soundingFoghorn

don't look

[soundingfoghorn]

[funeral]

Temporal disruptions in melancholic time can vary in intensity, but are almost always inductive of significant suffering and distress. The future can collapse such that the past becomes fixed. As a result, temporal momentum can falter and stagnate to the point of stasis. At a standstill, time can become impoverished and empty such that one finds oneself detached from temporality altogether, beyond or outside of time. In its most extreme contortions, then, melancholic time can culminate in atemporality, a condition that can be defined as schizoid or desynchronized time.

Emily Hughes, "Melancholia, Temporal Disruption, and the Torment of Being Both Unable to Live and Unable to Die"

[funeral]

If what we are is a "project towards the world", then the Cartesian cogito ("I think") becomes I act; my existence as a self is not that of a single continuing "consciousness", or a series of such consciousnesses, but a single "experience" in which I, as an embodied human being, engage with the world. My body is not, as objectivists might have it, an instrument loosely attached to me that I can use, but is me myself as involved with the world and as expressing myself in its movements. If I am an embodied subject, then the thoughts, feelings, intentions, wishes and so on that I have necessarily find expression in my body, not only in my actions and the objects I manipulate in them or the environment that I change by them, but even in the very characteristics of the body itself. Conversely, my body for me, or what Merleau-Ponty calls le corps propre, is not some kind of mechanistic system loosely attached to me, but is my mode of expression of my thoughts, feelings, intentions, and so on. A person's body can become what Merleau-Ponty beautifully describes as "the eloquent relic of an existence."

Eric Matthews, The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty

[funeral]

In today's state of hyperactivity, where boredom is not allowed to emerge, we never reach the state of deep mental relaxation. The information society is an age of heightened mental tension, because the essence of information is surprise and the stimulus it provides. The tsunami of information means that our perceptual apparatus is permanently stimulated. It can no longer enter into contemplation. The tsunami of information fragments our attention. It prevents the contemplative lingering that is essential to narrating and careful listening . . . In the process of digitalization, . . . information acquires an altogether different status. Reality itself takes on the form of information and data. For the most part, we perceive reality in terms of information or through the lens of information. Information is an idea—that is, a re-representation. When reality takes the form of information, the immediate experience of presence withers. When digitalization gives everything the form of information, reality is flattened.

Byung-Chul Han, The Crisis of Narration

[soundingfoghorn]

[soundingfoghorn]

i fear i'll never get over her

[soundingfoghorn]

[soundingfoghorn]

and when i was ship-wrecked, i thought of you

in the cracks of light, i dreamed of you

it was real enough to get me through

i swear, you were there

[soundingfoghorn]

I swear I've been frozen in time since January 26. Life has stopped. I feel paralyzed and I can't move. Can't move and think too much. I don't think life is supposed to be like this

[soundingfoghorn]

The only way I can pull myself out of this is by...

everything that makes me cry as a 21 year old

[soundingfoghorn]

[soundingfoghorn]

Das Leben wirklich kann nur perfekt sein

[soundingfoghorn]

life cannot be anything but perfect

[soundingfoghorn]

Finish the 10 projects this year and just focus on the QBank

That's my only goal for the next 7 months

[funeral]

In melancholia, the body loses the lightness, fluidity, and mobility of a medium and turns into a heavy, solid body that puts up resistance to the subject's intentions and impulses. Its materiality, density, and weight, otherwise suspended and unnoticed in everyday performance, now come to the fore and are felt painfully. Thus, melancholia may be described as a reification or corporealization of the lived body. The melancholic patient experiences a local or general oppression, anxiety, and rigidity (e.g., a feeling of an armor vest or tire around the chest, lump in the throat, or pressure in the head). Sense perception and movement are weakened and finally walled in by this rigidity, which is visible in the patient's gaze, face, or gestures. To act, patients have to overcome their psychomotor inhibition and push themselves to even minor tasks, compensating by an effort of will what the body does not have by itself any more. With growing inhibition, their sensorimotor space is restricted to the nearest environment, culminating in depressive stupor.

Thomas Fuchs, "Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in Melancholia and Schizophrenia"

[funeral]

Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity towards those who are not regarded as members of the herd. . . . Fear generates impulses of cruelty, and therefore promotes such superstitious beliefs as seem to justify cruelty. Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to think sanely under the influence of a great fear. And for this reason poltroons are more prone to cruelty than brave men, and are also more prone to superstition. . . . Many a man will have the courage to die gallantly, but will not have the courage to say, or even to think, that the cause for which he is asked to die is an unworthy one. Obloquy is, to most men, more painful than death; this is one reason why, in times of collective excitement, so few men venture to dissent from the prevailing opinion.

The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell

[funeral]

For it is not by describing that words acquire their power: it is by naming, by calling, by commanding, by intriguing, by seducing that they slice into the naturalness of existences, set humans on their path, separate them and unite them into communities. The word has many other things to imitate besides its meaning or its referent: the power of speech that brings it into existence, the movement of life, the gestures of an oration, the effect it anticipates, the addressee whose listening or reading it mimics beforehand.

Jacques Rancière, The Flesh of Words: The Politics of Writing

[achillesinhighheels]

[soundingfoghorn]