Orbán Viktor Facebook-oldalán jelentette be, hogy egyetért a vasárnapra a Sándor-palota elé szervezett akcióval. A volt kormányfő támogatja a „Ne féljetek!” címmel a magyar állami vezetők melletti kiállást hirdető szimpátiatüntetést.
Tényleg, mi vastag bőr van ennek a pofázmányán?
Hallom, Orbán "Békedisznó" Viktor már nem mer a földszintnél magasabbra menni, mert jó KGB-s tisztként Putyin elvtárs nem szereti az elvarratlan szálakat.
First you have to beat the authoritarian. Then you have to reform the system that allowed him to subvert democracy.
Jonathan V. Last at The Bulwark:
1. The NYT’s House Illiberal
Ross Douthat celebrated the end of Viktor Orbán’s rule by arguing that ackshually Orbán governed totally within the bounds of normal democracy and everyone who was upset about him should now see how silly and alarmist they were.
The Douthat position is: If the ruling regime leaves power without bloodshed, then that regime was, by definition, a democracy consistent with our understanding of the word.1 (To understand Douthat-ism, see this footnote.2)
But this isn’t about Ross. It’s about noticing what he’s up to. Because the rehabilitation of Viktor Orbán is the opening gambit in the attempt by American illiberals to prevent accountability and reform should Trumpism be defeated.
Because when Ross Douthat and his friends look at Hungary, they fear that they are looking at their future.
2. What Orbán Did
We start by understanding what Orbán actually did to Hungary’s government and the rule of law.
When Orbán returned to power in 2010 he did so with 52.7 percent of the vote. His support was concentrated in rural areas, which had disproportionate representation—so his majority was greatly magnified. His party controlled 68 percent of the seats in parliament. This supermajority allowed Orbán’s party, Fidesz3, to amend the Hungarian constitution on party-line votes. Orbán took this as license to rewrite the entire constitution and then pass it on a party-line vote.
Among the new constitution’s first objectives was to neuter the courts, because Orbán understood that he could not consolidate power if the courts were independent. So the new constitution:
expanded the Constitutional Court from eleven to fifteen judges;
created a new process for appointing Constitutional Court judges that allowed the ruling party to do so without consultation;
relocated the power of the Constitutional Court to elect its own chief judge to parliament (i.e., to the ruling party);
forced the removal of many sitting judges by putting the retirement age at 62;4
forced the removal of the Supreme Court’s chief justice by inventing a requirement that disqualified him from service on the high court;5 and
created a government office in charge of hiring and firing judges; this office would be controlled by an appointee from the majority party.
The next step was capturing the administrative state. Orbán embarked on a campaign to replace the heads of nonpartisan government agencies with political loyalists. (Sound familiar?) Simultaneously, he established terms for these appointments that were incredibly long—often nine or even twelve years.
The goal was to ensure that even if Orbán lost an election in the near term, his people would maintain control over both the courts and the administrative state, preventing the new government from undoing his actions6 and making a return to power easier.
Orbán next turned to attacking the political system itself. Here’s Johan Norberg’s excellent account:
[The 2012 constitution also gave significant powers to a restructured Budget Council. This three-member body consists of officials appointed to long, staggered terms—up to twelve years—ensuring they remain in office long after the government that appointed them may have left. They can veto the budget and if this results in no budget passed on time, the president can dissolve parliament and trigger new elections. As Orbán told an Austrian newspaper: “I make no secret of the fact that in this respect I tie the hands of the next government. Not just the next one, but the next ten.”]
Then Orbán changed the voting system. Hungary is a multiparty parliamentary system. Before Orbán’s changes, voting had been done in two rounds—the idea behind this being that in any given election, the first-round results typically split between the majority party on one side and the various opposition parties on the other. After the first round, the opposition parties consolidated around the leading vote-getter and the second round was a one-on-one runoff.
Orbán eliminated the second round of voting. In a two-party system this would not have meant much. In a multiparty system it created an enormous advantage for the party in power and a huge hurdle for opposition movements.
The next step was the creation of a majoritarian multiplier. This is somewhat complicated but the upshot is this: First Orbán changed the electoral system to make it easier for the ruling party to get a majority and then he changed the representation system to give extra seats to the majority—the net result being that even if Orbán’s party won only a plurality of the votes cast, they would still have a supermajority in parliament and hence the ability to change the constitution at will.
Then, just for good measure, Orbán gerrymandered the hell out of the parliament map to provide extra cushion for Fidesz.
Here is the net effect of these machinations: In the 2014 elections, Orbán’s share of the vote dropped from 52.7 percent to 44.9 percent. Yet Fidesz maintained a supermajority in parliament and could unilaterally alter the constitution to perpetuate itself in power.
Jonathan V. Last wrote a good article in The Bulwark on why the system that enabled Viktor Orbán’s autocratic ascent must be destroyed decisively, in addition to beating the tyrant himself.
After 16 years in power, the Hungarian prime minister is seeking a mandate to continue his ‘illiberal democracy’ that has clamped down on th
"... With his tough talk on immigration and emphasis on restoring the “Christian family”, Orbán attracted the backing of Donald Trump.
Maga and Orbán’s Fidesz party have since become kindred ideological spirits, with Washington throwing its weight behind Orbán and sending vice-president JD Vance to campaign on his behalf this week. Such an intervention in a European election would have been unthinkable in a previous US administration.
But paradoxically, the backing of the world’s most powerful man may have sealed Orbán’s fate, as Trump’s “America First” policies continue to hurt European economies. ..."