THE STAGE FOR THE POWER-COERCIVE
Here goes, as promised in my last posting, a few (or more) words on a general strategy type of change known as power-coercive.[1] Generally, these strategies are based on avoiding what is anticipated as painful or disagreeable; that is, a set of change strategies in organizational operations – be it in terms of goals/aims or processes – that are deliberate and conscious. These changes are on the part of a party related or associated with an organizational entity and motivated by an understanding that not to change will resort in enduring some pain or disagreeable consequence. These changes are spearheaded by a person or group. They are in a position to administer some sort of punishment if the party does not get the change it wants and, therefore, the strategy can be called a power-coercive strategy. I billed this type of strategy as one that promises to be efficient in instituting a desired change. By efficient, I mean the change will be effective in a relatively short amount of time with minimal costs. I will explain that this billing is true only if certain conditions are met.
In the last posting, I reviewed what is commonly called empirical-rational strategies and that set of strategies is seen as fairly quick and efficient, but it does not hold a candle to what is anticipated with the use of power-coercive strategies. This is true if those wanting to institute change enjoy a relatively powerful position within or over the organization in question. If they don’t, then the use of such a change strategy is possible, but it will not be as quick and efficient and might, as a matter of fact, take a significant amount of time.
When the change is by the powerful, though, they have resources that do make a difference. Why? Because power-coercive strategies rely on what I have termed, along with French and Raven,[2] coercive power. That is, power – an ability to get someone to do something that they would not otherwise do – is based on the belief that those implementing the power can and will administer some sort of punishment to the subjected party if the subjected party does not comply with what the would-be power wielder wants done. It is the sort of power one usually thinks of when the term power is used. You get someone to do something because not doing it will result in that someone experiencing a consequence that is unpleasant or even worse. You’ve seen untold number of movies in which such power is central to the plot line. The Godfather trilogy comes to mind. But does power have to rely on punishment? Let’s read on.
In the realm of change: power-coercive strategies rely on the more powerful agents exerting their wishes on the less powerful. In real life, not the movies, exertion of power-coercive strategies takes place without guns and sinister sneers; they are usually expressions or implementations of legitimate authority. That is, the person or group seeking the change has the authority, due to organizational positioning or ascribed positioning by law, to exert the “commands” that would institute the change. I should add that such power is usually exerted to maintain what is, the status quo, instead of trying to institute change.
But when it is change that is sought, such change efforts by those in legitimate power positions are taken when a new set of authority figures takes hold of an organization such as a corporation or a governmental department or other bureaucratic entity. Sometimes those in power want to institute a new direction that calls on a certain level of change. Whether change is emanating from a change in administration (usually with the election or the selection of a new president, governor, or CEO) or a change in strategy by those already in power, such changes are deemed legitimate due to the legitimacy of the power positions of those seeking change. Even in such cases, what is in existence, the ongoing set of realities, is usually very well entrenched. So change promises to be difficult. It helps to have authority on one’s side and using authority, relying on power-coercive strategies, usually can result ostensibly on implementing the desired change, at least on paper. By on paper, what is usually meant is that the structural and verbal commitments upon which the change relies can be put in place in a relatively short amount of time. The problem is in the ensuing performance by those who have to carry out the change. If the change objectives are not really shared by this corps of workers, change, even with authority on the side of the “changers,” can prove to be elusive.
But before I address these types of consequences, let me fill in more of the details entailed with the power-coercive set of changes. First, there are modes of change for such coercive moves. These are generally of two types: political and economic modes. Political modes encompass the necessary policy changes that support the operational changes that the change advocates desire. This is dependent on the procedural apparatus the organizational or governmental entity has in place and the politicking in which both the advocates of change and those who oppose the change(s) engage. This process is deserving of its own analysis – rest assured, such questions have their own literature of research that one can review. But, whatever the result, assuming both sides follow accepted procedures of politicking, the results of the conflict will be accepted, at least verbally. And then, second, there are economic modes. Here, decisions over expenditures will be instrumental. If those in authoritative positions sense or know that there are recalcitrant rebels fighting the desired change, decisions over budgetary allocations can and will administer the necessary punishments to solicit compliance. This has proven highly effective in terms of actual activities subordinates perform, if not the all-out devotion those activities might demand. Those are the sorts of actions that the more powerful can administer over the less powerful, but do not explain what options exist for the less powerful entities who desire and are willing to pursue change.
If the change advocate is less powerful (and assuming that there exists enough of a cadre of malcontents, either within or without the organizational structure in question who wish for change) what can those desiring change do? Under these conditions, this type of change is not short term; these strategies take a lot of time. The most common avenue here is for such a person or group to organize the discontented who is or are demanding that change occur. This can take place, as appropriate, within or without the organization or governmental entity, within or without the legitimate channels of authority. For example, teachers who seek changes in their working conditions might organize to engage in tougher labor actions such as staging a strike or work stoppage – activities that are to some degree illegal in a lot of states. The aim is not to cause disruption for its own sake, but to seek a shift in the conflict from confrontation to negotiation. This might take on the air of legitimacy, even if the actions are illegal – albeit more difficult – if the initial demands are seen, by the general public, as advancing fairness and justice. Of course, if the lesser powerful party has been viewed as being subject to authoritarian subjugation, this adds to the image of any existing unfairness. If these conditions exist, then such options as quasi or fully illegal means might cause the more powerful party to be sufficiently hurt by the actions and, therefore, will be encouraged to negotiate. This result, being the aim of the change advocates in the first place, will be considered a success. Needless to say, the fact that one might be speaking of illegal or semi-illegal activity adds to the burden of those seeking change as they must overcome expected allegiance for the law.
There are times, however, that one or two of the conflicted parties might want, for whatever reason, to continue the conflict. If this is the case, then we are talking about such a heightened conflict that one would question the ultimate aims of one or both sides of the conflict. In these extreme cases, expressed aims are simply not what is sought. Instead, what is sought is probably a more institutional change that is or borders on revolutionary change. That is, they are either attempting to change the system by destroying the ability of the advocates to organize or overthrow the system.
In my next posting, I will review more specific power-coercive strategies. I will address the issue of having to depend on punishment; i. e., does one, even under a power-coercive type of strategy have to depend only on punishment to get results? These more specific strategies will stretch from those advocated by Gandhi to Marx. The expanse of these strategies is quite wide, but they are over a singular aim: inflict pain – physical, economic, or psychological – to gain acquiescence to sought-after change.
[1] Chin, R. and Benne, K. D. (1985). General strategies for effecting changes in human systems. In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45). New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, Winston.
[2] French, J. R. P. and Raven, B. H. (1967). The bases of power. In. E. P. Hollander and R. G. Hunt (Eds.) Current perspectives in social psychology (504-512). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.