#consensus democracy

[left-reminders]

This is your daily reminder that we are at a point of post-scarcity where we could feasibly feed everyone on the planet, utilize technology to the extent that we could liberate people from a lot of menial jobs, AND have significantly shorter work days/weeks; but no, we only benefit from these things when they are profitable to autocratic owners; this isn't freedom.

[all-is-for-all]

To expand upon that autocracy/democracy post, propertarians (right-libertarians) and ancaps will argue that democracy is just “two wolves and a sheep deciding what’s for dinner”, but I’m curious – what does that make autocracy? One wolf and many sheep, with the former deciding what’s for dinner. If anything, you run into more problems when exclusive individuals run things that are done socially. And yes, propertarianism and ancap-ism advocate hierarchical relations predicated on autocracy, from workplaces to living quarters (among other things), justified through supposed claims to private property.

Autocracy and oligarchy, the two main ways in which our social institutions are arranged under capitalism, not only run counter to the common good – they run counter to genuine individualism. It only nurtures the individual if the individual is an owner, among those who make decisions for large bodies of people; to the average individual, the individual who doesn’t climb to the top of the system to implement their autocratic will, they are left to conform to the decisions made by those at the top, decisions they had no say in. This is why democratic social institutions are more likely to simultaneously nurture the common good and the individual. While democratic spirit embraces a theory of common good for obvious reasons, I believe that it could also embrace the individual; having the ability to participate in the decision-making process, having your voice count, tossing around various ideas presented by all individuals who make up the whole, constantly taking in new perspectives and challenging old ones – when in a social setting, what could be more truly individualistic than that?

Again, majority-rule democracy can present problematic scenarios, but I’d still argue that those negative scenarios would be better than the negative ones presented by individual-rule autocracy or subset-rule oligarchy. I absolutely want to see a world where people have individual rights that can’t be voted away –freedom of association, speech, religion, etc etc – but I don’t consider private ownership over the means of socially-operated production an “individual right”, as propertarians and ancaps do. In their wolf and sheep scenario, what they really mean is “sheep = exclusive proprietor, two wolves = workers/tenants who would gladly see the activity democratized”, with “sheep = oppressed victim of actual mob mentality, two wolves = angry mob who would limit actual individual rights” as an afterthought. I do like the idea of consensus democracy in a socialist/communist system, where all voices are heard and a decision that satisfies all is reached, but I also realize that that may not be feasible in every scenario. Majority-rule democracy and all-rule (or consensus) democracy are two types of social activity arbiters that would be central to socialism/communism; individual-rule autocracy and subset-rule oligarchy are the defining arbiters in our current capitalist societies, and the sooner we understand that and seek to change it (and stop double-speaking the whole thing as “freedom”), the better off we’ll be as a species.

[crypto-keynesian]

Is radical democracy incompatible with the goal of consensus? Radical democracy's emphasis on the difference, dissidence, and diversity inherent to any given association of people doesn't seem to impede the potential for the realization of consensus among these associated individuals; consensus is meant to prevent imposition or coercion as a potential consequence of the "majority rules" manifestation of direct democracy, and can only be genuinely realized upon intensive deliberation and mutual accommodation for a variety of ideals, concerns, and interests. The goal of consensus isn't so much working through differences as it is coming to terms with them, and providing a horizontal network for general expression and objection. Consensus-based methods of decision-making shouldn't imply uniformity or conformity, but rather acceptance of intellectual autonomy and plurality. 

[weekly-wonder-blog]

Consensus Democracy

This week’s idea is consensus democracy.

Image source: Alan Sim on Flickr. This is the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut.

The idea is quite simple: everyone talks about the decision being made, and the decision isn’t considered made until all agree (or at least consent to the result). In practice, of course, it is more difficult, but then so is any form of democracy. Note that this decision-making can involve a “relaxed threshold” more along the lines of, “Is this something you can live with?” than, “Is this your preferred option?” One of the major benefits of such a system is that minority groups cannot be ignored to the point where their lives and wellbeing are jeopardized. Another benefit, not mentioned by Wikipedia, is that most people involved in the decision-making process feel more invested in the decisions made, since it isn’t usually a win/lose situation, and this means people take more individual responsibility in the political process, even while it seems (or is) more communitarian. That’s the theory, anyway. (The opposite, an adversarial democratic system, is what many democratic countries use, including the United States and most of Canada.) Countries such as Switzerland, Germany, Lebanon, Sweden, Iraq, and Belgium try to achieve or approach consensus democracy and consider it part of their political culture. The Netherlands also embraced this idea in the 1980s and 1990s, calling it the Polder model. (The history of the polder model is worth reading.) However, I learned of the idea in high school history class (or was it politics?), pertaining to consensus government in the Canadian territories of the Northwest Territories, which started using it in the 1970s, and Nunavut, which used it from its formation in 1999. Since Canadian territories are more autonomous than Canadian provinces, they can use political systems that aren’t in line with other province’s methods. However, these governments are not run purely on a consensus model; you can see the Nunavut government website for more. This style of politics was chosen in part because the people of Nunavut and of the Northwest Territories (or those people advising the federal government, anyway) felt that it reflected Inuit decision-making traditions, and the Inuit people make up most of those two territories' populations. Posted by Christian H.

[uninotes-blog]

On "Patterns of Democracy" by Arend Lijphard

Explaining in what aspects consensus democracy is better than the majoritarian one, Arend Lijphard gives various examples of both models in his book “Patterns of Democracy.”

As far as many political scientists often confuse a general notion of “democracy” and its majoritarian model, considering them to be the same, Arend Lijphard bases his work on the contrast between two models – majoritarian and consensus. He characterizes majoritarian democracy, where simply the majority of people hold political power, as “exclusive, competitive, and adversarial.” In contrast, consensus democracy, having such features as “inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise,” is more characterized through the concept of “proportional representation.” These general features, consequently, reveal ten differences, which Lijphard grouped in two dimensions: “executives-parties” and “federal-unitary.” All items of these dimensions are closely related to each other and can cause one another. Later, the author will use these differences to expose both models in detail.

Mechanism of the majoritarian model Lijphard shows on examples of the UK, New Zealand, and Barbados. Due to British origins of the pattern, author calls it the Westminster model of democracy. Following 10 differences stated in an introductory part of the book, the model is defined through “executives-parties” and “federal-unitary” dimensions. The first dimension shows how political power is distributed within the ruling elements. In the Westminster model executive power is concentrated in the hands of one party which holds the majority of seats in the cabinet. Cabinet usually dominates over the parliament that results in almost no (or weak) bicameralism. The third difference is political predominance of only two parties which lead to the next feature – disproportional results of parliamentary elections and “pluralitarian democracy.” The last feature concerning influence of interest groups distinguishes two alternatives – interest group pluralism and corporatism. The majoritarian model is characterized by the interest group pluralism, i.e. uncoordinated multiple interest groups whose political pressure is thus significantly decreased. The “federal-unitary” dimension concerns the concept of institutional separation. Features of the second dimension in the majoritarian model include unitary and centralized government; unicameral legislation (due to weak bicameralism) that concentrates legislative power; the opportunity to change the constitution by the majority of votes; as a result, no juridical review of consistency of new laws or amendments; and a governmentally controlled central bank.

All above presented features can cause possible confusion in a political situation and a lot of problems in a socioeconomic layer. Hence, the Westminster model is inefficient in plural non-homogenous societies, and the countries structured in this way are gradually moving towards consensus democracy.

The consensus model of democracy can be observed on examples of Switzerland (the purest one), Belgium, and the EU (since considering it as a federal state, rather than an international organization). In contrast to majoritarian democracy, political power here is not concentrated in ones hands but is more or less equally distributed within a broad coalition of parties and political actors. As a result, two branches – executive and legislative – act more independently and in a more balanced manner; though deviations from this point exist in Belgium and the EU, they stand closer to the consensus model rather than the majoritarian one. Due to developed multiparty system (3) and proportional representation (4), these plural countries do not translate their “societal cleavages into party-system cleavages”. As compared to the majoritarian model, the consensus model is defined through the strong pressure from interest groups which have particular spheres of influence in politics, “social and liberal corporatism”. Although the degree of corporatism varies within different countries, this feature is a typical one for the consensus democracy. In the sense of “federal-unitary” dimension, consensus model is either represented in federal and decentralized government or is developing in this direction; the two chambers of the parliament are equal that results in strong bicameralism. In such a model the constitution can be changed only by special vast majorities, which almost never happen. Consequently, the judicial review takes the first stand, though Switzerland deviates from this point whose Federal Tribunal has no right of juridical review. At last, the independence of a central bank is extremely important for the model, as far as its autonomy can define economic strength and consistency.

CRITICISM. Arend Lijphard considers the consensus model as a more democratic one comparing with the majoritarian model. He explains his viewpoint showing shortcomings of the majoritarianism and a more substantial position of the consensus pattern. However, the argument “for” the consensus model concerning advantage of the corporatism over the pluralism sounds rather unconvincing. Today some of the economic industries pass through a crisis due to the strong social corporatism, which defines the consensus model. The airline market is one of the most unstable and low repayable markets. One of the reasons is the influence of labor unions which have set too high standards for working conditions, including salary and incentives. Companies cannot decrease their costs on employees, thus attempting to adjust to more difficult economic conditions, not those of the free market. In the opposite, liberal corporatism is defined through lobbying interests of huge corporations, which can result in the monopoly of few companies and impossibility for smaller businesses to enter the market.

Despite the weakness of Lijphard´s “corporatism-pluralism” argument, the whole paper sounds logic and solid. Even though it tends to some generalization of countries, regardless their cultural and historical base, it has been well shown how inevitably different states apply this model for further development and, mostly, solving tangible societal cleavages.