#freudian psychoanalysis

[facts-i-just-made-up]

Origin of the phrase "cryptid?"

That’s just the name of the very first known cryptid, the “cryptid.” It lived in crypts, farmed bitcoins, and had a very small, weak superego. This was rare back in the 1600s but now it describes most business school graduates.

[celesrangebsd]

Hi :3 You already know why I’m here :>

And yes technically you’ve already done this but-

Q analysis and I will give you my soul :>

Q Character Anaylsis

My old analysis of Q was kind of bad so here is a new and improved one! No spoilers hopefully :3

Q is a very complicated character in my opinion, simply because we don’t know much about them despite multiple approaches and Dazai fearing them, they have this air of mystery to them that is very interesting in my opinion so- let’s take in the literature base first, Dogura Magura by Yumeno Kyūsaku.

In Dogura Magura the narrator wakes up in a hospital, finding out that he was originally an experiment and killed his mother and wife and he inherited his psychotic tendencies. The novel is inspired by Freudian Psychoanalysis- an idea that people could be cured by making their unconscious a conscious thought and motivations, and by that gaining "insight".

So, relating this to Q, their ability is a mind control that forces illusions on people who intentionally or unintentionally harmed them, we can relate this to Freudian Psychoanalysis since Q makes an unconcious thought (I assume fear?) conscious as an illusion that drives people to attack others because of it. Q thinks of their ability as a curse because they know how dangerous it is, and we also know that abilites can influence the user as well so perhaps Q's psychotic nature is due to their ability and how they grew up.

Q has some major issues on how they see society as well, their hatred of their ability was obviously a result of how people treated them and perhaps they feel that society deserves to be forced to see their fears (we know that Q has "fun" when using their ability on others after all). Their personality seems to flip flop between being an innocent child and being sadistic, they are good at following directions and ignoring their wants.

When Q was captured by the guild, we saw that they were easily influenced, they took answers that were given to them and believed it easily, even when it was something that mentally harmed them or made them hate themselves even more. Q's appearance could also relate to their personality since it seems split, half black and half white hair, different shaped pupils, etc.

Though we know that character designs in BSD are based off of the popular works of the authors so I might just be reaching for straws

[thezonestalker]

Grace Pailthorpe (1883-1971) - March 7 1937-4 (Sandbumptious). watercolour on paper.

[writinglittlemagics]

Forgive my poor citations for this one :[ I’m currently sitting in the nicest amphitheater I've ever been in getting ready to sing a holiday concert! Feeling a little nervous, a little silly, here’s some Freudian Analysis:

Freudian Defenses in The Main Character

“The Main Character” by Will Wood is a satirical song from the perspective of a modern self-obsessed, trope-defined egomaniac. This character is meant to embody someone who speaks without the use of their Freudian superego (see: “Look in the sky, it’s a bird! It’s a plane! No, it’s superego!” as the character watches their superego leave them behind). This speaker utilizes several of the Freudian defense mechanisms to justify their egoic actions and attitudes towards other people. One such example is the speaker’s use of regression. When speaking about being disliked, the narrator becomes incredibly uncomfortable, saying, “Don’t come at me; I’m the main character, and you have to like me.” After this, the narrator regresses into childish villain personas to hide from their actions. One such example is Snidely Whiplash, the villain from the cartoon Rocky and Bulwinkle. This villain is a caricature of evil and is known for tying people to train tracks and twirling his mustache. The speaker is hiding behind this immature cardboard character to hide from the more severe accusations they are being confronted by. Some other such villains are Boris Badenov and “Daleks in high collars,” more foolish villain types.

Another favorite defense mechanism of our narrator is rationalization. The chorus repeats the lines, “So God forbid I’m seen just as an average human being… Don’t come at me; I’m the main character, and you have to like me.” The word “like” here can refer to both “likes” on social media and liking someone as a genuine person. Our narrator easily conflates the two. The phrase “main character energy” is famous on a lot of social media platforms as a way to announce one’s self-importance in one’s life. You are living your life; ergo, you are the main character in your own story. The narrator in this song does not have the superego to recognize that they are not the main character in everyone else’s life, and so lives deluded into thinking that they are. This is exemplified in verse two, stating, “I loot plot armor from NPC’s; Well, they are to me. Trite tropes, traits, traumas, trinkets, and treats; it’s all XP.” To translate some of the slang here, the speaker is calling other people’ Non-Playable Characters’ and deeming them worthless to his endeavors. Plot armor is a film device that describes protagonists who have to stay alive, even in dangerous situations, for the sake of the story. Stripping someone of their plot armor means that they would be expendable to the narrator if they need to gain the ‘XP’ or experience. Because the narrator believes themselves to be the main character of this larger story, mistreating other people is acceptable for the sake of “the plot.”

The final commonly used defense mechanism is denial. The narrator can comfortably live this lifestyle as long as they don’t wake up to the reality that other people are more relevant than themself. The post bridge says, “The court fool got the guillotine, the witches the stake, you the dopamine. And Siemens made the Zyklon B, but we all still get the flu.” These lines all refer to some kind of scapegoat, different groups of people who were blamed for the sake of denying more significant issues. The court fool is executed as an example, witches are burned to defend the church and deny other ideas, and a person takes dopamine to deny their depression. This narrator is a self-aggrandizing, deluded narcissist and can only continue to be this way with the use of defense mechanisms.

(Word Count: 590)

“Will Wood – the Main Character.” Genius, 29 July 2022, genius.com/Will-wood-the-main-character-lyrics.

[iguanalysis]

Abjection: Explaining the Oedipal Triangle and the Superego

In Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, Kristeva makes the crucial distinction between “the abject” and “abjection”. Her concept of the abject makes one task easier for the reader of Lacan’s formalization of the Oedipus complex into the dualism of imaginary and symbolic triangles: turning the double triangle into a lozenge, the diamond-shaped lozenge found in the fantasy matheme ($ ◊ a). This undertaking requires first an examination of the superego and its constitutive dualism, its separation into ego-ideal and ideal-ego. The ego-ideal has no consistent algebraic denotation in Lacanian psychoanalysis, because it has no singular point of resolution, and turns out to be the accumulation of a phenomenal set of instances that result from the same process: assimilating the objet petit “a” with the specular image (i, in French, “image”) so it can converge onto the ego (m, “le moi”), by a form denoted algebraically as “i(a)”. This convergence onto the ego of a partial object acquired by means of the specular image capitulates the part of the mirror stage which Lacan refers to as the child’s “Urbild” (Formations of the Unconscious, pg. 209). On the Oedipal (double) triangle, this can be found on the imaginary triangle of the Oedipus complex, along the circuit m-E.

“The ego’s Urbild is this initial self-conquest or self-mastery that the child acquires once he has split the real pole in relation to which he has to situate himself. This brings him into the trapezium m-i-M-E, insofar as he identifies multiple elements of signifiers in reality. Through his successive identifications along the segment m-E, he himself takes on the role of a series of signifiers, understand by that a series of hieroglyphs, types, forms and presentations that punctuate his reality with a number of reference points, thus making it a reality riddled with signifiers.”

— Jacques Lacan, “Seminar V: Formations of the Unconscious”, pg. 209.

The ego-ideal, then, is produced actively by this ongoing developmental process which opens up the “self-criticism” found in Sigmund Freud’s essay Mourning and Melancholia, where premonitions of the concept of the superego make their appearance. Freud never says it outright, but he points out that the work of mourning, or the “normal” symptoms of a person going through the recent loss of a loved one, are difficult at the surface level to distinguish from pathologies of the personality in clinical patients.

“The essential thing, therefore, is not whether the melancholic's distressing self-denigration is correct, in the sense that his self-criticism agrees with the opinion of other people. The point must rather be that he is giving a correct description of his psychological situation. He has lost his self-respect and he must have good reason for this. It is true that we are then faced with a contradiction that presents a problem which is hard to solve. The analogy with mourning led us to conclude that he had suffered a loss in regard to an object; what he tells us points to a loss in regard to his ego.

“Before going into this contradiction, let us dwell for a moment on the view which the melancholic's disorder affords of the constitution of the human ego. We see how in him one part of the ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object. Our suspicion that the critical agency which is here split off from the ego might also show its independence in other circumstances will be confirmed by every further observation. We shall really find grounds for distinguishing this agency from the rest of the ego. What we are here becoming acquainted with is the agency commonly called ‘conscience’; we shall count it, along with the censorship of consciousness and reality-testing, among the major institutions of the ego, and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can become diseased on its own account.”

— Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”. SE XIV, pg. 246.

This line of thought brings Freud to a formulation of what he calls moral masochism: an overly harsh self-critical faculty, engendered by a close attachment to a melancholic object. The constellation of melancholic objects from a person’s past form the overall history of an ego’s experiences with pleasure, which it can never let go of as a standard to compare itself to.

Freud’s conception of the melancholic object places the melancholiac into a position where there is a “disorder” of the ego in the form of the composite superego, whereby the ego cannot experience normal pleasure any longer because it cannot find the solution for its over-attachment to the unknown, to the missing melancholic object. If this object is “unconscious”, i.e. located beyond the perceptually subjective play of thought-presentations, is it truly an object for the ego, or even for any subjects of desire which the ego encounters in its domain of reality?

I think that such an object must have the ambiguity of being both perverse and an object gone-missing for the subject of the drive properly speaking, that which is introduced from the ego-ideal by the object of castration, which appears at some point within the culminating dialectic of contradictions between privation and frustration through which an object may enter our perceptions by means of the signifier. This panoply of signifiers, isolated as unitary in the mental processes of predications as they are linked in real-time to articulation, really does become a “pantheism” of mental presentations that elide logical objectivation, i.e., signifiers linked to the emergence of the object of castration which are pooled into conceptual source-material and forced to bear upon the symbolic order in a process that is characteristically “matrilineal”, since it is defined by its origination from the concept of a kinship with women.

A moment of privation, then, corresponds to Hegel’s third moment of logical entity, and the moment of frustration in contradistinction to this third moment is supported in the foreground of thought-presentations as a manifestation of the second moment of logical entity found in Hegel’s Logic. This is made possible from a phenomenological perspective because it is borne along by a perception stemming from the moment of frustration’s objectal pre-existence within the first moment of logical entity, isolated in partial object-drives as S’. In this way, S is a simulacrum of S’, a copy without an original, since S’ must have existed prior to S in order for S itself to have been intuited. In the Lacanian mirror stage, this corresponds to what Lacan cleverly called “méconnaissance”, or “misrecognition”, since it makes a pun in French that would mean “me-recognition” in English.

Kristeva formulates the abject as something objectally alienated in a homologous way to the dialectical repetition of conflicts between objects of privation and objects of frustration, because it occurs in the same way that the object-cause of desire is alienated from the signifier in the specular relation, but this time it occurs in opposition to the composite superego, and not from the subject of desire or from the ego-proper. It is in “opposition” to the superego because it is something separate from the superego pertaining to a partial object which breaks off from its symbolic singularity, but still has some relation to the superego via abjection. Here we find even more use for Lacan’s dualism of the superego, since Kristeva’s superegoic object is the abject, but this abject is something jettisoned from the symbolic triangle since it cannot be assimilated in identification with the mother at M, nor with the father at P. The process which can aim a superegoic discharge towards a direct identification with the symbolic mother is therefore abjection, which is not ob-jectal, because it is manifested in the links between moments of logical entity, and because it is a process which cannot be predicated by thought-presentations.

So then, the ego-ideal finds its formation in the play of images, each of which have been tied to a respective object-cause, and proceed from the child’s interpretation of the mother’s desire towards the ego. This is an ego it may subsequently arrogate to itself, at the place in the Oedipal double triangle marked “E”. Or, as an object of privation which is flung to the opposite triangle (from the ego at m), triggered by the paradoxical “logic” of a kinship with women which “un-subtracts” from the real the imaginary relation between mother and child, E and M. This impossible ejection of something imaginary back into what is real occurs from a traumatic upset of the symbolic mother’s sudden and uncanny resemblance to the symbolic father, whose existence only she can indicate. Thus, instead of a starting-point for the Urbild towards E, a moment of privation is objectivated by a primordial terror, an event that occurs in reality, which reveals the existential horror of the fact that the imaginary mother cannot make the real penis appear in reality for the child via the imaginary relation, because the phallus-signifier (-φ) is what gives the image (i) of the specular relation its ontical substance [i(a)] which is subtracted from the real. This means simply that the child is helpless to demonstrations of aggression which plainly indicate that their caregiver is free to neglect them, even by sheer caprice, and the justice that goes missing from the real (because it is privated by the laws of the nature of reality) does not get incorporated into the ego-ideal, but rather it is routed by an automated circuit, that of abjection, which will force the object to eradicate the mother in her place at M, and the objet petit a will provide symbolic content from this place via the specular relation i(a), but this symbolic content will not be from the paternal symbolic order, and as a result, a (phobic) object linked to the symbolic order, but proceeding from the relation of E to the imaginary mother, will go missing from the superego’s paternal signifying economy later on in development, and logical signifying conception will encounter a brutal obstacle in the general dissolution of the Oedipus complex.

This trauma of the imaginary mother’s eradication results in the Kleinian formation of the maternal superego via the re-configured circuiting of the ego-ideal. But the corollary to the ego-ideal within the paternal superego is the ideal-ego, unambiguously denoted in Lacanian algebra as I(A). This ideal-ego is a finished product of sorts, an anchoring entity which ensures that signifiers and their respective object-causes will always return to the stable at the end of the day. This ordinarily results from the identification with the father at the close of the Oedipus complex that enacts its dissolution; it is a place where significations can be received and dealt with, since they are those provided by the three agents of the castration complex (real father, symbolic mother, imaginary father). Those significations indicated by partial objects encountered in perception which function like a “pantheism” of signals that pertain to the experiences of pleasure (phobia, avoidance, embarrassment, satisfaction, displacement, anxiety) will have a closer relation to the maternal superego, a moral agency which directs the flow of images linked to mental presentations in a profoundly essential way that the paternal superego could not ultimately justify via the Oedipal logic of castration. At the same time, this paternal superego must have communion with the Kleinian maternal superego very frequently in their interactions within the formations of the unconscious, since this maintains the ideal-ego’s sense of constancy, that which gives the thinking animal its very egoity.

The ideal-ego then seems like the primary correspondent for the abject, an object that is excluded from conscious detection or ordinary signifying conception because it basically is too horrific, or perhaps morally or logically unacceptable, since the repeating patterns of the castration complex for the perceptions of living organisms, i.e. those mental re-occurrences which are constantly blazing a trail for the subject of the drives to establish the uses of organic logic for itself, find their limits exceeded by such an ab-ject, since their perceptional stability will suffer from a sort of overload. Bringing Lacanian terminology into the relative simplicity of Freud’s cautious methods of hypothesizing, Kristeva explains:

“The abject has one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I. If the object, however, through its opposition settles me within the fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it, what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses. A certain “ego” that merged with its master, a superego, has flatly driven it away. It lies outside, beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the latter’s rules of the game. And yet, from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master. Without a sign (for him), it beseeches a discharge, a convulsion, a crying out. To each ego its object, to each superego its abject.”

— Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection.

If the abject is what is rejected from ordinary signification and must use the ideal-ego as its formal receptacle, then abjection must be this very process which is aimed at the place of the symbolic mother, the agent of the castration complex who is held accountable for the conflicts that proceed from privation.

[tryingforthedelicatehopeofitall]

As a psych major, The Haunting of Hill House allowed most of us to psychoanalyse each scene as they took place and list out everything DSM wise but Bly Manor is so much more emotional that I completely stopped even trying to analyse stuff and just went on with the emotions and the story but Ep. 8 OH MY GOODNESS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! IT PRESENTS SUCH A GOOD REPRESENTATION OF CLASSIC FREUDIAN ID VS EGO VS SUPEREGO and so many other defense mechanisms are so vividly presented like it is so sad and beautiful!!!!!! UGH IF ONLY THIS WOULD BE SHOWN IN CLASSES TO TEACH ABOUT FREUDIAN THEORIES!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[physiologicdeadspace]

A hippocratic sense that each human being deserves respectful treatment was never part of Freud’s perspective. Most people struck him as contemptible. “I have found little that is ‘good’ in human beings as whole,” he would write to Osakar Pfister. “In my experience, most of them are trash.” And he was unforgiving toward what he called the “moral cowardice” of hysterics.

Freud: The Making of an Illusion by Frederick Crewes

[writeuntilitshollowinside]

That moment when you feel no sense of shame whatsoever. Well, I did try to make it pretty. 🤷‍♀️ ------ Aquele momento que você não tem nem um resquício de vergonha. Meh, eu tentei deixar bonito. 🤷‍♀️

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