Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the particular figuration of human life. To what extent is this articulation of life a specifically human one? From the perspective of a phenomenology that situates itself beyond the Husserlian level and is instead concerned with the prehuman sphere, prior to emergence of the ego, the distinction of life loses its clarity. Merleau-Ponty poses a critical question: ‘Life and nonlife are different only as chemistry of mass and individual chemistry: Are viruses living or nonliving beings?’. The question is in direct contradistinction to a phenomenology purportedly concerned with the human experience, and that alone. From the perspective of a human subject, a virus or a disease enters the body and is experienced as a form of anti-life. It is experienced as something that reduces life to a paralysed state, draining the body at all times of the resources [it] depends [on] in order to advance itself in the world. But how does the virus perceive us, to paraphrase David Cronenberg? The very reversibility of these perspectives confuses the boundaries between life and nonlife, masking the phenomena with both dimensions at once
Dylan Trigg, The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror, pg. 29





















