Ecology of the Brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind (Thomas Fuchs, 2017)
“According to the classic cognitivist or modular view, the brain implements encapsulated mechanisms for cognizing (perceiving, planning, evaluating, decision-making, etc.).
Each module is believed to be responsible for computing an independent cognitive function, largely unaffected by the working of other modules and disconnected from bodily and environmental processes.
This conception still fuels experimental cognitive research, not least because of its suitability for isolated study designs.
However, it has now come under growing criticism as being inadequate for the distributed functioning of the central nervous system, multitasking at every level and highly dependent on contextual variables.
Therefore, the modular model is increasingly replaced by thinking in overarching functional systems and highly flexible brain connectivity patterns, where the same cortical or subcortical area may be co-opted into different functions depending on which of its interconnected networks is activated.
This also corresponds to the complexity of experience itself: all terms for special functions, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, wishing, and so on, single out components of consciousness, whereas factually subjective states of experience always remain holistic.
Thus, all perceptions are not only embedded in a bodily background experience, but are also connected with feelings, memories, and linguistic concepts.
There is no “pure” pain, no “plain” seeing or hearing. (…)
Granted, partial functions of consciousness can to a certain extent be assigned to certain specialized regions, damage to which then also results in the failure of the function.
However, every theory which views consciousness as being assembled from localizable individual functions or modules incurs the problem of how these individual functions are to be integrated into a united activity—a question which is mirrored in different variations of the “binding problem.””

















