MjMalabs❤️ @mjvergara - Tumblr Blog

Posts

ART 1280. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the guarantor may set up compensation as regards what the creditor may owe the principal debtor.

This article explains that compensation benefits the guarantor. Although, he is only subsidiarily, not principal bound, he is given the right to set up compensation.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

A owes B P100,000.00 with G as guarantor. In another transaction, B owes A P30,000.00. If pagrment is G will be liable for the balance. If B will demand the payment of P100,000.00 and A cannot pay, G, the guarantor may only be liable for an amount of P70,000.00 because he has the right to set up the 30,000.00 credit of B to A as the basis for partial compensation.

Article 1408. Unenforceable contracts cannot be assailed by third persons.

Strangers to a voidable contract cannot bring an action to annul the same neither can they assail a contract because of its unenforceability. The beneﬁt of the Statute can only be claimed or waived by one who is a party or privy to the oral contract, not by a stranger.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:

A owns a parcel of land, which is under the possession of and being used by B as grazing land for native ducks for his balot business. Under a verbal contract, A sold the land to real estate developer, C. In an action for ejectment by C against B, the person in possession, the latter cannot set up the defense of the Statute of Frauds because he is a third party to the contract.

Article 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

A, a minor 17 years old, sold for P100,000 his car to B without the consent of his parents.He lost P30,000 to a pickpocket although he was able to deposit the P70,000 in a bank. If the contract is annulled, A is obliged to return only P70,000. However, he has the natural obligation to return P100,000. If he voluntarily returns the whole amount, there is no right to demand the same.

Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao versus Ramon Alcantara

FACTS

On August 3, 1931, appellant Sia Suan executed a deed of sale with Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and appellee Ramon Alcantara, conveying five parcels of land tosaid petitioner. Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorneyof Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor andaccordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, RamonAlcantara executed an affidavit ratifying the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantarareceived from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots toNicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same. On August 8, 1940, an actionwas instituted by respondent Ramon Alcantara in the CFI (Court of First Instance) of Lagunafor the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of landcovered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. The CFI of Laguna rendered adecision in favor of appellee Alcantara in view of his minority during the execution of thecontract. Thus, this appeal by certiorari of Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed on August 31, 1931 is null and void

RULING

No. The SC ruled that Ramon is not allowed to annul such deed, because he alreadyratified it. The letter written by him informing the appellants of his minority constituted aneffective disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itselfavoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shieldedRamon from laches and consequent estoppel.. Ramon may have executed his acts in badfaith for he earned money from Gaw Chiaoas a result of the sale and its ratification, yethe summons the courts to annul the sale because he executed it while still a minor. Theappealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from thecomplaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara

Article 1376 The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of the stipulations which are ordinarily established.

WERR CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL vs. HIGHLANDS PRIME INC.

FACTS

Highlands Prime, Inc. (HPI) and Werr Corporation International (Werr) are domestic corporations engaged in property development and construction, respectively. For the construction of 54 residential units contained in three clusters of five-storey condominium structures, known as “The Horizon-Westridge Project,”, HPI, the project owner issued a notice to award/ notice to proceed with its chosen contractor, Werr and thereafter executed a general bldg agreement. However, The project was not completed on the last extension given. Thus, HPI terminated its contract with Werr.

Not having received any payment, Werr filed a Complaint against HPI to recover the balance of its retention money. By way of counterclaim, HPI prayed for the payment of liquidated damages.

ISSUE

WON the provisions of Article 1376 can be applied in construction agreements to determine whether the project is entitled to liquidated damages?

RULING

The court ruled in the affirmative. As expressly stated under Article 1376, the construction industry’s prevailing practice may supplement any ambiguities or omissions in the stipulations of the contract.

In this case, clause 41.5 of the Agreement is undoubtedly a valid stipulation. However, while clause 41.5 requires payment of liquidated damages if there is delay, it is silent as to the period until when liquidated damages shall run. The Agreement does not state that liquidated damages is due until termination of the project; neither does it completely reject that it is only due until substantial completion of the project. This omission in the Agreement may be supplemented by the provisions of the Civil Code, industry practice. Hence, the industry practice that substantial compliance excuses the contractor from payment of liquidated damages applies to the Agreement.

ART 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not have been employed by both contracting parties.

Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages.

Alejandro Tankeh vs Development Bank of the Phils., Sterling Shipping Lines Inc. and Ruperto Tankeh

FACTS

Sometime in 1980, Alejandro was approached by his brother, Ruperto (president of SSL) informing him that the latter was operating a new shipping line business and offered him1000 shares worth P1M to be a director of the business. Alejandro accepted the offer based on the promised that he be part of the admin staff so that he can oversee the operation of the business plus his son, who is a practicing lawyer would be given a position in the company. A loan was applied from DBP for financing of an ocean-going vessel with theconditions that the first mortgage is obtained over the vessel, the future earnings of the mortgage including proceeds should be assigned to DBP and DBP is assigned to no less than67% of the voting shares of the company. Alejandro signed the Assignment of Shares of Stock with Voting Rights and the promissory note making him liable jointly and severally for the amount of the loan. After the vessel is acquired, a deed of assignment was executed in favor of DBP. On 1983, upon realizing that he was only being made a tool to realize the purposes of Ruperto, Alejandro officially informed the company by means of letter that he has severed his connection with the company and asking the board to pass a resolution to released him from his liabilities with DBP and notify the latter about this.

ISSUE

WON the fraud perpetrated by Ruperto is serious enough to warrant annulment of the contract?

RULING

No. Only incidental fraud exists in this case. Therefore it is not sufficient to warrant the annulment of the contracts petitioner entered into but respondent Ruperto is liable to pay him damages. Petitioner had the opportunity to become aware of the facts that attended the signing of the promissory note. He even admitted that he has a lawyer-son who the petitioner had hoped would assist him in the administration of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. The totality of the facts on record belies petitioner’s claim that fraud was used to obtain his consent to the contract given his personal circumstances and the applicable law.

ARTICLE 1312. In contracts creating real rights,third persons who come into possession of the object of the contract are bound thereby,subject to the provision of the mortgage law and the land registration laws.

Sps Litonjua vs L&R Corporation

FACTS

Spouses Litonjua obtained a loan from L&R Corporation in the aggregate amount ofP400,000, which was secured by a mortgage upon their two parcels of lands in Quezon City.With Spouses Litonjua defaulted on their loans, L&R Corporation initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings, and the lands were sold to L&R Corporation as the sole bidder. L&RCorporation learned for the first time, when it presented the Certificate of Sale to the Register of Deeds, of the prior sale of the spouses to Philippine White House Auto Supply, Inc. (PWHAS).

Issue

Whether or not L&R Corp. is bound by the first contract of sale between Sps Litonjua and PWHAS although it is a stranger to the first contract of sale?

Ruling

Yes. L&R Corp is bound by the first contract of sale between Sps Litonjua and L&R Corp although it is a stranger to the said contract in accordance with the provisions of Art 1312, since it provides that, third persons who come into possession of the object of the contract are bound thereby,subject to the provision of the mortgage law and the land registration laws.

Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other;

(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;

(3) That the two debts be due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.

Philipine Trust Company vs Spouses Roxas

FACTS

Spouses Roxas procured loans from Philippine Trust Company (PTC) to finance their real estate business, which were secured by real estate mortgages on the Spouses Roxas’ real properties. Subsequently, the Spouses Roxas, PTC, and Roben Construction entered into “a contract of building construction,” under which PTC granted an additional loan to the Spouses Roxas. Such contract was superseded by a new “contract of building construction” wherein Rosendo P. Dominguez, Jr. (Dominguez) substituted Roben Construction as the contractor under the same terms and conditions of the previous contract. Spouses Roxas did not finish the housing project due to financial difficulties resulting in non-payment of the loans.

As a result, Dominguez sued PTC and Spouses Roxas for breach of contract. On the other hand, Spouses Roxas in turn filed a complaint against Dominguez and the insurance company. PTC filed a counter claim against Sps Roxas.

RTC ruled in favor of Dominguez. PTC and Sps Roxas appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. PTC filed an Opposition where it raised for the first time the defense of legal compensation to offset the judgment debt due to the Spouses Roxas.

ISSUE

Whether or not PTC may raised the defense of legal compensation for the first time even when the decision has become final and executory?

RULING

the SC ruled in the negative. PTC should have raised the argument of compensation at the trial stage. Even assuming that the defense of legal compensation was timely raised, the court found that not all the requisite of LEGAL COMPENSATION was present in this case in accordance with the provisons of Article 1279. The fourth requisite which states that "debt should be liquidated and demandable" is absent. Compensation may only take place on certain and liquidated debts. It cannot be extended to unliquidated, disputed claims. Since the loan, including its amount and demandability is still undisputed on another civil case, it cannot be considered liquidated as of yet. Consequently, no legal compensation could have take place between PTC and Sps Roxas.

ARTICLE 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make the partial payments.

However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.

Barons Marketing Corp. vs CA and Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.

FACTS

Phelps Dodge appointed petitioner Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As dealer, the petitioner was given by plaintiff-respondent 60days of credit from the date of delivery of its purchases of the latters electrical products. Covering the period of 8 months, the petitioner purvhased on credit from respondent various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of ₱4,102,438.30 which were in turn sold to Meralco.

The petitioner only paid the amount of ₱300,000.00 out of its total purchases thereby leaving a balance of ₱3,802,478.20. On several occasions, the respondent wrote peritioner demanding payment of its outstanding obligation due the former. In response, the petitioner requested the respondent if it could pay its outstanding account in monthly installments of ₱500,000.00 plus 1% interest per month until full payment.

The respondent rejected defendants offer and accordingly reiterated its demand for the full payment of defendant's account until it filed a formal complaint in court.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent can be compelled to receive the payment in installments as proposed by petitioner?

RULING

No. Article 1248 provides that "Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make the partial payments."

Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected.

PNB vs Concepcion Mining Company et al

FACTS

In a solidary obligation evidenced by a promissory note, the solidary debtors were the Concepcion Mining Company, Vicente Legarda and Jose Sarte. Defendants Concepcion Mining Co. and Jose Sarte was sentenced to pat the PNB the amount of ₱7,196.26with interesr up to September 29, 1959 plus a daily interest of ₱1.3698 thereafter up to the time the amount is fully paid, plus 10% of the amount as attorney's fees and cost of the suit.

Upon filing of the complaint, the defendants presented their answer in which they alledged that co-maker Legarda died before the suit began. Defendants asked that effects of judgement be suspended for the reason that the deceased should have been included as a party defendant and his liability should be determined in pursuance of the provision of the promissory note.

ISSUE

Whether or not deceased Legarda's estate shall be included as a party defendant?

RULING

No. Deceased Legarda's estate shall not be included as a party defendant in accordance with the provisions of Art 1216 which provides that, "The creditor may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously."

Article 1184. The condition that some event happen at a determinate time shall extinguish the obligation as soon as the time expires or if it has become indubitable that the event will not take place.

AA. ADDISON v MARCIANA FELIX

FACTS

Addison sold four parcels of land to Felix through a public instrument. Felix paid the sum of three thousan pesos at the time of the execution of the deed and bound herself to pay the remainder in installments. The first two thousand on July 15, 1914, the second five thousand pesos, 30 days after the issuance to her a certificate of title under the land registration act.

On January 1915, Addison filed a suit to compel felix to make payment of the first installment of two thousand pesos demandable in accordance with the terms of the contract of the sale mentioned.

ISSUE

Whether or not Felix is liable to make payment of the first installment of two thousand pesos demandable in the contract?

RULING

No. Felix is released in his obligation. Applying the provisons of Article 1184, Felix bought the land on the condition that within a certain period, Addison would obtain the title but failed to do do within the stipulated time.

RECAÑA vs CA

G.R. No. 123850 January 5, 2001

FACTS:

The subject of this case is Lot 6 of Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land which the Land Tenure Administration, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1597, sold to Macario Arboleda, petitioner-spouses' predecessor-in-interest. The lot was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 7676 issued on February 1, 1962 in the name of Arboleda. Petitioner Ester Recaña and private respondents are the children and heirs of Macario Arboleda.5

For many years, realty taxes on the lot had not been paid both before and after the death of Arboleda. Thus, on August 26, 1980, the City Treasurer of Manila auctioned the lot for sale due to tax delinquency, under Presidential Decree No. 464. Spouses Cirilo and Miguela Montejo purchased the lot at a public auction and were issued a transfer certificate of title.

On April 25, 1984, the Montejos sold the property to petitioner spouses, who also refunded the amount equivalent to the delinquent taxes paid and other expenses entailed. Petitioners thus became the owners of the subject lot, evinced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1464015.

On March 5, 1991, private respondents Aurora Padpad et al. filed Civil Case No. 91-56327 for declaration of co-ownership and partition against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They claimed co-ownership of the subject lot with petitioners, asserting that the repurchase by the latter of the lot redounded to their benefit as co-heirs and now as co-owners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners repurchase of the subject lot within the five-year redemption period of Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 is within the purview of a redemption by a co-owner which insures to the benefit of all other co-owners of the property.

RULING:

Yes. The deed of sale between the then Land Tenure Administration and Macario Arboleda contains provisions which preclude the application of Section 78, P.D. 464. As raised by private respondents in their complaint before the trial court, Paragraph 2 of the Deed of Sale contains the proviso of Section 4, R.A. 1597, that every conveyance of the lot "shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance." Paragraph 5 thereof also provides that the contract "shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the respective parties thereof."

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad

G.R. No. L-12191

FACTS:

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.

It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was still moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.

ART 412 of the Family Code of the Philippines:

“No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.”

Republic Act No. 10172:

“An act further authorizing the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to correct clerical or typographical errors in the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person appearing in the civil register without need of a judicial order, amending for this purpose republic act numbered ninety forty-eight”

WHAT ARE CORRECTIBLE THROUGH JUDICIAL SANCTION. — The clerical errors correctible through judicial sanction under Article 412 of the new Civil Code are "those harmless and innocuous charges, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled, etc."

ILLUSTRATION:

Yu vs. Republic

G.R. No. L-20752. November 25, 1967

FACTS:

Appellant’s verified petition alleged that he was born on May 16, 1967 in the City of Manila, Chinese citizens Yu Cho Koo and Tiu Oh Yek being his parents; that he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration under the name of Sincio C. Yu; that the fact of his birth had been entered in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar for the City of Manila under Registry No. 1543 (e37) under the name of Sincio Yee; that a mistake was committed in said entry as a result of the report made by the Chinese midwife who assisted in his delivery who wrote his name as "Sincio", instead of "Sencio," and spelled his surname as "Yee," instead of as "Yu." Attached to the petition were a certified true copy of appellant’s birth certificate and the affidavits of his father and the aforementioned midwife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner may use the name "SENCIO YU," and with the further result that his name appearing in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar for the City of Manila under Registry No. 1543 should also be changed correspondingly?

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner may use the name "SENCIO YU," and with the further result that his name appearing in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar for the City of Manila under Registry No. 1543 should also be changed correspondingly. Corrections authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code are those harmless and innocuous changes, such as the correction of a name that is clearly misspelled. The only issue in the instant case is whether the change of appellant’s name from "Sincio" to "Sencio" involves a mere clerical error or, as the lower court held, it involves "already a change of name" and must, therefore, be obtained in "another petition." Upon the facts set forth above, The court held, that what is involved in this case is merely the correction of a mistake in appellant’s christian name. To change "Sincio" into "Sencio," which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel "i" in the first name into the vowel "e" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error.

ART 380 of the Family Code of the Philippines:

“Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use different names or surname.”

SUMMARY: Alias is a name or names used by person or intended to be used by him publicly or habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or, substitute name authorized by competent authority.

ILLUSTRATION

People vs. Uy Jui Pio

G.R. No. L-11489. December 23, 1957

FACTS:

Uy Jui Pio was charged in the municipal court of Manila with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142 for using publicly a name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he had been known since childhood. Convicted in that court, he appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the case was submitted for decision solely upon the admissions made by him at the hearing. Those admissions were to the effect that he had been known since childhood "by the name of Uy Jui Pio alias Juanito Uy" ; that he was also known in school "as Uy Jui Pio alias Juanito Uy" ; that the records of the Bureau of Immigration from the year 1946 "would also bear (out) the same name of Uy Jui Pio alias Juanito Uy" ; that "since 1936 until the passage of Commonwealth Act 142", he had been using that name; and that in his marriage contract he signed the name "Juanito Uy" to conform to the name already typewritten thereon by someone else.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Uy Jui Pio had violated section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 by adopting the name "Juanito Uy" "when he was already named in his own country as ‘Uy Jui Pio?

RULING:

NO. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 reads:j

"SECTION 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames." brary

In forbidding the use of a name different from that by which one has been known since childhood, this section, by necessary implication, allows the use of the latter. Defendant, therefore, had the right to use the name "Juanito Uy" because he has since childhood been known by that name.

It is contended, however, that the name "Juanito Uy" is an alias and defendant is not authorized to use it without judicial authorization in view of section 2 of this Act which reads:

SEC. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefore in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authority for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register." ary

The contention is without merit. Section 2 necessarily refers to a name whose use is not already authorized by section 1 for, otherwise, the two sections would conflict with each other in that one forbids what the other allows. A statute should be so construed as to prevent a conflict between different parts of it. Moreover, as Commonwealth Act No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.

ART 213 of the Family Code of the Philippines:

Sa kaso ng paghihiwalay ng mga magulang, ang awtoridad ng magulang ay dapat gamitin ng magulang na itinalaga ng hukuman. Dapat isaalang alang ng korte ang lahat ng mga kaugnay na pagsasaalang alang, lalo na ang pagpili ng bata na higit sa pitong taong gulang, maliban kung ang magulang na pinili ay hindi angkop.

Walang anak na wala pang pitong taong gulang ang dapat ihiwalay sa ina maliban kung ang korte ay makahanap ng mga mapanghikayat na dahilan upang ito ay iutos o gawin.

ILLUSTRATION

Hontiveros vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-64982 October 23, 1984

FACTS:

Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros and private respondent Brenda Hernando are the father and mother of an acknowledged natural child born on November 27, 1981 named Margaux Hontiveros. From November 1981 to June 1982, the child had been under the care and custody of Brenda, and Alejandro used to take the child out during Saturdays and return her Saturday night. On June 21, 1982, Alejandro picked the child up and never returned her to the mother. Brenda then filed a petition for habeas corpus to recover custody of Margaux without depriving the father of his visitorial rights. At the hearing conducted on September 9, 1982, the minor child was ―produced before the Court and a settlement was reached upon agreement of the parties that Margaux shall be under the custody of the petitioner for seven days every other week. On May 24, 1983, the petitioner filed an urgent petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Brenda Hernando from bringing the kid to the USA where she is bound for.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to custody of his minor child?

RULING:

No. Article 213 of the family code provides that “In the case of separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by a parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of a child over seven years old, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under the age of seven shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”

ART 194 of the Family Code of the Philippines:

“Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a)”

Under Article 194, an unborn child is entitled for support.

-In accordance with existing jurisprudence, even an unborn child is entitled for support. This is so, a conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for purposes favorable to it and correspondingly, the right to support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only “en vetre de sa mere”, just as a conceived child even if as yet unborn may receive donations under Article 742, New Civil Code.

ILLUSTRATION:

Quimiguing Vs. Icao

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing (petitioner) and Felix Icao (defendant) were neighbors. They had a close and confidential relationship. The defendant succeeded in having carnal intercourse with the petitioner several times although he is married. Also, the carnal intercourse was executed by force and intimidation, and without her consent. As a result, despite efforts and drugs supplied by the defendant, she became pregnant. Likewise, the petitioner had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages, and attorney’s fees.

The defendant contended that the case be dismissed since it did not allege that the child had been born. After hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained the defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to claim for support and damages.

RULING

Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. It is explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Therefore, the unborn child has a right to support from its progenitors.

It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article” (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb).

ART 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

DOCTRINE: The court could allow the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother upholding the best interest of the child concerned.

ILLUSTRATION:

Calderon v. Republic

G.R. No. L-18127 April 5, 1967

FACTS:

On July 23, 1959, Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderon, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, born on March 17, 1956, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo. The publication of the order for the hearing of the petition was duly made.

The lower court found that petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado was born on March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child of Manuel del Prado and Corazon Adolfo as a result of their bigamous marriage which was annulled on July 18, 1957, after a judgment of conviction of said Manuel del Prado on the complaint for bigamy on December 5, 1956; that subsequently, on December 26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo, mother of the petitioner, got married to Romeo C. Calderon; that the petitioner is living with her mother and her foster father; and that Romeo C. Calderon declared in open court his consent to the petitioner's adopting his surname, especially so because he is the one supporting her. The lower court says, "In the opinion of the Court the reasons adduced by the petitioner are valid and will redound to the best interests of said minor who after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate child."

After hearing the court a quo issued an order, under date of July 28, 1960, granting the petition and ordering the change of the name of the petitioner from "Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon."

ISSUE:

Whether or not whether the court could allow the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother, upholding the best interest of the child concerned?

HELD:

Yes. A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using his surname. The mother had considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate father.

Trending Blogs

Recently Viewed Blogs

MjMalabs❤️