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Check out our new website: graspedinthought.org Same content, different format.
Maybe Morality Isn't Real: An Introduction to the Argument from Queerness
Maybe Morality Isn’t Real: An Introduction to the Argument from Queerness
One of the most discussed arguments for moral error theory is the argument from queerness. While there are actually several distinct arguments from queerness, I’ll be discussing it as if it was one argument, since they all take on the same form. The name of the argument originates from J.L. Mackie’s work. Mackie thought that moral properties are too queer or strange to be allowed into our…
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The Now What Problem for Moral Error Theory
Moral error theories present us with a unique challenge that doesn’t come up on other moral theories. Following Matt Lutz I call the challenge The Now What Problem. Assuming that a moral error theory is true, that our moral discourse is systematically erroneous, what ought we to do if there is nothing that we morally ought to do? If moral discourse fails to track the truth, what should we do with…
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Why "Rights Imply Duties" Fails to Refute Animal Rights
Why “Rights Imply Duties” Fails to Refute Animal Rights
People with a deontological persuasion tend to like rights and duties/obligations talk. Rights are typically taken to be constraints on things that can be done to rights-holders. For example, a right not to have one’s legs cut off so they can be consumed by hungry cannibals narrows the range of permissible actions down for those around the rights-holder. Those around the rights-holder cannot cut…
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The Case Against Carl Cohen's Case Against Animal Rights
The Case Against Carl Cohen’s Case Against Animal Rights
Moral rights are claims against moral agents by other moral agents, according to Carl Cohen. The content of claims can vary from repayment of loans to forbidding trespassers on a tract of land. Cohen argues that rights claims can only be levied against moral agents, by moral agents. Moral agency is characterized by the ability to choose to act according to moral rules in an autonomous way. Cohen…
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Phenomenal Conservatism and Destructive Defeat
Phenomenal Conservatism and Destructive Defeat
In this post, I will explore a problem for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). If you are unfamiliar with PC, then check out this post. Epistemologists recognize two kinds of justification. Propositional justification is what makes a belief justifiable for an agent. Doxastic justification is what makes a belief justified for an agent. The latter kind of justification requires the agent to base her…
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An Introduction to Phenomenal Conservatism
An Introduction to Phenomenal Conservatism
An Introduction to Phenomenal Conservatism Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is a foundationalist theory of justification that can be applied to perception as well as the a priori. Michael Huemer formulates PC like this: PC: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p (Huemer 2007). PC takes seemings to be the…
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The Difference Between Moral Dilemmas and Moral Conflicts
The Difference Between Moral Dilemmas and Moral Conflicts
Not many moral theorists believe in genuine moral dilemmas, but almost all of them recognize moral conflicts. I will describe two situations and explain why I think one is a genuine moral dilemma, while the other is a mere moral conflict. In the process of my explanation, the differences between the two kinds of moral situation will become salient. Moral Dilemma: Sophie and her two children get…
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A Brief Analysis of the Euthyphro Dilemma
A Brief Analysis of the Euthyphro Dilemma
The Euthyphro Dilemma is typically considered to be a problem for divine command theories of moral properties. The dilemma in this guise usually goes like this: Either X is good/right because God commands it, or God commands X because it is good/right. The dilemma afflicts versions of divine command theory that take the good to be prior to the right as well as versions that take the right to be…
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Non-Moral Values Can Override Moral Values
Non-Moral Values Can Override Moral Values
There seem to be states of affairs in which an agent ought to act immorally to secure non-moral goods. Here is one example of such a state of affairs: Suppose that Michelangelo had to steal the marble that he used to form David. There was no other way to secure the materials to construct his sculpture. Michelangelo noticed that there was a marble dealer who had excess marble that he planned on…
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Emotions and Morality: An Introduction
Emotions and Morality: An Introduction
When doing moral theory, the question of emotion will inevitably arise. Some theorists think that emotions should not play any moral role because they are antithetical to reliable reasoning. Others doubt that emotions are a wholly distorting influence. Some theorists believe that emotions are an integral part of our moral lives. In this post, I’m going to briefly introduce some ways in which…
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Tyrannical Reasons
In a previous post I outlined what I think it is for a moral theory to be tyrannical. One kind of tyrannical moral theory takes the class of our moral reasons to be identical to the class of our all things considered reasons. When we act, we do so for reasons. Reasons are things that count in favor of acting one way or another, or refraining from acting. I have a reason to eat breakfast in the…
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Free Form Discussion 8: Is Determinism Self-Defeating? Heidegger, Free Will, and Problems with Analytic Epistemology
Free Form Discussion 8: Is Determinism Self-Defeating? Heidegger, Free Will, and Problems with Analytic Epistemology
https://soundcloud.com/grasped-in-thought/free-form-discussion-8-an-argument-against-determinism-heideggerian-free-will-and-epistemology Huemer’s Argument graspedinthought.com/2016/06/01/is-…self-refuting/ Free Will book I mentioned: goo.gl/6NDG8Y Mackie’s INUS conditions analysis of causation: comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaMackie.pdf
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Free Form Discussion 7: Virtue Ethics, Epistemology, and Ordinary Language Philosophy
Free Form Discussion 7: Virtue Ethics, Epistemology, and Ordinary Language Philosophy
https://soundcloud.com/grasped-in-thought/free-form-discussion-7-virtue-ethics-epistemology-and-ordinary-language-philosophy
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Free Form Discussion 6: Tyrannical Morality and the Universal Basic Income
Free Form Discussion 6: Tyrannical Morality and the Universal Basic Income
https://soundcloud.com/grasped-in-thought/free-form-discussion-6-tyrannical-morality-and-the-universal-basic-income
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Free Form Discussion 5: More on Morality
Free Form Discussion 5: More on Morality
https://soundcloud.com/grasped-in-thought/free-form-discussion-5-more-on-morality
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Free Form Discussion 4: Transcendence and the Meaning of Life
Free Form Discussion 4: Transcendence and the Meaning of Life
https://soundcloud.com/grasped-in-thought/free-form-discussion-4-the-meaning-of-life-and-transcendence
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