The Auxiliary Sciences of Formal Thought
The Penumbra of Logic.—Outside the boundary of logic proper, inhabiting the penumbra of logic, if you will, are theories of truth, the nature and role of definitions, and the structures of formal systems. Other modes of formal thought, such a mathematics and mereology, also employ or imply these penumbric ideas. Axiomatics, being the paradigmatic structure of a formal system, has been so thoroughly assimilated into mathematics it is often taken to be a part of it, but the axiomatic method—long called the geometric method because of its association with the exposition of geometry since Euclid—is equally applicable to any of the formal sciences, and indeed is employed in the natural sciences as well when rigor appears to demand it. But axiomatics didn’t appear in a work on logic until the Port-Royal Logic in the seventeenth century (La logique, ou l’art de penser, 1662). Nevertheless, these auxiliary sciences of formal thought have a closer relationship to logic than the other formal sciences, as various systems of logic down through history have included them or excluded them as the logic in question was conceived with a narrower or wider scope. Aristotle gives his theory of doctrine of definition in the Posterior Analytics, so if we take this book to be a part of logic (and it is traditionally part of the Organon), then definition is a part of logic. But the Posterior Analytics is widely recognized as a work in the theory of science (at least, science in the Platonic sense of demonstrative knowledge), so that the position of this work within logic itself is the question of the position of definition within logic writ large. Being shared, then, among the formal sciences, serving as the common language of the formal sciences, are these disciplines in the penumbra of logic actually the essence of formal thought? Rather than being in the gray area of formal thought, ought they to stand out as the most sharply defined exemplars of formal thought?














