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@wallifaction
adamrichter.me
Want to know more about me and my research on history of science / science and religion? Check out my new personal website!
Wallifaction - Top Posts
Welcome to the Wallifaction blog! Here are some of the most popular posts:
Alchemy and Avarice: Scientific and Religious Fraud in Ben Jonson’s “The Alchemist” (1610)
The Discovery of Titan: Huygens’ Cipher and Wallis’s Trick
Great Children: History, Science and Religion in the Ender's Game series
The New Martyrs of Science
Reflections on Teaching the History of Science and Religion: Part 1
The Eschaton Game: Children and War Games in Science Fiction
(The X-Files’ Gibson Praise – image source)
Few images are more chilling than the child soldier. It makes sense that literature often depicts children at war, articulating our collectively worry about passing today’s violence on to future generations. Such literary works address our anxious curiosity about whether the violence in our world is a manifestation of human nature. A classic example is William Golding’s Lord of the Flies (1954) which depicts a group of school-age boys stranded on a island whose efforts to organize and cooperate descend into a violent power-struggle and, eventually, a simulated war. The outbreak of violence in Lord of the Flies marks the boys’ return to a Hobbesian state of nature, but – at least in part – the boys are emulating adult warfare, but without fully realizing the consequences of their actions. Lord of the Flies addresses the danger of blurring the line between fighting-as-entertainment and fighting-as-warfare. The distant descendants of this book – the likes of Battle Royale and The Hunger Games – continue to explore this issue that, if anything, has become more relevant in the last half-century.
Science fiction has dealt with the disturbing idea of children’s warfare in a distinctive way. Several prominent sci-fi works, especially those that take place in a sinister dystopian future, depict children engaging in simulated warfare aided by new technologies. These works suggest that as technology changes the way that people interact, it also changes their relationship with violence. As new forms of telecommunication become second nature to new generations, sci-fi writers express a concern that people might perform acts of violence without feeling their consequences. This may be one consequence of technologies that, on one hand, connect us to the world and, on the other hand, create distance between us and the people with whom we communicate.
But why is it that children in particular make such compelling subjects for this sort of sci-fi study? These works play with the trope of children’s innate innocence, showing how children can unwittingly be made into instruments of war. As I’ll discuss below, in Ender’s Game, Infinite Jest, and The X-Files, the image of children as soldiers is powerful because they don’t see it happening until it’s too late. In these works, adults push children into training for warfare, but they encounter little resistance as the training comes in the packaging of games, entertainment, and exciting new technology. As technology increases our reach and changes how we communicate, science fiction points these concerns toward the future, speculating on how later generations will respond to violence and warfare.
In a cogent journal article (cited below), Andrew M. Butler identifies four science fiction novels from the 1980s and 90s in which children engage in ‘virtual war,’ in the form of video games or staged events that blend fighting and entertainment. Butler finds that these virtual wars are essentially about alterity – about defining our identity in contrast to some ‘other’ represented in a virtual setting by aliens or monsters. The child protagonists in these stories learn how to distinguish themselves from others by fighting against them in a virtual format. However, Butler notes that by the end of their stories the child soldiers also learn how to empathize with the strange and distant other, to find the similarities that challenge the alterity ingrained by virtual warfare. Virtual others – even if they’re aliens or monsters – stand in for real, human others. As the children in these stories develop their sense of empathy, they learn how to humanize others, both virtual and actual.
Butler is right to identify alterity and empathy as key elements in these stories of children’s virtual warfare, but I think it’s important to keep in mind that these stories are science fiction, and that the experiences of these children are shaped by the technologies that are prominent in their futuristic worlds. It seems to me that the central questions addressed in these works are about new technologies: how they inform our views of others, how they affect our ability to relate to people, how they extend or collapse distances. Science fiction allows us to project our concerns onto an imagined future. Sci-fi depictions of children’s simulated warfare are in large part anxious speculations about how future generations will react to potent new technologies – including how people in positions of power will exploit these technologies to manipulate others.
Spoilers ahead for Ender’s Game, Infinite Jest, and The X-Files.
A particularly gripping sci-fi account of child soldiers is Orson Scott Card’s novel, Ender’s Game (which I’ve also blogged about in detail here). In this 80s sci-fi classic, Ender Wiggin is a genius child whose life as a soldier has been determined before his birth. From age six, Ender’s childhood consists mainly of increasingly realistic war games designed to maximize his potential as a military commander. With humanity having barely survived a war with an insectile alien species called the Formics (or more colloquially the ‘Buggers’), a loosely united Earth government handpicks promising children for an immersive Battle School located on a space station orbiting the Earth. Like his classmates, Ender becomes completely absorbed by the competitive battle game which pits two teams of children against each other in a zero-gravity cube, armed with laser guns that can freeze their opponents, with the goal of incapacitating the other team and taking over its base. As Ender emerges as the leader of his own battle-game squad and the most promising commander in the school, he remains aware that the whole impressive technological system of Battle School is designed to train Earth’s next generation for the next Formic war. Gradually the whole apparatus of the battle game is directed toward challenging Ender’s leadership and creativity in battle, as the military leaders overseeing the school try to test his limits.
After Ender overcomes every disadvantage concocted by his teachers in the battle game, he graduates to a Command School built on the Eros asteroid, even further from Ender’s home on Earth. Command School features more sophisticated battle simulations and tougher challenges. Ender is required to command a whole virtual fleet and to decide when to pull the trigger on humanity’s deadliest weapon, the Molecular Disruption Device, which breaks down molecules so effectively that it could wipe out the entire Formic homeworld – as well as the human fleet escorting the weapon. The novel’s big reveal comes when Ender deploys the MD Device in his most challenging battle simulation ever, wiping out the Formics and Earth’s fleet. As the onlooking military commanders cheer, a confused Ender is informed that the battle was real. Adapting technology discovered on destroyed Formic ships, Earth’s military employed faster-than-light communication the give Ender unwitting control over a fleet of ships lightyears away. Thus Ender fulfilled the military’s expectations by exterminating an entire intelligent alien species without even knowing what he was doing.
(Command School as depicted in the 2013 movie adaptation of Ender’s Game – image source)
In Ender’s Game and its sequels, we see Ender struggle to avoid becoming his sociopathic older brother, Peter, for whom violence and manipulation are a sport. Ender’s curse is that, unlike Peter, he has a conscience that makes him realize his role in history as a destroyer. Ender has to live with the knowledge that his empathy for his enemies was not enough to stop him from destroying them.
Yet Ender’s whole life was forced onto a destructive path not only by Earth’s government and military, but also by technologies that he lived with from birth. In the first chapter we see the removal of a monitor implanted in the back of Ender’s neck in early childhood, which the military used to assess his suitability for Battle School. During his training, impressive futuristic technologies facilitate Ender’s development. The space station itself, the sophisticated computer simulations used to evaluate the psychological state of the students, the zero-gravity environments, the MD device, the means of faster-than-light communication and near-lightspeed travel adapted from the Formics – these technologies determine not only what Ender will do with his life, but also how he will relate to humans and other sentient beings. After winning the war with the Formics for humanity, Ender is forced to leave Earth permanently and take part in humanity’s first interstellar colonial project. Because the colonists ships’ travel at almost the speed of light, relativistic physics come into play: time passes more slowly for Ender and the colonists, with centuries passing while they’re in transit. As we learn in the sequels to Ender’s Game, this technology allows Ender to see a future in which everyone he knew in his youth is long dead. Centuries after the war, Ender is remembered as the destructive monster who destroyed the Formic civilization: he is Ender the Xenocide. The war games of Ender’s youth gave him a role in human history that no one predicted.
A work that’s at least as ambitious as the Ender series – in breadth, if not in timescale – is David Foster Wallace’s postmodern, non-linear tome of a novel, Infinite Jest. This darkly comedic 1996 work is not normally described as science fiction, but it does provide a speculative look at a near future in which new technologies have become integrated into people’s lives, particularly in North America. Like Ender’s Game, Infinite Jest focuses on gifted children plucked from their homes and placed into an environment of constant competition. Rather than potential military commanders, though, these children are gifted athletes enrolled in the Enfield Tennis Academy in Massachusetts. These children live in a truly bizarre version of the twenty-first century when years are known not by a number, but by a corporate sponsor; most of the events in Infinite Jest take place during the Year of the Depend Adult Undergarment. The pathologically germophobic president of the United States has compelled Canada and Mexico to join the USA in a single polity called the Organization of North American Nations (known by the telling acronym O.N.A.N.). As a member of O.N.A.N., Canada is compelled to annex a swath of the northeastern United States that has become a dumping ground for hazardous waste so that the rest of the USA can maintain the president’s extreme standard of cleanliness. The sinister details of this dystopian near future are slowly revealed throughout the 1000+ pages of Infinite Jest, as students at the ETA (and patients at a nearby halfway house for recovering drug addicts) cross paths with several political factions within O.N.A.N. that want to reform North America according to their ideals.
More than anything else, Infinite Jest is about addiction to things in our lives that can stimulate or stupefy us – not only drugs, but also entertainment. The ever-prescient Wallace predicted the slow decline of network television in favour of a system that transmitted content by ‘spontaneous dissemination.’ The O.N.A.N.ite world still enjoys prerecorded videos, however, and we see various characters lulled into a stupor by their favourite repetitive entertainment: the tennis players watch fluid tennis strokes that bleed into each other in a hypnotic recording. Meanwhile, the intravenous drug users watch variously coloured flames emerge over and over as they sink into a binge.
Again, new technologies are destructive not only to individual lives, but also to relationships between people. One of the many kinds of addiction that Wallace describes is addiction to maintaining one’s personal appearance which becomes a pressing concern with the advent of video telephone communication. People become so anxious about looking good on videophone that they create avatars to stand in for them. Accessories for videophone avatars briefly become a major industry before the pressure to look good becomes too great and videophones fall into disuse. Wallace anticipated the concerns that would accompany new kinds of communication in the 21st century. In Wallace’s frighteningly accurate vision of the future, users of new communications technology become obsessed with projecting themselves as desirable, and we’re left to wonder whether the communication is between real people or artificial versions of them.
Central to the plot is a uniquely destructive piece of entertainment, a video so entertaining that it turns viewers into mindless, drooling husks that can only watch it over and over. The doomed viewers neglect their bodily needs until they starve to death. Part of the inspiration for this bizarre plot device seems to be autobiographical. Before his death, Wallace himself struggle with addictions to both drugs and television, and his penetrating writing speculates about a world where new technologies facilitate such addictions more and more.
The plot of Infinite Jest pivots around a game called Eschaton, which consumes the lives of certain students at the tennis academy to the point of obsession. Despite its name which signals the end of the world, the children playing Eschaton seem only dimly aware that they’re simulating war. The game takes place on an imaginary map of the world which is plotted onto a series of connected tennis courts. Players representing different world powers take turns lobbing tennis balls at opponents’ territories. The tennis balls represent nuclear weapons, and a game master wheeling around a portable computer – a device somehow appropriated from the adult authority figures in charge of the academy – calculates the extent of the damage caused by successful tennis-ball launches.
(an Eschaton map created by for Infinite Jest fansite – image source)
Significantly, a successful game of Eschaton requires two things: a powerful technological device and the supervision of older students at the academy. The book frequently reminds us that these older students, including the protagonist Hal Incandenza, are facing the struggles of entering adulthood. In the chapter that describes the key game of Eschaton, it seems that pressure from the older students is what gets the players interested in the game in the first place. They’re also under constant pressure from the older students to play according to the extremely strict rules. What’s more, the game is so mathematically complicated that it can only be run with the computer’s help. Wallace’s thick description of the computer’s specs emphasize that the machine is meant for more serious activity than simulated warfare. The players in this war simulation are being manipulated by things beyond their control.
The pivotal moment occurs when an impatient young player launches a tennis-ball warhead not at a territory on the map, but at the body of a rival player. The crossover into real-world aggression sets off a cascade of violence that turns into an outright brawl. At this point the game has gotten so far out of hand that the older students can only sit paralyzed in terror like Hal, or scream at the players for breaking the rules, like chief Eschaton enthusiast Michael Pemulis. Several players are badly injured by the time the violence comes to a climax, when the game master’s head is smashed through the screen of the computer. The descent of the Eschaton game into actual violence is unprecedented, but results from the players’ pent-up aggression accumulated through many hours of simulated warfare. It’s clear that the apparent authority figures – that is, both the teachers at Enfield Tennis Academy and the older students who are expected to look after the younger ones – are responsible for the violence but powerless to stop it. The game format and the use of a computer create distance between individuals and the violence they cause. But eventually the elastic snaps back and the characters are forced to realize that they’re participating in a culture that uses entertainment technologies to mask the destructive actions – actions that are slowly causing their society to crumble.
While I was thinking about this post, I was reminded on Twitter by Ellie Louson that chess players often represent battle commanders in fiction. This made me think of Gibson Praise, the telepathic chess prodigy in one of my favourite sci-fi tv series, The X-Files. Like several other X-Files characters, Gibson is a living piece of technology. His abilities result from experiments that are part of a conspiracy to create human-alien hybrids. The show’s protagonists, FBI Special Agents Mulder and Scully, try to rescue Gibson from a life of as a pawn (so to speak) of the conspirators working with and within the US government. The writers’ decision to make Gibson a chess master is significant. Mulder and Scully are engaged in a (usually cold) war with the conspirators, and Gibson’s telepathic ability to manipulate people like so many chess pieces makes him an asset sought by combatants on both sides.
(Gibson at eleven years old facing a Russian grandmaster – image source)
As I see it, these sci-fi examples of children playing at war reflect our collective concern about what technology does to us, and especially to our children. In particular, video games face frequent criticism for simulating warfare with various degrees of realism. Such complaints are one manifestation of a more general anxiety about how new technologies change the ways we interact, and the ways we conceive of ourselves in relation to other people. Lately, new articles about Pokémon GO appear online every day, as commentators worry that the game is making kids less aware of their surroundings, to the detriment of their safety and their sensitivity. Admittedly, searching for Pokémon at the Holocaust Museum or the 9/11 memorial is in bad taste. Incidentally, Pokémon GO is the latest entry in a video game series set in a near future, when children use sophisticated technology to simulate warfare. Within the games, a worldwide technological apparatus has been constructed to support what is ostensibly a child’s game: Pokémon can be stored in a digital format in order to be stored, traded, or prepared for battle. Now that Pokémon is blending into the real world, it’s putting a new face on an anxiety about children and technology that science fiction writers have been grappling with for decades.
Sources:
Andrew M. Butler, “‘We Has Found the Enemy and They Is Us’: Virtual War and Empathy in Four Children’s Science Fiction Novels,” The Lion and the Unicorn 28 (2004): 171-185.
Orson Scott Card, Ender’s Game (London: Century, 1985).
William Golding, Lord of the Flies (London: Faber and Faber, 1954).
David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest (New York: Back Bay Books, 1996).
Sonic Adventure: A Retrospective
(The memorable whale chase from Sonic Adventure -- source)
Gamers conventionally divide the long-running Sonic the Hedgehog series into two parts. First, there’s the 2D era of popular Sega Genesis games (also including titles on the Master System, Game Gear, and Saturn) which represents the height of the popularity and quality of Sonic games. Beginning with Sonic the Hedgehog in 1991, this was a time when Sonic games were simple, fast, and fun. In the early 90s, Sega’s Sonic Team cranked out a series of side-scrolling platformers with long stretches of space where Sonic could reach his impressive top speed. The developers filled out these experiences with beautiful and varied environments and memorable 16-bit music that made a permanent home in the brains of 90s kids.
(Sonic and Tails in Sonic the Hedeghog 2′s Emerald Hill Zone -- source)
Sonic’s downfall is generally associated with his move to 3D gaming. On less successful Sega consoles than the Genesis, and on other companies’ hardware once Sega stopped making its own consoles, Sonic games lost the simple, high-speed fun of the 2D era. The 3D games become bogged down by questionable creative choices, excessive characters, bad music, and gameplay sometimes so sluggish and glitchy that it made certain games unplayable.
(Sonic standing upside-down in the infamously glitch-plagued Sonic the Hedgehog of 2006 -- source)
Although there’s some truth to this general distinction between good 2D and bad 3D Sonic games, I consider Sonic Adventure (1998), a launch title for the Sega Dreamcast and the first true 3D Sonic game, to belong to the earlier period. The Sonic games of the 90s are not only generally more fun to play, they also feel like they belong to the same fictional world. One strength of the Genesis-era games that doesn’t get much attention is their ability to tell a story using just a few visual elements. In these games we follow along with Sonic’s pursuit of the nefarious Dr. Robotnik in a setting that gradually shift from pristine natural environments to polluted industrial complexes. Robotnik’s goal is to conqueror the world with his army of robots, but his plan also involves a conquest of nature. As Sonic blocks his enemy’s latest attempt to subdue the planet, he also incapacitates the factories and frees the living animals that power each individual robot in the Doctor’s army.
(The ideal world as Dr. Robotnik sees it, in Sonic the Hedgehog’s Scrap Brain Zone -- source)
But there’s more to the story than an environmentalist message. The Genesis games show us the world from Sonic’s (or from the perspective of his sidekick Tails or his rival Knuckles, if you play a variation on the main story). The player gradually gets a sense of the mysteries underlying the struggle between Sonic and Robotnik, a lore that includes ruined civilizations, mystical “Chaos Emeralds” containing unlimited power, an island floating in the sky, and ancient prophetic murals foretelling the game’s events. The appeal of the 2D Sonic games –– at least for me, as a 90s kid –– had a lot to do with gleaning bits of information about Sonic’s world.
(In the background, Super Sonic fights a giant robot in a prophetic mural within Hidden Palace Zone, from Sonic & Knuckles -- source)
More than any later releases in the series, Sonic Adventure feels like it’s set in the same world as the Genesis games. It’s fitting that Sonic Adventure was the last Sonic game released in the 1990s. To a degree, it achieves what Super Mario 64 did for Nintendo’s mascot: it filled out a familiar and beloved game world into three-dimensional space. When I first experienced Sonic Adventure at eleven years old, I felt immersed in Sonic’s world which now included lifelike 3D character models, dialogue, and –– most importantly –– environments to explore with secrets to discover.
(Big the Cat looks out over the Mystic Ruins jungle in Sonic Adventure -- source)
Sonic Adventure features six branching storylines held together by Dr. Robotnik’s latest plan to conquer the world. This time, he has resurrected an ancient water monster –– Chaos, “The God of Destruction” –– who gets stronger every time he’s fed a Chaos Emerald. Of course, Sonic and his allies want to frustrate Robotnik’s plan as usual, but they’re given extra motivation by the spirit of an ancient echidna, Tikal, who intervenes to transport the protagonists back to the time of her Mayan-inspired civilization. It’s only when you play through all the storylines that you get the full story about these ancient echidnas (presumably Knuckles’ ancestors) who were obliterated when Tikal’s father, another would-be world conqueror, provoked the anger of Chaos. This was the first time that Sonic Team tried to give some meaning to the mysterious elements of Sonic world established in the earlier games, and they managed to create an immersive experience that elevated the video game experience in the early days of 3D gaming.
(Tikal warns her father not to mess with Chaos as Knuckles looks on -- source)
That was 1999. Seventeen years later, Sonic Adventure has not aged well. The graphics are no longer impressive, which makes it harder for them to obscure the game’s flaws. The camera angles are a mess and the gameplay sometimes feels slow and clunky. The voiceovers are laughably out of synch with the movement of the characters’ mouths. Sonic fans are lucky that the sequel, released in 2001, made significant improvements, especially in terms of gameplay and level design. The high-speed platforming of Sonic Adventure 2 remains impressive when you play it today. Sonic Adventure 2 is the better game. I’d argue, however, that the first Sonic Adventure is the better Sonic game. It was the sequel that effectively rebooted the series, as a new lead actor reboots James Bond or Doctor Who. Sonic Adventure 2 pushed the series toward unfamiliar settings (in this case a faux San-Francisco and a deserted space colony). It relies heavily on new characters designed for the twenty-first century such as Shadow the Hedgehog, Sega’s effort to capture the “emo” sensibility of early-2000s youth culture. Sonic Adventure 2 was the first of the Sonic games that really felt like it was trying too hard –– always a risk for a series conceived of as the “cool” alternative to Mario –– especially since Sonic now had corporate sponsorship. A core gameplay elements, “grinding” on rails, is the result of a product placement sponsored by the makers of “Soap” shoes. Grinding was a lot of fun in Sonic Adventure 2, but it signalled that playing Sonic was no longer about entering a world distinct from our own.
(the moody hedgehog Shadow grinds on a rail in Sonic Adventure 2 -- source)
The difference was less obvious at the time, but in retrospect it’s apparent that Sonic Adventure belongs to Sonic’s original world much more than the sequel. In Sonic Adventure, as the action alternates between a bustling city, a lush jungle, and Robotnik’s massive airship, it’s never clear whether we’re visiting the same locations as the Genesis games –– such as the casino and the ice-covered mountain –– or locations merely inspired by them. Either way, these places feel like the world that we only got glimpses of on the Genesis, the world of mysterious ancient civilizations and foreboding prophecies. The flashbacks to the Mayan-like echidna civilization evokes the same historical sensation as Sonic the Hedgehog’s Labyrinth Zone, Sonic the Hedgehog 2’s Aquatic Ruin Zone, and Sonic & Knuckles’ Hidden Palace Zone. And direct references to the 2D games further reveal the developers’ reverence toward for the origins of the series. We see the villain insist on being called “Dr. Robotnik” while the protagonists continue to call him “Eggman”, which is a cheeky way of reconciling the different names he was called in the Japanese and international releases of the original games. We see damsel-in-distress Amy Rose fondly remembering how Sonic saved her in Sonic CD. We see cameo appearances from Metal Sonic and Silver Sonic. We even hear remixes of the underrated music from Sonic 3D Blast. This is a game intended to augment Sonic’s world rather than drifting from it, as all the Sonic titles exclusive to Nintendo consoles do, or failing badly at re-creating it, as Sonic the Hedgehog 4 does.
(The mural recording Chaos destroying the echidna world is reminiscent of the mural in Sonic & Knuckles -- source)
Obviously, Sega has struggled to figure out what elements of the original Sonic games are lacking in newer titles. They’ve tried stripping down the gameplay to just Sonic, injecting humour into the story, even returning to two-dimensional gameplay, and for the most part it hasn’t worked. One thing they’ve neglected is effective storytelling, which no game in the series does better then Sonic Adventure. The six storylines diverge, overlap, and resolve in unexpected and satisfying ways. The best storyline might be that of E-102 Gamma, a robot who makes his only appearance in Sonic Adventure. Gamma’s tragic story begins with Eggman announcing himself as the robot’s creator and master. Gradually, Gamma develops a conscience and realizes that he and his fellow robots are slaves to Robotnik. Resisting the Doctor’s control, he devises his own misguided mission to save the other E-100 series robots from servitude by... blowing them up. This is the most creative storyline in the game and perhaps the most compelling, even though Sonic features in it only tangentially.
In other ways, too, the developers of Sonic Adventure were eager to try novel storytelling techniques. The game toys with the idea of the “unreliable narrator” as the various characters you control seem to remember events a little differently. Sometimes the player has to defeat the same enemy as several different characters, as though each of them remembers being the one to win the battle. And the dialogue changes depending on whose perspective we’re seeing as well.
(Who wins this battle: Sonic, Gamma, or Tails? It depends on which character you choose -- source; source)
The developers also made the excellent decision to let players keep exploring after finishing the game. It’s extremely satisfying to uncover new secrets as you visit Knuckles’ floating island or scale Robotnik’s wrecked airship, the Egg Carrier, which ends up adrift in the ocean.
It must be said, though, that the developers of Sonic Adventure made some questionable choices. They experimented with what was feasible and enjoyable in a 3D environment, and not all of their experiments were successful. It’s still fun to race through vibrant stages as Sonic and Tails, but why Sonic Team thought people would enjoy the lumbering Big the Cat’s adventures in fishing is beyond me. There’s nothing more tedious than trying to get this giant cat to catch a frog on his fishing line, but unfortunately you have to complete Big’s storyline to see the real ending of the game.
(Thrilling. -- source)
Some players also consider it tedious to track down emerald shards as Knuckles, although I find it to be a nice change of pace. Sonic Adventure is far from perfect. But somehow it’s greater than the sum of its parts, and is a rewarding experience despite its flaws. There’s just a richness to this game that’s difficult to describe if you haven’t played it. As I see it, the game succeeds largely because it reflects a time when Sonic was still in touch with his Genesis roots.
Today, Sega’s strategy for Sonic is confused and misguided. The latest reboot, called Sonic Boom, might be a new low for a series that’s been floundering for the last decade. The Sonic Boom games are such a disaster in part because they’re Sonic games in name only. In terms of gameplay, story, and general style (I’m looking at you, big, dumb version of Knuckles), there’s no particular reason these need to be Sonic games.
(Why?? -- source)
These days, there are rumours that Sega is working on Sonic Adventure 3. Some have speculated that this is the big announcement they’re going to make this year to mark Sonic’s 25th anniversary. I’m skeptical of these rumours, but if they’re true, the success of Sonic Adventure 3 will depend on whether the developers are in touch with Sonic’s history. Short of bringing back the writers and programmers who worked on the early games, this means making a real effort to understand what elements, apart from fast and fun gameplay, made Sonic special in the 90s.
Cemetery of Dead Science on our floor this week!
This is so awesome I love this
Alchemy and Avarice: Scientific and Religious Fraud in Ben Jonson’s “The Alchemist” (1610)
(Stephen Ouimette as Subtle, the pseudo-alchemist, in the 2015 production at the Stratford Shakespeare Festival. Image source)
Last weekend I made my annual trip to the Stratford Shakespeare Festival. Instead of a Shakespeare play, this year I attended a production of The Alchemist by Shakespeare’s contemporary, Ben Jonson (1572-1635), which was first performed in 1610 – the same year when Galileo published his telescopic discoveries in the Sidereal Messenger. The Alchemist is the best known comedy by Jonson, Shakespeare’s more educated and slightly younger rival. The play’s most obvious theme is a satire of spurious alchemy and its credulous consumers who populated London in the early seventeenth century. The action begins in the middle of a productive day for three con artists who bilk people of all social classes in their fraudulent chemical laboratory. The trio’s mastermind is Jeremy, the butler of a gentleman who’s out of London during a plague outbreak. Jeremy has taken the opportunity to dress up his master’s house with books and instruments and recruit a beggar named Subtle to pose as an erudite alchemist, as well as a prostitute named Dol who contributes to the con by seducing the mark. The play depicts a series of overlapping scams in which Jeremy, adopting the persona of a gentleman named Captain Face, promises prosperity and good health to greedy, unwitting Londoners who visit the house and are persuaded to pay a small fortune for Subtle’s useless concoctions. Their scam is massively successful but always in danger of being derailed as Jeremy and his fellows try to keep their numerous lies straight – not to mention that each of them considers selling out the others and making off with the spoils.
The character of greatest interest to historians of science is Subtle, a man who, despite his poverty, has clearly received some education in the subjects that he uses to swindle his customers. Subtle claims to have made the intractable achievements that alchemists had sought for centuries – the transmutation of metals, the discovery of substances that would let a person live forever – and he speaks with authority when he describes the ingredients that alchemists use in these endeavours:
It is, of the one part, A humid exhalation, which we call Material liquida, or the unctuous water; On the other part, a certain crass and vicious Portion of earth; both which, concorporate, Do make the elementary matter of gold; Which is not yet propria materia, But common to all metals and all stones; For, where it is forsaken of that moisture, And hath more driness, it becomes a stone: Where it retains more of the humid fatness, It turns to sulphur, or to quicksilver, Who are the parents of all other metals. (2.1)
This is the language of someone who has studied alchemy in the Paracelsian tradition, who believes that all matter is composed of the three basic elements of sulphur, salt and mercury, and who uses this knowledge to transform matter into into whatever he wants. Subtle is a fraud, but he speaks like a true alchemist.
What he claims to be, though, is more than merely an alchemist. The pseudo-alchemist is a skilled astronomer who knows how to read horoscopes, and he is a physician who makes miracle drugs in his laboratory. These subjects – astronomy, iatrochemistry (that is, chemistry applied to the body) – were also passions of Paracelsus, the Swiss alchemist and physician of the sixteenth century who had a massive influence on early modern natural philosophy and medicine. Evidently, then, Jonson adopts an attitude of skepticism toward the several subjects that Paracelsian alchemists treated as interrelated. But Subtle’s pretended knowledge reaches further still: he has (or feigns) training in algebra and logic, and even claims to be an instrument-maker. As Dol puts it, Subtle claimed to be a master of all the “studies, that contemplate nature” (4.1). In Jonson’s view, it seems, no source of natural knowledge was beyond the abuses of charlatans.
The Alchemist is one of a handful of plays from the early modern period that feature fraudulent science. In Mandragola (1524) by Machiavelli – who was better known in his time as a comedic playwright than a political theorist – the protagonist Callimaco poses as a doctor who prescribes mandrake root to a dupe named Nicia as part of a scheme to sleep with his wife. Then there’s Thomas Shadwell’s The Virtuoso (1676), a play well-known to historians of the Royal Society. The Virtuoso makes the experimental philosopher into a fool with the character Sir Nicholas Gimcrack. Like Jonson, Shadwell takes real practices in natural philosophy to absurd places. For instance, Gimcrack performs animal-to-human blood transfusions as Richard Lower did at Oxford in the 1660s. In Gimcrack’s case a transfusion of sheep’s blood into a man has comedic results:
The Patient from being Maniacal, or raging mad, became wholly Ovine or Sheepish; he bleated perpetually, and chew’d the Cud: He had Wool growing on him in great quantities, and a Northamptonshire Sheep’s Tail did soon emerge or arise from his Anus, or humane Fundament. (2.2)
The Virtuoso was a source of considerable embarrassment to the Fellows of the Royal Society, especially Robert Hooke who attended a performance of the play and felt he was being personally mocked.
Each of these plays takes satirizes science, but each of them takes aim at other members of society apart from the natural philosophers and physicians. The Alchemist in particular gives religion a prominent role in its characters’ fraudulent activities. Jonson, a convert to Catholicism in Protestant England, found much to ridicule in the religious world around him. What I find especially interesting is how the religious satire intersects with the scientific satire. Subtle, Face and Dol manipulate most of their victims by appealing to their religious convictions.
One of the trio’s most lucrative sources of income is a modish nobleman named Sir Epicure Mammon, whose name and manner suggest a penchant for worldly pleasures. Yet, while Epicure does enlist the services of the pseudo-alchemist so he can turn all of his metallic possessions into gold, he is also impressed by religious authority that supposedly underpins the study of alchemy. While trying to convince his skeptical friend, Sir Pertinax Surly, that Subtle’s experiments and concoctions are legitimate, he claims that the biblical figures Adam, Moses, Miriam and Solomon all knew and wrote about alchemy. Apparently, Adam even wrote about the philosopher’s stone in “High Dutch … Which proves it was the primitive tongue.” Here Jonson takes aim at a technique often used to legitimate alchemy – a secretive practice that some early moderns viewed with suspicion – as well as various other aspects of natural philosophy. Many writers claimed to have found knowledge of alchemy in Scripture itself, as well as evidence that the wisest people of the Bible had practiced it. The historian Peter Harrison (cited below) has argued that, after the Protestant Reformation, people began to read Scripture in a strictly literal sense for the first time. This led many natural philosophers to treat the Bible “as a kind of scientific text-book” (140) containing secrets of alchemy, mathematics, cosmology, and nearly any other subject that studied nature. Adam, Moses, and Solomon knew, for instance, that the planets revolved around the Sun rather than the Earth, and diligent readers could find evidence for this with a close reading of Scripture.
Jonson suggests that Epicure has been duped by this sort of reasoning, but he goes further, poking fun at the those who sought to recover the “primitive tongue.” Many early modern scholars – including those who mined the Bible for knowledge of nature – believed that Adam had understood the natural world perfectly in the Garden of Eden, and used this masterful knowledge to give names to the animals that corresponded exactly to their natures. Depending on who you read, the Adamic language, which reflected this perfect knowledge of nature, was lost either when Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden, or when the Tower of Babel was destroyed and God punished humanity with a “confusion of tongues.” In the latter episode, God caused people to speak various languages rather than the single language they had spoken before, which greatly hindered communication. Many early moderns believed that the pre-Fall or pre-Babel language could be recovered; others believed it could be a model for a new universal language. Either way, the “primitive tongue” could be an invaluable tool for natural philosophers, especially because it could perfectly describe objects in the world according to their natures. For Jonson, though, this sort of reasoning is just another element in the fraud of the pseudo-alchemist and his fellows.
Furthermore, Jonson’s choice of Dutch as the false primitive language is no accident. In the Netherlands of the early seventeenth century, Calvinism was thriving. Jonson evidently viewed the Dutch Calvinists as the source of the Puritanism rapidly spreading through England. “Puritan” is a broad term for particularly zealous Protestants who sought to purge the Church of England of any Catholic trappings. The Puritans generally adopted a Calvinist theology, according to which God had predestined certain elect people for salvation. They are represented in The Alchemist by two Dutch Anabaptists, who are duped by the alchemical con artists because – despite acting as though they are among the elect – they are ultimately motivated by the pursuit of wealth. Subtle manages to fool the Anabaptists and secure their investment in his experiments by acting even more pious than they are. When he learns that one of them is named Ananias, Subtle chases him out of the house, screaming that he was named after a wicked disciple who stole money from Jesus’ Apostles (Acts 5). His knowledge of the Bible, then, is what allows Subtle to keep the Anabaptists at arm’s length so they don’t look too closely into his alchemical practice. As for Dol, she poses as a holy woman who speaks in tongues – but nonetheless seduces Sir Epicure so that Subtle can discover him sinning and send him home to repent. Thus Epicure, too, is deterred from investigating the laboratory. In short, the con artists succeed in their scam by taking advantage of their victims’ religious commitments. It is essential that the mark be credulous in both spiritual and worldly matters.
In the end, Jeremy the butler gets away with his con – but not before bringing his master in on the plan and betraying his fellows. As far as we spectators know, there is no justice for Jeremy’s many victims. Perhaps Jonson saw many people around him taken in by what he considered fraudulent natural philosophy and fraudulent religion. The fact that other plays address similar themes suggests that this was an ongoing concern for observant early modern dramatists. Like Machiavelli and Shadwell, Jonson appreciated that knowledge is powerful, but perhaps it is especially so in the hands of the greedy and duplicitous.
Sources:
James J. Bono, The Word of God and the Languages of Man: Interpreting Nature in Early Modern Science and Medicine – Volume 1: Ficino to Descartes (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).
Everett L. Jones, “Robert Hooke and The Virtuoso,” Modern Language Notes 66 (1951): 180-182.
Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Robert S. Miola, “Ben Jonson, Catholic Poet,” Renaissance and Reformation 25 (2001): 101-115.
Robert M. Shuler, “Jonson’s Alchemists, Epicures, and Puritans,” Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England 2 (1985): 171-208.
The Discovery of Titan: Huygens’ Cipher and Wallis’s Trick
(Christiaan Huygens – image source)
To mark the birthday of Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) – the Dutch mathematician, astronomer, physicist, inventor, and all-around superstar of 17th-century science – let’s recall one of the more bizarre moments of his impressive career, when he almost gave credit for a major astronomical discovery to someone who didn’t deserve it. In 1655, Huygens was encouraged by a friend to begin a correspondence with Oxford’s John Wallis, who was just beginning to make a name for himself in mathematics. Wallis was about to publish on his new techniques for quadrature (i.e,. determining the area bound by a curve), which seemed to hold promise for solving the ancient mathematical problem of squaring the circle. Huygens was eager to explain his views on quadrature to Wallis, but also took the opportunity to send a cipher whose solution contained Huygens’ recent astronomical discovery: he was the first person to find a satellite orbiting the planet Saturn. Today we know it as Titan.
The cipher technique was nothing new. Throughout the seventeenth century scholars, especially astronomers, sent ciphers or anagrams to colleagues as a means of establishing a timeline for their work. If the astronomer was fairly certain he had made an important discovery but felt that he needed more evidence, he could record a cipher in a letter or even a published text and reveal the solution when he felt more confident in his discovery. If, in the meantime, someone else announced that he had made the same discovery, the astronomer could immediately reveal the solution to his cipher and show that he had discovered it first. Decades before Huygens’ discovery of Titan, Galileo had used the same technique to record his observations of Saturn – which seemed to have “handles” protruding from its sides – and Venus – which exhibited phases just like the moon.
Like many of his colleagues in the seventeenth century, Huygens was deeply concerned about priority and credit. The prestige for a discovery in natural philosophy and astronomy, or for the invention of a novel instrument, depended on who got there first. Accordingly, natural philosophers, mathematicians and inventors often got caught up in conflicts – which historians call “priority disputes” – about who deserved credit as the initial discoverer or inventor of something that the wider intellectual community recognized as important. The most famous priority dispute is the one between Newton and Leibniz over the invention of calculus, which became particularly heated in the early eighteenth century, but this was just one case that followed the pattern set by numerous others throughout the seventeenth century. Priority disputes tended to bring out personal, professional, and even national rivalries, including when English and French writers argued interminably during the 1660s over which nation’s physicians had performed the first blood transfusion. (Both sides were passionate about claiming priority even though the results of blood transfusions were disastrous in the seventeenth century, when physicians and natural philosophers had no concept of blood types and nearly every patient died.) Galileo was deeply concerned that his priority be acknowledged, which is why he employed the cipher technique. This didn’t prevent him from engaging in priority disputes throughout his career, including one against Simon Marius over Galileo’s most famous discovery, the four “Galilean moons” orbiting Jupiter.
Huygens himself became embroiled in priority disputes later in his career, including a nasty one with Robert Hooke over who had invented a spring-powered pocket watch. So his concern about priority for discovering Titan was justified. But the technique he used to protect his priority in this and many other cases, the cipher, faced increasing criticism over the course of the seventeenth century since it did not seem to be absolutely secure. Couldn’t a talented codebreaker find the solution to the cipher and steal credit for the discovery? Indeed, Huygens evidently didn’t realize that when he sent his ciphered discovery to Wallis, he was sending it to a professional codebreaker who was not above a little opportunism to increase the prestige of English astronomers. Even if he had known about Wallis’s cryptanalytical prowess, though, Huygens could scarcely have predicted how exactly Wallis would demonstrate the vulnerability of the cipher technique.
(John Wallis – image source)
In fact, Huygens made his cipher particularly vulnerable by hinting at the nature of its solution. His letter to Wallis contained this cryptic Latin message: “ADMOVERE OCULIS DISTANTIA SIDERA NOSTRIS, VVVVVVVCCCRR-HNBQX”, the intelligible part of which means roughly “to direct our eyes to distant stars.” Huygens planned to reveal later that this code contained his discovery of Saturn’s moon in the form of an anagram. When the letters are rearranged it reads, “ SATURNO LUNA SUA CIRCUNDUCITUR DIEBUS SEXDECIM HORIS QUATUOR”, or “Saturnʼs moon is led around it in sixteen days and four hours.” The announcement would reflect the message in the cipher itself: Huygens had made a new discovery by directing his eyes to the distant stars. It seems that Huygens wanted not only to protect his priority, but also to add some dramatic flair when he revealed that the solution to his cipher had been under people’s noses the whole time.
Wallis, no stranger either to astronomical observation or to ciphered announcements, replied to Huygens with a cipher of his own. Apparently lacking Huygens’ sense of drama, though, Wallis didn’t hint at the solution with a clever arrangement of the letters. Instead he simply gave Huygens a list of letters in alphabetical order, which would be arranged to form the solution when Wallis was prepared to announce the discovery:
(image from Wallis Correspondence vol. 1, cited in full below.)
Then Wallis chose to bide his time, saving the solution to his ciphers until Huygens revealed his. In March of the following year, Huygens sent his colleagues in Oxford a copy of his newly published De Saturni luna observatio nova in which he announced his discovery of Saturn’s moon and explained that he had recorded this discovery in a cipher he had sent to friends the year before.
Wallis picked this moment to explain what his own cipher had concealed. He wrote to that two astronomers in Oxford, Paul Neale and Christopher Wren, had discovered Saturn’s moon several years before Huygens, which he could prove with the solution to his cipher. When properly arranged, Wallis explained, the letters he had sent produce the following phrase: “Saturni Comes quasi lunando vehitur. Diebus sexdecim circuitu rotatur. Novas nuper Saturni formas Telescopo vidimus primitus. Plura speramus.” This translates to, “A companion of Saturn is carried in a curve. It is turned by a revolution in sixteen days. We have recently observed new shapes of Saturn with a telescope. We expect more.” Wallis’s cipher established that the Oxford astronomers had observed the moon around 1649, when astronomers noticed that Saturn had apparently begun to change its shape. (When observed through a telescope, the Saturn takes on different shapes depending on the angle of its rings relative to the observer.) Huygens was disappointed that his discovery had been anticipated, but he conceded to the Oxford astronomers. They had established their priority according to Huygens’ own rules.
Wallis let Huygens think he had been scooped for over two years. In 1659 Huygens wrote to Wallis to tell him that he was ready to publish his Systema Saturnium. This book would explain why Saturn’s appearance changed over time: by supposing that Saturn is surrounded by a ring one could explain all the various shapes it appeared to take. (In fact, this was another discovery he had recorded in a cipher. He recorded the encoded version in print in De Saturni luna.) Responding to Huygens, Wallis again chose a crucial moment to reveal a secret: his cipher had been a fake. Wallis wrote that the Oxford group had, in fact, observed and recorded Saturn’s moon but they had mistaken it for a regular fixed star. When Huygens included a cipher in first letter to Wallis, the experienced cryptanalyst had created a clever pseudo-anagram with several possible solutions. Together with Neale and Wren, he had made a few guesses about Huygens’ discovery, then wrote out a cipher whose letters could be arranged to correspond to whichever discovery Huygens announced. Wallis’s anagram was a practical joke, and he thought Huygens should know the truth before he acknowledged the English astronomers’ fake discovery in print.
(image of the cipher from Huygens’ Systema Saturnium, 1659.)
It’s not entirely clear why Wallis and his friends deceived Huygens, but it seems that in part they wanted to convince him that the cipher system was insufficient to protect his priority. In general, though, Wallis rarely missed an opportunity to promote English natural philosophy and mathematics, and he may have seen this as a chance to humiliate a foreign rival. In the end, though, Wallis’s trick had little affect on either Huygens’ behaviour or his reputation. He continued to prefer ciphers as a means to record his achievements, and after he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1663 he sometimes sent ciphers to the Society’s secretary, Henry Oldenburg. And although Wallis had embarrassed him in the matter of Saturn’s moon, Huygens still earned great prestige for solving the puzzle of Saturn’s changing shape. In addition, Huygens continues to be recognized for his accomplishments in physics and optics, his name having been associated for centuries with the wave theory of light. If anything, the Titan affair made Huygens wary of Wallis himself, although he appears to have regarded the Oxford professor’s trickery with an air of amusement. He wrote to a French colleague after Wallis had revealed the truth, “indeed [he] has a quick mind and it is enjoyable to see how he tries at all costs to maintain the honour of his nation.”
For historians of science, though, Wallis’s trick should not be remembered as merely amusing. His pseudo-cipher reveals much about the shaky ground on which credit and priority were founded in seventeenth-century mathematics and natural philosophy. This episode suggests that one reason for the profusion of priority disputes in the seventeenth century is the lack of a secure means to establish one’s findings in public. It could take months or years to publish scientific texts, which were complicated and expensive to print. Furthermore, Wallis’s trick was believable in the first place because certain areas of study were particularly crowded. Huygens had a sense that if he did not make and announce discoveries in a timely manner then someone else would beat him to it, and he may well have been right. These problem were compounded by the fact that no one agreed about what constituted a discovery. Did Huygens deserve credit for recognizing Saturn’s moon, or did Neale and Wren deserve credit for observing the satellite but thinking it was a star? In cases like these there was plenty of latitude for different commentators to give credit to whomever they preferred. Between Huygens and Wallis, the former was more skilled in matters of astronomy, but the latter was more skilled in appreciating the sociology of his intellectual community and taking advantage of its ambiguities.
Sources
Philip Beeley and Christoph Scriba, eds., The Correspondence of John Wallis vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, “The First Human Blood Transfusion: Priority Disputes,” Medical History 24 (1980): 461-465
Rob Iliffe, “ʻIn the Warehouseʼ: Privacy, Property and Priority in the Early Royal Society,” History of Science 30 (1992): 29-68.
W. T. Lynn, “The Discovery of Titan,” The Observatory 148 (1889): 181-182.
E. W. Maunder, “The Discovery of Titan,” The Observatory 147 (1889): 147-150.
Paolo Palmieri, “Galileo and the Discovery of the Phases of Venus,” Journal for the History of Astronomy 32 (2001): 109-129.
Albert van Helden, “ʻAnnulo Cingiturʼ: The Solution to the Problem of Saturn,” Journal for the History of Astronomy 5 (1974): 155-174;
Albert van Helden, “Saturn and His Anses,” Journal for the History of Astronomy 5 (1974): 105-121.
Richard S. Westfall, “Science and Patronage; Galileo and the Telescope,” Isis 76 (1985): 11-30.
Reflections on Teaching the History of Science and Religion: Part 1
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This winter I've had my first chance to teach a university course, and it happens to be precisely the kind that I've always wanted to teach: a third-year course on the history of science and religion. The historical relationship between science and religion is not only the subject of my own research, but also the main reason I became interested in the history of science in the first place. Now, in the fourth year of my PhD program, I've got a different perspective on the subject than I had as an undergrad. A few years of graduate research makes you appreciate that your field of study is vastly more complicated than you once thought. My brief experience in teaching, though, has changed my perspective as well. It's a whole new challenge to weave together the strands of such a complex subject into a comprehensible narrative for an undergrad class, especially one made up partly of students who want to study history or philosophy and partly of students who just picked it up as an interesting elective. To do so is rather daunting on a weekly basis when I try to craft a narrative about, say, medieval science or Galileo. It's an order of magnitude more daunting when I think about how to leave the students with something they'll remember from the course as a whole, to tell a story about the history of science and religion that they might find useful and interesting in their lives. Maybe it's naïve, but I think (and hope) that most university students will walk away from a course with a lasting impression of a subject matter, rather than simply dumping the entire contents of the part of their brain where they stored trivia about Charles Darwin. At least, that's what should happen if the course is taught effectively.
As an extremely junior academic, I'm just starting to grasp what it means to teach a course effectively. What follows are my initial impressions based on teaching only half a course. I thought it might be interesting to preserve my thoughts on the subject at a time when I still find teaching a new and exciting challenge, and not just a routine part of my job. In a short time a have learned a few important things about the difference between academic research and writing on one hand, and teaching on the other, even if they deal with the same material.
A class about science and religion faces a particular challenge. You can't start to explain what's true about the relationship between science and religion until you address what's not true about it, and that takes time. Historians generally have no qualms about exploding myths about their subject; it can be one of the most enjoyable parts of the job. The myths about science and religion, however, are so entrenched, so familiar, that they need to be challenged anew whenever scholars in the field present their work to the public. When scholars address an audience of experts -- in an academic journal or at a conference, for instance -- they can assume that their readers share many of their sensibilities. An undergrad class is an entirely different matter, in part because all students bring their own feelings about science and religion with them to class, and in part because popular accounts of the subject resemble the state of the field in the 1960s more than than the state of the field today.
Three positions about the relationship between science and religion have flourished in the last hundred and fifty years, and each of them appeals to historical examples for support. I've posted before about how certain prominent members of the scientific community -- including Neil deGrasse Tyson, Richard Dawkins and Lawrence Krauss - present the science-religion relationship in a way that's misleading, outdated, and ultimately uninformative. These three are some of the most vocal proponents of what scholars of science and religion call the conflict thesis. This is the view there's an inherent and irreconcilable state of conflict between science and religion (or reason and faith, or fact and superstition, or evolution and creationism -- however it's convenient to hypostatize them for rhetorical purposes). The conflict thesis finds support in such historical examples as the execution of the quasi-Copernican Giordano Bruno, the trial of Galileo, and the famous debate between T. H. Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce about Darwin's theory of evolution. Proponents of the conflict thesis not only cherry-pick their examples, but also interpret them in problematic ways. In the first place, most of the people who have studied nature throughout history did not perceive an irreconcilable conflict between those studies and their religious beliefs. And the standard examples of conflict turn out to be much more complicated than "science vs. religion" on closer inspection. The conflict thesis ignores, for instance, the fact that Galileo had numerous supporters in the Catholic Church as well as detractors, that Giordano Bruno was executed as a heretic but not for his adoption of the Copernican theory, and that the Huxley-Wilbeforce debate was not the decisive victory for Darwinism that Huxley later remembered. In fact, the Dawkins-style conflict thesis is such a gross oversimplification of the historical record that historians have pretty much rejected it wholesale.
The counterpart to the conflict thesis gets somewhat less attention in popular culture but nevertheless has many adherents. According to the harmony thesis, science and religion are inherently complementary when properly understood. Conflicts like the Galileo affair or the Darwinian controversy, then, are just misunderstandings between people who don't know how to relate science and religion properly. It might seem that the harmony thesis balances out the biases built into the conflict thesis, but this view is just as simplistic and problematic. Usually writers insist on harmony between science and religion when they want to suggest that their own religion best accommodates scientific evidence. The harmony thesis also struggles to account for a great deal of historical evidence; in many cases a historical actor's beliefs about nature cannot be easily reconciled with her views about God. And the harmony thesis neglects the fact that many of the most religious students of nature in history had highly unorthodox views on theology. It's important to point out that Isaac Newton studied theology, biblical prophecies and Church history as actively as he studied mathematics and physics. But it's just as important to remember that Newton adopted a theology that was heretical and illegal in early modern England. Newton rejected the concept of the Holy Trinity and denied the existence of the devil, evil spirits, and immortal souls. It was this heretical theology that Newton brought together with his views of nature. Anyone who subscribes to a different theology will have a hard time representing Newton accurately when they argue about an inherent harmony between science and religion.
I began the first lecture in my class by articulating these two historiographical theses and identifying their problems. Then I introduced the most influential response to these simplistic narratives that a historian has produced: the complexity thesis presented by John Hedley Brooke in his 1991 monograph, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives. Brooke argues that the historical relationship between science and religion is so complex that it defies any sort of large-scale generalization like the conflict thesis and the harmony thesis. Brooke's Science and Religion is one of the most important books in the historiography of science and it has set the tone for a generation of scholars in the field of science and religion. But it's strange that a class about science and religion has to begin by addressing two deeply flawed historiographical theses, and offering as an alternative a third thesis which is essentially just a denial of the other two. Even though the field has reached a consensus that the conflict and harmony theses, at least in their traditional forms, are untenable, I still spent most of my introductory lecture describing them, and I've felt compelled to point out over and over throughout the course how the cases we've discussed challenge the two 'master-narratives' of science and religion. In my case, and I think in the cases of many other scholars teaching the history of science and religion, the teaching agenda is still dictated by the competing theses about conflict and harmony.
What I've found interesting is how well the students have understood the problems with the conflict and harmony thesis, and the advantages of the complexity thesis. If undergrads can easily appreciate that these two popular views are so deeply flawed, then one has to wonder why they have remained so popular. Evidently historians' success in moving on from the conflict and harmony theses has not changed the public's understanding of the science-religion relationship. It's important to convey this message to undergrad students, but clearly scholars in the humanities have to do more make the demonstrate the importance of their work to a broader audience. Another way of looking at this, though, is to say that those who question the utility of the humanities should first pay attention to what scholars have actually produced.
While certain aspects of my course have been dictated by popular understandings of science and religion, especially in the first few lectures, I have tried to structure the course so that it follows the literature in the field. Rather than adopting a simple chronological format, then, I've focused on the time periods and subjects that have attracted the most attention from historians in recent years. The vast majority of scholarship in the field discusses the relationship between science and Christianity, particularly in early modern Europe (i.e. in the 16th and 17th centuries). These foci -- or biases, if you will -- in the scholarship are reflected in the content of the course, which has devoted four out of twelve lectures to topics concerning the relationship between early modern science and Christianity. These include religious responses to the Copernican theory; the Galileo affair; the scientific and religious beliefs of the Royal Society of London; and Isaac Newton.
I've tried to follow the literature in developing this course because I think a history class should reflect not only the content of historical research, but also the practice of historical research. Especially in upper-year classes, students should get a sense of what historians do as well as what historians know. Where possible, I've tried to present topics in light of how historians have approached them. In a lecture on the Middle Ages, then, I emphasized that historians have drawn attention to members of the clergy who studied science in order to challenge the popular assumption that the medieval church suppressed the study of nature.
However, following the preoccupations of scholars in the field introduces new concerns. For example, while historians of science and religion can take for granted that their readers are familiar with the contents of Judaeo-Christian Scripture, I've found so far that it's wrong to assume this in the classroom. Early modern natural philosophers developed methodologies for studying nature that were informed by their interpretations of the Book of Genesis. In fact, many of them believed that Adam and Eve had perfect knowledge of Nature in the Garden of Eden but lost that knowledge when they sinned and were expelled from Paradise. For members of the early Royal Society, the goal of natural philosophy was to recover the Adamic knowledge of nature through experimentation. Robert Hooke, for instance, wrote in his popular book of microscopic observations, the Micrographia, that instruments like the microscope could contribute to the recovery of this lost knowledge.
(one of the famous images from Hooke's microscopic observations in the Micrographia. Image source)
Some natural philosophers also tried to emulate the wise King Solomon whom they assumed knew all about natural philosophy, since he know about everything. Such facts, however, are only interesting to learn if you have a good sense the events of Genesis and of how Solomon is described in the Bible. Many students have had no reason to study the Bible in their lives, and so don't readily understand the relationship between Judaeo-Christian Scripture and the study of nature in early modern Europe. It will take years for me to appreciate what undergrad students tend to know already when they take a course like mine, but my understanding has already improved over the last few weeks.
Teaching a third-year course has been a great challenge, especially because I got the job on short notice and had little time to prepare. It has also been quite enjoyable, and has reminded me about some of the reasons why I decided to pursue a career in academia. Sadly, my position as the instructor for this course has been compromised by the well-publicized strike by grad students at the University of Toronto, which includes me. While I'm sympathetic to the needs of U of T's grad students and understand why we're on strike, I hope to get back in the classroom soon. This could be the only chance I get to teach a course during my degree and, given the current state of the academic job market, it might even turn out to be the only chance I ever get to teach a university course. Assuming I get to teach the rest of the course, I'll add to these initial reflections on teaching the history of science and religion at the end of the semester.
Happy birthday to Thomas Willis
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Happy birthday to Thomas Willis (1621-1675), the English anatomist known for his investigation of the brain. In the centre of the above image we see Willis's most famous discovery, the "circle of Willis", a group of arteries that supply blood to various parts of the brain. Willis described his circle in Cerebri anatome, one of the most thorough accounts of the brain's anatomy published in the seventeenth century.
Willis, who sided with the Royalists during the English Civil War, flourished after the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, when he was made Sedleian Professor of Natural Philosophy at Oxford. He was a founder member of the Royal Society of London, having also been active in the Oxford experimental group that preceded it in the 1650s, and was one of several important Fellows who contributed from Oxford in the Society's early years. During his years at Oxford who taught and worked with figures who have become household names including Christopher Wren, John Looke, and Robert Hooke. Willis moved to London to practice medicine in 1667, and died a famous and respected physician in 1675.
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Willis's detailed observations might make him seem quite modern, but -- like almost all writers on medicine and anatomy in the seventeenth century -- his works contain certain unmistakable hallmarks of the early modern period. What's particularly intriguing about Willis is the key role played by 'spirits' and 'souls' in the anatomical systems he describes. Seventeenth-century references to spirits and souls are not easy for the historian to interpret. These words had a range of meanings associated with numerous philosophical traditions, and they could refer either to immaterial substances or material, microscopic ones. Just about any unseen agent could be called a 'spirit.' For Willis, while humans alone had an immaterial, rational soul, humans and animals alike had a sensitive soul. This was the locus of the animal spirits responsible for everything from muscle movements, to sensory perceptions, to emotions. Willis argued in De anima brutorum (1672) that animals indeed have sensitive souls, contesting the view of Descartes and his followers that animals are automata incapable of sensation. On the contrary, Willis maintained, animals see and feel what's happening around them -- including the vivisections and other experiments on animal subjects conducted throughout Europe in the seventeenth century.
As M.J. Eadie discusses in her article on Willis (cited below), animal spirits were vague and versatile enough to explain an enormous range of phenomena. When spirits explode, they cause muscles to move; when they're diverted to a part of the brain where they don't belong, they cause a headache; when they're damaged or inhibited, a person might become apoplectic or fall into a coma. These examples might seem to suggest that Willis simply applied the name 'spirit' to any chemical processes he studied but, as Eadie notes, Willis often assigns qualities or emotions to the spirits as if they're living beings: various conditions are caused by the spirits becoming weary, drowsy, or agitated. In fact, Willis's animal spirits are not even confined to their host's body: when attracted by an external stimulus, the spirits leave the body and produce various psychological conditions. When we seek food, when we experience emotions, when we feel love or sexual attraction, our animal spirits are interacting with objects in the world.
The activity of animal spirits in Willis's anatomy left traces in the works of his students, including the Cornish physician Richard Lower (1631-1691). Lower did not focus on the brain like his teacher, but on the blood: he performed the first known blood transfusion, from one dog to another, and proceeded to investigate the medical applications of this technique. For Lower, the spirits in an animal's blood could have therapeutic properties if transferred into a human patient: the lively spirits in a dog's blood could revive a sickly patient, while the calm spirits in a sheep's blood could sedate a madman. The results of these transfusion experiments were disastrous: a theory of blood types was still centuries away, and the indiscriminate transfusion of blood from one living being to another invariably led to the death of one or both of the participants. But the ugly consequences of these experiments did not change the assumption behind them: animal spirits were a powerful force in anatomy and medicine, and in principle they could be harnessed to generate vast knowledge and efficacious cures.
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Willis and Lower are members of a generation of English anatomists expanding on the work of William Harvey, who (according to some contemporaries and historians) first described the circulation of blood. Working with Lower in the 1650s, Willis suggested that the level of 'fermentation' (read: motion or agitation) in the blood varies throughout the circulatory system, and this accounts for the different colours of blood in the arteries and veins. But Harvey was not Willis's only influence: Willis also paid close attention to the Paracelsians and their iatrochemistry -- that is to say, their theory of medicine based on chemical processes within the body. Thus when animal spirits exploded to cause muscle movements, it was the nitre and sulphur within them that made them explode, just as these substances do in gunpowder. Willis's animal spirits may have some agency of their own but they're still affected by chemical processes observed throughout the natural world.
Willis must have appreciated the value of being able to draw on multiple traditions in medicine, anatomy and naturally philosophy, since his career involved him in some bizarre episodes that were difficult to explain. The most shocking case is surely the 'resurrection' of Anne Greene, described in Lindsey Fitzharris's post at The Chirurgeon's Apprentice. Willis was one of the physicians who came to dissect the body of Greene, who had been convicted of murder and executed by hanging. The only problem was that, when Willis and his colleagues arrived, they found that the corpse was breathing. Rather than dissecting the body, the physicians got to work reviving her. When they succeeded, the event was taken of a sign of Greene's innocence, and her sentence was reversed.
Such is the world of seventeenth-century anatomy and medicine: alongside unprecedented empirical research and seemingly modern accounts of the human body, we have the unseen operation of spirits and even providence as causes. Nearly 400 years after his birth, Thomas Willis reflects the complexity of studying the human body in a period that's at once familiar and alien to historians in the 21st century.
Sources: M.J. Eadie, "A Pathology of the Animal Spirits: the Clinical Neurology of Thomas Willis (1621-1675). Part I: Background, and Disorders of Intrinsically Normal Animal Spirits," Journal of Clinical Neuroscience 10 (2003): 14-29. John H. Felts, "Richard Lower: Anatomist and Physiologist," Annals of Internal Medicine 132 (2000): 420-423. Rina Knoeff, "The Reins of the Soul: The Centrality of the Intercostal Nerves to the Neurology of Thomas Willis and to Samuel Parker's Theology," Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 59 (2004): 413-440. J.M.S. Pearce, "The Circle of Willis (1621-1675)," Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 69 (2000): 86. Setti S. Regnachary et al., "Human Resuscitation in the 17th Century: an Interesting Case Report," Surgical Neurology 71 (2009): 408-410. Simon Schaffer, "Godly Men and Mechanical Philosophers: Souls and Spirits in Restoration Natural Philosophy," Science in Context 1 (1987): R. Shane Tubbs et al., "Richard Lower (1631-1691) and His Early Contributions to Cardiology," International Journal of Cardiology 128 (2008): 17-21.
It's a Great Big Beautiful Tomorrow: The Vision of Science and Progress at Walt Disney World
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What accounts for the massive popularity of Walt Disney World? The theme park complex in southern Florida does a staggering amount of business. In 2013, 18.6 million guests passed through the gates of the Magic Kingdom, the original Disney World park which opened in 1971 and the most visited theme park in the world. There are countless other entertainment options in the Orlando area, and there are theme parks across the United States and the world, but none of them draws tourists like Disney does. And ticket sales aren't Disney's only source of barely-conceivable revenue. The Walt Disney Company can merchandize anything; the parks represent the epitome of consumerism. Not only can shoppers at the parks' hundreds of stores find every imaginable form of the likeness of Mickey and Minnie Mouse, they can also find clothing items, housewares, and even some works of art that cost as much as a new luxury car.
Something about Disney World makes people want to come and spend their time and money again and again. The appeal is not easy to articulate. One aspect is that Disney's 'imagineers' have managed to distill fun into its purest form and inject it into dozens of experiences. Disney World is a place that allows you to turn off the analytical part of your brain and just enjoy yourself by taking in the visible, aural, and alimentary stimuli. And visitors who work in the humanities might find that they need to turn off the analytical parts of their brains to enjoy the parks. Disney's blatant reinforcement of traditional gender roles, for example, is grating: this is a place where boys are encouraged to be pirates and girls are encouraged to be princesses. There's no question that Disney has remarkable power to reinforce certain values, and to present them as those of the American people. This is precisely what makes Disney World a fascinating academic subject: Walt Disney himself helped to articulate the 20th-century notion of the "American Dream", and his successors at Disney World have continued to promote a particular vision for America's future.
Since Disney opened its first park -- Disneyland in California, in 1955 -- they've expressed an interesting and complicated perspective on science, technology and nature. These were subjects close to Walt Disney's heart, and he had the means and imagination to present his vision like almost no one else in history has done. Walt died before the launch of Disney World in 1971, but he was active in designing it. This much larger park close to Orlando had room convey Disney's scientific aspirations in much more detail: the property spans more the 27 000 acres, encompassing several theme parks and dozens of hotels. Indeed, the Disney World complex itself is a technological marvel, beginning with the transportation infrastructure. Disney has laid out a network of roads on its property and established efficient bus system; they've built artificial lakes with regular boat service; and their iconic monorail runs right through one of the hotels, which is as impressive now as when Disney World opened in 1971.
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Less well-known is the tunnel system running underneath the Magic Kingdom that allows costumed 'cast members' to avoid the crowds and appear anywhere around the park -- a feat of engineering that undergirds the Disney World's sense of magic. Perhaps the most dazzling aspect of Disney World, though, is nearly seamless coordination between the dozens of entertainment venues, restaurants and hotels, all of which depend on novel technologies to facilitate the fun and spending. The latest gadget is the MagicBand, a rubber bracelet with a chip inside that you simply touch against an electronic pad to gain access to parks, schedule wait-free access to attractions, open the door to your hotel room, and -- of course -- make purchases. The Disney experience creates the sense that everything is taken care of, that 'Mickey' is looking out for you. While children marvel at the vibrant scenes and fireworks, adults are sure to marvel at the efficiency of the Disney machine.
The technological achievements of Disney World dovetail rather nicely with the theme of 'progress' which is emphasized in many of their attractions. In the Disney worldview, progress entails control over nature. This is evident in the transformation of nature required to build the park in the first place -- only Walt could have had the vision to transform a sprawling Floridian swampland into a theme park complex -- as well as various attractions depicting Walt's vision for the human experience of the not-too-distant future. As sci-fi scholar J. P. Telotte puts it, Disney presents its parks "not simply as places to vacation, but also as wonders to appreciate as triumphs over the disorder and unpredictability of life outside of its theme parks." (Telotte, "Animating Space: Disney, Science, and Empowerment," Science Fiction Studies 35 [2008], 48.) The first site for Walt's futuristic aspirations was Tomorrowland, one of the original themed areas in both Disneyland and Disney World. Guests can take a tour of Tomorrowland on the PeopleMover, an above-ground electric train that runs right through the area's roller coasters and gift shops, and also passes by a detailed model depicting Walt's plan for "Progress City", the ultra-connected, ultra-efficient city that Walt envisioned for the twenty-first century.
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As BC Moore discusses in this blog post, Progress City was the inspiration for Epcot (which stands for "Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow"), the second park at Disney World which opened in 1982. Here the Disney Company can articulate their scientific vision on a grander scale. One half of Epcot, designated "Future World", features interactive exhibitions of novel technologies and attractions that take guests on simulated trips to into space, back through time, and across the United States. In nearly every case, the attractions in Future World are not merely thematically scientific and futuristic, but technologically so as well. For instance "Mission: Space", a high-speed ride sponsored by NASA, assigns each rider a role on a voyage to Mars -- navigator, pilot, commander, or engineer -- a simulates a dramatic blast off by enclosing them in a small room and spinning them around rapidly to create a powerful centrifugal force. Each 'crew member' has to press buttons to contribute to the mission, which is a genuine struggle while the intense motion is forcing your arms to your sides. It's only after reflecting on the ride afterward, though, that you realize you've been spinning: a screen directly in front of you depicts the upward motion of a launching rocket while you feel the pressure from the centrifugal motion, creating a convincing illusion of rapid acceleration away from the Earth -- which abruptly cuts off as you escape orbit and the thrusters turn off. The creative combination of motion, sounds and lights is fantastically immersive. On this attraction and many others, Disney World allows its guests to feel like they're participating in America's pursuit of progress.
The theme of progress, though, represents only one aspect of Disney's presentation of science and nature. Especially since the opening of Epcot, Disney World's scientific vision has been characterized by a balance -- or is it a tension? -- between the ideals of progress and conservationism. The conservation theme complicates Disney's illusion of control over nature: Disney may have the power to manipulate nature and create 'magical' immersive experiences, but they have also assigned themselves (and humanity in general) the role of nature's protector. In particular, Epcot emphasizes humanity's environmental responsibility in a building called "The Land", which features a didactic movie in which characters from the Lion King caution young viewers about their impact on the natural world. The Land also includes a boat tour of Disney's huge greenhouse, where they grow vegetables that supply many Disney restaurants. While the tour showcases new agricultural technologies that, we are told, will improve the efficiency of food production, the environmentalist message at The Land has gotten a little out of date. The voiceover on the boat ride emphasizes the promising role that "aquaculture" will play to combat food shortages in the future, as guests pass by tanks full of salmon, trout and tilapia -- but they gloss over the controversy in environmental circles about fish farming, which some critics consider to be decidedly unsustainable.
The theme of conservationism is especially prominent at Disney's Animal Kingdom, a Disney World park which opened in 1998, as well as the vaguely African-themed hotel called the Animal Kingdom Lodge. At these sites Disney has transformed large parcels of its enormous property into habitats for animals around the world. The Animal Kingdom is particularly attentive to charismatic African animal species: visitors can observe giraffes, gorillas, elephants, and so on in meticulously reconstructed environments. At the park and the hotel, staff members answer questions about the animal species and urge guests to support conservation efforts around the world.
Disney indeed employs hundreds of researchers and experts who seem committed to protecting the environment, but there are also signs that these efforts have more to do with Disney's image than with a real commitment to conservation. I've noted already that they oversimplify the impact of agricultural practices like fish farming. More troubling is the massive carbon footprint of Disney World's day-to-day operations. According to their website, the property includes 25 hotels, each of which serves thousands of diners daily at multiple restaurants, as do the parks themselves. The amount of power required to keep this system working must be staggering. Certain particular instances suggest that Disney values spectacular entertainment more than environmental responsibility. Each day concludes with several massive fireworks shows across the property -- which, some research suggests, puts a major strain on local wildlife. This is difficult to square with the promise in Disney's Environmental Policy "to minimize waste and to inspire public consciousness in support of environmental sustainability."
Nevertheless, Disney works hard to demonstrate a love of nature, and they suggest that this is an important part of Walt's legacy. An attraction called Walt Disney: One Man's dream, which is essentially a museum exhibit documenting Walt's life and work, draws attention to the series of nature documentaries that Disney produced between 1948 and 1960, entitled "True-Life Adventures". These films inject whimsy into natural history, much like the films released under the label Disneynature since 2007. Both series of films include an entry on bears (released in 1953 and 2014, respectively):
(both images from Wikipedia)
Walt's concern to teach children about nature in an entertaining way is evident in both the attractions that feature animatronic animals, such as the Country Bear Jamboree, and the various spaces devoted to endangered animals species.
(One such space is a tank that houses injured manatees at Epcot. Image source)
But Walt Disney's engagement with science and nature was not limited to his affection for animals, and nor is this the only way that the science and nature are presented at Disney World. Walt's efforts to promote space travel, which is described in an article by Mike Wright, are mirrored by the attractions which cultivate a fascination with space travel. In addition to Mission: Space, guests can take a simulated trip to the cosmos on Space Mountain, the roller coaster in Tomorrowland, which opened in 1975.
It seems that what captivated Walt most of all, though, was the notion of progress. He expressed this most clearly in the Carousel of Progress, an animatronic stage show which debuted at the 1964 World Fair in New York. Since then the show has run more or less continuously, having been moved to Disneyland and later to Disney World, where it has been a fixture of Tomorrowland since 1975. One of the most striking features of this attraction is the positive role played by consumerism in the pursuit of progress. The Carousel allows viewers to peek into the home of an American family at three different point in the 20th century, and one point in the near future. Each version of family celebrates the wonders of modern life as represented by the new products they've purchased: their lives are improved by a new icebox at the turn of the 20th century, by electric lights in the 1920s, by television in the 1940s, and by voice-activated computers in the 21st century. The theatre itself participates in the celebration of technology. As viewers advance from one period to another, the seats rotate to face another section of the circular stage as the American family sings an anthem of technological progress:
There’s a great, big, beautiful tomorrow Shining at the end of every day There’s a great, big, beautiful tomorrow And tomorrow’s just a dream away
Man has a dream and that’s the start He follows his dream with mind and heart And when it becomes a reality It’s a dream come true for you and me
So there’s a great, big, beautiful tomorrow Shining at the end of every day There’s a great, big, beautiful tomorrow Just a dream away
(transcribed at The Disney Blog)
(Walt Disney enjoying the Carousel of Progress. Image source)
In Disney's vision, it's new technologies and products which will usher in this great big beautiful tomorrow. The implicit message of Disney World seems to be that Disney contributes to progress by showcasing marvelous new technologies, comparable to those celebrated in the Carousel of Progress. Since Disney World opened it has used animatronic and optical achievements to cultivate a sense of wonder on its rides and attractions. The Haunted Mansion, which opened at Disneyland in 1969 and at Disney World in 1971, uses lighting effects to create ghosts which seem to move through furniture and even sit beside the riders -- effects which remain technically impressive in the 21st century. More recently Disney has introduced interactive shows in which popular CGI characters from Monsters Inc. and Finding Nemo respond to input from the audience as if they're really in the room. Attractions like these hint at the creative uses of technology that might be realized in the near future. Artificial intelligence, for instance, seems like an achievable goal.
Hanging over all of these technological marvels, though, is the influence of major corporations (and not just the Walt Disney Company itself which brings in billions of dollars in revenue each year). The "Test Track" attraction at Epcot gives guests a chance to design a prototype car and ride it through a series of tests that measure its speed, power, efficiency, and so on. The whole experience is sponsored by Chevrolet, whose logo is plastered on the walls -- and the ride exits into a room filled with Chevrolet's actual prototypes. One gets the sense that Chevrolet is overseeing progress in the automotive industry. Likewise "Spaceship Earth", the ride through the iconic Epcot globe which guides visitors through major achievements in human history, is sponsored by the German technology giant Siemens. Ellen's Energy Adventure, in which Ellen DeGeneres and Bill Nye teach visitors about the history of the universe since the Big Bang, was sponsored by ExxonMobil until 2004. There are industrial fingerprints all over Disney's presentation of science, technology and progress.
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For historians of science, I think it's helpful to view Disney World's attractions as artifacts that reflect particular American attitudes toward science since the mid-20th century. Indeed, the Disney Company itself has made this possible by making only minor changes to some of these experiences over the decades. Now attractions like the Carousel of Progress and Space Mountain are elements in the nostalgic feeling which pervades the Disney World parks. Alongside areas of the Magic Kingdom that celebrate colonial New England, the Midwest of Tom Sawyer, the Western frontier, and the Caribbean Sea in the time of pirates, we have the charmingly out-of-date vision of the future presented by Walt Disney. Disney's vision of the past, present, and future is subjective, flawed, and heavily influenced by corporate and political pressure, and their depiction of science is no exception. But this can give us in the humanities much to analyze and discuss. Few people have had the means and the imagination to articulate a view of the world to the degree that Walt Disney and his successors have done, and I suspect that this is a major factor in the enormous success of the Disney Parks. We would do well to take advantage of the academic opportunity that this provides.
Note: I haven't cited many sources here because this post is based largely on my own experience. If you couldn't tell, I've visited Disney World many times and -- despite its flaws -- it has left me with fond memories.
(image from Oakley and Weiner, "Piltdown Man," cited in full below)
On this date in 1953, one of the greatest hoaxes in the history of science was revealed: the famous 'Piltdown man', a skull believed to be the remains a pre-human hominid, was announced to be fake. The bones, as the London Times announced, didn't even come from a single species: someone had cobbled together the bones of a human and an ape!
The announcement came four decades after the apparent discovery of proto-human remains in Sussex, sparking the excitement of England's scientific community. Credit for the discovery of 'Piltdown man' was given to Charles Dawson, an amateur palaeontologist who had been collecting fossils since he was a teenager in the 1880s. In 1912, Dawson wrote to the British Museum to say he had found various fossils in Piltdown, Sussex, including what looked like part of a human skull. This appeared to be the first such fossil ever found in Britain from the Pleistocene era. (The term "Pleistocene" was introduced by the famous geologist Charles Lyell in 1839. It refers to the period which saw the rise and fall of numerous ice ages, leaving behind a high concentration of fossils. Geologists now consider the Pleistocene to have spanned from about 2.5 million years ago to 11 700 years ago.)
Dawson claimed that construction workers had stumbled onto the fossils accidentally while digging up gravel to make a path. Upon investigating the site, Dawson identified a cache of Pleistocene fossils, some human and some animal. The fossils were enough to convince Arthur Smith Woodward of the British Museum to join Dawson in digging up the rest of the remains buried at the site, a project they carried on for four years until Dawson's death in 1916. Early on, Woodward and Dawson unearthed a fragment of a lower jaw which seemed to confirm what palaeontologists expected from proto-human Pleistocene fossils: its cranium looked essentially human, but its protruding jaws more closely resembled the ancestors of Homo sapiens. Dawson's friend, the Jesuit palaeontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin also joined some of their digs, and found a canine tooth that fit perfectly with the other bones. All the while, though, various anomalies crept up the Piltdown story, including the discovery of a blade fashioned from an elephant bone -- an instrument unlike anything that palaeontologists had previously found. Nevertheless, 'Piltdown man' became a source of pride for the British Museum and for English scientists in general. The anomalies became more alarming over the subsequent decades, as the theories of palaeontologists changed. By the 1940s it was clear that Piltdown man's features were quite the opposite of what one would expect based on other human fossils: it should have had a jaw resembling a human and a cranium resembling an ape, but in this case it was the other way around. In 1949, Piltdown man was subjected to a new chemical tests for dating fossils. J. S. Weiner of Oxford University led a team that used fluorine dating on the famous bones skull and jaw bones, and the results were shocking. Whereas the gravel from the Piltdown site contained a significant amount of fluorine, the jaw and the skull from Piltdown man contained barely any, meaning they were much younger fossils -- perhaps only 50 000 years old rather than around 500 000 as the team had suspected before the test. Additional tests showed that the Piltdown man was younger still, far too young to be an ancestor of Homo sapiens. In fact, such a protruding jaw from this period could not have come from human remains: it must have been taken from an ape. Furthermore, X-ray images suggested that whoever forged the discovery had filed down the teeth found at the Piltdown site so that they would appear to have the kind of wear characteristic of human teeth. All this evidence confirmed what many critics had come to suspect: Piltdown man was a fake. What Dawson and Woodward had presented as bones from the same individual were in fact a human skull and an ape jaw. The conclusive findings of Weiner and his associates were made public on 21 November 1953 when the London Times announced their results. What no one could figure out, though, was who had perpetrated the hoax. The most obvious answer might be that Charles Dawson fabricated the discovery, hoping to become famous, but he died before he could be caught. However, some historians have suggest that it was Arthur Keith, a Scottish anthropologist who had fervently argued in the years following the discovery that the bones constituted a human skull. The perpetrator of the Piltdown man hoax remains a vexing question, and it stands alongside another that historians of science have found intriguing: why was the hoax a success for forty years? How did the forger convince a generation of diligent scientists that the fossils were really from a human ancestor? One possible answer is provided by an interesting document dating from the denouement of the Piltdown affair. In 1955, Weiner and Kenneth Oakley, his collaborator from the British Museum, published an article on Piltdown man in the journal American Scientist. The tone of the paper is at once apologetic and defensive. Oakley and Weiner explain that some scientists suspected that Piltdown man was a fake all along. Nevertheless, it was perfectly reasonable for Woodward to defend the discovery:
. . . we must agree about the logic of his conclusion based on the evidence available to [Woodward]. His belief that a new fossil ancestor of man had indeed been found was bold and courageous and at the time scientifically justifiable." (573)
According to Oakley and Weiner it wasn't the whole community that was fooled, and those who were fooled had merely followed the evidence as good scientists do. After all, the bones looked very similar to each other and were found in the same place. And, again, the Piltdown fossils confirmed what palaeontologists of the time expected to find in fossils from the Pleistocene era. I find the two aspects of Oakley and Weiner's argument difficult to reconcile: the evidence wasn't very strong, so not everyone believed it, but those who did were justified in believing it. Over sixty years later, what are we to make of this embarrassing episode? Piltdown man remains a mystery. Sources: G. Ainsworth Harrison, "J. S. Weiner and the Exposure of the Piltdown Forgery," Antiquity 57 (1983): 46-48.
Tim Murray, "Essay Review: The Piltdown Man?" British Journal for the History of Science 27 (1994): 103-104. Kenneth P. Oakley and J. S. Weiner, "Piltdown Man," American Scientist 43 (1955): 573-583.
"Piltdown Man Forgery," London Times (21 November 1953).
Keith Thomson, "Forgeries and Fakes" in Fossils: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 123-135.
"Unbelieving Chemists": Science, Religion and Politics in A Tale of Two Cities
(above: Sydney Carton at the guillotine, by Frederick Barnard. Source)
At its core, Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities is a story of profound injustice, and how a handful of virtuous men and women fight back against it. Dickens' Tale begins nearly a decade before the outbreak of the French Revolution and continues through the Reign of Terror, the bloodiest period of the Revolution which saw over 16 000 people executed by guillotine. It's clear from the tone of Dickens' text that he was horrified by what he learned from his research into these deadly months in 1793 and 1794, around 65 years before he published the A Tale of Two Cities. The constant violence, corruption and misguided laws which characterizes the revolutionary period in Dickens' description nearly lead the heroes of the story to their deaths. Charles Darnay, who abandoned his noble French roots and emigrated to England, returns to France to save a former servant, quickly finds himself in a prison cell in Paris, almost certainly doomed to execution. His wife Lucie and her father Dr. Manette follow him to Paris and search for a way to free him, only to become the targets of a plot by zealous revolutionaries determined to wipe out anyone associated with Darnay's noble family, the Évrémondes. While the reader becomes deeply invested in the fate of these protagonists, Dickens also conveys how typical their experience is in the context of the Reign of Terror: there are thousands more victims of the brutality and injustice of the revolutionary regime.
On the other hand, Dickens seems to understand well the motivation behind the Revolution. He suggests that the people of France were compelled to lash out after decades of exploitation by the callous nobility, who built their fortunes on the labour of expendable peasants. This class is represented by Darnay's uncle whom we see run down a peasant boy in his carriage, then chastise the grieving parents for allowing the child to get in his way. The injustice of the ancien régime is matched by to the injustice of the Reign of Terror -- only the latter is in a concentrated form, as the Reign lasted for less than a year. When Darnay is sentenced to death by guillotine, the narrator laments:
Before that unjust Tribunal, there was little or no order of procedure, ensuring to any accused person any reasonable hearing. There could have been no such Revolution, if all laws, forms, and ceremonies, had not first been so monstrously abused, that the suicidal vengeance of the Revolution was to scatter them all to the winds. (p. 328)
In Dickens' interpretation of the Revolution, both the nobility and the revolutionaries are guilty of a failure to respect the value of human life. And both parties reach this point because they take their values to the point of excess. The nobility did so with their belief in their superiority over the third estate, and now the revolutionaries have done so with their fierce defense of the Republic: anyone who shows the slightest inclination of placing his or her own needs in front of those of the Republic is sent to the guillotine.
One of Dickens' great strengths is his ability to make readers feel like they're a part of the worlds he describes. In A Tale of Two Cities he does so in part by providing details about the heterogeneous mixture of citizens who compose Parisian society on the eve of the Revolution. Dickens lists the sorts of people who latched on to the nobility during the ancien régime hoping to climb the social ladder, and two inclusions in particular seem worth investigating:
Unbelieving Philosophers who were remodelling the world with words, and making card-towers of Babel to scale the skies with, talked with Unbelieving Chemists who had an eye on the transmutation of metals . . . (pp. 110-111)
What do chemists have to do with overconfident philosophers, and what makes them unbelievers? In some cases, Dickens' generation used the word "chemist" where we would use the word "pharmacist". But in the Victorian period the word "chemist" increasingly came to refer to those men of science who performed experiments on such substances as gases and metals. This seems to be the meaning that Dickens has in mind in his account of ancien régime France. His reference to the transmutation of metals recalls the alchemical tradition from which modern chemistry developed. Apparently, then, the unbelieving chemists are not simply pharmacists.
But what connection did Dickens identify between chemistry -- or philosophy, for that matter -- and unbelief? It's difficult to say how broadly Dickens defined unbelief, but if he was hinting at dangerous ideas and activities in broad terms then his view may have been informed by certain examples from the time of the Revolution. I recently attended a superb colloquium by Jan Golinski on the chemist, philosopher and poet Humphry Davy (1778-1829). Davy, as Golinski argues, was a public figure who developed several different personae. In different contexts, the public might view him as a philosopher, or a genius, or as an "enthusiast" -- that is, someone who takes their beliefs or behaviours to a dangerous extreme. The "enthusiast" persona reflects wariness about Davy's famous experiments with nitrous oxide which, when inhaled, produced in his experimental subjects a giddy euphoria so novel that they struggled to find words to describe it. Yet, even if he was seen as an enthusiast, Davy had no particular association with religious heterodoxy. He is presumably not quite the sort of figure that Dickens had in mind.
To clarify what Dickens means by "unbelieving chemists", it's helpful to turn to other moments in A Tale of Two Cities when Dickens introduces both scientific and religious in the same breath. During the part of the story set in London, Dickens describes the shady activities of Jerry Cruncher who works as an odd-jobs man for the protagonists' friend, Mr. Lorry. Jerry, we learn, supplements his income by robbing graves, but he seeks to keep this shameful fact from his family. When his curious son asks him what is meant by the colloquialism "Resurrection-Man", Jerry tries to deflect the question by replying that a Resurrection-Man is someone who deals in "Scientific goods." (p. 170) Here the reader is meant to chuckle at the uneducated Jerry's rather liberal use of the word "Scientific", but nevertheless Dickens uses this episode to create a dual association with scientific activities in the late eighteenth century: a purveyor of "Scientific goods" might take part in the shameful and illegal activity of grave-robbing, but he also might take part in some sort of resurrection.
When events shift to Paris toward the end of the novel, Dickens echoes this dual association of scientific goods with the shameful and the spiritual. With Charles Darnay imprisoned and destined for the guillotine, his friend and lookalike Sydney Carton arrives in Paris and visits a chemist; Dickens doesn't specify whether he's the unbelieving kind. Carton buys a certain volatile chemical (identified in the footnotes of the Penguin edition only as "some sort of ether"), assuring the chemist that he intends to use it only on himself. What's curious about this episode is that it's bookended by Carton's experience of what Dickens depicts as the two major problems with Paris during the Revolution. On his way to the chemist he encounters a citizen totally desensitized to the violence of the guillotine, who hopes that it will reach a hundred victims by the end of the day. After the chemist, Carton visits a part of the city populated with churches where, these days, "no prayers were said". With the revolutionaries having rejected the Christian religion, Carton finds himself the only one willing to pray, as he repeats to himself Jesus' words in John's Gospel (11:25):
I am the resurrection and the life, saith the Lord: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die. (p. 326)
Like the other protagonists in the Tale, Carton stands out as a man who resists the currents of violence and godlessness in revolutionary Paris. The revolutionaries, in contrast, only worship "Sainte Guillotine". (p. 387) They have taken the place of the violent and sinful nobility who used to oppress them.
By the end of the Tale, Sydney Carton becomes a fairly obvious Christ figure. He sacrifices himself by switching places with Charles Darnay in prison and being executed by the guillotine in his place. As he and dozens of other prisoners are carried by cart to the guillotine, Carton comforts a condemned seamstress who says to him just before her death, "I think you were sent to me by Heaven." In his last moments, Carton repeats his favourite passage from John's Gospel, and as he echoes Jesus' words he effectively applies them to himself: it's he who has resurrected Darney with his sacrifice. After Carton himself is executed, witnesses describe him in the final moments as "sublime and prophetic." Indeed, Dickens treats us to Carton's prophecy as the story concludes, revealing to us what he would have told his friends if he had seen them before his death: his prophecy includes the downfall of the revolutionaries responsible for condemning Darnay and threatening to kill Lucie and Dr. Manette; it also includes a peaceful and prosperous life for his surviving friends. In short, sacrifice, resurrection and prophecy -- the crucial elements of Jesus' life -- are mirrored in Sydney Carton. (pp. 388-390)
Dickens is not very subtle about this parallel, but one detail that's easy to overlook is that Carton's salvation of Darnay requires the help of the ether he purchases from the chemist. When he comes to take Darnay's place, Carton uses the ether to render Darnay unconscious so he won't object to Carton's sacrifice. The chemist might be an unbeliever, but Carton nevertheless uses his product to effect a sort of resurrection. Science, in the right hands, has the power to save the life of the few virtuous characters in Dickens' story.
Still, we have seen that Dickens associates chemistry or science with dangerous ideas and immoral activities. What is the source of this association? Dickens was no opponent of science. Indeed, he was the founder and editor of a journal called All the Year Round which, in addition to printing novels like A Tale of Two Cities in a serial format, featured considerable scientific content. For instance, the journal featured reviews of Darwin's Origin of Species. Nevertheless, A Tale of Two Cities seems to reflect Dickens' concern about how godless and immoral people might respond to scientific ideas.
Dickens may have had in mind any number of troublesome scientific ideas from his own time or the period of the French Revolution, but what springs to my mind is the example of the chemist, Unitarian preacher and political philosopher Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). Though never formally educated in science, Priestley was a prolific experimenter and is generally credited as a co-discoverer of oxygen, which he isolated in a gaseous form. He determined the role of oxygen, or "dephlogisticated air" as he called it, in photosynthesis, animal respiration, and combustion. Priestley fostered his interests in chemistry in physics as an active participant in the Lunar Society, an informal network centred in Birmingham which joined together such leading figures in eighteenth-century English science as the poet and natural historian Erasmus Darwin, and the steam power pioneer James Watt. Yet, although Priestley may be best known as a member of this milieu, this is only one aspect of his complex identity: his religious and political views are at least as important. Priestley preached as a Dissenter, which meant that he diverged from the philosophy of the Anglican Church and campaigned for religious toleration in England. In part due to his theological commitments and in part due to his political philosophy more generally, Priestley was widely suspect of sympathy for the French Revolution. His enemies perceived his views as so inflammatory that they called him "Gunpowder Priestley" and "Gunpowder Joe", nicknames that reflected the explosiveness of both his politics and the chemicals of his experiments.
(This political cartoon from 1790 links Priestley's ideas to "fanaticism" and radical religious ideas. Source)
Priestley played no active role in the events in Paris, but during the Revolution he became embroiled in civil unrest about 120 miles from the other of Dickens two cities. The Birmingham Riots of 1791 are also known as the Priestley riots, since he became the main target of a mob reacting against his perceived support for the revolutionary cause.
(The Birmingham Riots may have been on Dickens mind since the city continued to be the site of frequent riots throughout the nineteenth century over various political and social issues. See Vivian Bird, The Priestley Riots, 1791, and the Lunar Society [Birmingham: Birmingham and Midland Institute, 1994], 11-15.)
The exact causes of the Priestley Riots remain somewhat unclear, but Bird suggests that the rioters targeted the Lunar Society as a group since they were considered a club of Jacobins, or supporters of the French Revolution. In any case, the riots broke out when Priestley organized a dinner on the second anniversary of the storming of the Bastille which launched the Revolution. Bird argues that the "anti-Jacobin" mob harassed the dinner guests and proceeded to destroy any buildings associated with revolutionary sympathizers -- as well as Unitarians. Evidently, conservatives in England came to associate the cause of Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité with Unitarians and Dissenters, and Priestley was among the their most well-known spokesmen. Thus the rioters proceeded to raze Priestley's house to the ground, including his laboratory and library. Over the next three days, the riot damage estimated to exceed £100 000 pounds of damage in total, which is equivalent to over £5 000 000 today. The rioters only relented when compelled by troops sent by King George III. As for Priestley, he fled Birmingham and ended up in London before leaving England in 1793 for the United States.
If Dickens considered these events when writing the Tale, it's doubtful that he would have approved of the rioters' destructive actions. In an 1869 issue of All the Year Round -- which didn't identify the authors of its articles, but which always had Dickens editorial fingerprints on it -- an article on the history of Birmingham comments on the riots of 1791. The author writes:
Dr. Priestley, Free Thought, the French Revolution, and Unitarianism, were the windmills which the mob attacked with fire and sword, the exciting cause being the simple fact that a number of gentlemen chose to dine together on the fourteenth of July, to commemorate the French Revolution . . . (p. 464)
On the other hand, even if this article reflects Dickens' concern about the needless violence of this event, he may still have been concerned about Priestley's religious views. Dickens took religious matters very seriously, and his commitment to Christianity was well-known; Tolstoy and Dostoevsky called him "the great Christian writer". Emma Mason suggests that the social concerns so evident in his novels are motivated by Dickens' strong religious belief. She also notes that Dickens was not particularly dogmatic, and as a young man he showed some interest in Unitarianism, so he probably wouldn't have been troubled by Priestley's rejection of the Trinity. Yet Priestley was not merely a Unitarian; he was also a materialist. Priestley denied the existence of immaterial substances, including a soul that exists without a body, a philosophical position which critics in England had associated with atheism since the early modern period. Priestley was no atheist, but he certainly fit broader definitions of unbelief.
When we consider the specific objections raised by Priestley's contemporary critics, we can get a sense of why Dickens paired unbelieving chemists with unbelieving philosophers in his retrospective look at the late eighteenth century. Dan Eshet's article on Priestley discusses the close relationship between the chemist's scientific, philosophical and theological views. In his scientific texts Priestley developed an ontology that left no room for immaterial substances. For Priestley, phenomena could be explained entirely through the interaction of particles. He claimed that God had caused matter to act according to certain physical laws, and then no longer needed to intervene in the natural world. This system could even accommodate mental activity. Drawing on John Locke, Priestley argued that ideas are based on experience of the world, and he gave this process a material foundation: the sensory organs come into contact with vibrations generated by objects in the world, and these vibrations are ultimately transmitted through the brain. There is no need in this system for an immaterial soul interacting with the human body. Furthermore, Eshet explains, not only does Priestley's materialism support a theology devoid of immaterial substances, it also supports his liberal political position. According to Priestley's Lockean philosophy, all minds are created equally ignorant, and humanity needs to consider matters from a wide range of viewpoints to overcome this collective ignorance. This makes Dissenters like Priestley an indispensable element of society.
It wasn't only in Priestley's broader philosophical views that his opponents found ammunition. For commentators like Edmund Burke, who's famous for his harsh criticism of the French Revolution, Priestley's chemistry in particular had dangerous implications. Maurice Crosland explains that Burke blamed science in general for playing a key role in the French Revolution; the philosophes promoting the rights of man praised science for its rationality, and they arrogantly assumed that they could apply the same rationality to the ordering of society. As for Priestley, as a Unitarian he was not even a true Christian in Burke's assessment, and his research had no practical utility. The only consequence of Priestley's works was the wide dissemination of scientific knowledge which, Burke feared, might inspire the same sort of radical reforms which characterize the French Revolution.
What's particularly interesting for our purposes is that Burke strategy for discrediting Priestley included playing up the association between chemistry and alchemy. As Crosland explains, Burke argued that the revolutionaries in France were distorting the natural order of society, just as alchemists distort natural substances when they try to achieve the transmutation of metals.
We should recall here that the association between pernicious ideology and arcane transmutation experiments is echoed in A Tale of Two Cities; Dickens' unbelieving chemists "had an eye on the transmutation of metals". Like Burke, it seems, Dickens considered that those who sought to transform natural substances might intend to extend their transformative power to the ordering of society. As much as the Tale reflects Dickens' lifelong concern with the needs of the people, it also suggests a concern about the possibility that any ideology, when taken to an extreme, can lead to violence, injustice, and godlessness. Science, in the wrong hands, can become a factor in this bloody process.
In the right hands, though, science can serve the needs of the righteous. In his effort to resurrect the doomed Charles Darney, Sydney Carton relies on an ether that he buys from a man who seems to be one of Dickens' unbelieving chemists. And it's this ether that he uses to emulate Christ. In the article on the history of Birmingham in All the Year Round, the account of the city's numerous riots is followed by a list of some of the greatest achievements of Birmingham's citizens, quoted from the antiquarian John Alfred Langford. Langford writes of the city, "Her share in the development of the great instruments of prosperity and progress is surpassed by few cities in the empire." (p. 464) These great instruments include those produced by prominent members of the Lunar Society:
It was here that Mr. Priestley made those discoveries which earned for him 'the title of the founder of pneumatic chemistry.' Here James Watt perfected the steam engine, which is . . . 'without exception, the greatest invention of modern times . . .' (p. 465)
Dickens' journal chastises the city of Birmingham for attacking its own citizens,then praises the city for driving scientific progress. The city held the potential both for the needless violence that Dickens so regretted and the service to humanity that he so encouraged. For Dickens, it seems, the products of unbelieving chemists could be put to virtuous purposes -- especially in the hands of a believer like Sydney Carton.
Thanks to Kristen Schranz for her advice on researching this topic.
Works cited:
"Birmingham a Century Ago," All the Year Round 1 (1868-1869): 462-465.
Maurice Crosland, "The Image of Science as a Threat: Burke versus Priestley and the 'Philosophic Revolution," The British Journal for the History of Science 20 (1987): 277-307.
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
Dan Eshet, "Rereading Priestley: Science at the Intersection of Theology and Politics," History of Science 39 (2001), 127-159.
Emma Mason, "Religion" in Charles Dickens in Context, eds. Sally Ledger and Holly Furneaux (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 318-325.
I've written a guest blog post for the University of Toronto Scientific Instruments Collection (UTSIC). It builds on my earlier Wallifaction post on the sodium chloride prism. I encourage you to check out the other great posts on the UTSIC blog as well!
Jesuit Science since the 16th Century
(image source)
The Society of Jesus was officially recognized by the Catholic Church on this day in 1540, when Pope Paul III granted approval to the order in a papal bull. Since the days when they grappled with the Copernican question, the Jesuits have maintained an important place in the history of science. Many Jesuits resisted the move away from geocentric cosmology, and some contributed to Galileo's trouble with the Roman Inquisition (including Christoph Scheiner, whom we'll meet below), but it would be a mistake simply to characterize the Jesuits as obscurantists. Indeed, the Jesuits have often served as the Catholic Church's advisors on matters of natural philosophy and science. Furthermore, historians have written at length about the exchange of natural knowledge between the Jesuits and the Eastern cultures the encountered during Catholic missions. Below is a small sample of the members of the Jesuit order who have contributed to natural philosophy or science since 1540:
Christopher Clavius (1538-1612). A Jesuit astronomer born in Germany, Clavius was never convinced to adopt Copernicus' sun-centred cosmos, but he was nevertheless a skilled astronomer. He had a hand in establishing the Gregorian calendar which several Catholic countries adopted in 1582.
Christoph Scheiner (1573-1650). Another German Jesuit, Scheiner was one of the first astronomers to observe sunspots. This was the foundation of his animosity toward Galileo; the two astronomers argued over who first observed them and whether they were imperfections on or near the surface of the Sun (Galileo) or shadows cast by tiny stars (Scheiner).
Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680). Frequently identified by historians as a polymath, this German Jesuit contributed to fields of study ranging from medicine to geography to the study of Asian cultures. Although he never went there himself, Kircher wrote a sizable volume on China, drawing together the observations of fellow Jesuits who had gone on missions there. His China illustrata (1670) is pictured below.
Christian Mayer (1719-1783). This Czech Jesuit is remembered for his catalogue of binary stars (that is, systems in which two stars revolve around a common centre). He served as Court Astronomer for the Elector Palatinate in Mannheim, where he had an observatory built.
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955). A French palaeontologist, geologist and Jesuit, Teilhard de Chardin is one of the best known Jesuit scientists of the twentieth century. He was a member of the team that discovered Peking Man, a famous Homo erectus skeleton discovered in China in the 1920s. Teilhard de Chardin is also known for arguing that Darwinism can be fully reconciled with Christian theology.
Georges Lemaître (1894-1966). Pictured above, Lemaître is the astronomer, physicist and Jesuit priest who's often credited with first proposing the Big Bang Theory. Lemaître didn't coin this term, but he did espouse the basic ideas of the theory, namely, that the universe began at a particular time and expanded outward from a single point. Canadians will be interested to know that Lemaître was developing his ideas while in Toronto for a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1924.
Bienvenido Nebres (1940-). This Jesuit priest, mathematician and pedagogue is a prominent figure in Filipino science. In 2011 he was granted the Philippines' highest honour in science, the title of National Scientist, for his work to reform science education. During the 1970s he had papers published on infinitary mathematics while serving as the first president of the Mathematical Society of the Philippines.
Michael C. McFarland (1948-). An American Jesuit, McFarland is also a computer scientist and the former president of the College of the Holy Cross. In the 1990s, McFarland published technical articles on digital systems, and also wrote about the ethical issues associated computer technology, anticipating the ongoing concerns about this subject in the twenty-first century.
Who's your favourite Jesuit natural philosopher, mathematician or scientist? Answer in the comments below.
(image source)
The New Martyrs of Science
Among historical bloggers, there's no shortage of complaints lately about the idea of "martyrs of science", a term applied to those who sacrifice their lives for the cause of scientific knowledge. Historians have attacked this idea with a renewed sense of urgency since Neil deGrasse Tyson's Cosmos reboot premiered in March. The first episode of Cosmos relates the classic tale of the "martyrdom" of heretical priest and quasi-Copernican Giordano Bruno at the hands of the Roman Inquisition. Indeed, Tyson has explicitly listed Bruno among the "martyrs of science" (and is quoted here), reciting the tiresome account of a reactionary and obscurantist Christian Church who, with the support of the unthinking "mob", executed Bruno for his frightening new scientific ideas.
Luckily, Tyson's outdated attitude notwithstanding, the myth of Bruno as a scientific martyr no longer carries weight with professional historians. Scholars working in the fields of science and religion and the history of science generally agree that the Bruno-as-martyr story reflects the discredited "conflict thesis" between science and religion. I'm not concerned here to pile on Tyson's bad history -- such expert bloggers as Rebekah Higgitt and Meg Rosenburg have covered that well enough -- but suffice it to say that the real reason for Bruno's execution was his denial of central Christian doctrines, not his espousal of a heliocentric cosmos.
(On the history of the Bruno myth, see Jole Shackelford, "Myth 7: That Giordano Bruno Was the First Martyr of Modern Science" in Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion, edited by Ronald L. Numbers [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp. 59-67].)
I'm hopeful that historians of science, especially in the age of blogs and social media, can change the popular understanding of scientific martyrs and the nature of science-religion conflicts. I think if we do manage this, though, the concept of a scientific martyr will transform rather than disappear. As the conflict thesis has fallen out of favour in the last few decades, writers within and without the field of history of science have continued to celebrate -- even eulogize -- those figures who seem to have given their life for science. Without the spectre of backward-thinking and barbaric religious authorities, we still retain the notion that Nature itself is out to get us, and scientists are fighting on the front lines.
Accounts of scientific heroes who sacrificed their lives studying nature are easy to find. In fact, they predate the establishment of history as its own professional field. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is a towering figure in the history of science, traditionally depicted as the early modern period's champion of empirical and experimental methods in natural philosophy. A contemporary of Bacon, the biographer John Aubrey, gives a (perhaps apocryphal) explanation of Bacon's death in his Brief Lives which has become widely known: Bacon contracted a fatal case of pneumonia while investigating refrigeration.
Mr [Thomas] Hobbs told me that the cause of his lordship's death was trying an experiment: viz., as he was taking the aire in a coach . . . towards High-gate, snow lay on the ground, and it came into my lord's thoughts, why flesh might not be preserved in snow, as in salt. They were resolved they would try the experiment presently. . . .
Bacon stepped down from his coach and visited a nearby house to acquire a chicken, which he proceeded to stuff with snow.
The snow so chilled him, that he immediately fell so extremely ill, that he could not returne to his lodgings . . . [This] gave him such a cold that in 2 or 3 dayes . . . he dyed of suffocation. (pp. 75-76)
As Hobbes and Aubrey tell it, Bacon was so enthusiastic about experimentation that he died for it. The refrigerated chicken story became an important element in the mythology that developed around Bacon -- who very quickly became a key figure among English experimental philosophers. The founder members of the Royal Society, for instance, claimed to take inspiration from Bacon's commitment to experiment. Whether or not the story is true, it generates a powerful image of the experimental philosopher sacrificing himself for the sake of knowledge.
As we move closer to the present, such stories of natural philosophers and scientists slain by Nature proliferate. Even in the nineteenth century when the roots of the conflict thesis took hold, there were accounts of scientists martyred by their research rather than religious fanatics. In 1841, Scottish scientist and historian Sir David Brewster published an influential early work in the historiography of science called The Martyrs of Science; several more editions were published later in the nineteenth century, which indicates the book's popularity. Brewster provides in-depth biographies of Galileo, Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler, three astronomers "martyred" during the Scientific Revolution. As Rebekah Higgitt (again!) discusses in her excellent blog post, Brewster didn't intend for "martyr" to refer to those killed for their scientific ideas. He argues through the lives of these astronomers that science itself is sacrificed when governments neglect to fund it. Thus the work of each of these three geniuses, Brewster tells us, was hindered by the failure of their patrons to fund their research consistently. Brewster's martyrs are not quite the same sort as those who, like Bacon, are said to have died for science, but his book shows that the concept of scientific martyrdom in the nineteenth century was not restricted to those who were persecuted by religious authorities.
A century and a half after The Martyrs of Science was first published, the concept of scientific martyrdom had taken on a distinct new form. By now the term could be applied to the victims of Nature itself, rather than human injustice or neglect. In December 1986, Anthony R. Michaelis published a piece in the journal Interdisciplinary Science Reviews called "The Martyrs of Science" (vol. 11 pp. 321-323). He explains that he intends "to pay tribute to those individuals who gave their lives in the cause of science, the martyrs who are so rarely remembered for more than a few years." Michaelis' article catalogues the deaths of various scientists since antiquity, focusing on those who died during missions of exploration. He sorts his scientific martyrs by categories: "Deaths in Space", "Deaths of Balloonists", "Deaths in the Arctic" and so on. Religiously-motivated persecution is conspicuously absent in Michaelis' account; these are scientists who suffered at the hands of Nature. The reason for this becomes clearer when we consider the immediate context of Michaelis' article: earlier in 1986, the crew of the Space Shuttle Challenger suffered a public and horrific death when the shuttle exploded just after its launch. Michaelis' list of martyrs begins with the Challenger crew and continues with others who accepted the dangers of research on the physical and epistemological frontier. In his section on Antarctic exploration, for instance, Michaelis writes,
When Captain Scott and his party set out in 1911 for the South Pole, they knew the dangers that faced them. They took risks, but their sacrifice was not in vain. Today the Antarctic has become an international land of science . . .
For Michaelis, these explorers sacrificed their lives for their belief in the importance of scientific research. And without those willing to die in pursuit of knowledge, Michaelis tells us, we would never have achieved flight, space travel, or any of the other achievements of modern science. Even though American science has suffered a recent tragedy, Michaelis reminds readers that science eventually prevails over Nature's cruelty.
In the twenty-first century, the scientists who died for their research are not often explicitly identified as martyrs, but just below the surface is the notion that they gave their lives to the cause of conquering nature and improving the world. I was motivated to write this post primarily by science journalist Richard Conniff's blog post entitled "The Wall of the Dead: A Memorial to Fallen Naturalists". Before launching into his catalogue of sacrificed scientists, Conniff begins by comparing them to fallen soldiers:
We go to great lengths commemorating soldiers who have died fighting wars for their countries. Why not do the same for the naturalists who still sometimes give up everything in the effort to understand life?
Conniff's list of naturalists killed in the line of duty, as it were, ranges from Georg Steller (1709-1746), the German botanist and zoologist who never made it home from studying wildlife in Kamchatka, to Mike DeGruy (1951-2012), who died filming a documentary for National Geographic when his helicopter crashed in Australia. As he memorializes these scientists, Conniff creates what seems like a cenotaph.
Apart from the scientists memorialized on such lists, there are those whose deaths in the service of science are famous enough to make them household names. The scientist characters on the sitcom The Big Bang Theory often refer to Marie Curie (1867-1934; pictured above), always in connection with her death by exposure to the radioactive elements that she discovered. (Curie is perhaps the most famous female scientist in history, and she is often the only woman included in lists of sacrificed scientists such as this one.) Likewise, I think it's becoming increasingly difficult to discuss Crocodile Hunter Steve Irwin without recalling his death in 2006 from an encounter with a stingray. The man once known for his confident way of handling nature's most intimidating animals might ultimately be remembered for the way he died.
It's no surprise that science fiction has responded to this enduring notion of scientific martyrdom. What's interesting, though, is the spin that sci-fi writers have put on the as they entwine it with the trope of "playing God." Especially where it overlaps with the horror genre, sci-fi has made a cliché of the scientist who takes the manipulation of nature (especially living things) too far. In nearly every case the scientist is made to suffer from the effects of his or her (but usually his) invention or experiment. The oldest example that comes to mind is Mary Shelley's Dr. Frankenstein who has become an avatar of scientific hubris -- other manifestations of which reappear in H. G. Wells' Invisible Man, the films The Fly and Jurassic Park (both starring Jeff Goldblum??), and countless entries in the zombie genre such as Resident Evil and 28 Days Later.
On the other hand, this trope leaves some room for the noble scientist. In the reboot on the Planet of the Apes series (spoilers ahead), James Franco's character is the lone scientist who shows compassion for the apes that are kept in captivity and tested with experimental drugs. The second film in the series, 2014's Dawn of the Planet of the Apes, reveals that Franco's gentle scientist is one of the many victims of the viral outbreak and ape takeover that has reduced human society to rubble. The implication of this twist on the playing-God trope seems to be that a scientist tainted by hubris is no longer a true scientist; true science and its practitioners fall when those who play God rise to positions of power. Ultimately, then, sci-fi seems to participate in creating an image of the scientist martyred for the cause of the disinterested pursuit of knowledge.
The notion of scientific martyrdom is broad and complex, so I welcome comments that can help to refine these ideas!
(image from Philosophical Transactions Vol 1.9, 12 February 1665/6)
Happy birthday to Robert Hooke (1635-1703), the Curator of Experiments and later Secretary of the Royal Society of London. Hooke is best known for his brilliant and popular Micrographia, which introduced readers to secrets of the microscopic world. But Hooke was also a prolific inventor (among other things), and the devices that he designed in his apartment at Gresham College (or one of his favourite local coffee houses) contain as many wonders as his microscopic observations.
Here are my favourite Hooke inventions, which were described in an early issue of the Philosophical Transactions. Figure 1 is a device that sailors could use to sound depths, without needing to tie it to a line. The device sinks until it hits the bottom of the sea. This causes the latch to release the lighter ball on top, which floats to the surface. By timing this process (perhaps with one of the pocket watches also designed by Hooke!) the "Seamen, bound for far Voyages" that Hooke was addressing could determine the depth of the water.
The device depicted in Figure 2 by a similar mechanism, but is attached to a line. The open box collects a sample of water, which one can retrieve by pulling on the line. As the box is pulled back up, the lid is forced closed by the resistance of the water.
Historians recognize Hooke as an unusual figure at the nexus of élite natural philosophy and middle-class craft knowledge. And it's devices like these that reflect Hooke's relationship with England's maritime culture. Merchant and military vessels could benefit from inventions like these, and in turn Hooke could benefit from the exposure his devices would get from successful reports. Hooke never achieved the high social standing of colleagues like Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton (the latter eventually becoming more of a rival than a colleague for Hooke), but he nevertheless remains one of the best known figures of the early Royal Society, and the history of early modern science in general. Happy 379th, Robert!
Further reading:
Chapman, Allan. Englandʼs Leonardo: Robert Hooke and the Seventeenth-Century Scientific Revolution. Bristol: Institute of Physics Publishing, 2005.
Iliffe, Rob. “Material Doubts: Hooke, Artisan Culture and the Exchange of Information in 1670s London.” The British Journal for the History of Science 28 (1995): 285- 318.
Jardine, Lisa. The Curious Life of Robert Hooke: The Man Who Measured London. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.
Shapin, Steven. “Who Was Robert Hooke?” In Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was Produced by People with Bodies, Situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority, 182-211. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.
Stewart, Larry. “Other Centres of Calculation, or, Where the Royal Society Didnʼt Count: Commerce: Coffee-Houses and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern London.” British Journal for the History of Science 32 (1999): 133-153.
Vesalius Spot the Differences Game!
Anyone want to play a game? The top image is the title page from the 1543 first edition of Andreas Vesalius’ De humani corporis fabrica. The bottom image is from the 1555 second edition.
There are a few differences between the two. Can you spot them?
I've found seven so far. The best one is that Vesalius' beard is bushier. How many can you find?