What do you think Robespierre was trying to do when he took out an arrest warrant for Brissot and Roland right before the September Massacres?
I solemnly swear thatRobespierre was up to no good.
The events of early September 1792 have been reiterated in most everypopular work on the French Revolution that to spin another rendition is nearlyredundant. What else is there, indeed, to say about them? On 2 September 1792, themurders of the prisoners began. It started modestly enough, or at least asmodestly as Massacres can be expected to go, with the butchering of a group ofpriests. Then it spread throughout one prison. And then another. Hundreds of otherwise respectable (in the bourgeois sense) Parisians began a slaughter of anywhere between 1,100 and 2,000 prisoners.
Also on 2 September1792, Robespierre gave a speech at the Commune of which he was a memberdenouncing a conspirator who was an agent of the invading Duke of Brunswick; hedid not use Brissot’s name but it did not take much to catch his allusion.Subsequently an arrest warrant was issued for Brissot, Roland, and otherprominent Girondins.
Months later, after allthe bodies had been buried, Robespierre’s behavior was challenged. Had he triedto murder his political rivals? “Since when is to denounce someone to killthem?” he responded shortly.
The answer is, when adenouncement means prison, and prison means massacre.
It has been pointed outby some historians- and indeed, Robespierre was at pains to demonstrate - that Robespierre made this denouncement well before the bodyat which he was attending was alerted to the Massacres. Before television andwidespread news alerts it would be understandable if a man on one end of Pariswas ignorant as to what was going on in the other. How could Robespierre haveknown that Brissot’s very life would be in danger were he incarcerated?
At the time of theSeptember Massacres, it had not yet been a month since the overthrow of theKing. The Prussians were marching into France, with Brunswick at their head –Brunswick, who had promised to wreak destruction if the Royal Family wasfurther insulted. Lafayette had defected. Revolutionaries differed as to thedetails of their new regime but the very Revolution itself was under siege.Every inch of ground that had been gained was in danger of being lost.
The stakes were high butwere known to shortly grow higher: to counter the advance, swarms of youngFrenchmen would have to march to the front and leave their families behind themin Paris. Who then could protect them from the hundreds of imprisoned counterrevolutionaries,the thousands of imprisoned criminals they were leaving behind?
Prisons in theeighteenth century weren’t the impenetrable fortresses of today. Even were itotherwise, the Bastille herself had been stormed from without and it stood toreason that a well-planned prison riot could break from within. Parisiansimagined a veritable river of brigands washing over Paris, preying on thefamilies of the departed soldiers – all at the behest of a counterrevolutionarycabal.
Fantastic, to be sure. Butthe belief was widespread even by the Powers That Be. And so a solution wasproposed – not commanded. Suggested.
“Our enemies prepare thelast bows of their insane rage…they wish to open a route to Paris, they maysucceed….Citizens, you have traitors in your bosom’ well, without them thebattle would soon be finished,” the Provisional Government proclaimed on 25August.
“Every measure of preservation is good in theextreme crisis of danger,” beckoned the Interior Ministry.
Jean-Paul Marat was notone to mince words. “The…option which is the safest and most wise, is toproceed armed to the Abbaye, seize the traitors, particularly the Swissofficers and their accomplices, and put them to the sword!…Rise and let theblood of traitors flow again. It is the only means of saving the country!”
The ProvisionalGovernment was often on edge, and Marat was usually writing about violence, butDanton did not usually take an interest in the release of prisoners, and he didseem to make a point of releasing old friends and teachers from jail. Dantonhas been effectively acquitted of orchestrating the massacres but he did, atleast, seem to suspect that there was danger in the air.
Robespierre was a memberof the General Council of the Commune and of the electoral assembly, hardly a body ignorant of Parisian goings-on. His social circle was surely familiar; although he was not close to Danton or Marat, he was very close to Jean-Nicholas Billaud-Varennes, his futurecolleague on the Committee of Public Safety. So close that Robespierre did not make his speech alone as Billaud was by his side, supporting his every word.
Billaid would later be spotted in theprisons during the Massacres. Whether Billaud was saving lives or taking them hasbeen a matter of debate but given Billaud’s later location, and ignoring the unlikelihood that he just happened to be at Ground-Zero during the massacres… he at least, had to have been aware ofthe danger. Did he choose not to tell Robespierre as they shared thisdenouncement?
Although the two wouldbreak ties in the coming years, they remainedon good terms after September 1792. Robespierre certainly did not seem to holdany grudge against Billaud for manipulating him into attempted murder. Frankly,it does not appear as though Robespierre was manipulated into anything at all.
It would be narrow and abackwards reading of history to view the September Massacres as inevitable, assomething Robespierre had to havepredicted, but he was likely as aware of their potential coming as Danton was, asMarat, as Billaud was.
And Danton, Marat, andBillaud seemed very aware of the potential of a Massacre.
But he could have known more than just that: their probability. He would not have known when, ornecessarily where, or indeed how they would operate. He had been involved in the Revolution sinceits inception and he knew that the crowds could strike at one and leaveanother. Like a tornado tearing up your home and leaving your neighbor’s untouched, a crowd was unpredictable and often arbitrary.
Robespierrecould not have known with any certainty that denouncing Brissot and his friendswould mean Brissot’s death. There are too many variables for it to be hisintrinsic goal. His goalwas to remove these men from the playing field of Revolution. That could besecured either with their imprisonment or their death; the details were unimportant.This behavior is mirrored in his later attitude towards Marie-Antoinette andMadame Elisabeth: he had wanted both removed from the vicinity of power. IfMarie-Antoinette were executed, that is fine, but it is not necessary – he washappy to let Madame Elisabeth, nearly Antoinette’s equal in political currency,persist in prison.
Which is to say,Robespierre knew that there was a chance Brissot would be killed if hewere arrested.
And Robespierre does not seem to have cared one way or another.
Nor does he appear tohave cared to seriously mend this damning blot on his reputation.
In point of fact Brissot was notarrested, nor were any of the others that Robespierre and Billaud denounced.Danton effectively vetoed their arrest warrants and with a reluctant Robespierre at hisside – when it was Danton’s turn tobe denounced, in 1794, Robespierre specifically mentioned that Danton stoppedhim from destroying the Brissotin conspiracy early on. This is not aconfession, per se, as Robespierre was hastily cobbling together any stripe ofevidence to convict Danton, but it does read as a damning reflection ofRobespierre’s intentions.
The Girondins, for theirpart, certainly interpreted Robespierre’s denouncement as attempted murder. “Robespierreand Marat have a knife at our throats!” Madame Roland, whose husband had beendenounced, wrote to a friend on 5 September. “Would you believe they had issueda warrant for the arrest of Roland and Brissot as being suspected of havingsecret dealings with Brunswick, and only held back out of a kind of fear …Ifthey had used their arrest warrant, these two excellent citizens would havebeen taken to the Abbaye and butchered with the others!”
In fairness, theGirondins were inclined to shovel responsibility for the Massacres onto theirMontagnard rivals as a rule – and there is, indeed, a strain of hypocrisy here. The Girondins had displayed at least as much toleration for the bloodshed as even the most “radical” of Montagnards.Monsieur Roland included. After hearing of them, he described them as a “sortof justice” – this was before he was made aware of Robespierre’s attack.
Massacres are all funand games until you’re in danger of being massacred. Henceforward, the duelbetween Robespierre and the Girondins takes on a personal edge.
They remembered. Five days after theConvention formally opened, the Girondin Vergniaud alleged that Robespierre hadtried to have his opponents massacred.
“That’s false!” the Montagnard Sargetinterrupted him.
Vergniaud responded, “I congratulatemyself on this denial, which proves that Robespierre too might have beenslandered.” He waited for Robespierre to rise and insist on his innocence.
Robespierre did notrise and perhaps that says all.
Robespierre could be very eloquent when it came to defending himself and charges against his character piqued him. His silence here is unusual especially in light of his behavior at other points in the Revolution when he is accused of attempted murder – he would later hastily disavowal any intention of executing Louis XVI’s sister, even going so far as to break decorum and criticize another member of Committee of Public Safety; he would speak on the eve of Thermidor for hours about how his reputation was being assaulted with charges of bloodlust.
But on this charge, this accusation of conniving at the surreptitious destruction of his political opponents, Robespierre practically says nothing. He is at no pains to even privately clear his reputation with the Girondins as the gulf between them grows larger.
But the Girondins, understandably, made sure that the accusation remained a burr in Robespierre’ side. He was finally compelled to respond to the allegation when formally challenged by the Girondin Louvet in the Convention. The other deputies agreed: Respond or face a Tribunal.
And so, after a time of preparation, Robespierre responded. Briefly. Already quoted, his flippant “Since when is to denouncesomeone to kill them?” does not seem very convincing. His insistence that he was “unaware” of any danger even less so.
But a veil, it was finally agreed, should be “swept over these events [the September Massacres.]” Pressing Robespierre too much could lead to a press of others - and there were few who wanted a public dissection of their behavior in early September 1792.
“Let posterity judge,” was the ruling of the Jacobin Club.
The accusation against Robespierre receded from public discussion in the National Convention.
The question, although it was not asked, hereshifts: Was Robespierre justified in his denouncement? That he was desperate toisolate certain Girondins from thepolitical situation at apparently any cost is beyond much dispute, but why washe so desperate?
Narbonne, one-timeMinister of War, was Brissot’s ally. Narbonne had also made an offer toBrunswick: to give him a crown. Carra, the Gironde’s favorite journalist,proposed on separate occasions the Duke of York and Brunswick as potentialsuccessors of Louis XVI. In Bertrand Barère’s memoirs – often littered with untruths, admittedly, but useful incorroborating other assertions – recalled that Brissot had proposed the Duke ofYork as the new King of the French around this time before the Commission of Twelve.
And here Brunswick wasmarching upon Paris, where active electors were swarming and confessedlywilling to welcome him with more than open arms. It was not a mere matter of Robespierre eliminating political rivals in a personal sense. I don’t believe Robespierre was correct in his diagnosis of Brissot’s party’s practical sympathies, but he did have reason to be concerned.
Execution would havebeen out of line at this juncture but brief imprisonment less so; at thispoint-in-time they were virtually synonymous, and Robespierre erred on the sideof prudence for the whole rather than for the individual.
I was trying a new thing - illustrating my longer posts with details from 18th century paintings, inspired by @lissabryan. I’m not sure if it’s really a success but hey, it was nice trying - and shout out to her for being so generous with the idea!
discoholicmusic
origamiaround
areudirty
2087
theartofmadeline
