Xu Shichang (1855 – 1939) & The Shanghai Peace Conference
President of China in Beijing between 1918 - 1922 and the only man of civilian background to hold the position. Xu notably attempted to broker peace between the northern and southern governments during the Shanghai Peace Conference, the proceedings of which will be the focus of this long post.
Early Years
Xu Shichang was born in Weihui in Henan province on October 20th, 1855[i]. Xu’s ancestors were originally from Zhejiang province before eventually becoming registered as natives of Tianjin city in Hebei Province[ii]. While registered as natives of Tianjin, they had worked as minor officials in Henan province for several generations, and it was there that Xu Shichang grew up[iii].
His grandfather Xu Enmu was a minor official in the province at the time, and his father Xu Jiaxian was a military veteran who had fought against the rebels during the Taiping Rebellion [iv]. At the age of seven his father died, the burden for raising Xu and his brothers falling onto Xu Shichang’s mother Madame Liu, as well as Xu Enmu[v]. While his grandfather and great-grandfather had both held relatively high ranks in the civil service, they had never managed to accrue great wealth, resulting in Xu growing up in poverty[vi].
Despite his poor economic circumstances, he received a traditional education[vii]. He was not regarded as a brilliant student, but possessed fine motor control and an artistic flair that enabled him to master calligraphy[viii]. He then went on to make a living as a tutor of a district magistrate’s family in Henan, in addition to working as a scribe along the northern and southern banks of the Yellow River[ix].
It was during this time that Xu made the acquaintance of someone who was to have a significant impact on his life; Yuan Shikai. At the time, Yuan Shikai was at the age of 20 and living on his estate at Zhenzhou in Henan province, sponsoring literary associations and inviting scholars for discussion, in addition to assisting with flood relief in the province[x]. Xu Shichang, then at the age of 24 and currently working at Huaining county as a minor official, became acquainted with Yuan, immediately becoming impressed by Yuan’s hospitality, intelligence and attention to national affairs.
Xu Shichang and Yuan Shikai became firm friends, with financial assistance from the latter enabling the former to go to Bejing and take the imperial examinations [xi]. Xu became a juren in 1882 AD, and a jinshi in 1886 AD[xii]. Xu managed average scores among all jinshi-holders in the palace examination, so he was appointed only as a fellow at the Hanlin Academy[xiii].
The academic circles of Beijing were under the influence of a great scholar called Wang Tonghe [xiv]. Unfortunately for Xu Shichang, none of his examiners were members of Wang’s circle, and because a jinshi’s examiners became their chief patrons, his career prospects suffered accordingly [xv]. Xu was also disliked because his superiors, including Wang, preferred scholars to be all-rounded and well-versed in all fields, whereas Xu Shichang was specialised in only a few, such as calligraphy [xvi]. To further compound Xu’s poor prospects, the scholars at the academy were classified into red and black groups, with Xu Shichang being assigned to the inferior black groups [xvii].
While Xu’s position and rank as a jinshi and Hanlin fellow held great prestige, he had few responsibilities, receiving no assignments for years at a time and not even serving as an assistant in the administration of an examination [xviii]. It was only in 1894 AD, eight years after his jinshi exam, that he finally received a job rechecking a set of examinations and was made an assistant editor at the Wuying Hall of the National History Bureau [xix]. Xu remained highly discouraged about how his career had progressed, and he considered applying for a provincial post in Henan province [xx]. It was at this point that his old friend Yuan Shikai returned to Beijing to assume a new post, and the fates of both men took an unexpected turn.
The Beiyang Army
Yuan Shikai
What had brought Yuan Shikai back to Beijing was the First Sino-Japanese War that broke out between China and Japan over control of Korea. While Xu Shichang had spent the past decade of his life failing to make headway in the academic circles of Beijing, his friend Yuan Shikai had risen to serve as the imperial commissioner in Korea [xxi]. Korea at the time was a Chinese dependency, and Yuan’s powers were significant with respect to maintaining the Qing’s presence there in the face of foreign penetration. Growing Japanese influence on the Korean peninsula saw the war break out in 1894, lasting until 1895 when China was soundly beaten.
The aftermath of this defeat convinced the Qing court of the need to revamp their military. Yuan Shikai was able to secure the backing of several senior officials at the Qing court to take charge of the training of the Dingwu Army troops stationed at Xiaozhan as part of the Qing’s wider program of military modernisation[xxii]. This unit would later be renamed the Xinjian Lujun or ‘Newly Created Army’, and become popularly known as the Beiyang army, due to Xiaozhan being located in the coastal region around Tianjin city in the northern province of Zhili [xxiii].
It was because of this that Xu Shichang’s career prospects finally changed for the better, as Yuan would appoint him as the chief civilian advisor of the ‘Newly Created Army’ (contrary to popular claims, he was not a ‘chief of staff’) [xxiv]. This must have been a difficult decision for Xu to make, for while his financial rewards and responsibilities while working in the academy, especially having been placed in the inferior ‘black’ category, were minimal, his persistence in remaining at Beijing indicated a significant political ambition. Accepting the offered post would mean that that Xu would be finally surrendering the ambitions he had nurtured for a career at the capital.
The move to Xiaozhan would turn out to be an important step in Xu’s career and subsequent rise to power in the last days of the Qing. It put him in a position of authority over officers that were to become very important figures in the early Republican period, such as Duan Qirui, Zhang Xun and Li Chun, establishing himself as a figure of respect [xxv]. It also allowed him to become familiar in military affairs, leading him to research military topics and eventually writing several treatises discussing military strategies and drilling methods, in addition to creating military songs and instructional manuals for the troops [xxvi]. Finally, it allowed Xu to reaffirm his relationship with Yuan Shikai. During this time, Yuan reportedly referred to Xu as his ‘elder brother’, and frequently communicated with him via letters whenever Xu was away [xxvii]. In this way, Xu became Yuan’s most trusted advisor.
When Yuan became Govenor-General of Zhili Province in 1901 AD, he recommended Xu to Empress Dowager Cixi, who was impressed by his analytical abilities during the interview[xxviii]. Xu Shichang would rapidly climb the ladders of bureaucracy as a result, eventually becoming admitted to the Grand Council in 1905 AD, as well as President of the Board of Police [xxix]. During this time, Xu Shichang built a group of loyal followers for himself, many of whom were to serve in a prominent role in the future, such as Zhu Qiqian, Zhou Shumou, Qian Nengxun and Wu Jisun [xxx].
Career in Manchuria
In November of 1906, Xu was made co-leader of an investigative tour of the three Manchurian provinces alongside Prince Zaizhen, the purpose of which was to reform and strengthen them in the face of Russian and Japanese penetration [xxxi]. Upon their return, Xu and Zaizhen submitted memorials to the court reporting immense neglect and weakness in the Chinese administration; from an army that was smaller in size to the Japanese and the Russians, inefficient civil administration, and poor fiscal policies and infrastructure that saw the foreign powers increasingly exert influence and dominate the affairs of the region [xxxii].
The memorial recommended comprehensive reforms to overhaul the administration of Manchuria, with Xu implying that failing to act quickly would lead to the loss of the whole region, with dire consequences for the rest of the country inevitable. One of Xu’s key recommendations was to put the region under civil control and unify the three provinces under one administration, placing them under a governor-general who would have overall control and complete authority over all matters such as to enable them to accomplish serious and vital reforms, with only foreign matters requiring that they consult with the Board of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. [xxxiii] Xu also argued for gaining the assistance of other powers such as America in counterbalancing the influence of Russia and Japan in Manchuria, in addition to encouraging Chinese immigration into the region, as well as pushing for the construction of railway lines and the stationing of modern-style troops to increase the Qing’s military presence there [xxxiv].
On the 20th of April, 1907, the court accepted the recommendations from the memorials, with the man they appointed as the first governor-general of the three eastern provinces of Manchuria being none other than Xu Shichang himself [xxxv]. Xu not only brought his pre-existing group of followers to Manchuria with him to serve in various important capacities (Zhu became the Director of the Bureau for Mongolian Affairs in Manchuria, Qian was to serve in various capacities in Manchuria, including as a prefect, and Wu was to serve in various secretarial capacities in Xu's administration), but used the opportunity to further dispense new favours and extend his network, such as by aiding the careers of figures such as Ye Gongchuo and Xu Shiying [xxxvi]. Xu also recommended fifteen people for promotion in 1907, all of whom were to become important political figures in the early Republic, including Cao Rulin, Tan Yankai, Zhang Zongxiang, and Lu Zongyu [xxxvii]. In addition, some of the prominent military commanders of the early Republican period also served under Xu’s administration in various capacities, such as Cao Kun, Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu [xxxviii].
Yuan Shikai’s fall from political prominence after the death of his patron the Empress Dowager in late 1909 AD also led to Xu Shichang being forced from his post and transferred back to Beijing to become the President of the Board of Postal Service and Communications[xxxix]. This organ was responsible for all matters relating to Chinese communications, directing and managing railways, maritime affairs, postal networks and telegraphs [xl]. Xu strove to resolve the confusion with the different regulations that existed between the various areas of Chinese communications, owing to how different areas had been derived from different countries, with maritime regulations coming from Britain, postal regulations coming from Japan, by having studies conducted of pre-existing codes and recommendations made for the creation of a uniform code [xli].
Xu was transferred to the Grand Council in August 1910 and also made the Grand Scholar of the Tiren Chamber on the 30th of September, establishing him as the most influential Han Chinese advisor to the court [xlii]. On May 8th, 1911 the Qing court introduced a cabinet system into the central government that consisted of thirteen members. Xu Shichang and three others were the only Han Chinese members in the cabinet, with Xu becoming vice-premier, retaining his standing as the leading Han Chinese minster at court, despite the cabinet being otherwise dominated by Manchus and members of the imperial clan [xliii].
End of the Qing Dynasty and Yuan’s Presidency
The year of 1911 would see the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, in which the Qing found itself overwhelmed and desperately sought to have Yuan Shikai return from his forced retirement to stabilise the situation [xliv]. On October 20th, Xu was sent by the court to Yuan’s home in Henan to negotiate Yuan’s terms to assist the besieged dynasty, eventually playing a key role in securing his old friend’s return to Beijing [xlv]. Once Yuan assumed office as Premier, Xu Shichang stepped into the background, acting as an advisor to his friend but otherwise not having a position in the new cabinet. Aside from being honoured by the imperial court through being bestowed the title of Grand Tutor to the young emperor Puyi – no doubt an attempt to curry favour with the one advisor close to Yuan that was sympathetic to them – Xu’s role in the final days of the Qing was a circumspect and passive one [xlvi].
Following the abdication of the Qing, Xu proceeded to leave politics and refuse all offers for position for the first two years of the Republic, owing to his attachment and sense of obligation to the fallen dynasty. It was only in 1914 that Xu was finally persuaded by Yuan’s son Yuan Keding to return to Beijing and assume the post of Secretary of State on May 1st, with much support for Xu’s appointment coming from various old military and bureaucratic associates that had benefited from his support in the past [xlvii]. Xu also continued to pay his respects to the vestigial imperial court, which had been allowed to remain in the northern portion of the Forbidden City and in the Summer Palace. There he continued to serve as the grand tutor for the emperor, in addition to becoming the chief of the imperial court’s newly established office for the regulation of rites, which eventually restored Confucian sacrifices in September [xlviii].
At the end of 1915, Yuan began to make serious moves towards to restoration of a monarchy in China with himself as the emperor of a new dynasty, strongly driven by his desire to use the symbol and style of monarchy to reaffirm his flagging government and power, badly damaged by the Twenty-One Demands crisis and his inability to prevent foreign penetration into Mongolia and Tibet [xlix]. Xu refrained from offering any support for Yuan’s venture, and resigned from his position on October 27th on the pretext of illness. Despite his apparent opposition and displeasure with the plan, Xu refrained from attacking the new emperor publicly and maintained friendly relations with Yuan during his brief reign, to the extent that Xu was honoured as one of the ‘Four Friends of Song Mountain’, which exempted Xu from the normal ceremonial courtesies [l]. In private, Xu predicted in his diary that Yuan’s attempt would bring nothing but chaos.
Yuan’s assumption of the imperial title was the final straw for the building discontent towards his regime, provoking a rebellion in the south-western province of Yunnan by Cai E, eventually spreading to various other provinces such as Guizhou, Zheijiang, Guangdong and others. Yuan sent military forces loyal to him in the south, but despite some minor successes they failed to make significant progress against the Yunnanese forces in Sichuan and a stalemate ensued. Prominent figures in the Northern military establishment that had been alienated by Yuan’s domestic policies recognised his weakness and challenged his authority, most prominent of whom being Feng Guozhang.
Xu and many others urged Yuan to abolish his dynasty and surrender the throne, leading to Yuan restoring the republic on March 22nd, with Xu once again assuming his old position as secretary of state [li]. During this time, Xu sounded out key northern military figures like Zhang Xun and Ni Sichong about the potential idea of restoring the Qing, though this was not accepted by the imperial court or the wider diplomatic community [lii]. This indicated Xu’s entrenched feelings of loyalty and commitment to the fallen dynasty.
Despite the restoration of the republic, demands continued to be made for Yuan’s resignation as president, with key figures such as Feng Guozhang, Duan Qirui, Li Yuanhong and Xu Shichang urging him to step down. At this point, Yuan’s authority over the Beijing government was virtually none-existent, with open competition and jockeying for power now breaking out among different groups seeking to advance themselves in the current environment. Yuan’s health sharply deteriorated as a result of the intense stress that the situation placed upon him since the outbreak of the civil war, exacerbating his already poor health. In anticipation of his death, Yuan called Xu Shichang and others to bear witness to his will, wherein he stated his regret over the imperial venture, requested that those present take care of his family and stated that the current vice-president should be made the president [liii]. After this, Yuan Shikai died at the age of fifty-six on June 6th, 1916.
Constitutional Struggles
Duan Qirui, Premier of the Republic of China and leader of the Anhui military clique
Li Yuanhong, President of China
Feng Guozhang, Vice-President and leader of the Zhili military clique
There were still fundamental questions at the heart of the young republic that remained unresolved with Yuan’s death; what was the proper role of the military? What should the distribution of power between the centre and the province be? How should power be shared between the President, Premier and the parliament? The lack of a firm consensus on these questions among the political elite, particularly on the distribution of power in the government, was to herald entrenched conflict in the time following Yuan’s death, leading to political dysfunction and deadlock in the government and increasing disillusionment with constitutional rule.
In the summer of 1916, a political compromise was reached between the various parties of the north and south, wherein Li Yuanhong was to be made president – his legitimacy being questioned by none – and Duan Qirui agreeing to the restoration of the original parliament of 1913 that had been disbanded by Yuan Shikai, which in turn would see the Kuomintang return to prominence [liv]. For their part, the Kuomintang and the southern provinces agreed to end their rebellion and recognised Duan Qirui as Premier. Positions in the cabinet were likewise divided in the spirit of compromise, with KMT members being made the head of four ministries, while Duan and his allies assumed others [lv]. Xu Shichang himself served as a major mediator in these discussions, notably being the one who persuaded Duan Qirui to support Vice-President Li to become the new President [lvi].
While this all appeared good in theory, it remained an open question as to how this spirit of compromise would translate to practice. The Kuomintang had originally supported the idea of a strong President back in 1911 in Sun Yat-sen’s text ‘Structural Outline of the Provisional Government of the Republic of China’, but had drastically revised this in the Provisional Constitution of 1912, wherein they sought to have ultimate executive power transferred to the Premier and the cabinet in anticipation of Yuan Shikai assuming the Presidency. This change would have consequences with regards to muddling the exact roles and powers of the Premier, President and the parliament.
Duan Qirui therefore had good reason to believe that he would take a leading position in the government on the basis of the constitution of 1912. His attempts asserting this, however, drew hostile reactions from sections of the parliament which retained a deep-seeded mistrust of Duan and his allies, in addition to members of the President’s office, notably the president’s private secretary Ding Shiyi, who asserted that the President ought to be able to take a more active role in government and be allowed to attend all cabinet meetings [lvii]. Despite Duan’s anger at what he viewed as thinly-veiled attempts at robbing him of the powers accorded to him by the constitution, he attempted to accommodate Li and Ding and reach a compromise with the office of President [lviii].
This would, however, only be the opening shots of increasingly bitter and destabilising conflict that would engulf the government between the Premier Duan Qirui, President Li Yuanhong and the parliament dominated by the Kuomintang. Duan Qirui initially defended the parliament against the attacks of the other northern dujuns and actively sought to work constructively with them, but increasing polarisation and intransigence between him and the government, most notably over the issue of China’s participation in World War 1, made him increasingly hostile towards them, which was reciprocated in turn by the Kuomintang dominated parliament, as well as by Li Yuanhong. This would culminate with Li Yuanhong’s attempt at dismissing Duan Qirui as Premier on the 23rd of May, 1917. Duan and his allies balked at this, resulting in a deadlock and forcing Li Yuanhong to summon Zhang Xun to Beijing to act as a mediator. Zhang would instead force the President to dissolve the parliament and then resign, with Zhang announcing the restoration of the Qing Dynasty on the 1st of July, 1917 [lix]. Zhang attempted to gain Xu’s support for the attempted restoration, but Xu refused to have anything to do with the plan [lx].
Zhang’s attempted restoration was crushed by Duan after twelve days, who then returned to his post as Premier while Feng Guozhang was made the acting president. Duan then announced at the end of July that he would not reconvene the original parliament and not restore Li Yuanhong as president. This drastic course of action was likely driven by an element of self-interest in creating a new legislature more amenable to him and his allies, yet was also an attempt to renew the government’s legitimacy and make a break with the chaos and instability that had marked 1916-1917; it was clear to Duan, as it was to many others, that the current constitutional arrangement could not function, and therefore shouldn’t be restored.
The New Parliament and the Hufa movement
Sun Yat-sen, former provisional president of the Republic of China during the Xinhai Revolution.
Duan convened the Provisional National Council in Beijing on November 10th, which in turn eventually promulgated the new Parliamentary Organic Law and revised the electoral laws, reducing the size of the parliament and assisting the dominant cabinet factions to better influence the parliament [lxi]. After revising the electoral laws, Duan’s Anhui Clique created the Anfu Club to serve as its’ political wing on March 8th, 1918[lxii] . In the subsequent election, the Anfu Club was able to take a majority in Parliament after heavy campaigning and lobbying, controlling 342 seats out of a total of 470, with the remaining members belonging to the Research Clique, Communications Clique and a number of independents [lxiii]
During this new state of affairs, Duan Qirui’s Anhui Clique increasingly struggled over policy with their rivals in Feng Guozhang’s Zhili Clique, the other major military clique that had arisen from within the old Beiyang army after Yuan’s death. This manifested in contests to determine the composition of the parliament, competition over the presidency and parliament, in addition to different policies in regards to how to deal with the rebelling South, with Duan eventually advocating for unification by force (Wǔlì tǒngyī), while Feng pursued peaceful unification (Hépíng tǒngyī)[lxiv].
Meanwhile, when Zhang Xun attempted to restore the Qing, Sun Yat-sen hosted a secret meeting with other prominent Kuomintang members and Cheng Biguang of the Chinese navy. There they agreed to the necessity to restore the republic that Zhang Xun had dissolved. To accomplish this, Sun moved to Guangzhou, accompanied by a number of old parliamentary allies and close associates.
Sun had actually been exploring options for rebellion prior to Zhang’s coup as a result of his frustrations with Duan, believing him to be a dictator and a traitor who was selling out the nation to imperialists, in addition to Duan’s actions against President Li and the parliament prior to Zhang’s coup. As a result, Sun had attempted to win over the autonomous military governors of Tang Jiyao of Yunnan and Lu Rongting of Guangxi and Guangdong, in addition to trying to gain the support of the navy through the backing of Cheng Biguang.
The aims of Sun’s efforts eventually shifted and took a firmer form when Zhang pushed President Li to dissolve parliament, which eventually took place on June 13th. While there was nothing that prevented the president from doing this in the constitution, there wasn’t anything written that explicitly accorded him that power. The resistance by some ministers to countersign the order and the restoration of the Qing gave Sun’s efforts an even clearer form and a clear overarching focus to coalesce around; to defend the parliament and the constitution, and preserve the republic. This would see his efforts become known as the Hùfǎ yùndòng, or the ‘Constitutional Protection Movement’.
Thus, even once Zhang’s movement was crushed Sun didn’t cease his efforts to topple the northern government, for the guiding impetus of his attack wasn’t fundamentally about any constitutional infringements, but rather a holistic attack aimed against the overall style and structure of the Beijing government as it currently stood. He therefore sought to establish a military government in the south, based in Guangzhou, from which he would initiate a military revolution that would sweep away the current Beijing government and achieve the major changes he saw as necessary to restore the true republican spirit and topple the reigning militarists.
It should be said that Sun was perceived in the south as merely one of the many leaders of the Hufa struggle, with his political positions and leadership being far from being the predominant one[lxv]. Sun had, for instance, initially pushed for the military government in the south to have him declared as the new president of the new provisional southern government, provoking firm criticism from close allies, such as Tang Shaoyi, Wu Jinglian and Cheng Biguang, who pointed out that doing so would be equally illegal as Duan’s actions, and that they should instead restore the government dissolved by Zhang and make Li Yuanhong the president. Eventually, Cen Chunxuan was made chief director of the southern military government, though Sun would later successfully push in late 1917 to have decision-making power centred onto a military government that Sun himself would control as the Grand Marshal (though even this arrangement would only last for a year, being replaced by a seven-man directorate), while the other prominent southern factions and figures continued to play key roles in the direction of the movement[lxvi].
Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting both had very ambivalent and lukewarm feelings towards Sun’s goals, not wanting to break with Duan completely despite their previous support for Li Yuanhong in 1917, and only really joined firmly with the Hufa movement due to Duan’s attempt to extend his power towards the south. The Guangzhou parliament itself was comprised of diverse factions with their own views and agency in the movement, ranging from Sun Yat-sen’s own radical faction, to the Political Study Group comprised of people like Han Yucheng who were not optimistic of the chance of success through military means and were ready to settle for favourable terms, to the moderate members of the KMT led by Wu Jinglian who held the balance of power.
Xu Shichang’s return to politics
Cao Rulin, Minister of Communications of the Republic of China
Liang Shiyi, leader of the Old Communications Clique (OCC)
Despite the success of the Anfu Club in the elections, Duan’s political prospects as a candidate for the presidency was weakened by his inability to achieve results with the military unification policy in time for the election. The groups arrayed against Duan - The Research Clique, the breakaway government in the south, rival dujuns like Cao Kun - were together strong enough at this point of time to make holding the presidency untenable [lxvii].
To resolve this, Duan Qirui struck upon Xu Shichang as a compromise candidate [lxviii]. Xu was an elder statesman who commanded considerable respect amongst the Beiyang military commanders, in addition to having respect and recognition among different factions and parties in both the north and the south, particularly due to his previous successful efforts as a mediator between the various factions in the year after Yuan’s death. Xu also lacked a territorial base of his own, and therefore was judged to be of no risk at substantively challenging Duan’s policies. Xu’s apparent non-partisanship would also make Feng more comfortable with stepping down as president, particularly if Duan decided to also resign as Premier; while they might be rivals, Duan didn’t wish to alienate the Zhili Clique[lxix]. Duan would still be in a position of considerable power through his role as the head of the War Participation Bureau, which controlled the Japanese backed War Participation Army that had been ostensibly created for the purposes of fighting in WW1, with its’ apparent role really being Duan’s powerbase and a formidable weapon against his domestic opponents [lxx]. Duan also continued to enjoy open support and backing from the Japanese Terauchi cabinet through the Nishihara Loans [lxxi].
Duan approached Feng Guozhang to convince him to support Xu for the presidency and peacefully resign from the vice-presidency, in exchange Duan promised to not continue as the premier. Lacking any meaningful prospects for securing the presidency himself and comforted by Duan’s proposal to step down simultaneously, Feng communicated his agreement through his secretary in mid-August. Feng issued a telegram calling for the parliament to elect someone “of virtuous repute and capable of restoring unity and peace”, which was widely recognised as an endorsement of Xu Shichang [lxxii]. Xu himself remained publicly quiet on whether he was willing to serve, but privately communicated his agreement in the hopes of seeking reconciliation between the differing Beiyang factions, as well as between the North and the South[lxxiii]. He also stated in his diaries that the primary reason for him accepting the presidency was that it was the wish of the remanent Qing court for him to do so, due to the court believing that he would be able to protect their interests if he was president [lxxiv]. An account of a meeting with palace officials also highlighed some of his feelings about accepting the position and his relationship with the Qing court, where he spoke of errors made by Yuan Shikai and Zhang Xun, then going on to say that “In leaving retirement this time, we have only this in mind: to serve as regent for the young monarch." [lxxv].
This near unanimous demonstration of support for his candidacy had been something that Xu Shichang had been actively working to realise as the political conflicts of 1918 unfolded. He had purposely refrained from taking sides in the rivalry between Feng and Duan, avoiding taking any clear stance with regards to whether a peace policy or a war policy would be best for resolving the conflict with the southern provinces. Xu also made strident efforts to win the support and good graces of Duan Qirui and his subordinate Xu Shucheng (not to be confused with Xu Shichang himself), recognising their preeminent position in the central government, such as by praising the latter’s literary ability and inviting him to dinner parties, and even allowing his private Beijing mansion to be used by the Anfu Club [lxxvi]. In addition, Xu had worked hard to convince Duan to withdraw his intention of remaining as premier, recognising that if Duan remained in control of the cabinet then Xu’s ability to direct policy would be null and he would be nothing but a figurehead [lxxvii]. He delicately argued to Duan that it would be better for Duan to resign, otherwise Feng Guozhang would be deeply embittered. Duan heeded Xu’s arguments and agreed to resign as premier, confident that he would still remain in control through his position as the head of the War Participation Bureau, as well as through directing the Anfu Club [lxxviii].
To further bolster his political position in 1918, Xu Shichang allied himself with the Old Communications Clique (OCC), a key member of which being Xu’s protégé Zhu Qiqian, while the clique’s head, Liang Shiyi, was on close terms with Xu to having worked under him in the Board of Postal Service and Communications during the last years of the Qing Dynasty [lxxix]. The OCC itself commanded around 80 seats in the parliament following the landslide election for the Anfu Club in the same year [lxxx]. This alliance would thus serve as a great help to Xu, as the OCC would be able to help support Xu in campaigning for the presidency on his behalf, maintaining his non-partisan appearance, as well as providing future support for his policies in the parliament against the dominant Anfu Club [lxxxi].
The Election of Xu Shichang
Despite intense suspicions between both the Feng and Duan groups that the other was trying to hold onto power despite their agreement, the election went ahead as scheduled. Both Duan Qirui and Feng Guozhang resigned from their positions, while Xu Shichang received the plurality of the parliamentary votes. Xu’s house became the scene of considerable celebration as friends and followers alike came to congratulate him, while a parliamentary delegation led by Wang Yitang came to urge Xu to accept the office. Xu Shichang issued a circular telegram on the September 5th, wherein he invited the possibility that he might not take office because of age, weakness, and illness[lxxxii]. Xu was sixty-four at this time, so he was by no means as feeble and befuddled as he described himself; the purpose of the telegram was to gauge the depth of his support and the factional consensus, forcing those who supported him to commit themselves publicly. Support came from all corners, except for Wu Peifu, who privately urged Xu against taking the office for the time being, though his opinion carried no real weight as a relatively junior military officer.
The Guangzhou government had, in accordance with their general position on the illegality of the northern government, stated on August 3rd that “no matter who is elected by the illegal parliament, we absolutely will not recognise him” [lxxxiii]. This firm attitude was to turn into hesitancy in the aftermath of the election, with there being no immediate reaction from the south to the events in the north. This, combined with the public knowledge of Xu’s excellent reputation in the south, led to rumours spreading of imminent reconciliation between the two governments
The south finally made their position clear in a telegram issued on the 16th to Xu wherein they reaffirmed the southern government’s position, urging him to not take the presidency due to what they argued was the illegality of the northern parliament. The telegram and their initial hesitancy indicated that, while the southern government would not make any accommodations with the north without negotiations, they held a favourable attitude towards Xu Shichang, with their objections to the election being because of the parliament’s illegality, not the new president himself [lxxxiv].
Inauguration and the Calls for Unity
Xu Shichang was inaugurated as the fourth President of the Republic of China on the 10th of October, 1918. In his inaugural address, Xu Shichang stressed the considerable domestic and international danger that was posed to China because of the political division. The current situation and civil war were causing a stagnation of industry, inhibiting any moves by the nation to achieve greater wealth and national power. Xu also stressed that if China was unable to resolve these domestic issues, it would not only be unable to reap any benefits from its’ entry in World War 1, but could also be vulnerable to foreign penetration, perhaps even a military intervention, by those who might seek to exploit their weakness:
I predict that when the fighting is ended, commercial competition will break out. Every little plot of ground, east and west, will attract the gaze of the industrialists. If we in China prolong the period in which our people’s industry is not flourishing and domestic government is ineffective, we are going to be in straits a hundred times more dangerous than we are in today. The writ of the government must run throughout the country before the power of the nation as a whole can develop and international standing be protected. If instead we take our ease in the midst of these world development and fail to adopt a policy, the foundations of the nation itself will be threatened. and it will be of no use to speak of foreign affairs. This is a crisis of national existence. The officials, merchants and people of the nation must give it long a deep consideration.[lxxxv]
To counter this, Xu publicly announced his desire to word towards bringing an end to national discord:
To achieve unity, peaceful means are indeed to be preferred; If these fail, the government will be forced to use violence. Judging by the experience of the past, both peaceful means and violence have had difficulties ... under the promise of saving the country and people, I sincerely wish to make progress towards unity in order to achieve the major goal of peace.[lxxxvi]
While the telegram was ambiguous as to how this was to be accomplished, his argument indicated that a negotiated peace was the approach to be taken. The prospects for military unification in 1918 had never looked bleaker, with a stalemate having ensued with defeats of northern troops along the Guangdong and Fujian provincial borders [lxxxvii]. This was compounded by the reticence by the northern warlord factions to commit to another campaign against the south. Diplomatic pressure was also beginning to be applied from foreign powers for there to be a resolution to the domestic troubles in China, with the British Prime Minister George and the United States President Wilson both urging peace.
Xu Shichang had been elected with broad support across the northern factions and had considerable prestige because of his recent election, but the policy of a peaceful negotiation was not favoured by Duan Qirui and his Anhui Clique, as well as other dujuns such as Zhang Zuolin. Xu Shichang thus needed to be extremely careful in how he was to go about pursuing his peace policy, as any missteps would destroy the broad consensus among the northern factions that his power rested on. He was therefore faced with two serious challenges; getting the southern government to respond favourably and quickly enough to any proposed negotiations such as to overcome the hostility of Duan’s faction, while also ensuring that he maintained the support of the northern factions that his power was derived from. Xu therefore refrained from explicitly going for negotiations immediately, despite it being viewed by some that it was his intended approach. He instead sought to sound out the attitudes of the southern factions with regards to their positions in any peace negotiations, while also building up his political position in the north in order to be prepared to meet Duan Qirui and the other pro-war dujuns.
As part of his preparations, Xu sought to establish political alliances and win the support of powerful political figures in the northern government that would be able to support him in his future struggle with Duan Qirui. This included convincing Cao Rulin, an experienced loan negotiator with extensive financial connections that would be important in gaining Xu the funds needed for the negotiations, to continue to serve in his government [lxxxviii]. Xu was successful in this by leveraging his long relationship with Cao, which dated all the way back to when Xu had recommended Cao for promotion during the Qing, as well as offering Cao the ability to serve as both Minister of Finance and Minister of Communications.
Further political alliances were also established with the Research Clique headed by Liang Qichao and Xiong Xiling, which had been alienated by Duan due to him failing to support them despite their previous assistance in the aftermath of Zhang’s attempted restoration, leading to the Anfu Club beating many of their candidates in the election [lxxxix]. Xu therefore appointed Liang and other Research Clique members as part of the recently created Committee on Foreign Policy, advising the president on foreign matters and being paid well for their work; having become incredibly resentful over Duan’s treatment of them, they attacked Duan publicly and aligned themselves with Xu against their common enemy.
Xu also invested significant time and effort into gaining popular support for his future peace initiative among the general public. To do this, he established the Peace Promotion Society on October 15th, 1918, which was filled with and run by Xu’s allies in the OCC and the Research Clique, and was aimed at promoting the importance of the peace effort and bringing in to the fore of the national agenda[xc] . This organisation would serve as a key piece of political machinery in providing support for Xu’s peace policy, with the Society successfully influencing the media through bringing forward new plans to resolve key constitutional issues and organising conferences to bring the peace effort to the top of the national agenda.
The non-political façade of the organisation also enabled it to attract the support of a number of key figures who otherwise would have been uncomfortable directly taking sides in a partisan power conflict between Duan and Xu. These included moderate KMT members, former presidents (Li Yuanhong and Feng Guozhang both), major industrialists, prominent intellectual figures and representatives from all the major northern factions aside from Duan Qirui[xci]. The non-partisan façade of the organisation even allowed it to act as an effective organising tool by which to draw the support of even some Anfu club members, with considerable financial incentives employed to entice them into attending the society’s meetings and convince them to join the peace movement [xcii]. Through this organisation and the façade of non-partisanship, various prestigious and prominent figures from all across the country were convinced to support Xu’s peace efforts and bolster its’ legitimacy.
Public declaration of peace policy
Xu Shichang publicly announced his peace policy towards the southern government on October 23rd in response to the telegram issued by his follower, Acting Premier Qian Nengxun, to the Guangzhou government, offering peace negotiations [xciii]. Xu then followed this by issuing a presidential mandate that ordered respect for peace, reiterating that the time had come for the Chinese to cease fighting one another, just as the Europeans had ceased their own struggles.
The response by the Guangzhou government was swift, with Cen Chunxuan issuing a telegram to Beijing on the 30th of October that argued for a peace conference between the two sides with equal representation. Policy proposal for the conference was passed by Beijing on the 12th of November, with an armistice in Hunan province being issued on the 16th. The leaders of the southern government communicated their request for a quick beginning to the conference.
Xu took steps to overcome the opposition of the pro-war dujuns in the north. To this end, he called for them to attend a conference in Beijing regarding the policy towards the south, where in invited Zhang Zuolin, Zhao Ti, Zhang Huaizhi, Yan Xishan, Cai Chengxun, Lu Yongxiang, Ni Sichong, Yang Shandi, Chen Guangyuan, Cao Kun and Wang Zhanyuan [xciv]. Cao Kun, still bitter about being passed over for the vice-presidency, deliberately delayed in coming, but the other military governors readily accepted [xcv].
As they awaited the arrival of Cao Kun, the northern dujuns debated and discussed what the appropriate policy towards the south ought to be. Zhang Huaizhi and Ni Sichong both quickly announced their support for the peace policy [xcvi]. Such attitudes were the exception, however, as most of the dujuns remained uncompromising in their opposition to peace negotiations. This was seen with Zhang Zuolin, who ominously stated at a banquet hosted by the Anfu Club on November 7th that “there is definitely no reason to dissolve the new parliament as part of a compromise with Guangzhou. Parliament is the organ which elected the president. If we can’t preserve parliament, we can hardly continue to uphold the president.”[xcvii].
Xu Shichang’s position was strengthened by the news of a European armistice on November 11th which, in conjunction with his own reputation and the propaganda offensive he had been directing since October, caused the dujuns to grudgingly accede to the peace policy [xcviii]. This agreement to negotiations was mostly in name only, as the dujuns insisted on conditions for negotiations that would make its’ success very unlikely. These included things such as insisting on no equal representation between the two sides, demanding that it not be a ‘peace’ conference but a ‘reconstruction’ conference between the ‘legitimate government’ and ‘rebels’, and demanding no compromise on the question of the continuation of the current northern parliament [xcix]. They also insisted that if the negotiations failed, they reserved the right to take up arms against the south once again.
Duan Qirui’s Response
Jin Yunpeng, Minister of War
Li Chun, pro-peace military governor of Jiangsu Province and ally of Xu Shichang
Duan Qirui was not idle in the face of Xu Shichang’s attempt at asserting a peace policy in defiance of Duan’s own. The Anfu Club obstructed Xu’s government in parliament by opposing Qian’s nomination to becoming Premier, due to Qian’s role in assisting Xu in carrying out the peace policy, one which posed an existential threat to the parliament [c]. They sought to block submission of Qian’s name by bringing a bill before parliament to impeach him for supposed abuses of authority in his current position during his time as minister of the interior. He also had his allies like Zhang Zuolin threaten the pro-peace dujun Li Chun, who had been assisting Xu Shichang’s preparations for the peace conference and acting as his right-hand man, by instructing them to deploy their troops in the vicinity of Li Chun’s territory[ci].
Duan Qirui himself was busy expanding the functions of the War Participation Bureau to encroach upon and interfere with the government ministries, undermining Xu’s administration. Xu for his part had been conversely attempting to weaken Duan Qirui’s position, namely by exploiting conflict between Duan Qirui and Jin Yunpeng, a major military general and previously one of Duan’s most trusted allies before they had a falling out. Xu appointed Jin Yunpeng to the position of Minister of War, who then proceeded to aggressively expand the functions of the Ministry of War at the expense of Duan’s War Participation Bureau, undermining Duan’s powerbase.
Cao Kun and some of the other prowar dujuns established the ‘War Participation Comrades’ Association’, for the effective purpose of showing solidarity in the face of the push for peace [cii]. They argued that the south needed to disband their troops first, and only after would the north disband their own forces [ciii]. The Anfu club repeatedly demanded that Cao Kun be made the vice-president, else they’d refuse to allow Qian’s nomination as premier to pass through. It was because of these issues that Xu had the dujuns remain in Beijing for further discussions.
Breaking the deadlock
Paul Samuel Reinsch, United States ambassador to China
On December 2nd, the ministers for the five allied powers - Japan, Britain, America, France and Italy - were received by President Xu, during which they handed him an aide-memoire co-signed by the powers which said that “while refraining from taking any steps which might obstruct peace, both parties ... seek without delay, by frank confidence, the means of obtaining reconciliation” [civ]. An identical note was also handed over to the southern government.
The note went on to say that:
In taking this action to express earnest sympathy with the efforts of both sides to achieve a solution of the difficulties that have hitherto divided them, the Government aforesaid desire to make clear that in doing so, they do not contemplate any ulterior plan of intervention and no desire to control or influence the particular terms of the adjustment which must remain for the Chinese themselves to arrange.
The fortuitous timing of this had been no coincidence, as Xu Shichang had been surreptitiously influencing the timing of when the letter would be delivered for some time [cv]. Xu had been keeping in close contact with Paul Reinsch, de facto leader of the foreign delegations and ambassador for America, successfully lobbying him for support of his peace policy, leading to Reinsch endorsing Xu’s policies and increasing Xu’s prestige [cvi].
Xu Shichang also sent Liang Shiyi to Japan to lobby the new Hara cabinet that had replaced the pro-Duan Terauchi cabinet in September, 1918 [cvii]. The new Japanese prime minster Hara Takashi had previously opposed the policy of supporting Duan Qirui, and believed that Japan needed to once again become a respectable imperial power and rein in the excesses it had freely indulged in while the other powers had been distracted by World War 1 [cviii]. If Japan failed to correct its’ overreach and minimise the suspicions of the other powers who were now returning their attention to Asia, it ran the risk of becoming isolated, he argued.
This attitude manifested itself with the previously mentioned Japanese support for the aide-memoire, yet Japan remained reluctant to fully support the other initiatives to control the provisions of loans and arms to China [cix]. Despite belated attempts by the Hara government to preserve their position, a combination of Xu’s lobbying and intense pressure by the United States and Britain finally caused the Hara cabinet to issue the following statement on December 3rd, wherein they told Japanese banks to suspend advances on loans to China[cx]:
…loans supplied to China, under the existing conditions of domestic strife in that country, are liable to create misunderstandings on the part of either of the contending factions, and to interfere with the reestablishment of peace and unity in China, so essential to her own interests as well as to the interests of foreign Powers. Accordingly, the Japanese Government have decided to withhold such financial assistance to China, as is likely, in their opinion, to add to the complications of her internal situation.
Japan continued to exhibit a disparity in their cooperative rhetoric and their steadfast efforts at trying to preserve some form of unilateral arms shipments and financial support in the face of concerted Western pressure, with Duan’s War Participation Bureau continuing to receive arms and money for months after the announcement[cxi]. Nevertheless, this announcement significantly alarmed the military factions supported by Japan in China, who saw Japan’s position in the country becoming increasingly embattled and weakened by Western pressure, with the future provision of funds and arms increasingly drawn into question [cxii].
The combination of the aide-memoire in support of peace and Japan’s announcement had the effect of crushing Xu Shichang’s opposition and forcing them to stand down. Qian Nengxun’s nomination as Premier passed through parliament, and the pro-war dujuns who had remained in Beijing immediately dropped their opposition to the policy of negotiations. Now would come the formation of the new cabinet and preparations for the peace negotiations.
Preparation for the Peace Conference.
Zhu Qiqian, leader of the Northern delegation
Qian Nengxun, Premier of the Republic of China from 1918-1919
Tang Shaoyi, leader of the Southern delegation
As soon as the deadlock had been broken, Xu Shichang moved to announce the composition of the peace delegation as swiftly as possible before it could become the subject of factional wrangling. By the time the northern dujuns got around to sending telegrams that each province should be able to appoint their own representatives, it was too late, as Xu publicly announced the list of delegates on the 11th of December.
There had previously been disagreement on the number of delegates, with the north arguing that it be equal to the number of districts and provinces that each respective side controlled - which would have given the north 20 delegates and left the south with 5 delegates - while the southern government insisted that there be equal representation of 10 delegates for both sides. The Beijing government again agreed to the southern government’s terms.
Xu Shichang wanted to have Liang Shiyi lead the delegation, but this was protested and obstructed by the members of the Anfu club, likely because of the animosity they held to Liang for his role in blocking their plan to elect Cao Kun to the vice-presidency several months ago. Xu therefore appointed Zhu Qiqian, a long-time follower of Xu since the early days and his adopted son, who had been serving as Minister of the Interior in previous cabinets. That Zhu was a native of the southern province of Guizhou would also no doubt have been an advantage in having him deal with the Southern delegation.
The other members of the northern delegation consisted of Wu Dingchang, Wang Kemin, Fang Shu, Wang Yuling, Jiang Shaojie, Shi Yu, Liu Enge, Li Guozhe and Xu Fusu[cxiii].
In this selection of members of the northern delegation, Xu Shichang managed to adequately represent the key northern political factions whose cooperation would be needed for the any successful peace negotiations. In addition, while the Anfu Club was appropiately represented strongly in the makeup of the northern delegation, Xu cleverly ensured that the chosen Anfu members also had other connections aside from just the Anfu Club, serving the dilute the actual influence and representation that they commanded in the delegation.
Wu Dingchang, for instance, was a non-MP member of the Anfu Club, but also had strong ties with the New Communications Clique that was led by Xu’s ally and current Minister for Communications and Finance, Cao Rulin, and was also a close ally of the Old Communications Clique in his occupation as a banker. The other delegates ostensibly representing Duan Qirui and the Anfu Club likewise had other loyalties that could conflict with the Anfu Club’s designs; Fang Shu had served in Xu’s secretariat, Wang Yuling was only loosely associated with them due his role in publishing the Genyan Bao (a major pro-Anfu newspaper) and was also associated with the Communications Clique through having previously been a subordinate of Liang Shiyi, Jiang Shaojie was a senator and member of the Anfu Club, but also represented the military governor Ni Sichong’s interests as well, and Liu Enge was the head of the Manchurian delegation in the parliament, and thus also represented Zhang Zuolin’s interests. The delegates that weren’t connected to the Anfu Club consisted of Shi Yu, who had previously served in Li Chun’s secretariat and had worked on Li’s behalf, in addition to Li Guozhe and Xu Fusu, who represented the Research Clique.
The Shanghai Peace Conference
The person standing is Zhu Qiqian, the general representative of the North. On the left side of the conference table are representatives from the South, from left to right: Wang Boqun, Guo Chunsen, Miao Jiashou, Zhang Shizhao, Tang Shaoyi, Hu Hanmin, Zeng Yan, Liu Guanglie, Peng Yunyi, Li Shuying, Zhong Wenyao. In front of the door and behind the table is Jia Shiyi on the right and Zhou Yichun on the left.
The opening of the conference was delayed due to several outstanding disagreements between the two sides, some of which were key to the framing and nature of the conference. There was the argument by northern factions that the conference be a ‘reconstruction’ conference, versus the southern government pushing for it to be a ‘peace’ conference. Xu Shichang and the northern dujuns wanted the conference to be held in Nanjing, controlled by a military governor that recognised the Bejing government and had actively supported the peace process (Li Chun, Military Governor of Jiangsu), whereas the south insisted that it be held at the foreign concession of Shanghai, which stood as neutral ground, and had previously served as the site of the 1911 negotiations that saw the end of the Qing Dynasty [cxiv].
Lu Rongting and Cen Chunxuan both privately indicated their willingness to concede on these matters to Wu Peifu, viewing them as trivial and wanting the conference to be under way as quickly as possible, but Tang Shaoyi would not relent and refused to budge [cxv]. While the Beijing government eventually gave ground on this matter, Tang Shaoyi’s behaviour had disturbed Zhu Qiqian, due to his willingness to jeopardise the future of the conference on unimportant matters [cxvi].
The most pressing matter that served to act as the first major problem of the conference was the matter of a truce at fronts where the north and southern forces were fighting. The Beijing government had ordered a truce in Hunan, but forces in Fujian and Shaanxi continued to fight their southern counterparts [cxvii]. The southern camp insisted that the truce be applied to all fronts as a precondition for negotiations, to which the Beijing government partially acceded to by ordering a truce in Fujian, but not in Shaanxi, claiming that they were only engaging in bandit suppression.
The reasons for this were that Xu did not want to recognise Shaanxi’s status as a contested province that could be the subject of negotiations, in addition to the fact that the KMT-aligned force of the Jingguo Army led by Yu Youren in Shaanxi was close to being exterminated at the time [cxviii]. Furthermore, the northern dujuns were convinced that Shaanxi was vital to their territorial integrity and security, and thus did not wish to yield it. After vehement protest from the southern military government, wherein they stated that they would not participate in any conference until their position in Shaanxi was recognised, Xu and the northern camp compromised with their demands. A five-point agreement was eventually reached on Shaanxi through the mediation of Li Chun, wherein both sides consented to a temporary ceasefire, in addition to an inspector that was acceptable to both sides being sent to delineate spheres of control between the northern and southern camp and verify the truce [cxix]. The position eventually fell upon a retired official by the name of Zhang Ruiji, who had an excellent reputation in Shaanxi Province in addition to having good relations with both Yu Youren and Chen Shufan.
After these two months of preconference negotiations, the Shanghai Peace Conference was formally opened on the 20th of February 1919 at the former German Chambers of Commerce in the foreign concessions in Shanghai [cxx]. However, the issue of the truce in Shaanxi Province arose once again in the very first meeting in the conference. Tang accused Beijing of failing to abide by the terms of the truce and demanded that the pro-war military governor of Shaanxi, Chen Shufan, be replaced. He also questioned whether Xu Shichang was even genuine in their desires for peace, and if Xu would even have the power to uphold it. The reasons for these actions by Tang was likely heavily influenced by radical members of the Guangzhou government pressuring him to take a hard stance, in addition to Yu Youren – who had never been in favour of negotiations to begin with – repeatedly complaining and sending inflammatory reports to Tang of incursions by Chen Shufan against him despite the truce.
The truth was that both sides were involved in violations of the truce, as they were eager to strengthen their positions in anticipation of the arrival of Zhang Ruiji. Chen Shufan believed it ridiculous to stop the conflict in the province at the time when the northern forces had achieved superiority and were on the crux of crushing the other side, particularly considering he had just won several victories against Yu’s forces in southern Shaanxi in the middle of February. Furthermore, there was an actual widespread problem of banditry in the province, with Chen and the northern government viewing the agreement as not restricting them in attacking bandits. Chen no doubt gained to benefit from this due to how several bandit groups were aligned with the southern troops. However, though Chen might have argued that his actions were legitimate and keeping in the terms of the truce, Tang simply saw Chen opportunistically labelling the southern forces as ‘bandits’ such as to continue hostilities against Yu Youren under a false pretext.
Tang Shaoyi issued an ultimatum in late February, in which he demanded that Beijing replace Chen Shufan as military governor of Shaanxi, and publicly acknowledge that they had mishandled the situation and violated the truce, else he would withdraw from the negotiations in 48 hours. Zhu Qiqian made attempts to resolve the situation, but the stated terms made any attempt at conciliation extremely difficult, as Chen Shufan was a powerful military figure who could not simply be dismissed with ease, and conceding to the demands would have led to the humiliation of the Beijing Government. Accordingly, two weeks after it had been opened, the conference was adjourned on the 2nd of March.
Private negotiations between Zhu Qiqian and Tang Shaoyi began after the adjournment to resolve the situation, in addition to public pressure from the likes of Wu Peifu and the Yangtze military governors, as well as foreign pressure induced by Xu Shichang’s visits with foreign representatives. The inspector to Shaanxi also confirmed that there was a serious banditry problem present, and that many of the inflammatory claims that Yu Youren had made had in fact been exaggerated. As a result, Tang found it difficult to continue his hardline position, and backed down on his demands. On the northern side, Xu Shichang used the breakdown of negotiations to force Chen Shufan, who had failed in his attempt to defeat the remainder of Yu Youren’s forces, to abide by the truce and cease making any further advances. Accordingly, the conference reconvened on the 9th of April.
The second session of the Conference.
With the reconvention of the Conference in early April, several critical issues between the two camps had been resolved, yet more remained to be grappled with. One of the key issues concerned the matter of the military, and the role it was to play in the future government. As some radical factions in the southern government had seen it, the main issue that had been crippling the stability of China and undermining its’ governance was the military, particularly with respect to the role that Duan Qirui and his allies had played in dismissing the original parliament, and that it was necessary that they suffer consequences for their actions. This led to Sun Yat-sen and other radical figures of the southern government pressing for Duan Qirui and his associates to be punished as a condition for the peace agreement, placing Tang Shaoyi under enormous pressure.
When Tang Shaoyi tried to bring forth this demand however, Zhu Qiqian adamantly refused to even discuss the matter, arguing that it had no place in the discussion of the conference, and even implied that the northern delegation would withdraw if Tang Shaoyi continued to insist on a punishment clause. The deeply hostile response to the demand was in clear contrast to their previous willingness to be conciliatory on other issues, yet was unsurprising, as such a clause had always been non-negotiable for Xu; however much that Duan was a political rival of his, Xu was still reliant on his cooperation. As a result, any attempt to ‘punish’ Duan was a non-starter, putting aside how Duan would never accept such a punishment without a fight, nor any of the other military governors in the northern government.
With the view of the fact that the only people who would gain from a collapse of negotiations was Duan Qirui, Tang recognised the necessity to back down on this demand, particularly given that other southern factions such as Lu Rongting’s were heavily invested in the success of the conference, yet the underlying issue for elements in the southern government remained. Afterall, if Duan Qirui were to keep his position without any adjustment whatsoever, than what use would the negotiations be? Would he not remain in a position to pose a clear threat to the southern provinces, and potentially tear down the agreement once he was able to do so? Thus, while conceding on this matter, Tang changed his attention to the War Participation Army (WPA), which ostensibly existed for the purpose of fighting in WW1, but was clearly intended to strengthen Duan’s domestic position by serving as his personal military force.
The southern delegation pushed for the WPA to be disbanded immediately, identifying its’ continued existence as a major threat to them and arguing that there was no need to maintain them, as World War 1 had already ended. The northern government pushed back against this, arguing that a peace settlement had still yet to be reached in the European conflict, and argued that such a matter was to the discretion of the northern government and was not relevant to the conference proceedings. This reticence by the northern government to the south’s demands likely stemmed from several factors, ranging from the fact that disbanding the WPA would sap Duan’s authority to an unacceptable degree (Duan had already voiced his staunch opposition), and that it was viewed by some that the very threat the WPA posed to the south was a key reason for why they came back to the negotiating table.
Additionally, various key dujuns in the southern government sought to press Beijing for financial support, due to the major fiscal crisis in the south because of the conflict with Beijing between 1917-1918, in addition to needing more financial resources with which to disband the many soldiers that they had conscripted for this conflict. These southern figures pushed for significant support, adroitly recognising that they were in a good position because of Xu’s need to secure peace. The fact that the more financial support they had, the better prepared they would be for the parliamentary elections that were sure to come following the successful conclusion of the conference no doubt also served as added motivation for pressing for more support.
Despite Beijing’s own financial difficulties and the sensitive matter of the WPA to the northern dujuns, as well as the increasing air of tension and suspicion between both sides, the north and the south were able to agree and come to terms on these issues. The WPA was not to be disbanded, however, it was to be downsized as part of a broader program of reducing the number of military forces in the whole country. For the matter of support for the southern provinces, Xu and Zhi addressed the issue with a brilliant solution - contracting a loan with a foreign consortium. This was a masterstroke for Xu, because the foreign powers would be unable to refuse granting a loan that they knew would be critical to the success of the conference and securing peace in China, while the southern government knew that the loan (and the financial support earmarked for them) would not be granted without a restoration of unity in China, incentivising the south to achieve and maintain peace. Though the agreed amount ended up lower than what the south had initially asked for, the two sides were able to accept this.
However, all this progress would be for naught if the fundamental question that lay at the heart of the conflict between both the two sides remained unresolved.
The matter of the Constitution
The issue of the constitution lay at the heart of the Shanghai Peace Conference, for it had been Duan Qiuri’s refusal to reconvene the original parliament and the establishment of a rival parliament in the south that had precipitated the civil war. Simply restoring the status quo as it had existed in 1917 was undesirable by many key figures such as Duan Qirui and Sun Yat-sen, as that period had been marked by rampart dysfunction and had failed to work well. A solution was therefore needed that could reconcile the two rival parliaments that were competing for legitimacy, while also achieving an effective constitutional settlement that addressed the issues that had existed with the pre-1917 constitutional order such as to provide a firm basis for stability going forward, in addition to maintaining the overall continuity and legitimacy of the Chinese republic.
The exact nature of the solution to this issue would also have significant ramifications for the political landscape of the republic and the major players thereof. If the provisional parliament was to be restored in its’ entirety or the Guangzhou government granted supremacy, then Sun Yat-sen and the southern factions could expect to be significant political players in the years to come, whereas if the northern parliament and the constitutional revisions made during its’ tenure ere retained, then Duan Qirui and the northern dujuns would continue to dominate. More immediate consequences lay for the hundreds of political figures that held seats in the parliaments that might potentially lose them depending on the chosen solution, costing them their livelihoods and political positions.
It was therefore not surprising that this was a very heated and important issue in which both sides were heavily invested; in fact, it had been this very recognition of its’ importance that Zhu Qiqian and Tang Shaoyi agreed to have it addressed last, as having it discussed earlier could lead to discussions on the other issues becoming negatively impacted. With a desire on both sides to construct a new constitutional settlement that was superior to 1917, a variety of proposals were then put forward for bringing this about in a manner acceptable to all the northern and southern factions. These included suggestions such as combining both parliaments to draft a new constitution and dissolve itself, or recalling the original parliament of 1913 for the sole purpose of drafting a new constitution and dissolving itself, among others.
The most notable of the proposals put forward by the north was one wherein both parliaments were to be dissolved simultaneously, with either a selection of members of both or a new election determining the composition of a new single parliament. This new parliament would then take charge of revising electoral rules and drafting a permanent constitution, in addition to retaining Xu Shichang as president. This was seen as a promising settlement, as it did not entail an outright defeat for either side, prioritised creating a permanent constitution that would resolve the issues with the old provisional constitution, and allowed for new elections that would relegitimise the republic.
This scenario was undesirable for both Sun Yat-sen’s faction in the south and Duan Qirui and the Anfu club in the north, for with the former it was clear that he would not do remotely as well in any new elections as was the case with the old parliament, whereas the later were reticent about any moves that would dissolve the northern parliament they dominated and cost many of them their positions. Sun Yat-sen and his faction pressured Tang Shaoyi significantly over this matter, even if it meant the collapse of peace talks, as it was preferable to him that talks fail rather than a settlement be reached that would be unfavourable to him with respect to his future political position. Duan Qirui and his Anfu club allies were likewise agitating against Xu Shichang, arguing that Zhu Qiqian had no right to discuss such constitutional matters and threatening to impeach him, in addition to attempting exert pressure on the government by announcing that they would not accept any proposal to dissolve the Anfu-dominated northern parliament.
Despite attempts by his opponents within the north and radical factions in the south, Xu Shichang and Zhu Qiqian pushed forward, confident of their ability to force the northern factions to accept whatever settlement that they were able to wring out of the peace conference. With regards to the south, as detailed earlier, Xu had already offered significant financial inducements to various prominent southern leaders for their support for peace, in addition to outright bribery of various members of the Guangzhou government and the Kuomintang to gain their support, to mixed success. Xu also sought to influence more moderate members of the southern parliament like Wu Jinglian to convince them to break with Sun and come to terms with Beijing. This was to pay off, with Wu and other moderate members of the Guangzhou parliament coming to believe that they could achieve good terms with Xu, and even coming to believe that it was in fact in their interests to ensure that Xu was successful and maintained his power, as any probable alternatives, such as Duan Qirui, would be far worse for them; they now needed Xu as much as Xu needed them. The fact that the south achieving any victory by military means was increasingly a distant prospect no doubt served to reinforce the belief that negotiating was the best means to achieve the best possible outcomes available to them.
With their failure to obstruct Xu and the momentum increasing towards acceptance of a settlement, the Anfu Club came to realise that the tide was firmly against them and finally conceded in April the idea that dissolving both parliaments would be acceptable to them, even though it would spell the end of the very political organ they dominated. Some members of the northern parliament even went as far as stating that they could potentially accept dissolving the northern parliament and retaining the southern counterpart, provided other matters were met. Coming to see that a settlement was inevitable, members of the northern parliament resolved to actively involve themselves in the drafting of the peace settlement, rather than letting their futures be dictated to them by Xu and the south.
In the south, Sun Yat-sen and his faction became increasingly unhappy with the progress of events at the time, seeing his own hardline position and goal of hufa being discarded and rejected as the other southern factions prepared themselves for accommodation with the north. It was claimed that as many as 200 members of the southern parliament were in Shanghai so that they might be involved in the creating of the settlement, despite pleas from Guangzhou and condemnation from Sun’s faction, highlighting the extent to which the various factions of the south had come to accept accommodation with Beijing over further conflict.
While the Shanghai Peace Conference had yet to formally conclude by the end of April, it was clear that the two sides were able to overcome this significant hurdle to the acceptance of most factions on both sides, with a negotiated settlement of some form or another becoming inevitable. Xu Shichang’s effort to achieve peace over the stringent opposition of powerful factions in both the south and north appeared to be near to completion, the final success of which would entrench Xu in his position as a figure with genuine political authority for years to come.
Unbeknownst to Xu at the end of April, events taking place in Paris were about to cause a political storm in the Chinese Republic.
The May 4th Incident
News emerged in early May that the Versailies Conference would not see the former German concessions located in Shandong returned to China, instead being transferred to the control of Japan, despite China’s participation in the war on the side of the Entente [cxxi]. This led to students in Beijing protesting, which then escalated with them storming the house of Cao Rulin and setting fire to it, in addition to violently attacking another minister. At the end of the day, 30 students were arrested.
This elevated the matter of the Shandong concessions to the fore of public attention displacing other matters, including the peace negotiations. The Beijing government itself struggled to determine an acceptable response, as they knew that there was enormous sympathy for the students among the public, yet the government was equally cognisant that failing to adequately punish them could open them up to attack from the northern dujuns and other establishment figures.
The situation continued to escalate as a wave of student activism erupted in major cities across the country and a boycott against Japanese goods initiated, with demands made that Xu release the imprisoned students, reject the treaty, and punish both Duan Qirui and Cao Rulin for being traitors[cxxii]. These demands were extremely difficult for Xu to consider undertaking, as it would make him look weak, damage the international image of the Chinese government, discredit him among his close allies and require him to directly attack the powerful northern military establishment – an impossible prospect for him, considering the precariousness of his position. Further complicating matters was immense Japanese pressure placed on Xu to quell the surge of violence being directed towards Japanese nationals in China, and hostility towards Japan at large [cxxiii].
It was in the face of this that the fragile consensus upon which Xu Shichang’s power rested began to dissolve, with various northern dujuns and parties exploiting the current controversy to pursue their own agendas, chief among whom being Duan Qirui. Duan used Xu’s failing position to attempt once again to assert complete control over the government by pushing to have the current pro-Xu premier replaced the Anfu Club member Wang Yitang, in addition to inflaming prospects of a coup and general efforts to discredit Xu among his allies and the public at large [cxxiv]. The various members of the northern parliament also proceeded to cast themselves as patriots attempting to defend national sovereignty through openly attacking Xu and Qian over Shandong, their motivations likely stemming in part to gain popular support, in addition to wanting to damage a president that had been so willing to disregard their political interests during the peace conference [cxxv].
The events in Beijing were also not missed by Sun Yat-sen and his radical faction, who opportunistically used the occasion to criticise the northern government as tyrannical and fanning the flames of the student movement in defending national sovereignty, to the point that Sun personally encouraged them on several occasions and offered material and financial support [cxxvi]. Sun also used this to exert pressure on the rest of the Guangzhou government to condemn the northern government and push Tang to finally adopt a hardline position at the conference, realising that Sun had been given a perfect opportunity to ruin peace negotiations [cxxvii].
This outcome was borne out on the 10th of May when Tang Shaoyi issued a series of demands to the Northern delegation that were completely extreme and detached from the previous negotiations, including demands Cao Rulin and Duan Qirui be punished [cxxviii]. Tang either believed that the weakness of the northern government in the face of the protests gave him space to push for extreme demands, or he simply sought a pretext to resign from the negotiations. Zhu Qiqian attempted to convince the southern delegation to adjust their demands, but to not avail; on the 13th of May, 1919, the southern delegation resigned from the conference. The Shanghai Peace Conference had collapsed in its’ final stretch, and with it went Xu Shichang’s endeavour for peace.
Later Years
In the aftermath of the May 4th Incident and the collapse of the Shanghai Peace Conference, Xu’s power within the government was critically damaged, a situation further compounded by former allies like the Research Clique deserting him and inflaming the student movement, with Xu’s attempts at taking a moderate course between the students and the political establishment pleasing no-one. Following the resignation of Cao Rulin, who had broken with Xu due to feeling abandoned in the middle of the student protests, Xu Shichang and Qian Nengxun both offered their own resignations to parliament; Xu’s resignation was refused, but the Anfu dominated parliament enthusiastically accepted Qian’s, replacing him with the Anfu Club member Gong Xinzhan as premier [cxxix].
For the remaining three years of his presidency, Xu was reduced to political impotency as he attempted to weaken the stranglehold that the Anhui Clique had on the central government. Xu attempted this through trying to influence and play off different political factions against each other, such as by trying to exploit divisions within the Anhui Clique and working with rival military factions such as the Fengtian and Zhili Cliques [cxxx]. After the collapse of the Anhui Clique’s power in the aftermath of Zhili-Anhui War, Xu again attempted to exploit divisions between Zhang Zuolin and Cao Kun’s rival military cliques in an attempt at gaining political leverage [cxxxi].
Xu Shichang’s efforts were to come to naught, as he was never to regain the kind of control and political initiative that he had held in 1919. Following Cao Kun and Wu Peifu’s victory against Zhang Zuolin in the 1st Zhili-Fengtian War, Xu Shichang would be forced to resign by the victorious Zhili Clique in 1922, paving the way for Cao Kun’s election to the presidency [cxxxii]. Xu would live in retirement for the rest of his life, refusing all attempts to have him return to political life, passing away of natural causes on June 5th, 1939 in Tianjin at the age of eight-five [cxxxiii]. A Hong Kong paper reporting about his death wrote that “in the end Xu Shichang did not lose his standing as a Chinese scholar.”[cxxxiv].
Conclusion
The conventional assumptions of politics in the early republican period was that it was a time where warlords were able to effectively dominate and monopolise power and decision-making in national politics. The political role of civilian groups and figures were ultimately de facto subordinated to the will of the various military factions, at best serving as hapless figureheads and tools for legitimising the power of the military. While providing for the clear fact of military dominance in civil-military relations in the government during this period, it was not always the decisive factor in early republican politics, as can be seen with Xu Shichang’s early presidency in the time leading to the Shanghai Peace Conference.
During the events of 1918-1919, Xu Shichang was able to employ several means by which to bolster his political position and pursue his policy initiatives in the face of staunch military opposition; playing off rival military factions against each other, fostering support for his peace policy amongst the domestic population, extensively networking with various figures in the rival government, establishing political alliances with various civilian politicians and leveraging foreign support for his policy initiatives. Through this, Xu defied expectations that he would serve as nothing but a civilian figurehead and was able to emerge as one of the most important political figures in the country within months of his election, employing bold and intuitive strategies appropiate for his contemporary nickname of the ‘living Cao Cao’.
The events surrounding the collapse of the Shanghai Peace Conference in 1919 would also mark a noteworthy turning point in the early republican period, as the May 4th Incident significantly discredited the northern government and heavily polarisied the country, making the kinds of compromises that Xu had sought to reach a distant prospect. It would also see the southern government and Sun Yat-sen increasingly take a radical line as they tapped into the power of popular mobilisation, while the northern military factions took a firmer line towards the south, further contributing to political disunity. This would only be resolved decades later, in a China that had changed much from the one that Xu had started his career in.
***
[i] Howard L. Boorman & Richard C. Howard, ’Biographical Dictionary of Republican China Vol. 2′, pp 136.
[ii] Livingston Tallmadge Merchant, "The Mandarin President: Xu Shichang and the Militarization of Chinese Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1983), pp 21.
[iii] ibid
[iv] Allen Yuk-Lun Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution: Chinese politics, 1917-1919′ (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1996). pp 145
[v] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp. 21.
[vi] ibid
[vii] Boorman & Howard, ‘Biographical Dictionary’ Vol. 2, pp 136
[viii] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp. 22.
[ix] ibid
[x] Patrick Fuliang Shan 2018, ‘Yuan Shikai : A Reappraisal’, Vancouver, BC : UBC Press, pp. 28
[xi] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp. 24.
[xii] Boorman & Howard, ‘Biographical Dictionary’ Vol. 2, pp 136
[xiii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 146. The three highest scoring people were automatically offered the position of compiler at the Hanlin Academy, where they serve as advisors to the throne.
[xiv] Arhtur W. Hummel 1943, ‘Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912 Vol. 2′, 1943
[xv] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 27.
[xvi] ibid
[xvii] ibid
[xviii] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 27
[xix] ibid
[xx] ibid
[xxi] This period of Yuan’s life is covered in-depth in Shan, ‘Yuan Shikai’, pp. 32-55
[xxii] Hong Zhang (2019) Yuan Shikai and the Significance of his Troop Training at Xiaozhan, Tianjin, 1895–1899, The Chinese Historical Review, 26:1, 37-54,
[xxiii] ibid
[xxiv] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 31; Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 147. Both Fung and Merchant identify Xu Shichang’s position at Xiaozhan as a civilian advisor instead of a chief of staff, with Merchant explicitly stating that he wasn’t a chief of staff, citing Wang Bogong, Quan lu suibi, (Taipei, n.d.), pp. 138. This mistaken identification of his role as being chief of staff is present in a number of other scholarly works, and appears to originate from Xu’s entry in the biographical dictionary by Boorman & Howard.
[xxv] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 148.
[xxvi] ibid, pp 148-149
[xxvii] ibid, pp 49-50
[xxviii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 149.
[xxix] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 38
[xxx] Boorman & Howard, ‘Biographical Dictionary’, pp 136
[xxxi] ibid, 137
[xxxii] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 66-72
[xxxiii] Ibid, pp 72
[xxxiv] Ibid, pp 69-72
[xxxv] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 150
[xxxvi] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 151; Andrew Nathan, ’Peking Politics 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism’, pp 115
[xxxvii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 152
[xxxviii] ibid
[xxxix] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 122
[xl] Ibid, 124
[xli] Ibid, 124
[xlii] Ibid, 125
[xliii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 153; Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 126; Boorman & Howard, ‘Biographical Dictionary’, pp 137
[xliv] Patrick Fuliang Shan. 2018, ‘Yuan Shikai : A Reappraisal’, Vancouver, BC : UBC Press, pp 146
[xlv] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 133; Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 153
[xlvi] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 137
[xlvii] Shan, ‘Yuan Shikai’, pp 191; Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 157
[xlviii] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 160
[xlix] Oris Dewayne Fiesen 1982, ‘Republic to Monarchy: The Impact of the Twenty-One Demands Crisis on the Yuan Shih-k’ai Presidency’ 1914-1915’, Arizona State University.
[l] Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 167
[li] Boorman & Howard, ‘Biographical Dictionary’ Vol. 2, pp 138
[lii] Ho Man Chan. 1988, ‘The Revival of the Manchu Monarchy in the Early Republican China with Special Reference to the Restoration Movement of Chang Hsun’, pp 61; Merchant, 'The Mandarin President’, pp 170
[liii] Shan, ‘Yuan Shikai’, pp 227
[liv] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp 91
[lv] Exact ministerial appointments can be found in His-ping Shao’s dissertation, ‘Tuan Ch’i-Jui, 1912-1918: A case study of the military influence on the Chinese political development’, pp 143
[lvi] Zhang Guogan. "Jindaishi pianduan de jilu", Jindaishi ziliao no.37 (1978:2), pp. 165.
[lvii] Zhang Guogan, "Zhonghua minguo neige bian", Jindaishi ziliao no.40 (1979:3), pp. 175
[lviii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp 29.
[lix] Chan, ‘The Revival of the Manchu Monarchy’, pp. 123-126
[lx] Xu Shichang and Zhang Xun had previously disagreed strongly over proposals for the restoration of the Qing, see Chan, ‘The Revival of the Manchu Monarchy’, pp. 71
[lxi] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp 92
[lxii] Joshua Hill 2019, ‘Voting as a Rite: A History of Elections in Modern China’, Harvard University Press, pp 145
[lxiii] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp 113
[lxiv] Shao, ‘Tuan Ch’i-Jui’, pp 247-248; Nation, ‘Peking Politics’, 113
[lxv] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 76-77. Fung notes that a number of contemporary Guangdong-based newspapers paid little attention to Sun’s activities, instead focusing more on Lu Rongting and Chen Jiongming. He also notes, citing Shao Yunchong, "Guangazhou hufa riji", Jianguo yuekan, (vol.12, no.6), pp.6-7, that a number of Sun’s proposed ministerial appointments waited for approval from the likes of Lu Rongting and Tang Jiyao before taking their posts, again highlighting the degree to which these figures were viewed as the main locus of power for the Hufa movement instead of Sun.
[lxvi] This would again be later changed to a seven-men directorate in May 1918 which consisted of Cen Chunxuan, Tang Shaoyi, Wu Tingfang, Lin Baoyi (commander of the southern-aligned navy vessels after Cheng Biguang’s assassination), Lu Rongting, Tang Jiyao and Sun Yat-sen. This came about as an effort by moderate members of the southern parliament under Wu Jinglian, who were concerned of the urgent situation facing southern forces in the wake of their major defeats by Wu Peifu in April and had been increasingly alienated and frustrated by Sun’s neglectful and contemptuous attitude towards them. Wu saw this reorganisation as necessary to create a political structure that enabled all prominent southern stakeholders and factions like Lu Rongting and Tang Jiyao the ability to participate in decision-making and bolster unity among the Hufa forces. This is extensively discussed in Fung, ‘the struggle over the constitution’, pp. 88-100.
[lxvii] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 114
[lxviii] Ibid, pp. 116
[lxix] Merchant, ‘Mandarin President’, pp.199
[lxx] Shao, ‘Tuan Ch’i-Jui’, pp 279
[lxxi] Ibid. pp 252. The name ‘Nishihara Loans’ is a bit of a misnomer, as Shao writes in their footnote: “During the period from 1917 to 1918, the Terauchi cabinet invested in China over some 200 million yen through various Japanese banking groups. The Nishihara Loans represented but a portion of this investment. Secondly, Nishihara Kamezo was only an unofficial agent of Terauchi to establish contacts with the Peking government and to facilitate the execution of his economic diplomacy in China. Nishihara's name never appeared in any of the signed contracts, and it is impossible to identify all the loans which were concluded through his personal efforts. Over the years, the term Nishihara Loans acquired a special connotation which suggested reckless borrowing at tremendous sacrifice of China's natural resources and administrative integrity. The borrowed money was squandered in internal political strife.”
[lxxii] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 116
[lxxiii] Ibid, pp. 117
[lxxiv] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 176
[lxxv] Merchant, ‘Mandarin President’, pp. 200; there was widespread celebration in the Forbidden City following Xu’s inauguration: W.J.F. Jenner ed., ‘From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin Gioro Pu Yi’, pp.98-100
[lxxvi] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 164
[lxxvii] Ibid, 164-165
[lxxviii] Shao, ‘Tuan Ch’i-Jui’, pp. 279 - 280
[lxxix] Mackinnon, S. R. (1970). Liang Shih-i and the Communications Clique. The Journal of Asian Studies, 29(3), 581–602. https://doi.org/10.2307/2943245; Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 163
[lxxx] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 103; Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 163
[lxxxi] The reason why the OCC would be useful to Xu despite the Anfu Club commanding a two-thirds majority in the parliament lies in the specific constitutional system in place in China at the time, wherein it was required under the 1912 Provisional Constitution that three-quarters of the parliament needed to be present for a vote to be initiated. Simply by abstaining from voting, and by luring others from the Anfu club to do likewise, the OCC could frustrate any attempt by the Anfu Club to push a vote,
[lxxxii] Full translation of this telegram is given in Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 124-125
[lxxxiii] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 126.
[lxxxiv] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 175. This extended to even the Chief Director Cen Chunxuan, who despite condemning the election as unconstitutional still publicly praised Xu’s abilities and showed considerable regard and respect for him.
[lxxxv] Translation from Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 128.
[lxxxvi] Anthony B. Chan 2010, ‘Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-28,’ Second Edition, pp. 31
[lxxxvii] Shao, ‘Tuan Ch’i-Jui’, pp 253-255
[lxxxviii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 172
[lxxxix] Ibid, pp. 172
[xc] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 134.
[xci] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 179; Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 135-138.
[xcii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 179-180.
[xciii] Full translation of the peace mandate issued by Xu Shichang is recorded in Joseph V. Fuller 1930, ‘Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918’, United States Government Printing Office, Document 102.
[xciv] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 139.
[xcv] Ibid, pp. 140
[xcvi] Ibid
[xcvii] Ibid
[xcviii] Ibid, pp. 141
[xcix] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 196
[c] ibid, pp. 171 & pp. 175
[ci] Ibid, pp. 170
[cii] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 141.
[ciii] Ibid, pp. 141
[civ] Ibid, pp. 142
[cv] Ibid, pp. 143
[cvi] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 182
[cvii] Ibid, pp. 182
[cviii] Stephen J. Valone, “A Policy Calculated to Benefit China”: The United States and the China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929’, Greenwood Press, pp. 31
[cix] Ibid, pp. 34-35
[cx] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 142
[cxi] Valone, “A Policy Calculated to Benefit China”, pp. 42
[cxii] Jordan to Balfour, 11 November 1918, F.O. 371/3184, 187343, PRO. Sir John Jordan noted that the announcement by Tokyo had “alarmed Military authorities [in China] as they are almost entirely dependent on this money for support of their troops. … funds in hand will suffice to meet Military expenditures for the next six months.”
[cxiii]The information regarding the composition of the northern delegation, their background and their factional affiliations is taken from Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp 146-148
[cxiv] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 195-196
[cxv] Ibid, pp. 196
[cxvi] Ibid, pp. 197-198
[cxvii] Nathan, ‘Peking Politics’, pp. 151
[cxviii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 198
[cxix] Ibid, pp. 199
[cxx] Unless otherwise noted, the following account of the two sessions of the Shanghai Peace Conference is taken from Fung’s own excellent narrative of the conference in his Ph.D. dissertation ‘The struggle over the constitution: Chinese politics, 1917-1919′ (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1996), pp 203-238
[cxxi] Chow Tse-tsung 1960, ‘May Fourth Movement Intellectual Revolution in Modern China’, Harvard University Press, pp. 92
[cxxii] Chow Tse-tsung 1960, ‘May Fourth Movement’, pp. 128
[cxxiii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 245
[cxxiv] ibid, pp. 246-247
[cxxv] Ibid, pp. 248
[cxxvi] Chow Tse-tsung 1960, ‘May Fourth Movement’, pp. 125-126
[cxxvii] Fung, ‘The struggle over the constitution’, pp. 249-250
[cxxviii] Merchant, ‘Mandarin President’, pp. 217-219. Tang made eight demands, which included rejection of the Shandong settlement, renunciation of secret agreements with Japan, punishment of those responsible for the peace accords, demobilisation of Duan Qirui’s War Participation Army and removal of all bad military governors and commanders, invalidation of Li Yuanhong’s June 13th order from 1917 that disbanded the original 1913 parliament (which would necessarily require the disbanding of the northern parliament), establishment of a unity cabinet, settlement of other outstanding issues and recognition of Xu Shichang as the provisional president. Suffice it to say, these terms were not remotely acceptable for the north.
[cxxix] Merchant, ‘Mandarin President’, pp. 222
[cxxx] Boorman & Howard, ‘Biographical Dictionary’ Vol. 2, pp. 138
[cxxxi] Ibid, pp. 139
[cxxxii] Merchant, ‘Mandarin President’, pp. 224
[cxxxiii] Boorman & Howard, ‘Biographical Dictionary’ Vol. 2, pp 139
[cxxxiv] Merchant, ‘Mandarin President’, pp. 225
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