The Material and the Divine: Cosmologies and Finding Meaning by Tori Bloom
In this essay I will examine two vastly different cosmologies from different cultures. I am particularly intrigued by the question of how each cosmology overlaps in their consideration of ethics and how they each avoid or embrace the concept of the void and infinite division of parts. Specifically, I will analyze the perspective of the Greek Atomists and their materialist idea of creation, along with the perspective of Islamic philosophy and Ibn Sina, who proposed a divine creation. The key sources that I will focus on include David J. Furley’s The Greek Theory of the Infinite Universe, Lillian U. Pancheri’s Greek Atomism and the One and the Many, Jon McGinnis’s A Small Discovery: Avicenna’s Theory of Minima Naturalia, and Philosophy in the Middle Ages by Arthur Hyman, James J. Walsh, and Thomas Williams. However, I will also use a variety of background sources as support. Through my analysis I intend to argue that materialist cosmologies and divine creationist cosmologies are not so different., and I will develop the idea that despite the subjectivity of cosmology it may be our duty to study it.
The Greek Atomists argued that there is a universe of endless space, filled with infinite atoms and matter that construct infinite other worlds, that lies outside of the boundary of our own (Furley 575). According to Aristotle, the evidence for the infinite lies in the fact that all limited things are limited in that there is something else that limits them, and so there cannot plausibly be an ultimate limit, as it would have to be limited against another as well (577). Furley cites a thought experiment presented by the philosopher Archytas, who wondered if one was at the edge of the universe if it would be possible to stick one’s arm into the outer region of the universe. If the answer to that question is no, then it follows that something must be stopping one from reaching out. If the answer is yes, then it follows that there is something outside (578). However, these arguments only present the idea that something infinite exists outside of our world, and not what that infinite is. The atomists use an inductive argument to make a case for the existence of matter likes ours in the void. They suggest that nothing that we can observe is unique, in that we always find something else with the same properties. If it is true that nothing is unique, then it follows that our cosmos is not unique either (580). Following the idea that there is an infinite void, we are brought to the question of why our world exists at this place in that void and then how the matter in it moves the way that it does. To the question of why our world is in the place that it is, the atomists had no answer except for suggesting that matter is equally spread across the void. This still leaves the question of why things would have a pattern of motion of rising and falling, but also of circular motion and how these patterns could be attributed to the collisions of atoms (580). The Stoics would suggest that there was a center of gravity within the void that all things moved around, however the atomists could not take this approach because they could not attribute this motion to atoms themselves. Furthermore, the atomists struggled with the idea of circular motion, as circular motion requires a center and the idea of an infinite void suggests that there is no center (581). Democritus’ solution was to suggest a whirl pattern of movement, due only to the jostling and collision of atoms. Yet this still holds flaws, in that it doesn’t necessarily explain why something would fall in a linear fashion. Furley holds that the atomists’ ideas about motion are flawed, but that they were important because they presented one of the first unified theories of motion (585).
In breaking the world down into atoms, there arises the problem of the one and the many and how unchanging atoms could constitute a changing reality (Pancheri 139). One argument is that the size, shape, and number of atoms account for the differences in objects. However, Aristotle argues that this does not account for an equal reality of atoms and compounds. He says that a thing can only be considered one when it has a continuous nature, and because compounds are capable of changing and the atoms in them capable of being rearranged, they are not one. He also posits that if atoms exist at different magnitudes, then it would seem that they have different parts as one would have the ability to point out the differences between the levels of magnitude, and therefore atoms would not be indivisible either (140). Epicurus, however, says that it is possible for atoms to both be distinguishable from each other and also indivisible from one another. He suggests that atoms have parts, but that these parts exist as minima, least parts, and cannot be divided up further (141). The minima are distinguishable, but are at the same time inseparable. This theory suggests that atoms themselves are both one and many. Furthermore, Epicurus presents a solution to the idea of compounds existing as parts and as one by saying that compounds are coterminous with the atoms that they are made of (143). Pancheri uses fire and iron as an example. The arrangement of atoms in a fire make it so that fire is hot. However, that heat is a property of fire is no more or less true than heat being a property of iron that has been placed in a fire. Even though the iron, once taken out of the fire, will eventually cool and its atoms will return to their original state, the quality of heat in a hot piece of iron is as real as the quality of ironness in it. This is because of that co-existence between the arrangement of atoms in an object and the object’s properties. Epicurus does not argue that compounds are indivisible physically in the same way that an atom is, but that because a compound object is the perceivable arrangement and qualities of the atoms that constitute it, it too is a one. That is, the body is indivisible in the sense that our perception of it relies on the indivisible attributes of the atoms themselves, and any change in the atoms constitutes a change in what that body itself is (143). Following this logic, the one can be the many just as much as the many are the one, and we can allow for the idea that objects are not merely illusions of our perception (144).
With the groundwork for the atomists laid, there still comes the question of the, seemingly, opposing side; and that is the prospect of divine creation. Ibn Sina was a prominent medieval philosopher who subscribed to this cosmology through Islam. In particular, he argued for a necessarily existent being whose existence relies only on itself. He reaches this conclusion first by suggesting that all things exist as the effects of other things that caused them. They are possible things because their existence is relies on something else having to occur for them to exist, making their existence contingent. Ibn Sina says that without positing a necessarily existent being, one would have to assume that the possibly existent beings go on ad infinitum, and that, according to him, would be absurd (Hyman et al. 244-245). Following this logic, there must be a necessary, self-existent, being from which all things came from. However, unlike many divine creationists, Ibn Sina says that this necessary being, which he suggests is God, cannot be defined by human properties, such as ‘good’, because that would mean that God is dependent upon the qualities that he has and would thus not be self-existent. Along that same line of thought, Ibn Sina says that God does not know about his creation in the sense that he is perceiving it, because that would suggest that there is knowledge that is outside of God and that, again, he is not self-existent, or at least not the only thing that is self-existent. Instead, Ibn Sina says that God intellects himself and knows his creation in the sense of universals within himself(246). Dimitri Gutas writes in the Stanford Encyclopedia on Ibn Sina that the philosopher further suggests that the goal of human life is to look employ our rational mind to look toward the intelligibles by means of coming into contact with the active intellect, an intellect of the celestial spheres that is closest to the terrestrial world. According to Gutas, this aligns with Aristotelian ethics, which argued that happiness (eudaimonia) is unique to humans, when compared to other species, in that we are capable of rational thought. Gutas goes as far as saying that Ibn Sina’s philosophy is deeply concerned with ethics, because it suggests that it is our duty to use our rational minds to become like the celestial intellects. Yet some of Ibn Sina’s ideas seem to conflict with the idea of ethics, as they suggest little room for free will. Ibn Sina says that the distinction between possibly and necessarily existent things is actually arbitrary because possibly existent things exist out of the necessity of an array of causes that brought them to be. That is, they are possibly existent in that they require something else to bring them into existence, but they are also necessarily existent because the causal nexus was set up in such a way that no other outcome could have occurred (249). The outcomes of the choices that we do not make do not exist, and never could have existed, because every outcome is the result of a myriad of causes. If this is true, then any choices that we make are the result of causes that we have no control over. Ibn Sina also posits that all causes and their effects exist simultaneously, and that we are just unable to perceive it (253). For example, the instant that we place our hand in a fire we are burned. We assume that we become burned after touching the fire, but in actuality it is that very instant that our hand and the fire meet that we are burned. If the causal nexus exists simultaneously, then the distinctions between the past and the present are the result of our flawed perceptions. Furthermore, it could again suggest that free will is meaningless, because all of our choices have already been made. Ibn Sina’s ideas, overall, suggest a divine, self-existent, being that is the first cause of everything else and through which all causes exist simultaneously, leaving little room for free will.
Unexpectedly, Ibn Sina’s cosmology does not completely oppose atomism. In fact, according to Jon McGinnis in his article A Small Discovery: Avicenna’s Theory of Minima Naturalia, Ibn Sina argued for the existence of things that could not be physically divided any further ( 9). Yet unlike Epicurus’ idea of least parts, Ibn Sina believes that these smallest things are physically indivisible but that they could, conceptually, be divided ad infinitum (1). He defends this view by arguing for the continuous. That is, the continuous occurs when two things share a relative limit. McGinnis uses the example of two lines forming an angle, both of which meet at the same limit to form one continuum (10). Furthermore, Ibn Sina suggests that the continuous is formed by enforcing accidental limits on things due to our perception of them. For instance, we may refer to one side of a table as the left side and one as the right side. In this case we are dividing the table into parts, which meet at a certain limit. However, the table is one continuous thing, and the limit is something that we impose on it (11). Still, there is no reason to suggest that this conceptual division by accidental partition should have a limit, as there is nothing to impede the division (12). Ibn Sina suggests still that, though conceptual infinite divisibility is possible, things are physically indivisible to a certain point because once a body is divided so much, it no longer retains its form (20). Ibn Sina also presents that idea that the smaller the body, the more easily it can be influenced by its surroundings. For example, a ton of molten iron would take more time to cool down in water than an ounce of molten iron would (21). It is necessary to mention that, despite his agreement with the atomists on the physical indivisibility of things, Ibn Sina was not a proponent of atomism, particularly in its explanation of motion. In fact, Ibn Sina argued that the existence of the void made circular motion impossible (McGinnis 1). He demonstrates this criticism through a diagram, where he pictures the sphere of our world within the void, rotating. He extends an imaginary infinite line through the void and from our sphere and suggests that, at some point, there is a moment where the two first meet, or a moment where they last meet. This suggests that their meeting is not infinite (3-5). So, the overlap between Ibn Sina’s theories concerning minimal parts and the atomists’ theories does not suggest complete synchronicity in their theories of physics.
Given the background for atomism and Ibn Sina’s perspective divine creationism, as well as Ibn Sina’s own concurrence with some of the prospects of atomism, the stark contrasts between materialism and creationism start to dissolve. For instance, it was mentioned that Ibn Sina was in agreement with the atomists that it is possible that there are parts that are physically indivisible. This, of course, does not mean that Ibn Sina supported all of the theories of the atomists. In fact, one of the biggest differences between creationist and materialist philosophies are their considerations of the soul. For example, Sylvia Berryman notes in the Stanford Encyclopedia that Democritus believed the soul to be constructed of a certain type of atom, specifically fire atoms, which moved about and brought rational thought to life. While, according to Dimitri Gutas, Ibn Sina saw the soul as an extension of the realm of intellects, with the human soul being a rational thing which seeks to gain knowledge of the intelligibles through the goading of the active intellect. These different conceptions of the soul, however, do not necessarily mean that the ethics derived from them are vastly different. In fact, I would argue that they are quite similar, in that they both suggest that pleasure is the meaning of life. Gutas says that, for Ibn Sina pleasure (eudaimonia) is found through intellection and rational thought. In fact, he makes intellection a prerequisite for pleasure in the afterlife. Furthermore, Ibn Sina says that it is our bodies that make us subject to a dampening of our intellects, and so tending to our bodies is necessary for rational thought. Democritus’ thoughts on ethics, though he is sometimes cited as a proponent of hedonism, follow a similar line of beliefs on the ideal state being one of balanced pleasure (McGibbon 77). Their similarities are evident likely because both philosophers borrow from Aristotle’s view of happiness. Ibn Sina’s ethics, however, are grounded in the belief of a God, and a yearning for our souls to reach his level of intellection. The atomists have no such God, aside from infinite matter and atoms that seem to exist with no purpose, and one could argue that such a meaningless existence could lead to nihilism. A brief look into the Indian Carvaka, however, suggests that although there may only be this life and only matter, that does not suggest that ethics are meaningless. In fact, because there is only the minor pains of this life, the body becomes all that much more important, as it is representative of “I” (Sarma 6). This could lead to hedonism, but considering the importance of intellection, I would argue that Aristotelian ethics are more rational. Hedonism, after all, is not always in our best interests. Self-indulgence in one area can lead to an imbalance in another. For example, it may bring me pleasure to eat a full plate of donuts, but that same act can lead to health problems in the future. Because, according to atomism, everything is matter at its core, your body is important, and so is balance. For these reasons, I argue that divine creationism and materialism result in the same conclusion in terms of ethics and the meaning of life.
The core difference between materialism and a divine creationist cosmology, such as Ibn Sina’s, is that creationists believe in a striving for something that may be achievable after death. However, materialists, like the atomists, believe that there is and all that we can know is matter. Atomism and divine creationism both have flaws. For example, atomism faces much criticism in trying to explain unified motion in the void. Creationism denies the possibility of that void. However, creationism has flaws as well. Under Ibn Sina’s theories, there seems to be a lack of free will, which leaves room for questioning the purpose of existence. In the same way, materialism can be critiqued for suggesting a seemingly meaningless existence. However, unlike Ibn Sina’s lack of free will, the meaningless existence of materialism can be reconciled by putting an emphasis on the pleasure and balance of body and soul in this material world. Atomism and divine creationism overlap in other ways at times, including in their belief in the possibility of least parts. This overlap, along with their similar arguments for ethics and meaning, reveal how these theories come from a place of common ground. In the context of their unique cultures, it is necessary to recognize the Aristotelian influence on both cosmologies, as it shows how the same foundation can lead to different conclusions. Ultimately, I argue that this foundation and the flaws and similarities of both cosmologies show the subjectiveness of inquiring about the world’s existence. At its core, cosmology is inductive, because we have no way of knowing until we die, and perhaps not even then, what the laws of this entire cosmos are. If, however, it is true that we should use our intellection to achieve pleasure, be it in this life or the next, this does not suggest that cosmology is meaningless. In fact, it may very well be our duty to try to make sense of the world.
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