To what extent has US foreign policy toward Israel been shaped by security interests since the end of the Cold War?
      I shall argue in this essay that since the end of the Cold War, US policy toward Israel can be explained in a large part by analysing the policy through a constructivist lens. This is not to say that security interests do not influence US policy, but through a foreign policy analysis we can observe that the relationship has been heavily influenced by ideological and cultural aspects of both public opinion and the views of policy-makers in the US. In order to answer this question, I will split my essay into four sections; the first will briefly discuss US-Israeli relations during the Cold War and the âspecial relationshipâ that emerged to set the scene for my argument. In the second section I lay out the argument that US policy toward Israel is mostly defined by security interests. In this section I will put forward the counter-arguments to this position to show that it is insufficient as an explanation for the US approach to Israel. The second section addresses the Israel lobby and the influence it has within the US on the policy-making process. In the final section of this essay I present my argument that the ideological and cultural perceptions within the US help to drive the agenda on Israel which, in turn, boosts influence of elements of society such as the Israel lobby.
      In order to analyse the nature of the US-Israeli relationship and consider the factors contributing to this state of affairs, it is necessary to show how the balance of power in the international system has shifted since the Cold War. This has, in turn, led to a shift in the prioritisation of factors contributing to the relationship. Chomsky argued that during the Cold War years, the US was concerned about threats to its economic interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). He argued that this concern was directed towards Europe, and it was exemplified in 1973 by Kissingerâs warning of a trading bloc in the MENA dominated by Europe (1999, pp. 65-66). However, one of the most significant foreign policy concern for the US in the region was the USSR. Mansour pointed out that during these years the Israelis cooperated heavily with the US; Israeli intelligence services provided the Americans with captured Soviet tanks and planes in order for them to be studied (1994, pp. 6). The Cold War was defined by a bipolar system and this balance of power also manifested itself in the MENA region. Stephens argued that the US was worried about Soviet influence in Egypt in 1970, thereby leading to a conflation of US-Israeli interests (2006, pp. 27). Furthermore, Stephens expanded her argument to assert that the US aimed to balance against Soviet influence over Arab states more broadly, and this could be seen by the US aligning itself with Israel in the 1967 against the USSR and Arab states (2006, pp. 27). It is important to understand how the Cold War bipolar system led the US to balance against the USSR in the MENA region, and how the end of the Cold War has reduced this strategic necessity. This is not to say the US does balance against other states or have strategic interests invested in its relationship with Israel, but it no longer faces an existential threat in the form of the USSR. My argument in this essay rests on the premise that the US has a âspecial relationshipâ with Israel; the nature of this relationship will be explored throughout this essay. However I shall also defer to Stephens who argued that the US-Israeli relationship came about partly due to the influence â⌠of significant religious, historical, political and sociological factorsâŚâ (2006, pp. 8-9). In the following section of this essay, I shall discuss the arguments that consider US foreign policy toward Israel to be mostly shaped by security interests.
      US foreign policy toward Israel is constructed by many different complex factors that interact with one another. The key factor I shall analyse in this section is security interests, and the argument that Israel enhances the security of the US. Security is a broad term that encompasses geo-strategic, intelligence, and economic aspects among others which I will try to unpack. Eisenstadt and Pollock argued that security benefits to the US provided by Israel include a testing ground for US weapons and tactics, a âbulwarkâ against Islamic extremism in the region, and also a state that helps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (2012, pp. ix). One of the main advantages of Israel is its geographical location. Krauthammer advocated an active US foreign policy in order to defend national interests and to counter states in the Middle East that threaten these interests (1990). He identified the Persian Gulf as a vital interest of the US and one it must protect (1990). Israel is in a unique position to assist the US in defending interests in the region from hostile actors. Chomsky emphasised the importance of this region for the US, and its interest in maintaining â⌠control over its energy reserves and the flow of petrodollars.â (1999, pp. 69). He asserted that the importance of the resources in the region contributed to the influence of the Israel lobby in the US, which is a point I will return to in the third section of this essay (1999, pp. 69). The geo-strategic relevance of the Middle East was emphasised by Dodge who said that the region supplies 32 percent of the worldâs oil and has 58 percent of the worldâs oil reserves (2012, pp. 201). Therefore it is a part of the world that the US needs allies in order to preserve its influence, particularly as there are many hostile actors present. Lipson expanded on this with the argument that Israel assists the US by opposing radical Arab states that threaten oil supplies and other hostile Arab states (1997, pp. 129). Lispon argued that much academic research over-estimated the influence of domestic factors on US foreign policy and that it is mainly determined by geo-strategic calculations (1997, pp. 129).
      Kagan and Kristol emphasised Israelâs utility for the US as a âbulwark of American powerâ and a port of liberal civilisation (2000, pp. 62). Therefore, Kagan and Kristolâs assessment is that Israel is a useful ally partly due to its domestic makeup as opposed to simply its strategic location. He argued Israelâs democratic nature tied it to the US as an ally (2000, pp. 62). This is a key observation as the perception of shared values is certainly a contributory factor to the US-Israeli relationship and one that differentiates the relationship that the US has with other states in the region such as Saudi Arabia. I shall go into more depth on this point in my argument further on in this essay. Berman highlighted the Iron Dome missile system in Israel as a particular example of how the American contribution to Israelâs security can enhance its own security (2012, pp. 6). According to Berman, US investment in the Iron Dome system from 2011 through to 2015 totalled around $900 million (2012, pp. 6). The first argument Berman put forward to justify this financial support was that the Iron Dome defence system deters conflict as it detracts from the ability of terrorists to provoke a violent response, and if there is less conflict in the region, the flow of oil is less likely to be disrupted (2012, pp. 6). He also claimed it would be easier for the US to promote democracy in the region (2012, pp. 6). This argument is reasonably vague and it is a highly contentious issue as to whether American democracy promotion contributes positively to its security. However, the second argument Berman uses is more convincing; he highlights the advantages of testing a weaponsâ system that could be employed by American bases in the region that may face similar threats of rocket and mortar attacks (2012, pp. 7). It is certainly true that close cooperation with Israel provides an opportunity for the US to test weapons and tactics to tackle threats from non-state actors such as Hezbollah. Zunes asserted that the US foreign policy approach to Israel is defined primarily by perceived security interests, although he included a caveat stating that this perception is not always correct (2014, pp. 92-93). Nevertheless, Zunes argued that a look at the aid given to Israel by the US illuminates the strategic motivations for this support. He pointed out that almost all of the aid â around 99 percent â was given to Israel by the US after 1967 when Israel had already established its military dominance over its Arabic neighbours (2014, pp. 89). Zunes built on this point by arguing that even if the substantial aid given to Israel was completely cut off, its survival would not be threatened, therefore the US is trying to advance its strategic interests in the region through Israel (2014, pp. 90). He argued that Israel had been successful in advancing interests of the US in the past, such as preventing nationalist victories in Lebanon and Jordan (2014, pp. 90). As well as this, Zunes highlighted the occasions where Israel transferred arms on behalf of the US where US public opinion deemed the recipients undesirable such as the Nicaraguan Contras (2014, pp. 90). Feldman argued that there exists a strategic cooperation between the US and Israel, as opposed to Israel being simply an asset of US power (1996, pp. 17). However, the most significant point made by Feldman was that with a decline in American military capabilities, it may become necessary to rely more heavily on regional allies such as Israel (1996, pp. 2-3). The next paragraph addresses the arguments made in support of security as the salient driver of US policy, with regard to Israel, and shows how these are limited in their explanatory scope.
      In this essay I do not contend that security interests help to shape US foreign policy toward Israel, but argue that other factors may better explain the special relationship. In the next couple of paragraphs, I will critique the argument that security is the salient variable that influences US policy. Stephens contended that realist concerns were insufficient to explain the extent of US support to Israel (2006, pp. 235-236). She argued the extent of this American support could be exemplified by the foreign aid decisions made after the 1994 US Congressional elections; the fiscally conservative Republican Party was elected and reduced the foreign aid bill from $13.6 billion in 1995 to $12.1 billion in 1996 (2006, pp. 235). Despite this overall reduction in foreign aid, Israel still received $3 billion each year (Stephens, 2006, pp. 235). Furthermore, Stephens highlighted the strength of the Israeli economy after the end of the Cold War; in 1998 Israelâs GDP was higher than $98 billion (2006, pp. 235-236). This aid to Israel continues to be provided by the US despite the relative wealth and military superiority of this Middle-Eastern state, but also in spite of failings of Israel. Stephens argued that Israelâs strategic uses are limited in preventing some perceived threats to the US such as the spread and rise of Islamic fundamentalism as this often comes about through democratic elections (2006, pp. 233). This is an even more pertinent point since the Arab Spring, where the landscape of the MENA region has been completely altered by revolutions from below. An apt example was the election of Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood to the post of President of Egypt in 2012 with 51.7 percent of the vote (Weaver, 2012). Stephens also noted that if strategic considerations were the prime determinant of US foreign relations, it would probably choose to ally itself more closely with Arab states more wealthy than Israel (2006, pp. 253).
      There are also convincing arguments that Israel is not only unhelpful in enhancing US security, but the US-Israel relationship may threaten it in certain ways. Dodge claimed that the nature of the US-Israel relationship has led to a negative opinion of the US in Arab and Muslim countries, which allows Islamic radicals to feed of this sentiment (2012, pp. 212). Nye Jr. went into depth on the importance of public opinion; he pointed specifically to opinion after the 2003 Iraq War where less than 15 percent of the population in Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan had a favourable view of the US (2004, pp. 43). Nye Jr. acknowledged that much of this negative feeling was down to the invasion of Iraq, but he also attributed some of this feeling to the role of the US supporting Israel in the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict (2004, pp. 43). Nye Jr. went on to say that the US failure to establish soft power in the region provides opportunities for terrorist organisations and other radical groups to recruit members in the midst of anti-American sentiment (2004, pp. 44). The support the US provides to Israel is not limited to economic and military aid, but includes diplomatic support which helps to drive anti-American sentiment in the region, as highlighted by Nye Jr.; Zunes pointed out that the US has vetoed 42 resolutions at the UN that were critical of Israel (2014, pp. 83). Â
      It may be argued that close relations with Israel are facilitating damaging anti-American sentiment in the region, but there are also strategic limitations to Israelâs position. It is widely accepted that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal, but Mearsheimer argued that even with this destructive capability, it does not always work as an effective deterrent (2001, pp. 132). He referred specifically to the attacks in 1973 on Israel launched by Syria and Egypt even though they were knew that Israel had nuclear weapons (2001, pp. 132). Israelâs nuclear deterrent is not always effective in maintaining stability in the Middle East, and this is certainly true with reference to non-state actors such as Hamas who are not deterred by these weapons. The issue of nuclear weapons is an important one because one of the security benefits of the Israeli alliance sometimes cited by scholars in the US is its assistance in preventing non-proliferation in the region. However, the recent nuclear deal between with Iran was staunchly opposed by Israelâs Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu (Sabin, 2015). Netanyahuâs position on a potentially nuclear-armed was in stark contrast to realists such as Layne; he argued that if a nuclear agreement could not be reached with Iran, the US should be prepared to live with a nuclear Iran (2009, pp. 16). Layne criticised George W. Bushâs approach to Israel, saying that Bushâs âtiltâ towards Israel was unhelpful because it was encouraging Israel to pursue policies that were âself-defeatingâ and hampering US interests in the process (2009, pp. 23-24). Layne proscribed what he saw as a more even-handed approach towards Israel from the US, which would include seeking the removal of Israeli settlements from the West Bank (2009, pp. 23-24). Mearsheimer and Walt were also critical of the US-Israeli relationship and argued that it was damaging to US security interests (2006, pp. 30). The authors argued that Israel is not helpful in the fight against Islamic extremism; they pointed out that Hamas and Hezbollah were not a substantial threat to the US unless the country was involved on behalf of Israel (2006, pp. 33). Furthermore, Mearsheimer and Walt asserted that Israelâs military capabilities and nuclear armaments ensure it significantly outmatches its opponents in the region (2006, pp. 35). Therefore, Mearsheimer and Walt looked to US domestic factors to try and explain the special relationship between the US and Israel; I shall discuss their argument in the following section of this essay.
      In the following two sections of this piece, I shall consider the influence of domestic factors on US foreign policy. Mearsheimer and Walt wrote a prominent article that argued US support for Israel is driven, not by strategic or moral considerations, but by the Israel lobby within the US (2006, pp. 40). Mearsheimer and Walt were sceptical of the strategic benefits that Israel affords to the US as was mentioned in the previous paragraph. The other aspect to their argument is also significant; much of Israelâs domestic make-up would contravene liberal values upheld in the US (2006, pp. 35). The authors present the counter-argument to the point asserted by some academics that Israelâs democratic nature makes it a suitable country for a close relationship (2006, pp. 35). Mearsheimer and Walt argued that the US has good relationships with authoritarian regimes and that many of Israelâs policies would be contrary to certain American values anyway; for example, Arabs in Israel are often treated as second class citizens under the law (2006, pp. 35). On top of this, Mearsheimer and Walt argued that Israelâs response to Palestinian aggressors has often been extreme with disproportionate Palestinian civilian casualties as a result of Israeli military actions; as well as an American peace activist being killed by an Israeli bulldozer in 2003 (2006, pp. 38-39). Instead, Mearsheimer and Walt argued that organisations within the Israel lobby such as the hugely influential American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), are led by hardliners (2006, pp. 40). They emphasised the power of organisations such as AIPAC which is able to use its wealth and influence to ensure policy toward Israel goes unchallenged in the political arena (2006, pp. 43). Rubenberg wrote in the 1980s that the Israel lobby had a âvirtual strangleholdâ over US Middle-Eastern policy (1986, pp. 375). He also asserted a similar argument as Mearsheimer and Walt on the issue of a shared democratic political culture; Rubenberg highlighted that Israel was an explicitly Jewish state where religion had substantial influence over social policies (1986, pp. 331-332). Israel and the US have different internal structures and certainly do not share the same democratic political values on issues such as race. Therefore, Mearsheimer and Walt are correct in their assertion that it is not political similarities that constitute a main driving factor behind the relationship, although the perception of shared democratic governance may have some effect in the US, which Kagan and Kristolâs argument alluded to. However, Mearsheimer and Walt do not address important underlying factors that influence US foreign policy, which are also partly responsible for the Israel lobbyâs significant power. This is the perception of shared ideological and cultural values within the US public and policy-making elite; I will address this argument in the next section.
      I have argued that security interests have been limited in their influence on US foreign policy although they are still prominent. Ideological and cultural perceptions in the US are a key aspect to the special relationship formed by the US and Israel. Whether close US support for Israel enhances US security is debatable, but it is important that geo-strategic limitations of this alliances may be counteracted to a certain extent by the beliefs of American citizens that prompt them to take an interest in their country supporting Israel. A major element of American society is religion and Baumgartner et al. illustrate that it can be a significant determinant of opinion on foreign policy (2008, pp. 172). If the Bible is interpreted in a more literal sense, it could lead to the belief that the land occupied by Palestinians belongs to Israel and also that conflict in the Middle-East is a sign of the forthcoming return of Christ (2008, pp. 171-172). Baumgartner et al. found that around two-thirds of Evangelicals interpret the Bible literally (2008, pp. 173-174). Perhaps one of the most astonishing statistics highlighted by Baumgartner et al. was that in 2006, 21 percent of Americans claimed that âreligious beliefâ was their main determining factor in their position on the Israel-Palestine conflict (2008, pp. 174). This factor was ranked above âpersonal experienceâ and âeducationâ as a main determinant (Baumgartner et al., 2008, pp. 174).  Therefore, in the US it is clear that religion has a substantial effect on the opinion on some members of the public. It interesting that it is Evangelical Christians that express large amounts of support for Israel, and not simply the Jewish population. This support can be observed more explicitly in a poll taken after the outbreak of violence between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006; 59 percent of white Evangelicals responded that they were sympathetic to Israel in the conflict compared with 24 percent of secular people (Baumgartner et al., 2008, pp. 178). Elizur argued that Israel has always been viewed positively in the US due to shared values such as democracy, âmoral state behaviourâ, and âBiblical heritageâ (1997, pp. 215). I have argued that Israel and the US have differing democratic values and Israelâs actions are often not moral, but it is important that some may perceive these characteristics as present and mutual. It highlights the complex ways in which certain ideological and cultural factors interact. If some traits such as a âBiblical heritageâ are present, it may lead to the attribution of other characteristics to Israel such as moral behaviour.
      The sympathetic stance of Evangelical Christians toward Israel is important because of the substantial electoral weight of this demographic. Stephens estimated that there were around 40 million right-wing Evangelical Christians in the US, most of whom accept there is a shared Judeo-Christian heritage (2006, pp. 254). Martin also emphasised the large influence of the Religious Right which draws its support heavily from white Evangelical Protestants; this demographic amounted to 25 percent of all registered voters (1999, pp. 68). Martin asserted that almost all elements of the Religious Right were staunch supporters of Israel; the influential pastor, Jerry Falwell, declared his support for the country in 1979 (1999, pp. 72-73). The data on the views of Christian groups in the US suggests that a focus on the Israel lobby in a foreign policy analysis is too narrow as support for Israel in the US is much more ingrained in society. A recent GALLUP poll from 2013 showed that American support in the Israel-Palestine conflict was 64 percent in favour of the Israelis and only 12 percent in favour of the Palestinians; this is the highest level of support for Israel amongst the American public since 1991 (Saad, 2013). These levels of support, in spite of the dubious security advantages of US support for Israel, are indicative of the alternative connections that Americans have with Israel. I shall analyse some more of these variables in the next paragraph.
      Dodge presents a clear and convincing argument that constructivist factors such as perceptions and ideas help craft US policy toward Israel (2012, pp. 208-209). Among the constructivist elements driving US policy are the perception that Israel is a safe place for Jews, the âpioneering spiritâ of Israel as a democratic settler nation, and religious aspects (Dodge, 2013, pp. 208-209). This is not an exhaustive list, but it serves to illustrate how these perceptions and views held in the US are driving the US to pursue a relationship with Israel which may threaten its security in several ways. Nevertheless, Dodge also talked about how realist factors cannot be neglected when analysing US policy; Israel is still an ally in an unstable region (2012, pp. 209-210). This is perhaps the case in the last few years after the Arab Spring and during current conflicts in the Middle East where traditional authoritarian US allies have been usurped. Dodge also sought to explain the influence of the Israel lobby which was a point developed heavily by Mearsheimer and Walt. He referred to AIPACâs membership of 100,000 people, its $47 million annual budget, and does agree that the Jewish community in the US has a high voter turnout (2012, pp. 209-210). Nevertheless, Dodge correctly stated that the influence Jewish voters alone should not be overstated; most tend to vote for the Democrats consistently (2012, pp. 210). In fact, Jewish voters only represent a very small proportion of the population (Tate, 2012). However, AIPAC is able to garner high levels of support, observed by Mearsheimer and Walt, because this organisation successfully appeals to both realist and constructivist arguments to achieve favourable policies toward Israel (Dodge, 2012, pp. 210). There are already large portions of the American public and elite, not limited to religious groups, who identify strongly with Israel which AIPAC is able to use in their lobbying efforts. I will explore this cultural and ideological identification in the following paragraph.
      Mansour asserted that Israelâs strategic use for the US was limited, and it is a hindrance in some respects such as making it difficult for the US to pursue closer relations with Arab states (1994, pp. 37). Mansour saw the power of the Israeli lobby as requiring an explanation in itself as well as it being a factor in the close nature of US-Israel relations (1994, pp. 258). In other words, he saw the lobby as a symptom of the strong US-Israel ties that was driven by other variables. It is also important to note that favourable perceptions of Israel are present across a broad spectrum of American society and is not limited to religious groups and the Israel lobby. Mansour referred to a study conducted in 1988 that found 66 percent of conservatives and 75 percent of liberals agreed that the US had a âmoral obligation to prevent the destruction of Israelâ (1994, pp. 268). Although this study is dated, it demonstrates that support for Israel is ubiquitous in America, with different group emphasising differing aspects to identify with. Mansour concluded that strategic aspects to the US-Israel relationship were important, but ideological-cultural factors are central in influencing US foreign policy (1994, pp. 290). He summed up the ideological-cultural phenomenon; â⌠Israel perceives itself and is perceived as being part of European and Western culture.â (1994, pp. 268-269). US foreign policy toward Israel is driven by a complex mix of factors, but since the Cold War security factors are wholly insufficient in explaining the relationship that exists between the two countries. Perceptions of similar beliefs, values, and culture in the US have allowed the Israel lobby to build on this fertile ground to encourage further support for Israel. This is central in explaining the substantial economic, military, and diplomatic support provided to Israel by the US.
      In conclusion, I have argued that an explanation of US foreign policy towards Israel in terms of security is limited. This is not to say that the US does not have real, or perceived, security interests in maintaining a special relationship with Israel. However, continued high levels of support in the US of Israel since the decline of the USSR can be partly explained by ideological and cultural factors within the US. Public opinion in the US is very supportive of Israel which provides the Israel lobby with the influence it currently wields. US foreign policy is formulated by a complex mix of factors and security is still a prominent one, but it is the contribution of a constructivist analysis that provides a more thorough explanation of the US-Israel relationship.
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