“If you would be a real seeker after truth, it is necessary that at least once in your life you doubt, as far as possible, all things.” — Rene Descartes

seen from Russia
seen from China

seen from Netherlands

seen from United States

seen from Uzbekistan
seen from United Kingdom
seen from United States
seen from Malaysia
seen from Italy

seen from Malaysia
seen from Netherlands
seen from Germany
seen from Colombia
seen from France
seen from Armenia
seen from France
seen from United States
seen from United States
seen from China
seen from Azerbaijan
“If you would be a real seeker after truth, it is necessary that at least once in your life you doubt, as far as possible, all things.” — Rene Descartes
Philosophical Idealism & the Spook of Solipsism
An inevitable consequence of discussing philosophical Idealism is facing rejection based on the perceived implication of solipsism, but what underlies that implication?
Idealism is the notion that all that exists are mental processes, and that physical phenomena are themselves only mental processes. This is really rather simple to demonstrate if one applies reason and accepts the evidence without prejudice and without regard to further consequences or implications of that evidence.
Since gravity is the most common protest of the physicalist, I will use that example.
What can you say of gravity other than having an experience of it? Can you somehow escape your own subjective perceptions and interpretations and verify gravity outside of your experience of it?
In fact, you can not.
The next trick up the physicalists sleeve will be an appeal to consensus. They posit that since gravity is similarly experienced by just about everyone, it must lie outside of experience.
The first issue here is that we really have no idea if we are having identical experiences of gravity, since we cannot see the content of other minds. We know that similar language and descriptions of gravity occur, but we do not know that actual experience is in agreement, or if consensus is just a function of language use.
The second issue is some simple math. If all individual experiences are subjective, then they all have an ‘objectivity value’ of zero. You can add and multiply zeroes infinitely and and you will never reach a sum greater than zero.
Put another way, if you have a million broken clocks, you will have one time in which more of the broken clocks have stopped than any other. However this will not tell you what time it is. The consensus of broken clocks is not an accurate timepiece.
Neither is the consensus of subjective experience and accurate indicator of anything outside of subjective experience.
If there is an objective physical reality outside of the experience of it, we would be unable to confirm it given the limitations of our subjectivity. And so it makes no sense to build any foundation of reasoning upon the abstract hypothesis of an untestable objective physical basis for reality.
It is at this point that people become prone to reject Idealism based on the concern that it might lead to solipsism. But once again, we must not reject evidence based on where it may lead. We must accept it on the strength of it’s own evidence, for such is the intellectual honesty and rigor required for making logical deductions.
My first response to the slippery slope to solipsism is that only one thing can make you a solipsist, and that is to explicitly believe that all of reality is just a manifestation of your own individual mind. Just because Idealism might seemingly suggest solipsism does not alone make an Idealist a solipsist. A solipsist is someone who believes in and makes claims to a solipsist metaphysics specifically.
There are a few reasons why I do not believe in solipsism, and while these are based in more ephemeral modes of knowing like intuition, I do not think that nullifies them.
The greatest reason I doubt solipsism is the experience of beauty provided by creative endeavors. That so much beauty has been created outside of my own interests, talents and capabilities seems to suggest other agents at work.
While I accept that this is not a logical rebuttal of solipsism itself, it is enough to make me reject a belief in solipsism. Thus meaning that regardless of implications, I am not a solipsist. Further I would not build other ideas and beliefs upon any assumptions of a solipsist nature of reality. Thus any connection between what it is possible to know and what I believe is not relevant to solipsism at all.
And yet even as I scramble to deny the connection I must ask myself, why would I feel obligated to do so?
Why is solipsism something to be avoided at all costs?
I am not going to convince you of solipsism here, but rather try to pry open the reasons the very notion of it conjures up a strong sense of rejection.
It does not seem to be rejected on the merits of the evidence in its favor, so much as rejected as an intolerable outcome regardless of merit. Why is it intolerable?
It seems to me that it is intolerable because it denies the existence of other equal agents within reality. And so I believe we are averse to it for it because it denies either one’s own, or everyone else’s, existence.
And I can understand an intuitive rejection of that premise, but I think it also supposes something else, and that is that such a realization must necessarily lead to the belief that you are above the illusory standards of humanity and have permission to act with impropriety, ill will and complete self interest.
Basically I think we equate solipsism with some cosmic justification for selfishness. But that would be an incorrect assumption within the framework of solipsism.
If all of reality was a manifestation of your mind created to serve you, then you would be identical with the totality of reality, and therefore any harm done to other people in that reality is self-harm.
Solipsism would actually suggest that only by valuing others and treating them with dignity, respect and love can we ever be the recipients of these gifts ourselves.
Wait, why aren’t I a solipsist again? j/k
This video posits that “scientism” or scientific materialism an outdated way of looking at the world and scientific rationalism is the way forward. Do you agree? The Euler formula definitely seems interesting.
An extremely short refutation of materialism: Think of Lego. You can stick the bricks together and make lots of interesting things. But if sticking together a load of lego bricks -- even if the bricks could move in relation to each other -- somehow produced pain or greenness or hope or despair or intentionality, then that would be kind of magical. Exactly the same applies to the ultimate constituents of matter.
Ian Wardell
Obssessive use of meditative disciplines or perennial study of scripture and philosophy will never bring forth this wonderful realisation, this truth which is natural to awareness, because the mind…
Here is the first post on my newly-minted blog. It’s a fairly lengthy philosophical essay on why I’m a Buddhist, running through issues with materialism, panpsychism and has a brief dalliance with idealism before moving onto Buddhism itself. Future posts will probably not all be of this long/slightly technical format, but this was running through my head and needed putting down on paper, as it were.
The theme, logo, name e.t.c. are all provisional for the moment, but please do let me know what you think, both of the blog itself and the essay.
There is no need to deny that what science reveals is special, in a way that is brought out by the point about disenchantment. In discarding the medieval conception of nature as a book, science indeed unmasked projective illusions, and it is essential to how scientific investigation rightly conceives its topic that it should be on guard against such illusions. The investigative stance of science discounts for the effects of features of the investigator, even his humanity. That is why the world as science reveals it does not contain secondary qualities. More generally, what science aims to discover is the nature of reality in so far as it can be characterized in absolute terms; the content of the view from nowhere, in Thomas Nagel's evocative phrase. And the practice of science is not a mere quirk of our culture, on a par with, say, chess. Thanks to science, we know far more about the world, and understand it far better, than the medievals did, and it does not undermine the fact that this is an objective improvement to say (true though it is) that we make these assessments from our present standpoint, which includes the hard won idea of disenchanted nature as the province of scientific understanding. But it is one thing to recognize that the impersonal stance of scientific investigation is a methodological necessity for the achievement of a valuable mode of understanding reality; it is quite another thing to take the dawning grasp of this, in the modern era, for a metaphysical insight into the notion of objectivity as such, so that objective correctness in any mode of thought must be anchored in this kind of access to the real.
John McDowell, Two Sorts of Naturalism
...the belief that scientific models correspond to how things truly are doesn’t follow from the scientific method. Instead, it comes from an ancient impulse – one often found in monotheistic religions – to know the world as it is in itself, as God does. The contention that science reveals a perfectly objective ‘reality’ is more theological than scientific. Recent philosophers of science who target such ‘naive realism’ argue that science doesn’t culminate in a single picture of a theory-independent world. Rather, various aspects of the world – from chemical interactions to the growth and development of organisms, brain dynamics and social interactions – can be more or less successfully described by partial models. These models are always bound to our observations and actions, and circumscribed in their application.
The Blind Spot of Science is the Neglect of Lived Experience
Poetic insight is, paradoxically enough, one of the most concrete renderings of human experience, for it does not de jure exclude emotion from its formulations.
Elizabeth Kraus, The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead's Process and Reality