Despite abortion being seriously wrong, I will critically examine and evaluate Don Marquis's argument on “Why Abortion is Immoral.” Don Marquis defends that abortion is indeed wrong but under rare circumstances. In this argument, Walter Sinmoff Armstrong and Judith Jarvis Thomson's arguments about abortion will also be put into consideration. Lastly, a discussion will be done regarding the pros and cons of the moral impermissibility of the abortion argument. For that reason, this paper sets out an argument that claims that is right in rare circumstances and seriously wrong in common circumstances.
The main reason for the exceptional circumstances is to disregard from consideration cases whose ethical analysis should be controversially detailed for clear-headed abortion opponents. For example, when abortion is done after a rape case as well as in between the first fourteen days after conception whereby the fetus is absolutely an individual. Additionally, when a pregnancy’s extension appears to endanger a woman’s life and also in situations whereby the fetus is anencephalic.
The abortion debate seems to be intractable. This is visible from the symmetries that arise from analyzing the major arguments on both sides of the debate on abortion. For instance, in this standard anti-abortion argument that states fetus are alive and human as well, humans have a right to life hence since fetus are human, they also have a right to live. On the contrary, women have the right over their bodies and so, they are capable of controlling it. However, the right to life surpasses the woman’s right of controlling her body. Thus, abortion is not right.
Thomson argues that even if an individual poses that fetus has a right to life, this argument fails. Correspondingly, he requests people to imagine that during their sleep they are connected bloodstream to bloodstream to a popular violinist. Concurrently, the violinist is suffering from a rare blood disease and once there is a disconnection, she dies. According to Thomson, he argues that a person has a right to disconnect herself. Therefore, she appeals to people’s intuitions that lying in bed with a violinist for an indefinite period is too much for morality to demand. She further defends her claims by mentioning that the body in use is yours and not the violinist. Altogether, she differentiates between the violinist’s rights to life from the right of using one’s body when necessary to preserve another person’s life that the violinist lacks. The violinist’s case is not very different from the pregnancy case because an individual ceases to be morally obliged to remain attached to a fetus than to a violinist.
From Thomson’s violinist case, an individual can extensively approve that abortion is morally permissible when a pregnancy is a result of rape (Warren, p.49; Steinbock, p.79). However, it barely a universal right to abortion. On the contrary, Thomson diverts our attention towards an ideal pregnant notion. He confirms that during pregnancy, it is the fetus's life that is dependent on a woman and not the other way round. Nevertheless, an abortion opponent may make us conclude that the life lost is the fetus’ only and not the woman. Thus, appearing to leave us with a stand-off.
Besides, Thomson states that a fetus’ right to life does not involve its right of using another person’s body to preserve its life. On the other hand, an adversary of abortion can choose to highlight that a woman’s right to control her own body does not involve ending another person’s life just to do whatever she wants with her body. Similarly, another person might also that a pregnant woman’s right over her own body does not come too much if it is wrong for her to take any action that makes her abort. Again, an abortion’s opponent can argue the fetus right to life does not come too much if a pregnant woman can end it whenever she likes. Consequently, all these symmetries appear to be a stand-off hence leaving behind a conflict of rights. The conflict of rights exists between the fetus’ right to live and the woman’s power over her body. In one way or the other, the fetus's right to life surpasses a woman’s right to her own body. This is simply because losing a life is a bigger loss than a woman losing the right to control her body in respect for nine months. Thus, signifying that abortion is wrong.
On the other hand, Walter differentiates two ways in which we can understand what loss is. First and foremost, she identifies the neutral or non-moral way. The acts of an agent cause a neutral loss of a valuable thing to a loser when the agent performs the act when the loser does not gain or keep a valuable thing and lastly when the loser can gain or keep a valuable thing if the agent failed to perform the act.
Moreover, Sinnot-Armstrong uses the sense of loss at work in the subsequent setting. Imagine that the winner of the race is to receive a valuable trophy that an official holds. Conversely, Lee and Kristin are the only racers. Unless Kristin beats Lee, Lee will emerge victoriously but eventually Kristin triumphs. Therefore, Walter says that one can claim that Kristin caused Lee’s loss of missing a valuable trophy. Thus, by loss, possess this neutral or non-moral sense of loss which is also known as neutral loss.
Secondly, the loss can be understood using a moral way. In this case, the acts of an agent cause the neutral loss of something valuable to a loser. This is possible when the agent performs the act, the loser does not gain or keep the valuable thing, the loser can gain or keep the valuable thing if the agent did not perform the act, the loser has a moral right to the means necessary for gaining or keeping that valuable thing and lastly, the agent lacks a moral right to those means.
Walter continues further and states that in the moral sense of loss, Kristin cannot be blamed for Lee’s loss. In short, Kristin does not cause a moral loss to Lee. This is because the trophy is not Lee’s property and also he lacks the right of gaining it. Nevertheless, he lacks the right to the essential means of gaining the trophy which is winning the race. Thereafter, Walter relates her work to Marquis’s argument and she concludes that abortion is morally wrong except in life-threatening situations.
She clearly states that for an argument to work, in both premises, the same sense of loss must also be at work. Walter sees a problem especially when premises are understood as making claims about neutral loss, interpretation should be as follows, abortion is morally wrong except in life-threatening situations, to cause anything the neutral loss of a valuable future. Secondly, it causes a fetus the neutral loss of a valuable future. Consequently, abortion is morally wrong apart from in extreme circumstances. However, this argument can also be read in that the second premise can be true but it is unclear about the first premise is true. This is because if the loss does not denote to the one who loses, any moral right to the thing lost, or to essential means of achieving or possessing that thing, then it is unclear why it can be morally wrong to cause such a loss.
Conversely, if an interpretation is done on premises in form of making moral loss claims, then the argument can be interpreted as follows. Abortion is morally wrong, with an exception of extreme situations, to cause anything the moral loss of a valuable future. Secondly, it causes a fetus the moral loss of a valuable future. Thus, abortion is morally wrong except in extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, when an argument is read in this manner, the first appears to be true but it is insufficient to assume that the second premise is also true. This is because we cannot tell whether abortion causes a moral loss to the fetus or not. This can only be possible when we know that the fetus has a moral right to the essential means of its future. However, Marquis failed to put across such a claim whereby a fetus has a moral right to the essential means of its future. All the same, between Walter and Thomson’s opinions, Walter makes a better case because it is hard to tell if a fetus has the essential means of its future.
Marquis needs to illustrate that with or without ambiguous terms such as loss, his argument remains firm. When he decides to refer to moral or neutral losses then additional queries might come into the picture. Thus, he should stick with neutral losses in his entire argument. By using the term loss in this paper, to modify or compare Marquis’ Argument, it makes it obvious that abortion can cause the loss of a valuable future. Therefore, it would have been more appropriate if the paper focused only on the notion that abortion is morally wrong exclusive of extreme circumstances to cause the neutral loss of a valuable future. By doing so, Marquis’s argument can be saved.
However, Marquis’s inferences do not support the neutral losses principle. Besides, this principle does not explain our moral intuitions than any other case that he mentions. Therefore, he explains why killing a normal human adult and fetuses is morally wrong because it is usually wrong, exclusive of extreme conditions, to cause anything the neutral loss of a valuable future. However, Marquis fails to add that especially when the loser possesses a moral right to the essential means of that valuable future.
The stated explanations show that they have the same implications but a person’s moral intuitions them as bad. Likewise, the only thing that distinguishes the two statements is the loser’s lack of moral right of the essential means to the valuable future.
On the other hand, when values are considered, Kristin and Lee are the best points of analysis. For example, during the race, Kristin decides to carry an extra pair of shoes but Lee does not carry any and so, he runs barefooted. Concurrently, for Lee to win the race, he has to Kristin has to lend him a pair of shoes but for Kristin to also win, she is not supposed to lend Lee any pair. If Kristin fails to lend Lee a pair, she will be considered morally right because Lee has no right to that pair of shoes. Besides, for also winning the race and trophy.
On the contrary, if Lee decides to carry his sports shoes but Kristin steals them from them and wins the race. Since Lee owned the shoes and they were his only means of winning the trophy as well as the race, Kristin caused him a moral loss. This is because the shoes did not belong to her and she also had no right to steal them from him. Therefore, taking and stealing can be seen causing a neutral loss and moral loss respectively. Thus, causing a neutral loss of a valuable thing is not considered to be morally wrong but causing a moral loss is what is perceived to be morally wrong. To an opponent, he/she might comment by saying that this case is inappropriate because it is only a segment of the future that is lost and the whole of it.
Therefore, abortion implications should be obvious. For a fetus to grow, it requires a place for it. In addition to that, blood, as well as other fluids, are needed for its nourishment. However, all these essentials are provided by the pregnant woman’s body and not the fetus itself. Consequently, this does not mean that abortion can be morally wrong in situations whereby the fetus lacks a right to the womb as well as blood that is essential for its survival in the future. Likewise, it also not morally wrong to stop a doctor from taking bone marrow or blood from a woman without her consent just to save another person’s life. For that reason, it is not morally wrong to prevent a fetus from utilizing his mother’s blood as well as the womb, unless it somehow gains the moral right to those life essentials. Altogether, abortion can appear immoral depending on the information at hand.
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