#digitalrupee

[nextgengpost]

Digital Rupee vs UPI in 2026

Explore the key differences between Digital Rupee and UPI in 2026, from security and offline payments to speed, convenience, and everyday usability. Discover which payment method suits daily transactions better as India’s digital economy rapidly evolves.

[painfullymaliciousdestiny]

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

[painfullymaliciousdestiny]

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

[once-in-a-blue-moon2021]

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

[once-in-a-blue-moon2021]

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

[innerexpertwarden]

🚀 ProDevans – Driving Digital Transformation & CBDC Innovation in India

In today’s fast-evolving digital world, businesses need more than just technology—they need a reliable partner who can help them scale, secure, and innovate. That’s where Prodevans Technologies comes in.

ProDevans is a leading digital transformation company specializing in cloud computing, DevOps, cybersecurity, and CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) solutions. With a strong presence in India and across Asia-Pacific, they help enterprises, banks, and government institutions modernize their IT infrastructure and stay ahead in the digital era.

💡 What Does ProDevans Do?

ProDevans offers end-to-end technology solutions designed to simplify and accelerate digital growth:

👉 Cloud & DevOps Services They help businesses move to the cloud, automate operations, and improve efficiency using modern tools and infrastructure.

👉 Application Modernization Transform legacy systems into scalable, cloud-native applications for better performance and ROI.

👉 Cybersecurity & Zero Trust (ZTrust) Advanced identity and access management solutions to ensure secure and compliant digital environments.

👉 AI & Data Solutions With products like QweryAI, they enable smarter data management and decision-making.

💰 Leading the Future with CBDC Services in India

One of the most powerful areas where ProDevans stands out is CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) services.

✔ End-to-end CBDC implementation ✔ Secure wallet & token management ✔ Real-time transaction monitoring ✔ Compliance with RBI & global standards ✔ 24/7 operational support

ProDevans is also a key technology partner in India’s Digital Rupee initiative, helping banks and institutions adopt and scale CBDC infrastructure seamlessly.

🔥 Why Choose ProDevans?

✨ Cloud-native & scalable solutions ✨ Strong focus on security & compliance ✨ Trusted by leading banks & enterprises ✨ Full lifecycle support—from strategy to deployment ✨ Proven expertise in CBDC and fintech innovation

They don’t just provide services—they build future-ready digital ecosystems that help organizations grow confidently.

🌐 Get Started with ProDevans

Ready to transform your business with cutting-edge technology and CBDC solutions?

👉 Visit: https://www.prodevans.com/ 📞 Phone: [phone] 📩 Connect for consultation & digital transformation solutions

[debaprasad]

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?

[debaprasad]

Who Owns the Crisis? Indian Banking from Nationalization to Crony Regime by DebaprasadBandyopadhyay Via Flickr: onceinabluemoon2021.in/2026/04/01/who-owns-the-crisis-ind... This article traces the historical transformation of Indian banking from postcolonial state-led social banking to the contemporary regime of what it terms “resolution capitalism,” foregrounding the shifting configurations of power, distribution, and knowledge. Beginning with the pre-1969 era of private concentration and systemic fragility, it examines how bank nationalization sought to democratize credit and align finance with developmental and redistributive goals, albeit with embedded contradictions of bureaucratic inefficiency and political interference. The post-1991 liberalization phase introduced prudential norms and market discipline within a hybrid structure, delivering growth and crisis resilience—most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis—while simultaneously generating latent vulnerabilities through corporate over-leverage and regulatory forbearance. The article argues that the post-2014 period marks a decisive rupture: the recognition of NPAs through the Asset Quality Review was followed by massive recapitalization, large-scale write-offs, and the institutionalization of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which together reconfigured the system toward asset resolution rather than social intermediation. Through a detailed political-economic analysis, including the case of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), the study demonstrates how the IBC operationalizes a structural asymmetry—socializing losses through public sector banks and taxpayers while privatizing gains for a narrow set of corporate acquirers—under conditions of institutional opacity, particularly within the Committee of Creditors. By situating these developments within broader trends of wealth concentration, regulatory opacity, and declining democratic accountability, the article contends that contemporary Indian banking no longer functions as an instrument of public purpose but as a mechanism of financialized redistribution upward. Ultimately, it raises a fundamental question for the political economy of the Indian republic: who bears the cost of financial crises, who appropriates their outcomes, and who controls the knowledge through which these processes are legitimized?