#saul david

[vintagewarhol]

[theoscarsproject]

Von Ryan’s Express (1965). An American POW leads a group of mainly British prisoners to escape from the Germans in WWII.

Ah, dear. This isn’t a bad movie. Really! It’s totally fine! There are just so many World War II movies, and this one really does not stand out in any way shape or form. Frank Sinatra’s pretty charming, I guess? And the cinematography is solid? It’s worth the watch if you’re super into World War II films, but otherwise you can probably give this one a miss. 6/10.

[gregorygalloway]

Our Man Flint was released in the US on 16 January 1966.

Producer Saul David conceived of the James Bond spoof and cast James Coburn in his first leading role. The script was written by Hal Fimberg and Ben Starr, and the film directed by Daniel Mann.

Our Man Flint was a box office hit (it would be the 9th highest-grossing film of 1966) and spawned a sequel (In Like Flynt, released in March 1967).

[hforhistory]

Historian and detective: ‘There’s always more to discover.’ Saul David on exploring the History of the Entebbe Hostage Crisis.

‘What are you working on?’ a friend asked in 2013.

           ‘A history of the Entebbe Raid,’ I replied.

           ‘Hasn’t that been done to death?’

           Well no, actually. It’s true that the miraculous rescue of 100 hostages by Israeli commandos in July 1976 was a huge international news story. Within months the mission had inspired three hastily written books – all by journalists – and three feature films, including Victory at Entebbe starring Anthony Hopkins, Burt Lancaster and Elizabeth Taylor. More books followed, but not a properly researched history from the perspective of all those involved: hostages, rescuers, politicians and terrorists (of whom remarkably little was known).

To put this right I visited archives in four different countries, had key documents translated from French, Hebrew and German, and tracked down and spoke to more than 25 participants, including the deputy commander of the assault force (the commander was killed), a New York financier who was just 12 when he was taken hostage with his family in 1976, a former member of the Kenyan government and the boyfriend and colleague of the only female terrorist.

From these testimonies emerged a very different story to the one that had prevailed. Israel would have us believe that the raid was perfectly planned and executed, and that anyone who takes liberties with their citizens can expect similar treatment. In truth the mission was dogged from the start by infighting, hasty planning and tactical blunders – and owed its success to luck, secret diplomacy and a last minute display of humanity on the part of a doomed terrorist.

One of my greatest coups was speaking to Charles Njonjo, the former attorney-general of Kenya, who confirmed that in 1976 he had negotiated a secret deal with Israeli intelligence to let the rescue planes refuel in Nairobi in return for the destruction of the Ugandan air force and, if possible, the assassination of Idi Amin himself. This was the first time a member of either negotiating team had spoken of the highly controversial deal that was, in effect, an undeclared act of war by one African state on another.

I also interviewed commando Muki Betser who explained how his boss Yoni Netanyahu – brother of the current Israeli prime minister – had made an error at Entebbe that almost caused the mission to fail. They had taken a black Mercedes limousine to Entebbe to make any sentries think it contained a senior Ugandan officer. But as they drove towards the Old Terminal, where the hostages were being held, Netanyahu saw a sentry raise his rifle and ordered the driver to ‘cut to the right, and we’ll finish him off’.

This was, said Betser, ‘against the plan, against our orders, which were to get directly to the terminal building and ignore the Ugandans’. Betser, who had served in Uganda a few years earlier, knew the sentry was following his drill and would not fire. But ignoring Betser’s pleas, Netanyahu shot at sentry. With all surprise lost, and a firefight under way, Betser expected the building to ‘vanish in a fireball of explosions as the terrorists followed through their threats to blow up the hostages’.

Fortunately, there was no bomb. But the terrorists had automatic weapons and grenades, and at least one seemed about to shoot the hostages. Instead he had second thoughts and urged them to take cover. ‘At the last moment, they realized, “No, we won’t do it because it’s over”,’ confessed Gerd Schnepel, the colleague of the two German terrorists.

Just as extraordinary was the story of Olivier Cojot, then 12-years-old, who was carrying a piece of paper with vital intelligence information in the turn-ups of his jeans when he was released half way through the crisis. Though he forgot to hand over the note, Olivier had memorized many of the details and gave them to ‘some Israeli people’ – members of Israeli intelligence – after his return to Paris. Thus did a young French adolescent risk his life to help the Israelis plan the Raid on Entebbe.

There’s always more to discover if you look hard enough.

Find out more about Operation Thunderbolt by Saul David here.

[bookstand]

In late September 1943, almost 200 veterans of General Montgomery’s Eighth Army were arrested for refusing repeated orders to join units of the US Fifth Army at the Salerno beachhead in southern Italy. Within six weeks, all but one had been found guilty of mutiny, their sentences ranging from five years’ penal servitude to death.

Fifty years on, Saul David became the first military historian to gain access to the court martial papers – normally restricted for 75 years. In addition to crucial defence documents and the testimony of eye-witnesses, these papers have enabled Saul David to expose:

- How poorly-equipped Eighth Army veterans, some still recovering from wounds and illness, were needlessly sent as reinforcements to Salerno when Fifth Army men were available. - How transit camp authorities deliberately deceived the reinforcements as to their destination. - How the defence team at the trial was forced, by lack of time, lack of witnesses and the hostility of the court, to offer a case based on no evidence and doomed to fail. - How, after the humane intervention of the adjutant-general and the suspension of the sentences, insensitive staff officers and victimization in their new units caused many mutineers to desert. - How, as a result of their convictions, the former war heroes were stripped of their campaign and gallantry medals and branded as cowards.

Concluding that the men were victims of a terrible injustice, Mutiny at Salerno provides a compelling case for a free pardon.

Note: This book was free when posted. Check it still is if you only want it for free.