glonass system was completed and the Chinese Compass system has caught up and might be operational before Galileo.

Since Glonass is already in operation, various manufacturers have made their devices compatible to it with Apple’s iPhone being the most prominent example. However, manufacturers whose devices work with GPS and Glonass have little incentive to adapt them to yet another system, let alone two of them. While the combination of data from two systems improves the precision of services, adding data from a third one does not provide relevant added value for the user.

The advances of the Chinese system makes it even more challenging to convincing manufacturers to adapt to and service-providers to use Galileo. Even if Galileo becomes available globally before Compass, it will cover the economically important Asia-Pacific region only after the Chinese system. Moreover, China will probably use much more robust methods to promote its system than the EU dares so far.

In line with its philosophy of economic liberalism, the EU has so far primarily followed a laissez-faire strategy. At most, it tried to drive demand by raising awareness in sectors that would benefit from the more precise services that Galileo is promising to provide and by supporting related research and development (R&D) activities.

However, this might not be sufficient – particularly if the completion of the system is delayed any further. And in fact the EU is the only operator of a GNSS that is willing to play by the rules of the free market. In the US, devices that use a system other than GPS have a license fee imposed on them. Russia mandates the use of Glonass in a range of sectors.

In order to achieve true independence from foreign-controlled GNSS, the EU will have to follow a similar path. The Commission should either introduce standalone legislation requiring GNSS receivers sold in the EU to be Galileo-enabled or adapt existing sectorial legislation accordingly. Galileo is currently the only system under civilian authority and very likely to remain so. In order to avoid allegations of being protectionist, EU legislation could therefore just make the use of a civilian-controlled GNSS compulsory rather than explicitly mandating Galileo.

One of the options under consideration is to adapt the E112 Directive, which requires mobile phone networks to provide free emergency services and to transmit the location data of the caller. The data currently submitted is rather imprecise and of limited help to emergency centres. Mandating the submission of Galileo location data would not only help emergency services, but also promote the system’s use through the backdoor. Moreover, critical infrastructure such as aviation could be forced to use the European system rather than GPS.

Mandating Galileo seems to be the only way to ensure European independence from foreign satellite navigation systems. Even if it involves compromising the Union’s free market ideals, the Commission should follow that path.

This post was also published on European Geostrategy.

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EU elections: Getting the facts right

Over the past decade online factcheckers have scrutinised politicians’ statements in interviews, talks shows and their speeches. Starting in the United States with sites such as Pulitzer Prize-winning politifact, the idea has spread all over the globe. E&M author and fact checker Ragnar Weilandt explains how, in the run up to the European elections in May 2014, a new platform called FactCheckEU.org, is keeping European politicians in check.

Three months have passed since the labour movement restrictions on Romania and Bulgaria were lifted, and little has changed in the United Kingdom. This will have been a bit surprising if you had been following the British political debate in late 2013, which seemed to suggest the end of civilization as we know it. 'Hordes' of Bulgarians and Romanians were supposed to come to the island, either taking away jobs from hard-working Brits or grabbing the United Kingdom’s generous welfare benefits.

During the recent political debate on the freedom of movement within the European Union, many politicians across Europe proved to have a rather relaxed attitude towards facts. Whilst it is usually the media’s role to scrutinize what politicians tell their voters, they don’t always do a particularly good job when it comes to the European Union.

'Sold out! Flights and buses full as Romanians and Bulgarians head for the UK,' was the headline of a story in the Daily Mail on 31 December 2013. Although the paper quietly retracted the story later, it showcased the need for rational and fact-based reporting. Even in more responsible media outlets, a widespread lack of interest in or in-depth knowledge of European affairs contributes to the worrying trend of politicians getting away with most outrageous claims.

This creates a need for independent watchdogs checking up on them. In order to improve the quality of the debate on European politics, a group of young European citizens (including the author of this article) has set up FactCheckEU.org. Funded by a grant from the German Mercator Foundation, the website collects and analyses politicians’ statements on European affairs, and grades them on a scale from 'True' to 'Insane Whopper'.

The website monitors politicians across the political spectrum, independent of their views on the EU. If hardline Eurosceptics make valid points, this is acknowledged. At the same time Europhiles do not get a way with inaccuracies either. This is essential in ensuring the website can support a fact-based debate that is in everyone’s interest, whether they believe in a federal union or are sceptical about authority being transferred to Brussels.

Ironically, the most frequent 'insane whopper' is made by both Europhiles and Europhobes. In 1988 then Commission president Jacques Delors predicted that within ten years 80 per cent of economic legislation would be made by the European Parliament. Whilst in practice the European Parliament remained a rather toothless institution until the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, the projected figure took on a life on its own. Having been repeated again and again by journalists, politicians and even scholars, it is now widely seen as an established fact that 70-80 per cent of national legislation is made in Brussels.

In the last few months such claims have been made by presidential candidate Martin Schulz and vice president Viviane Reding, who used the figure to emphasise the importance of the European institutions and the upcoming European elections. At the same time Nigel Farage cited it as an example of what he considers to be creeping disempowerment of national governments and parliaments.

The truth is that the percentage of laws made by the EU varies greatly between different countries and actually gets nowhere near 80 per cent in any of them. According to research conducted by Professor Annette Elisabeth Toeller, Germany has one of the highest percentages, with 39.1 per cent of national legislation coming from the EU. In the United Kingdom, whose independence from Brussels Mr Farage is fighting for, it is only 15.5 per cent of the national laws, a number echoed by a 2010 House of Commons research paper.

There are enough valid arguments both sides could use to support their case for more or less Europe. To highlight the European Parliament’s relevance, Europhiles can point at its power to co-decide on most EU legislation, including international agreements such as the hotly debated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Eurosceptics could attack the limited transparency in the Commission’s negotiations on this agreement, or the waste caused by sending MEPs to the Parliaments’ second seat in Strasbourg every month. A debate on the real issues would be more helpful to tackle Europe’s problems and challenges.

Factcheckers ensure that politicians are made aware that someone is listening to and double-checking what they are saying. A number of politicians and even the European Commission have already reacted to individual factchecks on them. Academic research suggests that the awareness that someone is factchecking them does have an effect on what politicians say.

Expanding factchecking to politicians across the continent for the next European elections will require broad participation. Readers can upload statements to be checked or help with translating analyses in up to six different languages. If you feel like being a factchecker yourself, you can submit your own draft analysis of a statement to be checked, edited and published by the FactCheckEU staff.

The aim is to create a large community and a network of research institutes to help covering statements made by politicians all over Europe. In doing so, ordinary Europeans can be active in ensuring that all politicians are sticking to the facts when discussing European politics.

Few people doubt that there is a major need for a debate on what the EU is and should or should not become. Opinions are likely to very different and that is how it should be. But as a former editor of The Guardian once famously put it: 'Comment is free, but facts are sacred.' Whether they love Europe or hate it, politicians should get their facts straight.

This post was also published on Europe & Me.

[jubelpark]

Four-Letter Diplomacy and European Provincialism

Victoria Nuland's rather undiplomatic statement about the European Union's role in Ukraine last week was not well received on this side of the Atlantic. Angela Merkel, for instance, deemed it "totally unacceptable". But however uncharming Nuland's choice of words might have been, she actually just summed up the official US foreign policy line towards Europe in three words: Fuck the EU.

Jen Psaki, spokesperson of the US State Department called Russia's alleged role in the bugging of Ms Nuland a "new low in Russian tradecraft". Considering the recent and ongoing revelations about the NSA's practices, this is not without irony. Over the last years it has transpired that the United States have bugged European citizens, politicians and corporations on a previously unimaginable scale. In doing so, it has breached the privacy of millions of European citizens, conducted hostile acts towards allied governments and harmed the EU's political and economic interests. And while the European furor about Edward Snowden's revelations mainly concentrated on the NSA's invasion of citizens' personal privacy, US surveillance also affects EU citizens in other, less direct ways.

Whenever EU diplomats and politicians walk into transatlantic negotiations, their US counterparts may already know the European negotiation strategy since EU premises have been bugged globally. This would give the American side a clear advantage, enabling US negotiators to push their will through at the cost of the EU and its citizens. The most pressing example is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which if negotiated in an unfavourable way risks disproportionately privileging US industries at the EU's expense and threating European consumer protection rules.

Moreover, when European corporations compete with American ones for major foreign contracts, the latter might have an insight into the former's tenders. And if EU firms develop technologies the US deems strategically valuable, intercepted information about them might well be forwarded to US competitors. "There's no question that the US is engaged in economic spying," said Edward Snowden in an interview with the German public broadcaster NDR. "If there's information at Siemens that they think would be beneficial to the national interests, not the national security of the United States, they'll go after that information and they'll take it."

Evidence of US industrial espionage has already been around for more than a decade. A 2001 report by the European Parliament on the Echelon spy network, a signals intelligence network combining the NSA with four other services (including the British GCHQ), stated that its major purpose is the interception of commercial and private communication. While the report stopped short of making accusations, it made clear that the system is well suited for industrial espionage. It also provided an extensive list of cases in which US agencies have been accused of spying on EU corporations and warned them to protect themselves accordingly.

In spite of these revelations, the European leaders have not even succeeded in getting some sort of apology from the United States, let alone a credible promise to refrain from these activities in the future. The US gets away with damaging the EU, which is not only supposedly closely allied but also superior both in population and economic power, because the Union is not using its combined power to speak with one single strong voice.

It speaks with 29 voices instead. Four of them are heard but not taken very seriously in Washington (UK, Germany, France and the EU Commission), a further three are heard occasionally but not taken serious at all (Italy, Poland and Spain) and the remaining 22 voices create an obscure background noise that US policy makers see as a nuisance at most. Individually, all EU member states share the fate of becoming relatively irrelevant in a world increasingly dominated by the US and China as well as emerging actors such as Brazil or India. These states gratefully exploit the Union's leaders' inability and unwillingness to create a real common foreign policy.

The United States is deliberately sidelining the EU as a partner. After being appointed Secretary of State, John Kerry's first trip to Europe included stops in four EU member states but none in Brussels. A symbolic step that tells a lot about the American approach. The US prefers to talk directly to the EU member states and to make bilateral deals favourable to the respective state in the short term but undermining the EU's and its members' interest and their ability to enforce them in the long run.

This highly effective 'divide and rule' strategy explains European leaders' reactions to the NSA revelations. Although there was outrage, each individual state fears to loose its own special relationship with the United States. Accordingly, the strongest wording they could unite on following the revelation that various European leaders' cellphones had been monitored, was to declare that "a lack of trust could prejudice the necessary cooperation in the field of intelligence gathering". Not exactly impressive compared to the American reaction following the 2010 exposure of the comparably harmless Russian spy ring around Anna Chapman.

It is not totally unacceptable that a senior US diplomat uses a private call to express her view on the EU with four letters. What is unacceptable, however, is that her view reflects the United States line on Europe. And the most unacceptable thing is that the EU's leaders' shortsighted provincialism strongly encourages this line. Rather than calling it unacceptable, Merkel and her EU colleagues should get their act together and make sure that this line actually becomes totally unacceptable.

This post was also published on The Huffington Post UK.

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Fixing European entrepreneurship

In the past three decades, Europe has only produced three of the current global top 500 companies, compared to 26 in California alone. If the European Union wants to remain a relevant actor in global business this needs to change. The NSA spying scandal might be the wake-up call required to start that process.

The recent revelations that companies like Facebook, Google and Dropbox are participating in the NSA Prism spying programme came as a shock to Europeans. At least to those who thought that Hollywood depictions of American surveillance capabilities were hugely exaggerated. It turned out that they were not. The massive intrusion on EU citizens’ privacy also highlighted that all those companies that have become an integral part of today’s global web infrastructure are American and thus first and foremost bound to US jurisdiction. Europe’s lack of tech titans is therefore not only an economic challenge. Increasingly, it is also becoming a strategic one.

Europe could be a great place for start-ups. After all, European scientists and engineers have been at the forefront of those innovations that created the digital age. In fact, the World Wide Web itself was invented by a Briton working in a research institute in Switzerland. So why has it largely been American start-ups that became the de-facto monopolists which are now forming the Web 2.0 and what is wrong with entrepreneurship in Europe to have let this happen?

George W. Bush allegedly once said that “there is no word for ‘entrepreneur’ in French.” In addition to being a great connoisseur of the French language, he apparently gave some thought to the matter and concluded that Europeans in general and the French in particular lack entrepreneurial culture. And in spite of his other shortcomings, he certainly has a point here.

“Americans have a completely different mentality than Europeans” says Michael Krayenhoff, who co-founded the dating website ‘The Inner Circle’ in November 2011, shortly after completing his Masters degree. His start-up is based at Silicon Roundabout, a technology cluster in East London. The dating industry is a rather mature and competitive one, but Krayenhoff and his partner found they could deliver a better service than the established players. In March 2013 they broke even. “After graduating from university most Europeans expect to be given a good and safe job” he says. “In the United States it is more about creating your own opportunities.”

In addition, it’s often said that Europeans tend to be more risk-averse and more afraid of failure than their counterparts across the Atlantic. This creates a huge emotional barrier to trailblazing entrepreneurism, as starting a business is full of risks and prone to failure. “In fact, failure is a normal step on the way to success” says Nils Göldner, who works for blackboat.com, a consultancy helping start-ups to manage fast growth. “Few successful entrepreneurs have a major breakthrough with their first attempt.”

In order to become a successful entrepreneur, a ‘gifted’ failure is considerably more valuable than a minor success as the experiences gained can often enhance chances to succeed with the next idea. Unfortunately, after going bankrupt in France, for example, it can take up to nine years until you are able to access the resources to start something new. In Germany, you might even be banned for life from executive positions in big companies. And since failure leaves a lasting stigma, finding investors for your second attempt can prove to be a challenge.

A more entrepreneurial culture cannot be created overnight. “We have to start with education,” says Krayenhoff. “If you want to push entrepreneurship, you have to encourage it at schools and universities.” Europe lags behind when it comes to teaching students entrepreneurial skills and encouraging them to transform their ideas into business ventures. It is therefore hardly surprising that US-based companies successfully marketed various ideas that were originally European. One of the most striking examples is mp3 technology. Although this was developed in Germany, it was an American company who put a half eaten apple on mp3-players and made billions.

This is not simply down to a lack of entrepreneurial spirit, however: a European trying to market their ideas in the European Union faces various challenges. Raising capital is often the first problem faced by those setting out to build a company. Banks tend to be hesitant about funding start-ups, whom they perceive to be too risky. Although there are some governmental funding schemes, their application processes are often highly time-consuming. The most common source for start-up funding is venture capital. European venture capital has never been as readily available as in the US and has actually declined by 50% in the past five years.

In their “manifesto for entrepreneurship” a group of eminent entrepreneurs has thus called upon policy-makers to grant tax concessions for investments in small EU companies and to support start-ups to raise capital on public markets.

A second barrier is bureaucracy. When you start a business in Italy, you have to deal with up to 20 authorities. In Germany it takes you at least 10 weeks to legally set up your business before you can get started. In sectors in which being the first mover has all the advantage, bureaucratic delays like this make the difference between success and failure.

Once the business is set up, strict labour laws make it hard to hire staff without taking on long-term obligations that would overburden a company that made a few wrong decisions. Moreover, strict rules on working conditions can be an additional hurdle for new start-ups. Bill Gates could never have founded Microsoft in Germany, as he started it in a garage without windows, which is illegal under German labour law. While these rules are certainly justified for most established companies, loosening them for newly founded enterprises could significantly help entrepreneurs.

In the case of tech start-ups, European data protection law is a further obstacle. European laws are considerably stricter than American ones. Operating an online shop and saving customer data without violating privacy laws is a challenge. As technology has advanced, legislation at both national and European level has failed to adapt at the same pace. It is inconsistent across Europe and expanding your business to a second member state still requires in-depth knowledge of the local data protection laws, stifling cross-border expansion across the EU. It is therefore crucial that the European Commission’s plan to unify data protection by 2016 into one single regulation is not hindered by member states.

“Your only chance to succeed with a web-based service or application is to quickly access a large market,” says Göldner. But while American start-ups can target 300 million potential clients from their very first day in business, a Dutch company starts with 17 million potential clients. The Single Market is still far from complete, and expansion to other EU member states can require hiring additional local staff to deal with national legal issues that arise from adapting to local laws and regulations. In some cases this even necessitates the creation of a subsidiary of the parent company. This entails additional costs in terms of time and resources, which US competitors can invest in their actual products.

“But even in more traditional markets it remains difficult to expand” says Göldner, who also operates steakfreunde.de, a start-up selling high-quality meat products online. Expanding beyond Germany is currently not an option for the company. “It starts with trivial issues like shipping costs. We can sell our products to clients in Frankfurt/Oder. But if we want to post them to customers ten kilometres further east the shipping costs triple, just because we have to cross the border to Poland. This is not feasible for us.”

These are some of the issues that need to be tackled in order to create a more entrepreneur-friendly European Union. There is a lot of talent emerging from Europe: according to the Economist, there are about 50,000 Germans working in Silicon Valley and more than 500 start-ups in California were founded by French nationals. If the EU creates better conditions for entrepreneurs, a lot of talent, both European and non-European, might be more willing to start their businesses in the EU. After all, there are enough reasons to live and work in Europe. Eight of the ten most liveable cities in the world are located here. The surfing spots in France and Portugal can compete with those in California and the risk of being shot is significantly lower than in the US!

The European success stories of Skype, Spotify and Soundcloud show the potential European start-ups have. The EU needs more than these companies to maintain a competitive edge in the global economy. And the timing for boosting entrepreneurship could hardly be better, the NSA revelations might turn out to be a significant stimulus for EU-based tech start-ups. As private and corporate clients inside and outside Europe are becoming more sceptical about the safety of their data in US-based companies, demand for European alternatives is already rising.

This demand is something that could be built upon and policy-makers at both European and the national level should act now. They cannot enforce entrepreneurial spirit, but they can create conditions that facilitate it. Promoting entrepreneurial culture, cutting red tape for start-ups, facilitating access to venture capital, and completing the single market would be a good place to start.

This post was also published on Europe & Me.

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Welcome to the Eurobubble

"When I arrived in Brussels I was told that Eurocrats don't really live in Belgium. Well, the truth is: They don't even live in Brussels." Accompanied by electronic beats, the 43-second-trailer of the Eurobubble series manages to draw an ironic yet authentic picture of the atmosphere in the microcosm of young professionals working in the capital of Europe. E&M looks at the development of what is currently becoming the first comedy series on Eurocrats.

In spite of the impact which the EU's legislation has on its citizens, Europeans are only marginally interested in what is happening in Brussels. The daily political processes in the European capital are perceived as too technical, too distant and irrelevant. This is both a cause and a consequence of the media's lack of reporting on it. Documentaries shedding light on EU affairs are rare and only reach a few viewers. Against this background, it is not surprising that European politics has not yet inspired moviemakers either. There does not seem to be an audience.

The genre itself has inspired many artists and has always found audiences. Great writers of all ages have fictionalised the use and misuse of political power. Political dramas, thrillers and comedies entertain millions. The creators of TV series were the first to portray the daily politics as well as the lives of the people involved. The 1970s series Yes Minister remains one of the most popular sitcoms in the UK and even created one of the most resistant Euromyths: The Eurosausage. Meanwhile, quite a few people on both sides of the Atlantic would name Jed Bartlet, protagonist of Alan Sorkin's The West Wing, as their favourite US president.

Despite the apparent appeal of political fiction for readers and viewers, books, movies, and TV series don't tend to be set in political Brussels. Are Eurocrats simply too boring for fiction? A couple of months ago, this magazine suggested that Europe needs Aaron Sorkin. Well, we have not yet been successful in convincing him to make a European version of "The West Wing" but we might have found an alternative.

Actually Yacine Kouhen, the 30-year-old producer, screenwriter and lead actor of the Eurobubble series never watched The West Wing or Yes Minister. In fact, he was inspired by an entirely apolitical show, the French series Bref, which shows life in Paris from the perspective of a thirty-year-old unemployed antihero. In one to three minutes and at an intense pace, each episode depicts the protagonist's banal daily experiences and turns them into rapid-fire images and dialogues. Launched in August 2011, the show went viral on social networks, attracting 1.5 million likes on facebook in three months.

The Eurobubble series follows a similar concept. "The idea was to make it short but intensive," explains Yacine. Seen from the perspective of a 'policy officer' who remains unnamed, the series portrays the lives of young professionals working on European affairs in Brussels. Located around the European institutions, countless lobby firms, public affairs companies, NGOs and think tanks attract graduates from all over Europe. "It is a specific elite" explains Yacine, "they speak various languages, have studied European politics, law or economics at some of the best universities in Europe and they are all doing the same things here, the same kind of jobs with the same kind of profiles. But at the same time they are so diverse with their different national backgrounds. It is sociologically interesting to observe this".

In real life, Yacine works as a coach, training young professionals in public speaking. About a year ago he had the idea to create a series based on his experiences in the Eurobubble. After seeing various expat bubbles while working as a French diplomat in Africa, the United States and Latin America, he became fascinated by "the most impressive bubble" he had experienced so far. “We live in a city within the city” says Yacine. Indeed, the Eurobubble is a parallel society within Brussels. Its members speak a language almost incomprehensible to outsiders – full of abbreviations, technical terms and outrageous distortions of the English language. And they have a rather troubled relationship to Belgium and the Belgians.

The series introduces us to the different 'castes' of the Eurobubble - from the unpaid intern at a random consultancy to the honourable Member of the European Parliament. The protagonist ranges somewhere in the middle of this pecking order. In the first episode, he comes to Brussels to find work. He applies for various jobs with meaningless and exchangeable job titles (project officer, programme manager or policy coordinator) at companies with meaningless and exchangeable names (ECCF, EEB or F&P). After convincing the boss of the EOOA - the 'European Olive Oil Association' - of how important olive oil has always been to him, he gets a job as a policy offer and becomes part of the Eurobubble.

The series follows the policy officer and his colleagues into their professional and social lives. We see them desperately trying to attract attention at conferences. We join them to salsa parties where South European dancing instructors outperform them. We observe unpaid interns stealing sandwiches at receptions. We join the policy officer in his team meetings where he and his colleagues discuss the 'Olive Oil 2020' strategy and politely laugh at their boss's bad jokes. We follow him to Place du Luxembourg where newcomers, particularly interns, mingle every Thursday to participate in the most cherished activity in Brussels: networking.

You do not socialise in the Eurobubble, you network. Everyone desperately tries to get rid of their business cards, preferably in exchange for those of important people. As Yacine writes on his blog, you only start to exist in the Eurobubble once you have your own business cards. In order to get established in Brussels, being there is crucial in order to find out about vacancies and to meet potential employers. Newcomers to the bubble are willing to take on various un- or underpaid internships in order to be part of the whole circus. If you really want to stay for good, you should be willing to invest up to one year. If you are lucky you get a fixed, yet in most cases still underpaid job. For instance, as a policy officer who defends the interests of the European olive oil industry. From there you might gradually advance and if you successfully compete with around 15,000 applicants you might even become one of the 50 lucky ones annually recruited to become entry level officials in the hallowed halls of European politics: at the Commission.

Although the Eurobubble series deals with life in political Brussels, it is not primarily a political series. The institutions and their employees only play a minor role; the series rather describes the professionals in public affairs, lobbying and research. It aims to tell stories about the challenges and situations all young professionals experience, particularly those living in a bubble. And to some extent nearly everyone is. As Yacine puts it: "If you work in a foreign country, you are in the expat bubble. If you work at L'Oreal you are in the L'Oreal bubble. We all play a social game, and this is the way we play it in Brussels”.  

The series is aimed at audiences from both inside and outside the Eurobubble. "The challenge was to create a script that does not only include insider jokes but rather to develop some characters and situations between these characters that can be funny and understandable for anyone." And the concept works. The situations the protagonist encounters – whether at job interviews, meetings or conferences; the people he meets - nerds and achievers, relaxed roommates and careerists - are all familiar to most young professionals. However, viewers watching the first series might miss what they usually associate with Eurocrats: the Commission bureaucracy and the horse-trading in the Council. The scenes from the French-German marriage, the British diva's extravagances and the way the national leaders muddle through the Eurocrisis are indeed made for satire. There is huge potential for a second series…

This post was also published on Europe & Me.

[jubelpark]

Europe’s second reunification

At the heyday of its power, the Roman Empire controlled all Mediterranean shores. Centuries later Byzantium was centred on what is now called Istanbul and encompassed most of the Southern Mediterranean. In contrast, the European Union as their modern successor originally emerged as a Western entity centred on Berlin, Brussels and Paris. Although the Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 can be seen as a reunification of the European continent, the historical and cultural cradles of Europe remain peripheral and largely without membership perspectives. The recent events in the Arab world might be a good occasion to reconsider the modern perception of Europe’s boundaries. Indeed, they could constitute the beginning of a second reunification of Europe.

Most definitions of European geography use the Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea with its outlets to demarcate the continent. Looking back at Europe’s history and at its cultural origins makes these borders and an exclusion of countries such as Turkey look rather arbitrary. The territories and power centres of the European Union’s predecessors were largely located in the Mediterranean region. The same applies to Europe’s cultural origins: in fact, the very name of Europe is derived from a princess from what is now called Syria/Lebanon/Israeli, who was kidnapped by a Greek god; the European religions originated in Palestine and initially only spread to the Middle East and South Eastern Europe; the oldest Christian country is Armenia and the oldest still existing monastery is St. Katharine on the Mount Sinai in Egypt.

At the same time, European science and philosophy have their origins in ancient Greece and Rome and were complemented by Muslim scholars during the Islamic Golden Age. Thus, the cradles of ‘Europeaness’ are Greece, Rome and the Middle East rather than Germany and France. In fact, Berlin, Brussels and Paris are quite far away from where it all began, much further than Turkey, the Southern Mediterranean and the Caucasus. Iceland, which is likely to become a EU member soon, is as far away from Europe’s origins as Nigeria or Afghanistan. This strongly challenges the modern conception of Europe’s borders and makes the question of enlargement beyond these a very relevant one.

The developments in the Arab world have increased the necessity of thinking about the EU’s role as a regional actor. In the course of 2011, we witnessed the attempt of various Arab states to shake off their long-lasting dictatorships. Several western commentators drew parallels to the revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. At that time, the European Community decided to become deeply involved in this region and use its power to transform the political, social and economic structures of the Eastern European countries. Due to the carrot of future membership, these countries were willing to give the EU a strong influence over their domestic policy and allow it to restrict their sovereignty. Is this an option that should also be considered for countries that are not generally seen as European? Can something similar be achieved in the Arab world?

Obviously the Arab world cannot be compared to Eastern Europe, nor should its accession to the EU be expected within a similar timeframe and taken for granted. However, if states in the region adopt systems that adhere to European principles as stated in these criteria, there is no reason not to include them. Perfect compliance with the Copenhagen criteria cannot be expected in the short run. However, giving the transforming states in the Arab world a long-term perspective of accession might raise their incentive for sustainable reform. As in Turkey, membership perspective gives the Union the leverage to establish better governance, democratic principles and human rights in its southern neighbourhood. Considering the fact that the EU’s commitment to Turkish accession has always been rather vague, the extent to which it influenced the country’s domestic politics is remarkable. Are similar developments possible in the Southern Mediterranean?

When Morocco applied for membership in the late 1980s, it was rejected due to its non-adherence to basic European principles. However, it has improved on these ever since and still seeks the closest possible cooperation with the Union’s political structures. Granting the country a membership perspective might therefore have the same effects as in Turkey. The recent transformations in Libya and Tunisia offer similar opportunities. Libya’s richness in natural resources gives the country a realistic chance to catch up with Southern European economies. According to the 2011 Human Development Report, the country was already more developed before the war than potential EU membership candidates such as Turkey, Ukraine and Albania.

The impact of French norms and values as well as the existing tourism industries, framed by a neigbourhood policy that rather resembles the Marshall plan than the existing instruments, might help Tunisia and Lebanon to follow suit. As part of a comprehensive approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, membership perspectives might even be an incentive for Israel and the Palestinian Authorities to conclude a peace treaty. As the lion’s share of international aid for Palestine is funded by Europe, the EU has potentially significant leverage on the country’s authorities. And meanwhile, former Israeli foreign minister and current opposition leader Tzipi Livni demanded “significant participation of Israel in the European integration project” while still in office, and answered the question of how far this participation should go with “the sky is the limit.”

Europe cannot and should not rush into Southern Mediterranean enlargement. However, announcing its principal openness towards the region might already create a strong incentive for further transformation. At the same time the process towards accession and even enlargement itself would serve European interests. Arab migrants could help to counter the demographic timebomb which the European states are facing. The path to accession of Southern Mediterranean countries would give the EU leverage in tackling regional conflicts and further its energy needs as well as its security interests. From a historical and cultural point of view, the European Union might expand to wherever there are Roman ruins. Enlargement to the Southern Mediterranean shores therefore constitutes the final reunification of Europe. It might not be a short-term perspective. Making it a long-term perspective does, however, constitute a great opportunity for Europe and we should take this chance.

This post was also published on Europe & Me.