Findingself

a window to let out the voices in my head.

[eelapalan]

Sri Lanka: On borrowed time

Note: I meant to publish this few months ago but didnt get around to it due to a busy schedule. Some of the references are stale.

Sri Lanka: On borrowed time

Sinhala leaders of the Srilankan state continue to mis diagnose what ails the island. Two speeches of some significance were made a while ago. One by former president Chandrika Kumaratunga and another by Foreign minister Mangala Samaraweera.

The former president who waged a “war for peace” made her speech curiously titled “ Winning the war is not establishing peace”. Unfortunately, she does not seem to have any such epiphany when it comes to the root cause of the conflict.

The foreign minister was much more forthcoming about the shortcomings.  And had more specific things to say.

Yet both of them continue to dwell on the same outdated concepts. Thematically, both frame the conflict as “inequalities” through the dynamics of “majority” Vs “minority”.  

If the “third republican constitution” is going to be reflective of this mindset, then the ethnic conflict is sure to continue. Tamils can be sure that will be the case despite the hopeful writings and tweetings of the current Sinhala cosmopolitan liberals. As seen with the 19A, the final outcome will only be less than the initial attempts. And the starting baseline for the new constitution is already set too low.  Incrementalism is the way forward, we will be told.   

According to Mr.Samaraweera, the new constitution “will celebrate Sri Lanka’s ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and pluralism and meet the aspirations of all the peoples of Sri Lanka.”

For the Tamils, mere celebration of diversity means nothing. Good intentions alone don't qualify for celebrations. What matters are meaningful results. Current administration is still unable to release the occupied lands, release Tamil political prisoners, or demilitarize.

Any political reform must first explicitly recognize the Tamil nation and seek its consent to be in a union with the other nations in the island.       

Today Tamils are not told in specific terms what to expect from a political reform. It is very unlikely that any Sinhala political leader will ever go beyond a unitary state.

The U.S. and India no longer ( post regime change) have any incentives to support a political reform for the benefit of the Tamils.  

Then,  why are Sinhala leaders even attempting a reform ? or even talking about it ?

In the short term, the Sri Lankan economy is running, literally and figuratively, on borrowed time. Austerity measures need to be couched in a reform agenda.

In the long term, Sri Lankan state structure is far out of step with the global and regional trends. And it needs to show signs that it is trying to catch up ( to be discussed later )

On borrowed Money

Sri Lanka is one of the most indebted country in South Asia in more ways than one. It is in so much debt that it needs to borrow money just to pay the interest on previously borrowed money. Most of the post war growth was/is financed by debt.  

Between 2006 to 2012, The external debt grow twice as fast as the export revenue (1).

What is more critical was the type of liability Sri Lanka was incurring since 2005. It was increasingly non- concessional (1)

Source: http://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2013/05/14/sri-lankas-external-stability-foreign-debt-and-export-earnings/

And China played a convenient role in propping up the growth farce. It did it through non-concessional loans, given at higher than the market rate. (3)

The external debt servicing continued to increase since 2011 and now at about  25% level. (4)

Former President Chandrika Kumaratunga recently highlighted the dire economic situation, warning of bankruptcy. (5)

The west was working on toppling the Rajapakse regime, if the elections gambit hadn’t worked, through the OISL  process and the sanctions that were to follow.

When Ranil came to the fore, post elections, he was desperate for aid.  As evident in his Japan times op ed (6).  

“Sadly, the help that we have received so far is too little to enable my government to be as effective as it can and should be in rebuilding our country and resetting our strategic position in the world.”

Why didn't the aid pour in after the regime change? A change that the West and India so much supported.  

Because that is the new leverage West and India now hold over Sri Lanka.

The currency deal by India during PM Modi’s visit is an example of limited assistance.   Both the US and India conferred legitimacy on the new government and helped eased the UN pressure but withheld the monetary assistance. That economic assistance will come at a cost after the general election.

Sri lankans need to prepare themselves for the austerity measures the Ranil administration is going to bring to get the debt crisis under control.  That will likely to take precedence over any political reform. And if JVP also wins as much as the TNA in the general election, their leverage on a UNP lead administration will be much higher. Unlike with TNA, Ranil will have a real battle on his hands with JVP on any economic reform agenda. JVP had sounded the alarm multiple times before and has kept all of its options open. All of TNA’s bravado is sure to disappear post election because it has spent its goodwill too early and too soon.   

My write up, several years ago, about the China card is relevant here.   

“As long as Sri Lanka remains a market friendly country and is willing to pretend it is serious about reconciliation, the structural issues blocking a genuine peace will continued to be ignored by the powers.”

“China helping Sri Lanka to develop infrastructure also indirectly serves the US and India.  They do not have to spend money developing Sri Lanka and they can reap the benefits eventually. The more Sri Lanka develops, the more dependent it will become on the US and India.”

“While China continues to loan money for and help with infrastructure projects, America has integrated its purchasing power as an essential tool of its smart power.  America and the UK also have leverage over the IMF and World Bank lending to Sri Lanka.  If Sri Lanka continues as a market friendly country, these countries can continue to maintain their economic levers.”

As the west leans on Ranil for economic reform, he will need to please JVP and other Sinhala parties more than he will need to please TNA.  He is not going to risk the real, economic,  reform wanted by the powers over a pretend, political, reform. This is why getting an explicit promise from the West, India, and Ranil about very specific political reform was/is a must on the Tamil side. It was no time for an unconditional support or for a heart to heart agreement.

In addition to the interest Tamils are paying for the financial debt incurred by the Sinhala governments ( ironically on money borrowed to kill them indiscriminately ), Tamils will now have pay for the folly of tolerating leaders who run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. Their promises are not something that the Tamils can take to the bank.

http://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2013/05/14/sri-lankas-external-stability-foreign-debt-and-export-earnings/

3)http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/29/new-sri-lankan-government-hobbled-by-old-chinese-debts/

4)http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=123886

5) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/05/14/slec-m14.html

6)http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/04/08/commentary/world-commentary/winning-sri-lankas-peace/#.VcaSRBNViko

[eelapalan]

The allure of Colombo

By the Valentines day 2015, Colombo had managed to court back many of the jilted exes. They are the same coterie of capitals that were once fellow strategic travellers with Colombo but the relationship was starting to strain around 2010.

Neither why nor how these suitors were itching to get back together was a secret.

The end of cold war and the rise of China and India has made the Asia-Pacific and South-Asia the new theater of the “Great Game”.  The faster rate of change ( given the technical advances and the economic interconnects), compared to that of the cold war era, has also resulted in pieces of the puzzle moving or coalescing faster than before.  

A lot has been written about how much the American leadership will rely on unilateral initiatives to maintain its global leadership.  So that a need for a cold war type detente does not arise. And where a new and emerging power does not think of  itself as an equivalent to the US as Russia had presumably thought during the cold war.  American policyholders understand the difficulties in sustaining a unipolar world of American supremacy. But a global leadership is different than that.  America will continue to retain that for years to come.

In that spirit, this century will be defined more by the American pivot towards Asia- Pacific.  

South of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is on a strategic geo location. It is at the very center of a busy and fast growing maritime trade route.  The picture below shows the trade routes in the 2nd half of the 18th century and as of 2011.  

What the opening of the Suez canal and the growth of China’s economy has done to the Colombo port is obvious.  The Colombo port is ranked 34th among the world top container ports seeing about 4.31 million TEU’s ( Twenty foot Equivalent Units) (1).

Shanghai is now the largest port in the world in terms of container traffic. And China is also home to six of the top ten largest container ports in the world. The sheer volume of maritime traffic to and from China is unprecedented. And most of that Cargo at some point travels by south of Sri Lanka.  Obviously, for China to totally ensure its maritime supply security, it needs to dominate its supply route. And conversely, for America to “contain” that Chinese ambition, it needs to deny China total control.  The Indo-American competition courting the Indian Ocean countries, as also mentioned here, is through the paradigm of A2/ AD (Anti Access / Area Denial).

The ports in South of Sri Lanka are transhipment hub ports only. They are not a destination or an origination ports.  Thus the port’s economic contribution is only the revenue generated by the port authority for port entry, tonnage, handling etc. And it has some ancillary employment opportunities. The estimated economic value is about $50 per TEU (2). So at 4.3 Million TEU’s, the Colombo port may be generating little over $200 million in revenue per year amounting to approx only 2% of the total revenue.

China “assisted” with a lot of development in the Southern region of Sri Lanka that did not have a large economic multiplier for Sri Lanka. But it did multiply the wealth of many politicians.  China thought this would give it the economic foothold necessary under a prolonged Rajapakse regime. China has now reframed this “Strings of Pearl” strategy on its own terms as the Maritime Silk Road. But the regime change in Sri Lanka has slowed its objectives noticeably.   

As argued before,  the west and India will take over from China at an appropriate time once China spends it money.

South of Tamil Eelam

If South of Sri Lanka is a theater of operation for maritime trade, then South of Tamil Eelam ( currently east of Sri lanka )  will be a theater of operation if there is ever a naval confrontation in the Indian Ocean.

Before proceeding further, it is good to refresh on a Burma Connection here.

As America pivots towards Asia-Pacific, Indian policy makers continue to talk about “Look East”. As part of this initiative, India hosts an annual naval exercise curiously called “The Malabar exercise”.   

Note: The malabar coast is actually the South-West coastline of India which is current Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The British constantly referred to Eelam Tamils as Malabars during their early part of the rule and the West Tamil nadu coast line as Malabar coastline. Perhaps India chose to use a leftover term of the British to highlight its past glory of maritime prowess.  Though the Tamil Pandiya kings who ruled over the Malabar coast, had success in spreading their empire to the East, it was the Chola king’s, ruling over the coromandel ( Derivation of சோழ மண்டலம் ) coast, who dominated and looked east the most.  The went far and wide towards Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, etc. And of course the LTTE borrowed heavily from that imagination including the tiger flag and its leader Prabakaran’s early pseudonym of Karikalan etc.  A more appropriate name for the Indian exercise would have been Coromandel instead of Malabar.  But regardless, they both invoke a time when Tamils mattered a lot in the Indian ocean. Coromandel may highlight aggression while Malabar highlights the Indian centrality in ancient international trade just as China does with the Maritime Silk Road analogy.   See a map of the Chola trade route here.  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/Rajendra_map_new.svg

The Malabar exercise is an example of why India is sensitive about its projects in Trincomalee and reminds Sri Lanka often of it.  Whether it is the leasing of the oil storage facilities or the power generation.  The purported reports of China helping with an aircraft repair facility in that vicinity, as expected, would have been a redline for India. It is also a reason why the US would work hard to strengthen its bilateral agreements with Sri Lanka. Example would be an upgrade of the ACSA agreement to that of SOFA.  The same attempt did not work out with Maldives last year. It is also the reason why

Indian and American policy makers do not want two power centers in the island.  One power center controlling the East and another controlling the South of the island. In time of confrontation, both maritime interdiction and other operations needs to be coordinated and controlled under a single entity.

LTTE’s supply and resupply routes from Burma, Thailand and Indonesia ( The exact Chola trade routes and ports) crossed a threat threshold when they grew big enough to dominate the Sri Lankan Navy. It also became focus of lot of studies in the American defense circles because of LTTE’s rapid development of know how in asymmetric naval warfare.  

So if China succeeds in reviving its bi coastal strategy through Burma and/or as India ramps up its “Look East” policy, Tamil coastal lines ( In Tamil Nadu and in Tamil Eelam) gain more strategic importance.   But will the Tamil political leaderships on both sides of the strait, use this to convince Delhi and Washington as to why those coastlines remaining as a singular continuum where Tamils are in charge of both sides, as in the ancient days, serves them far better. Much better than an India - Sri Lanka (Sinhala) negotiated maritime boundary that leaves Tamils on both sides permanently upset. As repeatedly argued here, the first step in that strategic argument is to entangle both India and the US through an integrated Tamil economic corridor:  A Tamil economic corridor that connects not just TamilEelam with Tamil Nadu but also extends to Singapore and Mauritius where Tamil influence on those states is significant. The current Tamil political leadership in Eelam continues to allow itself to be entangled in the Colombo centered initiatives rather than focus on a regional context and to highlight how Tamils play a much more contributory role for the economic stability and growth of the region. This not about  separating into a Tamil country but about a Pan Tamil initiative that actually strengthens the Indo - US strategy and aligns Tamils behind it.     

http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports

http://www.portek.com/publications/FeederPort_InlandPortsandCorridors_TimeforaCloserLook.pdf

[eelapalan]

As the clock ticks down

 "..And so long as men die, liberty will never perish... Don't give yourselves to these unnatural men - machine men with machine minds and machine hearts! You are not machines! You are not cattle!... You are men! You, the people, have the power to make this life free and beautiful, to make this life a wonderful adventure.... let us use that power - let us all unite.”

We are proud individuals

Living for the city But the flames Couldn't go much higher We find God and religions To paint us with salvation But no one, no nobody Can give you the power To rise Over love Over hate Through this iron sky that's fast becoming our mind Over fear and into freedom Oh, that's life That's dripping down the walls Of a dream that cannot breathe In this harsh reality Mass confusion spoon fed to the blind Serves now to define our cold society From which we'll rise Over love Over hate Through this iron sky that's fast becoming our mind Over fear and into freedom You've just got to hold on You've just got to hold on [Charlie Chaplin's speech from The Great Dictator] “To those who can hear me, I say - do not despair. The misery that is now upon us is but the passing of greed - the bitterness of men who fear the way of human progress. The hate of men will pass, and dictators die, and the power they took from the people will return to the people. And so long as men die, liberty will never perish... Don't give yourselves to these unnatural men - machine men with machine minds and machine hearts! You are not machines! You are not cattle!... You are men! You, the people, have the power to make this life free and beautiful, to make this life a wonderful adventure.... let us use that power - let us all unite.” And we'll rise Over love Over hate Through this iron sky that's fast becoming our mind Over fear and into freedom Into freedom From which we'll rise Over love Over hate Through this iron sky that's fast becoming our mind Over fear and into freedom Freedom, freedom Oh, rain on me Rain on me Rain on me

[eelapalan]

The Logic of helping the lesser evil

One thing is clear. For the Tamils, the upcoming elections are not about a boycott. But It is about if Tamil leadership should actively endorse either of the two Sinhala nationalist candidates and campaign.  The lack of strategic thinking and inability to think outside the mainstream have been the TNA leadership failures. It was evident in their very early position on International Investigations, Failed endorsement of Fonseka, not using the NPC and EPC as the Palestinians have forced the PA to do, etc.

Yet telling the Tamils to “go with the flow”, not to “rock the boat”, choose “lesser of the evil” is the cleverest TNA is able to get so far.  Fielding a strong Tamil candidate to repeatedly and democratically show the Tamil stand and to still allow another opposition candidate to win would be the right strategy.   A Tamil candidature would have unified and motivated a much larger Tamil turnout. And if  the Tamil votes will make a difference, as it is being sold, then the higher turnout and a 3rd front would have forced a recount to find the winner.  The 2ND CHOICE of the Tamils would be the winner. Tamil narrative would stay intact and would have actually progress further.  Mr. Sampanthan could have been that candidate. This could have been the crowning moment of his career and contribution to the Tamil cause. Setting a very good example his way into retirement.  Mr.Sampanthan discounted such an idea in 2010 to the American ambassador and decided to endorse a “national” candidate. This time, it is the repeat of the same playbook.   

There has been reasonable amount of debate why actively endorsing Mythiripala is wrong.  

Mythiripala continues to demonstrate, as expected, why he is a candidate for the Sinhala nationalists. Many among the Tamils ignore that as having to be realistic to win the elections.  

Then what are Tamils being asked to contribute to?  An endorsement for the continuation of this ethno majoritarian mindset?

The tiring example of lesser of the two evils is used. Aren’t Tamils helping to move the acceptable norm of evil lower? Telling the world we will align, without any principles, with anyone. This slippery slope justification started first with the endorsement of Fonseka. This adds to the list of our contradictions when we will go to complain in a few years why things are not working out: Digging the hole deeper.  I can only assume, In a scenario of a family feud, if Gota had decided to run against Mahinda, we may have heard similar arguments in support of Mahinda perhaps.  Tamils should prepare themselves for such a future.

  As the Tamil Civil Society Forum reasoned well, the Sinhala constituency of the Island still refuses to acknowledge that the violent nature of the state came about because of their tolerance and endorsement of violence against the Tamils.  Until the larger Sinhala consciousness connects the dots, and asks for a genuine reform of the state, all else is a token exercise to provide temporary breathing space to them.  It is wrong to ask the Tamils to help provide that breathing space knowing Tamils won't get anything in return.  And it is wrong for the TNA leadership to do it on the backs of the Tamils, furthering the illiberal mindset.

Perhaps this cartoon captures the essence.

  I am biased against the parliamentary system of governance and support an executive presidential system with the judicial and legislative checks and balances.  This again is the failure of the Sinhala society that keeps electing leaders making promises to protect only them by whatever means. You can't have the cake and eat it too.

Parliamentary system will shift some of the powers to various party leaders and MP’s. Prime Minister will be beholden to to the whims and fancy of the same ineffective and corrupt party leaders. I am sure TNA leadership smells the same opportunity and thrives to feel important at  a “national” level. Bargain for their pound of flesh would begin for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Their logic will again revert to that of the NPC times that the Tamils can’t let Douglas win.

At this rate, Sinhala voters need to find a bigger evil who can dwarf MR, Gota, MY3, etc so Tamils can make themselves feel better about endorsing lesser evils. May be this is one favor Sinhala voters can do for the Tamils to make them feel better about their poor choices. May be that is the missing link for better understanding between the two nations?  

[eelapalan]

Voters are gonna vote

A further explanation is needed on the Tamil voter behaviour.

Tamil voter behaviour is best understood by the voter turnout than the absolute number of voters

Absolute number of eligible voters change in every election cycle.   Technically, the voter base should increase as there is a net increase in population.  Natural disasters ( 2004 Tsunami ), war, etc could have a gross negative impact .  But the voters showing up at the polling stations, as a percentage of registered electors, show a behavioural pattern.  A higher turnout rate could be signs of mobilization, excitement, etc. A lower rate could indicate apathy, boycott or even situations like the bad weather as it is happening now.

Looking at the number of people voted instead of seeing it as a percentage of eligible voters is misleading. Percentage removes the variability explained above. And it highlights the voters collective intent.  The reason 2013, 2012  registered electors list in the North and East is lower than the 2010 needs a different explanation. What is important is why, historically,only less than 50% of the voters in these provinces turn up to vote in presidential elections.

2) Tamils didn't boycott the 2005 Presidential elections.

There is gross misrepresentation that Tamils boycotted the 2005 Sri Lankan presidential elections.  They did not.  36% of the voters in the North and East voted in 2005. In the two previous elections Tamils voted in similar rate. Yet no one talks about a boycott in those elections. In 1994, the turnout was 37% and in 1999 it was 46%. Perhaps Tamils had been boycotting the elections all along.

So why do the press and many others selectively harp on a 2005 as a boycott and assign the blame to the Tamils for the Mahinda win?

It is true that LTTE made statements saying that election was for the Sinhala people to decide their leader. And in 2005, Sinhala people essentially deadlocked.  There is a big qualitative difference between enforcing a boycott and endorsing a candidate.  If LTTE really did enforce a boycott, then the Tamil people defied it.  Then the same people should be gleeful about that defiance. Had the LTTE asked people to come out and vote for Ranil, the turnout rate may have increased.  But they had to turn up in historically higher numbers to ensure a Ranil win.

Was that a reasonable expectation ?

Let us not ignore the fact that LTTE could not have endorsed an executive presidential candidate  standing for a unitary constitution while it is in the midst of a negotiation to change it.  Let us not ignore the fact, Ranil made no promises to restructure the state from the unitary state.  Let us also not ignore the fact that he made no such attempt EVEN after the 2002 Oslo declaration. Let us not ignore the fact that the Sinhala people deadlocked in that election because Sinhala voters didn't support him enough. Yet, the blame is put on the Tamils ( as a lie ) that they boycotted. And the blame is Tamils did not work harder than the Sinhalese to elect Ranil.  Let us also look at another data point.  In 1994, CBK enjoyed a lot of support among the Tamils for her “peace” platform.  There were Chandrika bangles being sold in temple festivals and there was a lot of hope. LTTE also tactically played along.  Yet, only 37% in the North and East were motivated enough to come out and vote. May be the other 63% foresaw the kind of peace that awaited them. And they were proven right within a year.  

The 2005 boycott wordsmithing is no different than calling the LTTE’s taxation an extortion. It is an exercise in delegitimacy.  

What the west couldn't get LTTE to do in 2005, can now, in 2015, be done by Delhl.

Despite what the Sinhala voters do, despite what the candidates themselves say, it is the Tamils who have to prove their worth by turning up en masse and voting for the lesser evil.

Tamils will be asked to repeat the unsuccessful strategy of  2010 again.  It is time for the Tamils to play again the game of "head I win, Tail you lose".

[eelapalan]

All about that base

As expected, write ups about the role Tamils should play in the upcoming Sri Lankan presidential election are starting to pop up.

A previous post highlighted the fallacy of Tamils trying to play a “national” role in Sri Lanka. This post further illustrates the same point using the Sri Lankan presidential elections.

Here are the key patterns of voting in the presidential elections since 1982.

Since 1982, one in two eligible voter in the Tamil region chose to ignore the Sri Lankan Presidential election.  The voter turnout in the North and East, in every election since 1982, has been less than 50%. 

voter turnout percentages in North & East and the rest of the island

Note: You can draw your own conclusions on if Tamil non-participation in the 2005 election was any different than the other elections. While the turnout was the lowest, it was not significantly different than other elections. It is a consistent pattern and 2005 was not an exception. 

2. Tamil votes have the potential to determine the outcome only when the Sinhala vote is split in half. This happened in 1988 and in 2005.  

The table below shows the the total votes the candidate won the election by and the number of votes he/she received from the North and East.  

For example, in 2005, keeping the turnout to be the same, if half of the Tamil people who voted for Rajapakse switched their votes for Ranil, Ranil would have won. If more Tamils had switched their votes in 1988, Premadasa would have lost. 

The election outcome has to come down to within about 500K votes for a Sinhala candidate to worry about the Tamil votes. If he feels he can get a wider margin than that, then there is no need to appeal for the Tamil votes.  The catch 22 for the Sinhala candidate is that he can not be seen as actively soliciting the Tamil votes for fear of loosing more Sinhala votes. He can only hope that the Tamils hate the other candidate strong enough that they come out and vote for him on their own no matter what his position vis a vis Tamils is. So it is not a surprise Sirisena does not want to do any thing to seek or earn the Tamil votes.  But strange enough he might even be praying that TNA does not come out and endorse him openly knowing Tamils had been voting against Rajapakse even with out any prodding. 

How does the election math work in a close election?

Lets use the 2010 election data.  The total of registered voters was ~14m.  In the North & East, it was ~2m and outside of Northeast it was ~12m  .   So 500K is ~ 3.6% of the total eligible voters.

This number means significantly different things along ethnic lines. 500K is ~ 25% of the Tamil eligible vote. But it is only about 4% of the Sinhala eligible vote.  But if you map it to the historical turnout rate, it actually means ~50% of the Tamils votes cast and ~5% Sinhala votes cast.

So what can a Sinhala candidate do to convince 25% more Tamils to turn up and vote for him? Or does he spend his energy on convincing 4% more of the Sinhala voters to support him?

Given the percentages, the obvious thing to do is to appeal to the smaller percentage Sinhala voters. Because cost of acquisition for equivalent Tamil votes is much higher than the 4% Sinhala votes.  Even just attempting to appeal to the Tamil votes, comes at a penalty.   The chart below shows the growth of the actual voters in the North & East and the rest of the island.  So the cost of acquiring 4% Sinhala vote is becoming less and less over time because the total available voter pool is growing. The Tamil vote has flatlined for last 38 years. 

A clear indication that a close election would drive a even more hardline campaign for the Sinhala votes.  This is a good example of why the mean voter theory doesn't work across the ethnic divide in Sri Lanka. National , Presidential,  elections in Sri Lanka mimic the local, primary elections in the US where the candidates only cater to their own bases. Not to a "moderate national mean voter".  

In Sri lanka, Sinhala voter is the national mean voter.  

What Options do Tamils have?

 Whenever there is a popular Sinhala Candidate and/or a very weak opposition candidate, there are no real choices for the Tamils. Their votes do not matter when the margin of victory is higher.  Nothing meaningful is gained by Tamil parties endorsing either candidate.

If Tamils anticipate a close election, then Tamils votes do matter. Tamils can use that to send a message. And that window of opportunity does exist in this upcoming election.  A Tamil message will be far more meaningful in this election given other parallel events and timelines. 

If a Tamil party were to also field a good candidate who can run on a platform of self determination, then it can potentially trigger interesting dynamics.

It would energize the Tamil voter base and increase the turnout in the Tamils candidate's favor. 

A Tamil vote to such a candidate can act as a precursor to an eventual referendum and strengthen the case for it.  This adds importance given the anticipated release of the UN report in March of next year.

If indeed there is a real split in the Sinhala vote, coupled with a higher Tamil turnout, it can potentially deprive the leading Sinhala candidate from reaching the needed 50% goal post.  In such a scenario, Tamil’s 2nd preferential votes could help determine the winner.  And a Tamil party can still endorse a Sinhala candidate as that 2nd choice. A regime change achieved this way is far better than being pawns in others agenda

 But do Tamils have leaders who can take such bold steps?  Clamoring to champion “national” issues does nothing to safeguard Tamil interests.  Eventually, Regime Change will be achieved not because of Tamils but despite of Tamils.  Tamils were needed only to start the process not to finish it.   Will the Tamil leadership take its own base for granted and loose all options?  We don't have to wait too long to find out. 

Until then, people of the island may have to sing along to a different version of the popular pop song. Sadly, it is a more intelligent tune than the one Tamil leadership is singing. 

Because you know

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base, no middle

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base, no middle

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base, no middle

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base

[eelapalan]

Will the real TNA leadership please stand up.

It is my wish that one day I can write something positive about the TNA leadership. I genuinely do. But until that day comes, one has to continue to highlight the wilful omissions and commissions of the leadership. Mainly because many of those omissions are not just tactical missteps but they are strategic blunders that will set the Tamil struggle back much further.  The latest misdirection comes in the form of a response to Sivajilingam for trying to bring a resolution under NPC, reaffirming that the Tamils are continuing to be subjected to Genocide.

If this reported response is true, it is riddled with many fallacies and conjectures.

One positive thing about Sivajilingam’s attempt at this resolution is that the debate can now be public. On a topic as important and critical to the Tamil struggle and discourse as Genocide is, there needs to be a vigorous debate at the grass root level.  This is far too important of an issue to leave it on the hands of a few “educated fools ( padiththa muddalkal ”.  

Please see the leadership’s response to Sivajilingam in entirety here in Tamil.

http://www.tamilwin.com/show-RUmszARUKWfvy.html

இதேவேளை கூட்டமைப்பின் தீர்மானத்தில் சுட்டிக்காட்டப்பட்டுள்ள விடயங்களாவன,

01 'இனப்படுகொலை' என்ற சொல்லுக்கு சமூக, அரசியல், ரீதியிலான பல வரைவிலக்கணங்கள் இருந்த போதும் அதற்கான சட்ட வியாக்கியங்களானது இனப்படுகொலை சமவாயத்தின் 2ம் உறுப்புரையிலும், பொருத்தமான சந்தர்ப்பங்களில் மற்றைய சர்வதேச ஆவணங்களிலும் காணப்படுகின்றது.

The response leads with emphasizing the legal premises of article 2 of the convention on the prevention and punishment of Genocide.  This outlook itself is flawed.  What Sivagilingam tries to bring, as a representative of the people, is a simple resolution that expresses the wish and will of the people. It is neither a legislation nor does it have anything to do with International Law.  if he gets enough votes in support, resolution becomes the political expression of the council.  If he is wrong to bring the resolution, then Tamil people shall judge him.  Tamils people and their representatives must have the right to expression on any democratic platform.  TNA leadership says there are social and political interpretations of the term Genocide but there is a subtle allusion that may be Tamils should not, perhaps not yet, get into the legal aspects of the term or the parameters of article 2.  Tamils do meet the criteria used in any interpretation of the term Genocide. Be that Social, Political or Legal. None the less, the question of legal threshold does not even arise in this case as it is a people’s expression.  Without Tamil’s own collective expression on Genocide, how would one expect go anywhere on this?  

02. இலங்கையில் தமிழ் மக்களுக்கு இழைக்கப்படும் கொடுமைகளை இந்த விரிவாக்கப்பட்ட சமூக அரசியல் வரைவிலக்கணங்களில் தாம் தெரிந்து கொள்ளும் ஒரு கூம்புக் கண்ணாடிக்கூடாக கண்டுகொள்ளும் உரித்து தமிழ்த் தேசிய கூட்டமைப்பு உறுப்பினர்களுக்கும், தமிழ் மக்களுக்கும், இலங்கையின் அனைத்து பிரஜைகளுக்கும், அனைத்துலக சமுகத்தினருக்கும் உண்டு. இவ் உரிமையினை அடிக்கடி அவர்கள் உபயோகிப்பதுண்டு.

03. சர்வதேச குற்றங்களின் விசாரணை ஒன்றுக்கு பொருத்தமான வரைவிலக்கணம் எனப்படுவது இனப்படுகொலை சமவாயத்தின் ஏனைய சர்வதேச ஆவணங்களிலும் காணப்படும் வரைவிலக்கணம் மட்டுமேயாகும்.

04. 1948ம் ஆண்டின் இனப்படுகொலை சமவாயத்தின் 2ம் உறுப்புரையில் காணப்படும் செய்திகள் பல தசாப்பதங்களாக இலங்கை அரசின் செயற்பாட்டாளர்களால் தமிழ் மக்கள் மீது இழைக்கப்பட்டு வருவது விவாதத்திற்கு அப்பாற்பட்ட உன்மையாகும்.

If the leadership truly believes that what is happening to the Tamil people is indeed Genocide and it is beyond debate, then why stop the expression of the same at the council? Mr.Sumanthiran is quoted reiterating again yesterday that it is indeed Genocide. Why is it okay for the leadership to continue to express it to the press but not the council?  What is the qualitative difference?

05. ஐ.நா செயலாளர் நாயகம் நியமித்த நிபுணர்கள் தமது அறிக்கையில் இனப்படுகொலை என்ற குற்றம் இழைக்கப்பட்டதற்கான நியாயமான சாட்சிகள் இருப்பதாக சொல்லவில்லை. தமக்கு கொடுக்கப்பட்ட மட்டுப்படுத்தப்பட்ட ஆணைக்குள் இப்படியாக குற்றம் புரிவதற்கான விசேட குற்றமென செயற்றிட்ட எண்ணம் இருந்ததற்கான சான்று இல்லாதது இதற்கான காரணமாக இருக்கலாம்.

06. யுத்தக் குற்றங்களும் மனிதாபிமானத்திற்கு எதிரான குற்றங்களும் இரு சாராரும் இழைத்தமைக்கான நியாயமான சான்று இருப்பதாக இந்த நிபுணர்குழு தீர்மானித்திருக்கின்றது. இதில் அரசாங்க செயற்பாட்டாளர்கள் இழைத்ததாக கூறப்படும் அழிப்பு மற்றும் துன்புறுத்தல் ஆகிய மனிதாபிமானத்திற்கு எதிரான குற்றங்களும் அடங்கும்.

The Panel of Experts indeed did not have the mandate to look into the charges of Genocide as is the case with OSIL. Here is what the Panel Of Expert member Ms. Yasmin Sooka said in her interview to Tamil Guardian

"I do think that when the [forthcoming OHCHR] inquiry takes place they will need to probe this question because many Tamils have often spoken about the fact that this is a genocide, and that it has genocidal tendencies - the way in which this war prosecuted.”

"I think all of us in the Panel that were confronted with this question have always raised that there is a real need for a proper investigation when it happens to test this issue [genocide]."

Note that she says it is indeed because the Tamils themselves have asked is why OSIL will need to probe this question.

07. சர்வதேச குற்றங்களில் உயர்ந்த, தாழ்ந்த படிநிலைகள் இல்லையென்பது எமது நிலைப்பாடாகும். யுத்தக் குற்றத்தாலும் மனிதாபிமானத்திற்கு எதிரான குற்றங்களாலும் பாதிக்கப்பட்டவர்களுக்கான பாதுகாப்பும் பொறுப்புப்கூறுதலும், இனப்படுகொலையால் பாதிக்கப்பட்டோருக்கான பாதுகாப்பும் பொறுப்புக்கூறலும் எவ்விதத்திலும் குறைவுபட்டதல்ல.

Another fundamentally flawed and irresponsible statement.    A charge of Genocide and a charge of Crimes Against Humanity aim at different outcomes. Prevention of Genocide is intended to protect a group. Prevention of Crimes Against Humanity primarily aims to protect individuals. This being the case on the prosecution side as well where Genocide assigns responsibility to a State or a group of people where as Crimes against Humanity can assign blame to individuals.  A good comparison between the two concepts is here. The convenience of prosecuting Individuals  through the International Criminal Court using the Rome statute and the reluctance by  Sovereign States to go after charges of Genocide ( due to the actions expected of them once Genocide is recognized ) may have shifted the recent International discourse on the side of Crimes Against Humanity.  But that should not be the reason why Eelam Tamils should be encouraged, through misdirection, to settle for vague Crimes Against Humanity charges.  The charge of Genocide goes to the heart of the Tamil national question: Under what political setup can the two groups (Sinhalese and Tamils ) coexist.  It seeks to highlight the persisting structural conditions and the continuing Sinhala indifference that put Tamil lives in danger.  One needs to wonder if the legal mumbo jumbo as a misdirection is to deflect the reactive, rudderless strategy it is pursuing. Is the leadership worried that in its busied efforts to bend over backwards, sideways and every other which way to please the Sinhala leaders  what is acceptable to them (who are the aggressors), that has failed to articulate the parameters of an acceptable coexistence model to the Tamils  (Who are the victims).  Perhaps this is a coded message to the NPC saying Delhi will stop whatever little the UN has started if you ask too much.

08. நிபுணர்குழுவிற்கு கொடுக்கப்பட்ட ஆணையை விட ohchr யினது விசாரணை விரிவானதும் பொருத்தமான விதத்தில் யுத்தக்குற்றங்கள், மனிதாபிமானத்திற்கு எதிரான குற்றங்கள் மற்றும் இனப்படுகொலை சம்மந்தமான விசாரணை நடத்தும் தேவைப்பாட்டை உணர்த்தியுள்ளது.

A wishful interpretation of the UN resolution.  The current UN resolution does not specifically mandate the OSIL to look into the charges of Genocide. This was the request and campaign of many diaspora organizations with the exception of a few.  If OSIL does feel that there is headroom to interpret the resolution language that way, it will only do so if Tamils themselves are demanding it. And if Tamils are continuing submit evidence towards it. It will not do so voluntarily as TNA leadership implies or wishes.  This why NPC resolution is both timely and is a needed expression from the ground.

09. தற்போது (ohchr) நடத்தும் விசாரணையில் கருத்தில் எடுக்கப்படும் சட்டம் மற்றும் சான்றுகள் பற்றிய அறிவிப்புக்கள் அல்லது தீர்மானங்கள் வடமாகமாகாணசபையோ வேறு அரசியல் கட்டமைப்போ செய்வது பொருத்தமற்ற செயலாகும் என நாம் கருதுகின்றோம்.

Why so? The very existence of NPC is due to the UNHRC and its resolution. If anyone has more conferred authority to speak to the UN, it is precisely the NPC. Not the TNA leadership. It should be noted that many of the NPC members, including the current CM, ran the election campaign on the following platform as well.

“3) We charge that Tamils living in Sri Lanka are subjected to genocide. Even after the war, demographic change through the systematic colonisation and land grab are continuing.  We are firm on our insistence that the war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed against the Tamil people during the war and for the last 30 years should be investigated through an international, independent, UN mechanism. “

A resolution by the council will naturally reflect, as late as it might be, the mandate they requested and were given during the election

10. இந்த சர்வதேச விசாரணையின் சுயாதீன செயற்பாட்டையும் அதற்கான மதிப்பையும் இப்படியான தீர்மானங்கள் பாதிக்கக் கூடும்.

The assertions come to end on a conjecture. It is very wrong that TNA leadership will neglect to do what is right and what is needed and place its trust on a system that has consistently failed us.  An absurd argument that Tamils should not exercise their democratic right because of a guess that  something might happen.   

11. இந்த சர்வதேச விசாரணைக்கு தமது சாட்சியங்களையும், சமர்ப்பணங்களையும், முறையான விதிகள் மூலம் மேற்கொள்ளுமாறு தமிழ்தேசிய கூட்டமைப்பு பொதுமக்களை தொடர்ந்தும் ஊக்குவிக்கும்.

All and every TNA resource should have been working on this. The youth leader of the ITAK complained a few days ago that the TNA leadership is not doing enough to help the people submit evidence. This begs the question.  Has TNA leadership been either discouraging or not helping victims of Genocide submit the evidence because they have assigned themselves to be the “legal” authorities ?

and furthermore as Dr. Packiasothy aptly  said

"Does Tamil political representation set the agenda for Tamil political aspirations or does it feel it has to adopt to an existing reality?" ... "At the end of the day, if, before you can articulate your political aspirations, you have to be concerned about what the Sinhalese would say in the South and what the Indians would say across the Palk strait, then what kind of self-determination are you talking about?

It can not be the say anything and then do something different kind of politics. Eelam Tamils are too astute to fall for that.  

[eelapalan]

The Indo-Lanka-13A

There is an uptick on the TNA pronouncements lately about India and her role in the 13th amendment to Sri Lanka.  A series of events perhaps contributed this: TNA delegation’s meeting with the new Indian prime minister and now the NPC Chief Minister’s letter to the Sri Lankan President invoking India’s role as a guarantor of Tamil interests.

Important to analyze Justice C.V.Wigneswaran’s letter to the Sri lankan president because it is a calculated step. It fits within the strategies outlined by TNA leadership in public. That is to show the world that 13A is not sufficient and then ask for help in correcting it.  But unfortunately TNA leadership’s worldview has shrunk just to Delhi.  A frog in the well world view.

The Chief Minister deserves credit for calling out the 13A for what it is. Impotent and hollow.  Better late than never.  He builds his case in the letter by highlighting “intransigence and the lack of political will and commitment on the part of the executive and the central government.”. As Hindu was eager to highlight, he also seeked India’s active role.

There are two aspects, if one were to look deeper, that are troubling.

The letter is essentially targets the Sri lankan president Rajapakse as the stumbling block. The letter does not include the historical facts of the similar issues faced by his predecessor and the well established pattern of Sri Lanka neglecting at will any democratic and legitimate wishes of the Tamil people.  The intransigence and lack of political will are not just a Rajapakse problem.  It is a Sinhala Sri lanka problem.  Rajapakse is just an other manifestation.  Varatharajah Perumal made his views known while the Indian military was still on the ground and even went as far as unilaterally declaring Independence. It is important to make this distinction between the current president and the state very clear.  He is only a tool. So as not to confuse the Deputy  to the Sheriff.  To quote from that post a year ago,

“The farce that is 13A is unravelling as expected.  and the Sinhala hardliners have drawn their redlines.  If TNA is unable to make progress, it may take the path of supporting a regime change agenda that is underway in some quarters.  It is a shifting of the problem. It is confusing the Sherif to a deputy as Bob Marley would say. “

The letter should not be the alibi for TNA’s support for regime change early next year.  It will certainly come up.  Even if you replace a Rajapakse with a Ranil, nothing will change.

As said in another post last year on the eve of the NPC election results, is TNA being loud enough ?

“But the Sinhala Buddhist state has no reason to listen. It has no obligation to act. It never feels accountable, in any way, to the Tamils.

It will be no different this time. But despite the structural genocide against them, Tamil people have spoken loudly and clearly.

Can TNA now speak as loudly and clearly as the people who voted for them?

So loudly that it reaches the ears of the powers that pushed for the election. Scream so they are unable to go back to sleep on the Tamil issue as they did in 2009.”

How loud and clear is the Chief Minister being when he calls on India “ as a guarantor of  Tamil rights” to “actively participate and contribute in the negotiation process”?

There is no denying that India is indispensable when it comes to resolving the Tamil national question.  But thinking that she is inherently supportive of Tamil rights and is motivated to see a Thirteenth amendment Plus through is only a wishful thinking.

The conflation of Indo-lanka accord with the Tamils interests is a dishonest act.  The Indo-Lanka accord has India’s interests. and the 13A has Sri Lanka’s interests. Neither has Tamils interests. More often than less, Eelam Tamil’s interests and India’s interests don't align.  Please see this post under the India’s regional policy section for India’s view of the 13th amendment.  TCSF’s Guruparan’s interview in Tamil here is a good listen on India’s view as well http://www.ctr24.com/archive/27082014-1423-%E0%AE%B5%E0%AE%A3%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%8D-%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%A9%E0%AE%9F%E0%AE%BE-aug-27-2014-guruparan-k

13A is a consequence of the Indo - Lanka accord.  That is the one and only relationship.  India only has a moral obligation, if any, to see the 13A through.  What matters to India the most is the exchange of letters that preceded the accord.  An account by the then Indian ambassador JN.Dixit captures the importance of the letters.

“I pointed out that India's co-operation with Sri Lanka to solve the ethnic problem was predicated on Sri Lanka giving positive responses on these important concerns of India."

And the Indo-Lanka accord technically binds India with more obligations and with little room for it to intervene if the accord is not faithfully implemented by Sri Lanka. And India has consistently and faithfully kept to its part of the obligations under the accord. namely

1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:

1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi ethnic, multi lingual and multi religious plural society in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations:

This language is still pervasive in all Indian official communications.  that all citizens live in equality, blah, blah.  

The binding resolutions of the accord only focus on the formation of the Provincial Councils for the Northern and Eastern provinces and the eventual referendum. There is nothing in there about its smooth functioning or if it functions at all.

If India had cared about the intent of the 13A, it would have intervened when the Sri lankan Supreme court said the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces was null and void.  But it did not.

On the contrary, Indian establishment has demonstrated multiple times that not going beyond 13A is even a higher policy priority than seeing the full implementation of the 13A.  India worked to undermine any possible opening to such an eventuality through a UN process. It diluted the resolutions against Sri lanka and then voted against the International Independent Investigations ensuring such a path stays shut for the Tamils. 

As the previous post showed through Dr.Destradi's work that India knew the Norwegian effort will not succeed as well. 

Sri Lanka has a much better read of the Indian position than the TNA leadership does. Or  is it that the TNA leadership is afraid to spell out the real truth to the people?  

Mavai and the CM continuing to pick on the NPC members who are trying to move the UN process towards investigation of Genocide are actually reflecting the Indian worry more than anything else. The Tamil Nadu assembly has passed far reaching resolutions on the Tamil genocide, sanctions against Sri lanka and on the referendum. Rather than rallying the people behind those initiatives and welcoming the NPC resolutions , as the UN team itself did  in September, TNA leadership is busy worrying about not making Delhi upset.  With this TNA trajectory, Eelam Tamil are unfortunately stuck behind the agendas of regime change and fighting for the full implementation of the 13A.  Not much more. 

[eelapalan]

Hate the game. Not the Player

This is a revision of a previous post. That was written as a critique of the TNA policy. Highlighting the folly in TNA aspiring to be a “national” party.  Using the same principle, this revision tries to highlight why Tamils or Muslims can never expect justice from the current Sri lankan system.  

The principle of median voter theorem is that politicians would move their positions to where the median voter is, in order to maximize their vote. A useful tutorial is here . This leads to moderating positions or middle paths.  Specially at federal or national level politics.

It is fashionable in liberal circles to search for such a phenomena even when none exists. Sri Lanka is an example of this. Many wrongly assume a normal distribution for the whole island and search for that single median voter who represents both a Tamil and a Sinhalese. You will never find one. In Sri lanka, the Sinhala median voter and the Tamil median voter are in completely different “bliss points”. This fundamental truth is ignored. The structural ( Constitutional, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary ) domination of Sinhala opinion is deeply entrenched in the current Sri Lankan system. So much so that a Sinhala politician ( or any person of power ) will never have to be accountable to a Tamil or Muslim voter.  

Sinhala leaders lose nothing by ignoring Tamil or Muslim plights. On the other hand, they risk loosing the Sinhala voters who are to the right of the Sinhala median voter, if they are seen as catering to Tamil or Muslim sentiments.

The Muslim people’s inability to get wider Sinhala political support for their plight will suffer the same fate as of the Tamils.

Some quick illustrations using a 2 dimensional graph to show the political solution to the ethnic conflict.  

The naive ( or idealistic ) view shown above is that the extreme views of a Sinhala voter in favor of unitary state and a Tamil voter in favor of TamilEelam would converge in the median as a federal solution. This is naively repeated by some NGOs as well as very few Sinhala liberals. And this view is almost always directed at the Tamils to convince them to keep trying to work with the existing system.  

Even the basic math will show someone that the best case distribution may look like the one below. and it is the “Sri Lankan” view.

The numerical strength of the Sinhalese will skew the distribution to the right.  History shows the Sinhala median voter is at the right of 13A.  Happy in the status quo of 13 minus realm.

My hypothesis is that Tamils and Sinhalese are on their own, decoupled, distributions. And those individual distributions were different during the war and after the war.  The illustration is below

When the LTTE was militarily strong, the Tamil mean voter “ideal point” would have been closer to TamilEelam and consequently the mean Sinhala voter “ideal point” would have been near 13A. or 13 A plus.  But post war scenarios have both shifted as well as altered the distributions. The Tamils, constantly reminded of defeat, have shifted lot more towards the federal middle. But the Sinhala state, through triumphalism, has consolidated itself near the narrow band of unitary structure.

As repeated in this blog, those supporting the naive model and ask Tamils to work it out within the current system and the process, never acknowledge the impossibility of it.  They now stand exposed by their inability to make any meaningful change to the system despite TNA’s willingness to obediently listen to them.  What history does not teach them, may be math can. But in any case, they are not students of logic.

As the illustration above shows the Sinhala leaders have no incentive to cater to Tamils or Muslims. And TNA or Tamils don’t gain anything by moving their position to the right of the scale.  Are the Muslims also in their own distribution that is not aligned to the two above?  If so, do they overlap more with the Sinhalese or with the Tamils?

There is nothing Tamils or Muslims do or say that will convince the Sinhala median voter to move to the left to meet them halfway as the median voter theorem dictates.

Few Sinhala liberals want to change the player ( regime change ) but keep the game as is. Changing of the player is rather easy. Things have already been set in motion in that regard.

But the game is permanently set in favor of the Sinhalese, and to be specific, in favor of Sinhala- Buddhists.  The permanent and absolute majority of Sinhala-Buddhists is now structurally enshrined. Thus Sinhala-Buddhist can unilaterally decide the destiny of the island under the trapping of a democratic process.  The Sinhala parties ( as the current government has) have gained supermajority that is needed for restructuring the state.  But that majority was always used to entrench the hegemony even further. Now the Sri Lankan constitution is such that it does not even trust the super majority political party with the structure of the state. Even a super majority party can’t restructure the state without a referendum where the majority Sinhalese have to agree. This steady, hegemonic, entrenchment employed parallel tracks , stripping away any protection constitution offered ( Soulbury ) to non Sinhala-Buddhists. It reduced Tamil participatory means and criminalized Tamil aspirations ( 6A, PTA). This process has now reached the conclusive end of Tamils facing the hobson’s choice of either

assimilate or be eliminated.  It is only a natural progression that the Muslims will also face the same choice. In a true, participatory democracy, there are structural protections against majoritarian abuse.  Only in Sri Lanka, the permanent, absolute, and unassilable majority, needs structural protection to ensure it can never be any other way. It is the game that produces a player like BBS.

So if the Tamils or the Muslim continue to dream of a better political future under the current setup, then it has to stay a dream.  

[eelapalan]

Part 2: Remember to Remember

Part 1:  5 yrs on. Remember to Remember 

Part 2: Remember to Remember. LTTE Calculus

Sivaram was worried that the Eelam struggle was increasingly becoming a test bed to try out different Counter Insurgency (COIN) campaigns.  He started discussing this with friends and was hinting at it in his writings.  RAND publications, now released in public domain, bear witness to his worries.  Many of the RAND’s National Defense Research Institute papers are sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Below are few examples of recent research releases where LTTE was used as case study.

“Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare”,

“Subversion and Insurgency. RAND Counterinsurgency Study. Paper 2”

and “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. RAND Counterinsurgency Study. Paper 3”

Furthermore,  right after the ceasefire, Sivaram was openly skeptical about the peace process and started warning about the “Peace trap”.  LTTE became concerned about Sivaram’s position and invited him to Vanni.  Sivaram visited the LTTE heartland for the first time in 2003 ( Unsure about the exact time) and met with the LTTE leadership.  He was engaged by LTTE on their strategy at some considerable depth during that meeting.   

This had an impact on Sivaram and his writings afterwards. LTTE’s strategy lead him to coin the term Counter - Counter Insurgency or as he called it CCI.  

He, later, became frustrated again that the LTTE was not “educating the people about the truth”.

By 2000, LTTE realized it had achieved the necessary level of strategic parity through military means.  Any further military expansion towards Jaffna risked a direct intervention by India. And further advances would have been hampered by the threat to its rear supply line in Vanni. All heavy war material needed to be brought in from Vanni, a  required element to sustain any large scale incursions into Jaffna.  LTTE would have incurred heavy casualties. Not to mention the Tamil civilian casualties in the peninsula.  This strategic pause also paid off when Sri Lanka launched the Agni Kela offensive in Apr and failed.  Sri Lankan military literally threw everything it had into that battle.  At this juncture of parity, and followed by the airport attack in July, Sri Lankan state was left with limited options. It had to pursue peace.  

The objectives of the American Department of Defense review, and the LTTE’s offer of peace coincided in 2001.

LTTE was aware of the peace trap yet it was determined to stay with the process.

LTTE’s immediate and short term goal was to consolidate and preserve the strategic parity it had gained.  LTTE calculated it can exit the peace process at an appropriate time with that parity recognized as inevitable, and as the  “new normal”.  It was worried that Sivaram’s public position about the “peace trap” would create doubts in Tamil's mind.   

Pre-Peace Process

LTTE invested heavily in the people of Vanni.  It was creating a lasting Vanni mindset: A mindset that is intimately tied to the LTTE’s state building project.  As Sivaram learned, LTTE made that investment as an antidote to counter insurgency tactics as well as a long term strategic springboard.  At that time, many of the counterinsurgency tactics of the Srilankan government was starting to work in the East and in the Jaffna peninsula. Tamils in those areas were starting to accept the state violence as normal. And accept the loss of dignity.   They were willing to accept limited violent instead of mass violence such as indiscriminate shelling and air raids. Constant military presence, disappearances, targeted killings, no freedom of movement, were rationalized as a price to pay. And those who did not know how to “stay out of trouble” had it coming the logic went.  This was an erosion of their will to resist. And exactly the desired outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign.      

In the Vanni, LTTE created areas of full control. And it invested heavily in projects of statebuilding: Projecta that gave people a sense of dignity, safety, and limited freedom of movement.  Before that meeting, Sivaram saw those projects as waste of precious resources during the time of war. He was of the opinion that, as a direct consequence of state building, LTTE focused too much on expanding conventional capabilities and on protecting territory. And it came at the expense of its guerrilla roots.   But the witnessing of statebuilding, and the lived experience, has left an everlasting impression on the Vanni people as well as on the visiting diaspora.  That investment paid off as an unflinching loyalty to the LTTE even in the dying days.

LTTE depended on that during the peace process to counter to any moves to weaken the bond between the people and the organization. It must be mentioned that it is because of that Vanni mindset, that the survivors of the war were made to suffer in the concentration camps. It was a pre-planned counterinsurgency exercise to dehumanize them.  To make them forget the dignified Vanni life.  Even Though Sivaram did not live to see the outcome of the LTTE’s Vanni mindset project, he understood the ramifications of it in 2003.  

  During Peace Process

LTTE devised several other strategies during the peace process to ensure Sri Lankan state and its backers did not drive a wedge between them and the people using the peace process.  As part of the counterinsurgency campaign, practitioners plan out the twin approaches of “legitimacy building” of their side and of “de-legitimizing”  of their opponents.  This delegitimacy campaign is targeted at different types of audience.  In the case of LTTE, it was primarily aimed at the Tamil people in the island and abroad.  LTTE  was already handicapped by the terrorist label. As mentioned in part 1 about the Aug 2002 visit of Deputy Secretary Armitage (who held one of the key leadership roles in the US DoD review) the following wiki leaks info sheds some light into what was happening. key word emphasis is mine

  “The Deputy Secretary.. noted that the US

bureaucracy has moved very quickly in response to GSL

requests for assistance in the areas of intelligence,

security, trade, investment, and aid...   He

noted that the intelligence team (septel) and a team from the

Peace Corps are in the country. He stressed that the

US could not serve as an "honest broker" between the GSL and

the terrorist LTTE (as some people wanted),..”

Deputy Sec. Armitage was very direct with the Tamil clergy and others when they met him in Jaffna. He made it clear which side the US backed in the peace process.  It was the reality but it was also an intended message to undermine the legitimacy of the LTTE in the eyes of the people.  

TNA was formed in Oct 2001 in a pre emptive move to consolidate the Tamil political space.  Primarily to deny any opportunities to delegitimize the LTTE.

LTTE also organized a series of Ponguthamil events to keep the people highly mobilized and motivated.  This mobilization was key to consolidate the support even in the peninsula where LTTE had very limited presence before the peace process.  Sri Lankan state later targeted and killed many of those involved in organizing the Pongu Thamil events.

LTTE also saw the calls for democratization by allowing multi political parties through a counterinsurgency lens. And resisted those suggestions.

As mentioned in part 1, the US DoD looked at “under governed areas with in states” as a security risk while LTTE was bent on consolidating the Vanni under its control.  

It should be noted, many of LTTE’s actions for parity ( thus legitimacy) were bitterly opposed by the Sri Lankan state.  And according to Dr. Sandra Destradi’s research, this is was one of the primary reason for the failure of the peace process. By undermining its hard won parity, it also took away the incentive for LTTE to continue negotiating.  Few actions of the delegitimacy campaigns are worth highlighting.

1) Holding of the Donor meeting in DC knowing LTTE can not attend

2) Denial of visits to the Vanni areas to Koffi Annan and to President Clinton after the tsunami

3) Abrogation of PTOMS

4) Framing the LTTE taxation as extortion or as ransom.  (Many Tamils fell victims to this campaign).

There are also accusations that few of the current TNA leaders were undermining the LTTE’s strategy to prevent delegitimacy campaigns.  They are accused of telling the foreign delegations in private meetings that LTTE should not be given the political legitimacy as it is a military organization. And that it should be the preserve of the TNA.

In anticipation of international pressure tactics on its associates ( As India did with the deportation orders of Anton Balasingam and Nadesan Satyendra in the 80’s ) and to prevent infiltrations, LTTE re organized its international operations.  Many long time associates, including KP, were intentionally sidelined. And its international coordination was moved to and controlled from the Vanni.  It was both a tactical necessity and as well as a strategic move that further reinforced the centrality of Vanni, forcing dignitaries to make the trek to the Vanni.  

Sivaram also learned about two of LTTE’s secretive divisions.  One was the “Defense Planning and Military Science Division” under Sasi master and the other was the “Strategic Planning Division” under the coordination of Mano master who previously was the head of “Military Training school”.  

Again, reverting to part 1, where the US DoD saw the  “adoption of asymmetric approaches “ as a challenge to be dealt with in the new century. While  LTTE doubled downed on its black tigers as the “asymmetric deterrence” against any possible foreign intervention.  Sivaram wrote an article in May 2004 under the heading “LTTE develops asymmetric deterrence to stall foreign intervention” .

LTTE considered its reaction to the Indian intervention in 87 a tactical failure.  While LTTE knew ( Purportedly through its close friendship with the TN chief Minister MGR )

of the plans for Indian intervention in 1986 , it thought it had pre empted it by banning TELO.  It did not maintain a tactical plan for such an eventuality.  Sasi master was tasked with such strategic scenario planning.  Accordingly Sivaram, LTTE had tactical plans in place to handle limited foreign intervention as well as for a possible rebellion in the east.   

As Katunayake Airport attack demonstrated and later the Anuradhapura air force camp attack reinforced, LTTE had elevated the suicide attacks to full unit level deployments which was never done before.  LTTE saw that as a core part of their strategic deterrence.

And by the end of 2005, while trying to prevent de legitimization, and while developing a deterrence, LTTE also simultaneously sought to undermine the “legitimacy building” of the UNP government.  Under the cover of international safety net, Ranil’s government was endowed with more legitimacy. There were open and public warnings from the US leaders ( Nicholas Burns, Ashley Willis, etc) to the LTTE about the cost of returning to war. So when LTTE “engineered” the defeat of the Ranil, and by letting a “Hawk” win the election, it reduced the “legitimacy” argument.  Today, that regime is accused of Genocide, War crimes, and Crimes against humanity. The international players are unable to openly endorse the conduct of the war.  Had Ranil won the election in 2005, the war still would have resumed.  The outcome may still have been the same.  But the conduct of the war and the narrative would have been different.

Next:  Post peace process.  Was Genocide anticipated ?

[eelapalan]

5 yrs On: Remember to Remember

5 Yrs On.

Global Tamils are remembering the 5th anniversary of the May 2009.  While we mourn the lives lost, we should also remind ourselves to remember the truth. The Tamilnation website quoted the following prophetically and purposefully, when it shut itself down.

"...A key psychology for leading (is to)..  retain absolute faith that you can and will prevail in the end regardless of the difficulties, and at the same time confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might be... Create a culture.. for the truth to be heard.

Among our losses were also two ablest strategic platforms. One was Sivaram AKA Taraki, and the other was the Tamilnation website.

I was hoping all along that there will be others stepping up to fill the vacuum left by them:  A new crop of people and platforms to stir the intellectual curiosity of the Tamil nation.  5 yrs on, we are still searching. Future will judge us harshly, if we ,the witnesses, victims, and survivors, don't document our thoughts in as many shapes and forms.

5 yrs on, I hope we can travel to the past with hindsight as a guide. Not to set a revisionist narrative but to unearth the truth. The Tamil nation needs to understand its place in the “great game” that is underway in the Indian Ocean.  In this write up, at first, a look at the American  strategic objective in Sri Lanka, and then what the LTTE calculus was leading up to the ceasefire and after, and then to see if the Tamil nation can benefit by a US presence in the region.  

The Long American Pivot towards Asia

The diplomat recently published an article validating what I meant several weeks ago about Sivaram seeing around the corners.   At the time of his kidnapping and killing, Sivaram was working on an article that Tamilnet later published.  Sivaram read the tea leaves correctly.  In that last write up, he tried to explain the US’s strategic interest in Sri Lanka. He focused primarily on the USA looking at basing prospects for its Air Force and for signal intelligence.  Note his uncanny insight into the NSA operations in Colombo at that time: Long before the current scandal.  His video interview below also touches on the same topics.   

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LPhun5awoo

The diplomat article, published 9 yrs after Sivaram’s analysis, outlines the U.S. strategic objective under the title “bases for Americas Asia Pacific Rebalance”.  It was written by two professors of strategic leadership at the naval War college.

In 2001, the US Secretary of Defense started a strategic review of the US global defense posture. The defense department termed it the “most profound re-ordering of U.S, Military forces overseas”.  The review was underway prior to 2001 but came into the limelight in 2001.  And portions of it were made public to the Congress in 2004.  

The new forward posture for the Asia Pacific rebalance, outlined by the review, was characteristically different. It was refined for the 21st century challenges.  The basing network envisioned were not the “fight in place” and defensive in nature. That was the case in West Europe and in northeast Asia since WWII and Cold war. The new posture called for strategies to enable rapid deployments in short notice.  In essence,  “to frequent expeditionary operations”.

Further more, the review outlined a wider range of challenges for the new century.  Among them were:

“· The nexus among terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

· Ungoverned states and under-governed areas within states, which can serve as both a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists and other transnational threats; and

· Potential adversaries’ adoption of asymmetric approaches – including irregular

warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and advanced, disruptive, technological challenges – designed to counter U.S. conventional military superiority. “

To be specific, the last 2 challenges above ( key word emphasis is mine), made the American anti - LTTE policy framework much more overt. It provided an opportunity to support the Sri Lanka’s “ international safety-net” approach.  A post 9/11 media and policy narrative provided the needed cover. And momentum for the collaboration between Sri Lanka and the US reached new heights.

A USA & UNP Strategic alignment

The 2001 (July) attack on the Katunayake airport precipitated an acute crisis for Sri Lanka. The LTTE military success in the North and the economic pressure in the South ( due to the attack) left the Sri Lankan state with very limited choices.  A RAND report written in 2004, titled “Urban Battle Fields of South Asia”, highlighted the severity. According to the report “..International airlines pulled out of Colombo and as tour group operators left Sri Lanka. Christmas bookings were cancelled, which levied a heavy loss upon Colombo’s coffers. The insurance premiums applied to planes and ships operating in Sri Lanka were inflated to $100,000 per vessel per port call, as Sri Lanka was considered a “war zone.”. Consequently, imports became sparse and prices increased dramatically.” “ The sharp increase in oil prices was sufficiently steep that the government could not maintain its subsidy. Second, the rupee came under pressure and the government allowed it to float, after which the value of the currency exchange rate sank from Rs 78 to Rs 100 per dollar within three days.”   Consequently, this made the ceasefire and international involvement an urgent matter to Sri Lanka.  With changes in the political landscape ( SLMC leaving and other defections), Chandrika was forced to call for elections just after a year of the previous one.  And Ranil was brought to be the PM in Dec 2001.  He reciprocated the LTTE ceasefire and ceasefire came into existence in Feb 2002.  Sri Lankan Prime Minister made the visit to Washington DC in July and Deputy Secretary Armitage made his first visit to Sri Lanka in August 2002.   

The core leadership team that was part of the American DOD review included Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage.  Under Secretary Douglas Feith represented the Defense Department. But It is noteworthy that Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, James Clad, who called Gotabaya his friend, played a role in the last stages of the war, along with his state department colleague Robert Blake. It is noteworthy that Clad’s eventual replacement, Vikram J Singh, was a longtime Sri Lanka strategist in the US defense circles. He had lived and worked in Srilanka. But after being appointed in 2012, he made several trips to Sri Lanka in his official capacity and regularly met with wide range of leaders.  It is important to note that he led the US defense department’s post 2014 strategy for South Asia before leaving the post.

A US de-mining team was already at work in the North when Deputy Secretary Armitage made his first visit. But Several US department of defense teams had visited Sri Lanka to do multiple evaluation studies starting from the late 90’s.   

According to Sivaram, “The USAF, DIA team that visited Palaly, China Bay, Sigiriya, Koggala and Kuda Oya in 2001 did a brief update regarding Sri Lanka... A classified version of this update on Sri Lanka was given to the Sri Lanka Air Force and Army headquarters and DMI for comments. It was basically about improving Palaly, China Bay and advantage of building new international dual-purpose airfield in Kuda Oya. If the update is read together with the RAND report it gives a clear picture of US strategic aims in developing Palaly, Trinco, Kuda Oya.”

In 2012, Sri Lanka rejected an India’s offer to develop the Palaly airport. 

The executional aspects of the US defense review was to seek legal agreements with identified host countries. Agreements lay the legal foundation and secure the logistical and support assets for forward forces.  Sri Lanka likely was identified as such a host country even before the review and long before the 2002 ceasefire. America  signed the Acquisition and the Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Sri Lanka in Feb 2007. According to Wiki leaks, the signing was deliberately kept quite.  And America has since then accelerated such agreements with other South Asian countries as well.  Eelam Tamils need to be aware that ACSA is up for renewal in 2017 and the concessions the US will likely to extract out of Sri Lanka.  The UN report finding person’s responsible for war crimes and a possible sanctions on the individuals and the regime will likely converge on this timeline.  

Sri Lanka offers ideal locations for the new kind of basing that the US seeks. The one the diplomat article now calls.  “.. “forward operating sites” that are normally maintained by a relatively small U.S. support presence and are used for temporary deployments or training purposes; an example is the Sembawang port facility in Singapore. Finally, “cooperative security locations” are austere facilities shared by the United States and host countries that may have little or no permanent U.S. presence and are designed essentially for contingency use.

Clearly, the preferred option for the future is the latter two categories. They are less expensive, less visible, less vulnerable, and offer greater strategic and operational flexibility; just as important, they are less likely to create political problems for the host government and in fact serve to promote bilateral security cooperation. “ . These operating sites can also emphasize “.. new capabilities such as remotely piloted drones and special operations forces, and one extending to parts of the world not previously active theaters of American military operations.”

Eelam Tamils mistakenly believe that an American military presence, if one were to be established, will be a large foot print base. Trinco harbor comes up right away in any conversations.  As we will see later, LTTE also feared an intervention.  But the American presence will be characteristically different. In the island, it will start out as a “cooperative security location” and then could progress to a “forward operating site” with an unnoticeable footprint.  With the ACSA in place, Sri Lanka is already a “cooperative security location”.  American military was already helping to rebuild schools even in the occupied areas of the island. And the training programs have not stopped.  Sri Lanka is obliged under the “Bilateral agreement for the exchange of logistics support, supplies, & services (LSSS) during exercises, training, or emergency situations”

In the Tamil analyst circles, The Tamilnation website and Sivaram were the only sources, that I am aware of, who understood and articulated the impact of the new uni polar direction of the US strategic initiatives in the region.  The American strategic objective in Sri Lanka is dualistic in nature. While seeking operating sites, it also seeks to deter any A2/AD ( Anti -Access/ Access Denial ) attempts by other powers.  And Sivaram was the first to pick upon and highlight the concept of A2/AD .  He highlighted that part of the American objective in (South) Asia is “To prevent the United States from being denied economic, political and military access to an important part of the globe. • “.  

As I wrote before, the Chinese orbit of influence on Sri Lanka only matters in the context of A2/AD. In that, China can convince the Sri Lankan state to avoid ( or delay ) leaning towards the US.  Or alternatively make the US pay a higher price for the access in the form of opportunity cost.  Despite popular belief, China has no chance of a direct military presence in Sri Lanka the way India or US can muster.  

The US has maintained its leverage on Sri Lanka before the 2002 ceasefire, during the ceasefire and since the end of the war. And America will continue to do so until its objectives are achieved. The UN resolutions are a clear demonstration of it. Assistant Secretary Biswal reminded everyone last month.  Speaking about the “U.S. Foreign Policy in South Asia: A Vision for Prosperity and Security” at the Harvard University, she said “We look forward to a resumption of a more comprehensive military relationship once the Government of Sri Lanka has made better progress toward reconciliation and accountability.”

The American strategic calculus at play before and during the peace talks was either the coercion of the LTTE into an agreement in favor of a unitary Sri Lankan state or the containment of LTTE as a small guerrilla force.  Either of these would have lead to the eventual withering away of the LTTE.  The expectation was, at the end, it would pay dividends for basing through a west friendly, and popular, Ranil government.  So LTTE’s contribution to the election defeat of Ranil government would have ruffled a lot of feathers in those planning circles.

Next : LTTE’s calculus. Sivaram’s meeting with the tiger leadership and the exchanges that left him immensely impressed.   What were the little known divisions under Mano and Sasi masters of LTTE planning for?

  Part 2: added.   

http://eelapalan.tumblr.com/post/87379110989/part-2-remember-to-remember

[eelapalan]

We suffer with out a you.

Taraki was killed 9 years ago today. Killings of key Tamils should have foretold us what was to come in 2009. Those killed were capable of articulating Tamil views in  Bi-lingual, Tri-lingual forums.  Sri Lanka clearly did not want them living in 2009.  Sivaram was a one of a kind.  How much he has been missed is very much evident in the current Tamil discourse.

He was such an inspiration at many levels.  He did not just devour knowledge, he constantly applied it. He saw things everyone missed.  He saw around corners.  And when he foresaw danger around those corners, he went beyond warnings. He proposed solutions.  And many a times, he went beyond offering solutions, he implemented them.  Sivaram: A rebel and a realist.  A thinker and a doer:  We suffer with out a you. 

[eelapalan]

USA 1 - India 0

It is surprising to see Tamils who are surprised by India’s abstention vote at the UNHRC on Sri lanka. But it is pathetic to see Tamils not even able to express their disappointment. Tamils speaking to the Sunday Time here.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/140330/columns/90860-90860.html

Sampanthan of TNA is quoted as saying  India “.. has to maintain some principles and we respect that.” He added, “India still has a role to play and we are confident it will address our needs.”.

And Suren Surendiran of GTF, followed up saying “It is diplomatically naïve and immature to interpret abstentions as being somehow supportive of the Government of Sri Lanka”

Translating this diplomatic speak in English it says.  “India, our big neighbour, you know and we know, you can kick us in the balls and we will have to take it. We apologize, this time, we had to wince a little”  

Diaspora organizations self- restricting their operational space to match that of the constricted space of the TNA is bad. More so when India is about to overhaul its foreign policy initiatives under a new administration.

The policy announcements of India and the US are not secrets.  They have been expressed and demonstrated many a times.

India:

Sri Lanka should not go beyond 13A. It is okay if Sri Lanka is slow to implement the 13A.

There should not be any other international interference in the neighborhood.  

USA:

There can not be a separate country.  

Will not take unilateral decisions against India’s wishes in the region.   

And both countries acknowledge and support the structural supremacy of the Sinhala nation over the Tamil nation.  

It is also factual that America along with India helped to destroy the LTTE. And willfully looked the other way during the genocidal onslaught. And both of them wanted the Srilankan government to implement the 13A in return for that help.  When Sri Lanka gave them the finger on the 13A, America chose to act but India chose not to.

During the peace talks, Eric Solheim and others thought keeping India informed was sufficient. But India played the spoiler at the very end by encouraging Sri lanka to go, literally, for the kill. And then proceeded to shield the regime from any outside investigations.  Coincidently, after the UN vote, in a pointed reference to India, US repeated the same language that they had kept other stakeholders informed .

The marked difference this time is that US chose to express its disappointment over India’s vote openly.

According to another set of informed people, America took in the suggestion of India to explicitly refer to 13A in the resolution. Apparently this reference was also supported by the TNA.  Primary reason for the 13A reference in the resolution is to set the ceiling for a solution. NOT necessarily to “encourage” Sri Lanka to implement it as it is made to sound.  

For whatever its worth, this blog has been repeating the theme.  From 6 months ago, trying to make a point about how Tamils have become an unnecessary variable in this game, I wrote

“Tamil discourse is now juxtaposed between the likes of ever compromising TNA on one hand and never relenting Tamilnet on the other. “

This binary mindset, that you have to either fully support something or oppose it entirely was again at display during the UN resolution debate. There was limited debate about the granularity of options, both pro and con, available.   A collective opposition to the references of 13A and LLRC while welcoming an international investigation would have been prudent.  And to have ensured Delhi tipped its hand much earlier than it had been doing at the UN.  

So at the end, India chose to keep Sri Lanka even if it meant losing Tamilnadu.

repeating from the same blog post,

“Only when Eelam Tamil problem becomes a national security issue for India, would there be any direct intervention. This is why a stronger and inseparable relationship with the people and leaders of TamilNadu is a predestined safety valve for Eelam Tamils. “

American policy makers have been frustrated with India in recent times. Frustrated because  India has not fully embraced America as the strategic partner in the regional affairs.  Indian officials are still suspicious of the US motives.  

I shared this article with a friend when it came out last December with the words “ Why US would continue to put pressure on India in multilateral forums like UN.”

The author, @MohanCRaja, asked  “that New Delhi discard its traditional impulse to view Asia through the anti-Western prism. The idea of Asian solidarity against the West, developed during the colonial era, has long been presumed to be a fundamental principle of India's foreign policy.”

and then concluded

“Managing these regional contradictions will be a major challenge for India's Asia policy in the coming years. Non-alignment, strategic autonomy and Asian solidarity might be attractive slogans for some, but offer no guidance for the conduct of India's foreign policy in East Asia and the Middle East. To cope with the new geopolitical imperatives, India must learn to deal with Asia on its own terms and stop imposing its ideological preferences on the region.”

(Note: Reminded of an old Tom Clancy Novel, Debt of Honor.  re Asian solidarity. Truth is stranger than fiction indeed.)

From the previous blog post, March Madness. is it USA Vs India, 

But would the US push through the resolution if India choose to sit on the fence?

Answer is now known.

America’s dealing with India has been forceful.  Whether it is the diplomat’s issue , or about Bangladesh, and now on Sri Lanka.

[ India, US at odds over Bangladesh policy

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-US-at-odds-over-Bangladesh-policy/articleshow/24950652.cms

India-US chasm opens over Bangladesh

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-02-210114.html ]

America wants to force India out of the sideline, non-committal, backdoor diplomacy. And wants India to take similar positions as the US.  America intends this at the new administration in Delhi which  will overhaul its foreign policy for certain.  But  many tamil activists still continue to see the US & India as the same collective they were in 2009.  Principally that still remains true. But the fissures have been visible.

Few Tamil Nadu organizations like the  May 17th, despite their best intentions and noble goals, squandered precious time and efforts on Anti American rhetoric and taking over KFC’s. Repeating from the previous blog post wrote weeks before UN voting.

Tamil Nadu activists have chosen to protest against the American resolution  because it does not include charges of Genocide.  While that is reasonable request, protesting it, misses the tree for the wood.  Tamil Nadu’s immediate focus should be in getting Delhi to take a public position within the next few weeks. Letting Delhi wait until the voting time, is a strategic mistake by the Tamil Nadu brethren.  Tamil Nadu activists should first mobilize towards getting Delhi to openly support an International Investigation mechanism.  Without that, protesting the resolution for what it does not include is premature and above all not prudent. It only helps Delhi’s agenda of deflection.   

Would Tamilnadu brethren make wise choices in the upcoming elections and hold their politicians accountable so that India does not stop the OHCHR investigations even before it starts?  

[eelapalan]

The Lord Business

UN is no Tamil’s string of pearls.

Lets just be honest. The current UN resolution as it stands will not bring impactful change to the Eelam Tamils.

What it does though is to keep a door ajar. It is a sensible beachhead strategy.  It is so because that is where the final act will play out. UN is where it should start so that it is there it can end.  

ReSolution. No Solution

It becomes problematic when few tend to market the resolution as a solution. Not coincidentally, they happen to be the same voices that said the same thing about 13 amendment.  

Tamils cant afford to be distracted by the UN theatrics if Twittersphere is any indication.   An impactful Tamil strategy must be at play in Tamilnadu.  For the beachhead that is the UN, the reinforcement is to come from Tamilnadu.  

If that does not materialize, the UN effort would, no doubt, go to waste.  

UNHRC options will not bring about a structural change in Sri Lanka.  But TamilNadu is capable of producing such change in Sri Lanka and through UN.  As things stand now, a game changer move can only originate from TamilNadu.

As repeated often in this blog, the current socio, economic, and political changes TamilNadu is undergoing is fundamental.  Student protests are only a symptomatic expression of a systemic shift. These are rare and long processes in that part of the world. When it does happen, you want to be there. Being at the right place at the right time.

It is Eelam Tamils duty to ensure this change culminates in our favor to bring about a meaningful and structural changes in the Island of Sri Lanka. And winds are blowing in our favor.  

So how do you land in the UN and battle in Sri Lanka and get reinforcement from Tamilnadu?

It is expected that the next Indian federal government will have to have TamilNadu support to exist.  Many are predicting BJP to have enough of a majority. But the likely scenario is BJP or a loose coalition of third parties will have to be at the mercy of the current CM Jayalalitha.  And she has endorsed a strong position as a party election platform.  

A series of recent articles in the US press have highlighted the importance as well (1)(2).  

Unlike the Congresse’s toothless foreign policy, a BJP government will have a more forceful policy.  With that pending change, US will not take unilateral initiatives in the region. Yet, it has shown it will take leadership in multilateral bodies cornering India into action.

My prediction is that should a BJP government come to power, they will choose Sri Lanka as the test case to prove their hegemonic policies to other regional countries as well as to the foe, China and the “friend” US. 

One should take serious note of Yaswant Sinha’s statement in Chennai two weeks ago

There will be personality change in Modi-led govt: Yashwant Sinha

Read more at: http://news.oneindia.in/india/therewill-be-personality-change-in-modi-led-govt-yashwant-sinha-1410096-lse.html

 “ "We need to just whisper in the ears of Rajapaksa that he needs to listen else face the consequences," he said. He dismissed the view that China will occupy India's strategic place in Sri Lanka if New Delhi took a strong stance against the island nation. "If America can have Monro Doctrine in southern hemisphere, we can have one in South Asia," he said, adding India cannot live in "perpetual fear" of China taking its place in Lanka. "Like (Lord) Hanuman, we must realise our strength and we can also cross over the Palk Strait not with guns but with roses," he said”

( Note: I hadn’t seen his comment re Palk Strait when I wrote about Tamils walking on water. But am amused by the Hanuman comment.  Though I am not into any of the lord business, willing to tolerate it in this context )

This comes from a senior leader of the BJP party who was both a finance minister and a foreign minister of India.   

A sweeping win by AIDMK and BJP’s reliance on that party, and an OHCHR report next year could be the perfect storm for Eelam tamils to turn the corner.   

It will be an amazing delivery of poetic justice should it come from two powerful Tamil women. One as a head of OHCHR and another as a head of TamilNadu.  What a fantastic testimony would that be for the Vanni mindset and to Periyar.

So using the UN resolution only as a tactical step of a strategy, Tamils should continue to push to make the language stronger and not dismiss the resolution.  Should a resolution pass with components of a OHCHR investigation intact, Tamils in their home turfs will hopefully work on other pieces.

1) Eelam Tamils should continue to insist, as demonstrated in Geneva this time through NPC members Aananthi and Sivajilingam, that elected members act as representatives and not as lawyers nitpicking the merits of a case.  Pseudo intellectualism at this juncture is missing the tree for the woods.

2)  The impressive articulation of TNPF leader Gajen and Civil society member Guruparan on the weaknesses of the resolution should reach the people so they are not fed false hope of delivery of justice.   But I also hope both of them do more to frame the discussions as pro strong resolution and don't get trapped into an anti resolution messaging.  

3) Tamils in Tamil Nadu should ensure that notoriously fickle TN politics does not go off tracks post elections.Congress and DMK have paid dearly in Tamilnadu for their 2009 disastrous inaction. And Chief Minister Jeyalalitha is determined to extract more.  All Congress leaders are running scared not wanting to run in the elections. Tamils should ensure CM Jeyalalitha keeps her election promises.

4) Tamils everywhere should ensure new government in Delhi thinks outside of the 13A and LLRC bullshit strewn all over.  The ominous reference to 13A in the resolution and TNA leaderships pussyfooting around it will not get us out of this mess.  If Delhi to whisper in Rajapakse’s ear as Sinha says, I would rather it be the dialog from the all time classic movie pulp fiction.

"The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the inequities of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he who, in the name of charity and good will, shepherds the weak through the valley of the darkness, for he is truly his brother's keeper and the finder of lost children. And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy My brothers. And you will know I am the Lord when I lay My vengeance upon you."  

That is a whisper that the Srilankan state needs to hear but hear it loud and clear. And that is a lord business that I can get behind.  

----------------------------------------------------------

here is the Pulp Fiction scene in Youtube. starting at 1 min.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2WK_eWihdU

(1) What Sri Lanka reveals about Indian democracy support

http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/19/what-sri-lanka-reveals-about-indian-democracy-support/h4s7

(2) The Indian Elections and Indian Foeign Policy: What Tamil Nadu parties have to Say

http://www.forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2014/03/20/the-indian-elections-and-indian-foreign-policy-what-tamil-nadu-parties-have-to-say/

For those interesting in learning more about UN’s role in deciding of people’s Self determination 2 recommended readings below

Self Determination in the Post 9/11 Era by Elizabeth Chadwick

http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415550048/

The responsibility of outside powers for acts of secessionist entities by Stefan Talmon

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=184A6DDAFF308E8C2F3B30A22FDB4518.journals?fromPage=online&aid=5916968

[eelapalan]

Can Tamils walk on water?

If one were to read Dayan Jayatilleka  last week, one might think so.  

The geo strategic advantage of Tamils he highlights needs further characterization.  Lets follow Dayan’s boxing analogy.

Eelam tamils have been forced into in the ring for a heavyweight match not of our choosing. We have been facing a genocidal state. We had to learn how to punch above our lightweight class. and learn quick.  Learn we did. We have been knocked down in many a rounds. But never knocked out.  And we never will be.      

We have had our share of mentors. They taught us the value of justice.  They told us how to chase after our love. Freedom.

and she's mine, she's mine, she's mine, all mine

yeah she's mine, mine, mine, mmm

i was thrown before the court of canes

tossed my soul to the furnace flames

where all my heros had been slain, exiled, or put in prison

because they rose above the mess

and because their power posed a threat

and because they spoke of something else

when everybody else didn't

We can sing this proud.  We also learned it is not all about throwing punches.  It is about the footwork. it is not about the size but about the stamina.  

We have had great mentors and we have had crazy ones.  It is those crazies, that the Sinhala state need to watch out for. We, the crazies, are not burdened by the trapping of a state. We “think different”.

"Here's To The Crazy Ones. The misfits. The rebels. The trouble-makers. The round pegs in the

square holes. The ones who see things differently. They're not fond of rules, and they have

no respect for the status-quo. You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify, or vilify them.

About the only thing you can't do is ignore them. Because they change things. They push the

human race forward. And while some may see them as the crazy ones, we see genius.

Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world - are the ones who DO !" -

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rwsuXHA7RA

And we are now learning how to transcend the small, shallow, body of water called the Palk Strait.  So indeed, one day, we will walk on water.  And that is the day, you, the racist, Genocidal Sri Lankan state, will get knocked out.  And both the Sinhalese and the Tamils will rejoice.  

... she's mine, she's mine, she's mine, all mine

yeah she's mine, mine, mine, mmm

[eelapalan]

March Madness: Is it USA Vs India?

Sri Lanka ready to face UN rights body: Minister

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2014-01-18/south-asia/46324566_1_unhrc-mahinda-samarasinghe-rights-body

Stalking Sri Lanka: UK Parliament Report Reveals Geneva Efforts On War Crimes

https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/stalking-sri-lanka-uk-parliament-report-reveals-geneva-efforts-on-war-crimes/

On March Threat Geneva: There Is Only One Strategy

https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/on-march-threat-geneva-there-is-only-one-strategy/

Collapse Of Lanka-US Relations

http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2014/01/19/collapse-of-lanka-us-relations/

Lalith Weeratunga in US

http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/41980-lalith-weeratunga-in-us.html

India keen to see political settlement in Sri Lanka

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/india-keen-to-see-political-settlement-in-sri-lanka_907004.html

If you follow the news on Sri Lanka lately, you will know the march madness is in full swing.  

There is a lot of optimism among the Tamils for a UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) against Sri Lanka at the March UNHCR session.  This is so because of the increased activity from the US and the involvement of the UK.  In contrast, only pedantic statements for reconciliation and political solution are released out of India.  

The theatrics behind the March session would just be that. The end result may yet again disappoint the Tamils.  Sri Lanka’s confidence in its willingness to face the resolution isn't just bluster. It also sees this, in a strange way, as a net positive in domestic matters.  

Internationally, Sri Lanka’s first line of defense has been India (Delhi and south block).  The second line of defense is the security council with the help of China and Russia.  Dayan Jeyatileka has been bloating about the UN victory and has detailed how the early initiatives against Sri Lanka were checked both by India and the Security Council in 2009.   India campaigned for and then voted with Sri Lanka in 2009, and in the consequent resolutions India significantly watered down the resolution language and made it nothing but a tool for the NPC election.  Using TNA leadership and the NPC, India is eager to tie the political solution to the 13 Amendment ( 13A) only. And continue to push the 13A both as a leverage against Sri lanka and also as a hedge against further internationalisation of the conflict.  

India made the decision to support 13A as the only solution as far back as 2007 as Dr.Destradi’s work shows. And India worked hard to get UN out of Nepal and succeeded.  Sri Lanka continues to resist 13A knowing full well that it will have to eventually capitulate.  But Sri Lanka hopes that the longer it can maintain the current status-quo, the more it becomes the entrenched reality in the International mind. And it also hopes that “accept the reality” mind set can be further reinforced by components of a Genocidal agenda on the ground.

Additional time and space given by the international players to Sri Lanka has increased its strategic maneuverability.  This, in turn, has limited America’s strategic options.

At the UNHRC, the US is worried about two things.

a) A split vote that does not have the overwhelming support of the council and the resolution being seen as a western interference limiting America’s future initiatives in the region.  Sri Lanka has been successfully framing this as the return of the colonialism.

b) Losing its leverage on Sri lanka if it gets a resolution, mandating a UN COI, to pass in March.  After that, US will have to seek direct and unilateral alternatives.  

The question then is, would the US expend its political capital to push through a resolution against Sri lanka at this time?

The US finds itself at this juncture  because of the 4 year delay in getting to such a resolution.  A COI few years ago would have given the US more options.  A COI now is too late to affect the kind of outcomes that the US desires in Sri Lanka: generating an accommodative ( to the West) attitude in the sri lankan regime or effecting an “organic” regime change all together. The US will have to resort to sanctions as a next step fairly quickly.  This is where the America finds itself in a  predicament.

A UN COI would help the Rajapakses win an early 2015 election ensuring the regime’s longevity.  In fact, indications are that the government sees the uncompromising behaviour being an election benefit with the Sinhalese. Sinhala people are now presented with a new enemy. And an “organic” uprising is not in the horizon and from the US perspective a UN COI alone ,without a strong follow up, will stop the possibility of a uprising.   

But a unilateral sanction by the US will feed the narrative as regional hegemonism.  Though this precedent was set in Burma. And more importantly, there is no strong opposition in Sri Lanka to make a stable transition.  A combination of UNP, Chandrika, and TNA alliance and economic pressure are the obvious venues.  What adds to the American worries is the closeness of the TNA leadership to Delhi.

Where will India be on regional issues as well as on its “partnership” with America post 2014 elections is still unknown.   

With a strong China and Russia support at the security council and with a vague Indian position, US could indeed suffer a shut out from Sri lanka.  Any stronger actions by America would only help India move closer to Sri Lanka and vice versa at the expense of American objectives.  In the case of Burma, India and America’s  good cop, bad cop routine worked to ultimately undo the military junta.

But will India and America reenact the same play in Sri Lanka or are their objectives diverging?  

India suspects that  US is trying to create multiple power centers with in India and in India’s backyard.  US won't do anything overtly that brings instability to the region since that will do more harm.  But the American gaze has been towards Tamil Nadu as one such potential power center. 

With in the Indian union, the call for meaningful political devolution ( NOT a call for separation ) will first come from Tamil Nadu. This, often, is driven by the socio economic growth not by the linguistic or ethnic ideology .  (Readers would be wise to see Clinton’s visit, the growth of American direct investment into TN, the American consulate support , etc in this larger context)

American persistence over resolutions against Sri Lanka,  exposes India as a reluctant partner to a stronger UN initiative against Sri lanka. Sets the narrative that India is brought to the table only because of the Tamil Nadu factor and not because of genuine Indian leadership over Human Rights.  Delhi also plays along with the same narrative to Sri Lanka to placate it.  

But would the US push through the resolution if India choose to sit on the fence?

During the peace talks, Erik Solheim and others thought that as long as India was kept informed, everything will be okay. This proved to be wrong.  Sri Lanka’s belligerent stand at the end of the war was reinforced by the direct Indian support.  By the end of 2007,  India had hijacked the turn of events at that opportune time.

This could possible be played out again at the UN this year where India hijacks the Sri lankan agenda in the context of post resolution.  Sri Lanka bringing up IPKF atrocities in a possible UN probe is a desperate attempt to prevent India announcing its support for a UN COI early.   A belated Indian support to the resolution, as it was before, is still a win for Sri Lanka.    

Tamil Nadu activists have chosen to protest against the American resolution  because it does not include charges of Genocide.  While that is reasonable request, protesting it misses the tree for the wood.  Tamil Nadu’s immediate focus should be in getting Delhi to take a public position within the next few weeks. Letting Delhi wait until the voting time, is a strategic mistake by the Tamil Nadu brethren.  Tamil Nadu activists should first mobilize towards getting Delhi to openly support an International Investigation mechanism.  Without that, protesting the resolution for what it does not include is premature and above all not prudent. It only helps Delhi’s agenda of deflection.   

[eelapalan]

Does TNA have game?

A good way to set up for the new year is to recap some of last years posts.  Some think I single out TNA leadership instead of appreciating the difficult task they are doing under tough conditions. TNA did step up to the plate when Tamil people needed them the most and is doing well holding down the fort.  But criticism isn't necessarily opposition.  I try my best to present ideas through different analytical frameworks.  In the current era of big data, game theory models have become popular tools to deal with areas of conflict: Be that economic, social, or political. This is an attempt at a recap of my last year’s TNA centric posts though a game theory model.  

The context of Tamil strategic thinking.

A new song by a coincidentally named band, New Politics, might be an appropriate setup.  

Should I believe in the world momma Should I give up and hide or should I stay and fight Should I believe in the rules momma Tell me if I should run or learn to shoot a gun I don't know what to believe momma ………... You won't believe what I've seen momma There's a fire inside there's a storm on the rise It's in the air that we breathe momma Can I speak out my mind in these changing times? Give me a reason to be momma 'Cause I'm down on my knees I'm begging please Help me back on my feet momma 'Cause I need someone to believe believe believe in ……...

Price takers in perfect competition and monopolies don't need to be strategic. Others in conflict must be strategic.  With the news about 56 Global Tamil entities releasing a New Year message, TNPF press meeting, and the TNA meeting with the president, talks of TRC, etc, It is useful to look at the current Tamil politics through that model.

Few highlights of the game theory when conflicting parties arrive at an equilibrium.    

1) If a strictly dominant strategy exists for one player in a game, that player will play that strategy in each of the game's Nash equilibrium .

2) If both players have  strictly dominant strategies, the game has only one unique Nash equilibrium. However, that Nash equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal, meaning that there may be non-equilibrium outcomes of the game that would be better for both players.

3) If only one player has a dominant strategy, then the other is expected not to play in that strictly dominated game.

4) By the similar logic, if both strictly and weakly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated resulting in single strategy for each player, this also is a Nash equilibrium.

Is TNA leadership pursuing a strategy set that will result in an (pareto) optimal equilibrium for the Eelam Tamil cause?   

A full game theory analysis would include every possible player.  So it is important to understand if the International community (mainly India & US) sees any equilibrium arrived at between Sri Lanka and the Tamilnation as a stable one.  But for this post, I limit the players to the Srilankan state and the Tamils only. Also to avoid confusion, a state of equilibrium is not necessarily a final state but can be an intermediate state before a process of negotiation begins. So the players can further explore the possibility of another optimal equilibrium state.  

A model in political science, known as the median voter theorem, predicts one equilibrium.  

Since strictly dominated strategies can’t be played, by a process of iterative deletion, political candidates tend converge on moderate positions in order to maximize the votes.   

This works in a setup when the constituents are normally distributed with the median near moderated positions. An accommodative political framework facilitates this. As in the case of many western political systems.  The political process in the US has been a better example of this until the recent phenomena of tea party politics.  

But in ethnically polarized and non accommodative political systems, this does not work well.  In these cases it is nearly impossible to get a normal distribution, cutting across ethnic boundaries, unless there is a very drastic and disruptive change of the framework itself.  The distribution is more of a bimodal one with peaks on each end of the spectrum and with a lot of empty space in between. So the payoff for each player is to move to the median of their own curve instead of wasting their effort to move to the area of empty space.  The political process in the island of Sri Lanka can be  seen in these illustrations.  

Fig 1

the first one is self explanatory.  A truly federal setup could be the happy median in an ideal case where the whole island population is normally distributed with bulk of Tamils on the left and the bulk of the Sinhalese on the right. A numerical strength of the Sinhalese would skew this distribution to the right.

Fig 2

The second curve is also self explanatory. This is largely the desired view of the Sri Lankan state.  But this also reflects the view of those who see the island through a prism of majority and minority (Ex: India, TNA leaders) and of those who do not subscribe to the ethnic nature of the conflict (Ex: The INGOs, pseudo liberals).  People such as Dayan Jeyantilaka often use the logic that the island is one nation and by virtue of the Sinhala majority, what Sinhalese think matters more than the Tamils.  As we will see, there is a qualitative and quantitative difference in how one sees the distribution. Because each view drives different game theory strategies.  

Fig 3

This third figure illustrates the pre and post war scenarios in my view and is the reality of the conflict. These quick drawings don't show the intent clearly. so to expand on it

While the post war Tamil positions skewed to the right, away from TamilEelam, by some amount because of the military defeat, the Sinhala positions skewed to the right, towards a unitary Sinhala Buddhist state, by far more because of the triumphalism. The shift aside, the pre war, wider Sinhala distribution, imposed by limited war weariness, became much more narrower in post war (tighter standard deviations) (Note: Drawing meant to show it as such but it not come through. Will edit later).  A narrower Tamil distribution pre war, hardened by being inside the theater of war (at enormous cost), became wider, post war. Some political party positions are listed just for illustrative purposes.

so If one believes in the 2nd illustration, as opposed to the third, then the payoff for TNA is better if they move more to the right towards the median.  But if one accepts the third distribution as the reality, then TNA’s pay off is better if they move more to the left within the Tamil distribution.  That offsets TNPF gain and neutralizes Diaspora influences.  To the right is empty space anyways.  

Sri Lanka has no incentive to move as it has no effective opposition within the Sinhala distribution and has no more to gain in terms of payoff.  

My concerns are when TNA leaders use language or strategies that fit the wrong models shown above.

TNA leaders at times aspire to take up the Sri Lankan opposition party mantle ascribing themselves to the 2nd illustration, thus trying to move to the right.  

TNA leadership also contradicts the median of the Tamil distribution. By mis interpreting the NPC votes as an endorsement from the Tamils for their strategy of moving further right in this distribution curve.  

TNA can take advantage of the strategic asset that is the   “Transnational ethnic kinship” , which will make the case for the third illustration even more stronger. If taken as one single entity, this kinship is additive to the distribution.  That would make the Tamil normal distribution on the left quantitatively larger. But often the TNA leadership, tries to distance itself from that kinship. Again, putting itself on the wrong curve.

If TNA is interested in playing, then it should understand the playing field.