When we talk about the freedom of the will being some universal aspect of phenomenal experience, we are merely enacting our own provincialism. Our ‘intuitions’ are relics of a past that we’ve long forgotten, even though they continue to weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living.
On ‘two truth’ compatibilism, Heidi Raaven, ‘The Self Beyond Itself’—summarizes the position (which is not hers) in the following way:
“The human perspective of experiencing ourselves as choosers and deciders, originators of our actions, and hence alone and individually morally responsible for them, is valid because it is phenomenologically true or real—it is a true (and universal) account of how we experience ourselves as human beings, they propose. At the same time, they hold that the naturalist perspective of our actions and choices as within and resultant from the complex interactions of various biological, psychological, social, cultural, historical, quantum, and cosmological systems is also true. Nevertheless, the authors claim that by giving up the idea that there is a faculty in our minds that is a will, free or otherwise (as the philosopher Hume did in the seventeenth century), science can be left to its kind of explanation—causal determinism—and at the same time, a second description from the insider human subjective perspective of experience can also be true. The insider subjective description of ourselves as originating our actions from ourselves alone is compatible with the scientific causal explanation, they say, because it makes no claims about a faculty in the natural brain that can be located and proven to exist or proven not to exist. One explanation is about natural causes, and the other is about presumably universal human experience. The human and the natural are separate self-contained systems of explanation.”
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