an interesting look at the history and future of experimental philosophy. the distinction between “positive programme” and “negative programme” stands out to me (as both a neuroscientist and philosophy B. A.) as markedly unscientific, something which within the sciences would be regarded with skepticism and disdain as a clear sign of bias which could influence the balance of experimental design. it’s worth asking if philosophy is necessarily compatible with the scientific method of experimentation, in this sense. in the sciences, one ought not set out to prove or disprove their hypothesis—of course we all want them to be proven right, if only because it increases chances of publication—but should approach the experiment giving equal weight and credence to the possibility of the null hypothesis. this is wholeheartedly disregarded by most practitioners of x-phi, which makes sense within the context of philosophy as something ultimately centered on argumentation rather than discovery per se (although this is technically arguable depending on what you believe knowledge is, fundamentally). is it even possible to be empirical and argumentative at the same time, or does true empiricism necessitate the absence of an agenda? science has traditionally assumed the latter, but it’s still a question worth pondering, i think.