#tim lindsey

[rainingmusic]

Molly Hatchet - Dreams I'll never see

[rainingmusic]

Molly Hatchet - Dreams I'll never see

[indizombie]

Most of the New Order elite survived Suharto's fall with their power and wealth largely intact. His children are still enormously rich business figures, and no one has ever been tried for the massacres of 1965. In fact, many major political figures today were powerful under the New Order. To name just two, former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was a New Order general, while Suharto's former son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, who allegedly abducted and tortured anti-regime activists in 1998, is now defence minister.

Tim Lindsey, ‘Suharto: The giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption’, ABC

[indizombie]

Despite his vast power, Suharto's seemingly unassailable regime collapsed with surprising speed when the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997. The currency fell fast from Rp 2,600, eventually reaching about Rp 20,000 to the US dollar. Indonesian borrowers could not service foreign currency loans and around 80 per cent of listed companies and banks were soon insolvent. The IMF stepped in, raising interest rates to 70 per cent. Suharto once again won rigged elections in March 1998, but to no avail. Students occupied the legislative building, demanding "reformasi", and growing political tension was accompanied by rioting, often targeting the ethnic Chinese. In May 1998, with smoke from burning malls shrouding his gridlocked capital, he resigned in a live TV broadcast. For the next decade, leaders of the "Reformasi" movement gradually demolished every pillar of the New Order in an attempt to build Indonesia's second liberal democratic system. In response, Suharto's cronies closed ranks around the elderly recluse, protecting him from trial until his death in 2008.

Tim Lindsey, ‘Suharto: The giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption’, ABC

[indizombie]

The banking sector was deregulated. The number of banks increased by half between 1989 and 1991 alone, and more foreign funds flooded in. Certainly, some of this vast new wealth trickled down to the poor. Per capita GDP grew from US$806 ($1,119) to US$4,114 ($5,712) between 1966 and 1997, and a new middle class began to emerge. However, much of the money stayed firmly in the hands of the ruling elite, thanks to corruption. Kickbacks, vast amounts skimmed from official budgets, and massive bribe revenues were paid to "charitable" foundations controlled by Suharto, which then paid out to ensure elite support for the regime. This system, described by Indonesia scholar Ross McLeod as a sophisticated franchise system, was key to keeping Suharto in power for so long, regardless of calls for change. The "Cendana family" (named for the street where the Suharto compound was located) became a byword for rapacious greed. Granted strategic monopolies, including in cloves, toll-roads and the national car project, the family had a stranglehold on the booming economy. In 1998, Transparency International claimed the family had accumulated more than US$30 billion.

Tim Lindsey, ‘Suharto: The giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption’, ABC

[indizombie]

There is no denying western support and Suharto's decisions to open Indonesia to foreign investment and follow the advice of US-educated technocrats (known as the "Berkeley Mafia"), delivered spectacular dividends for Indonesia. Under Suharto, poverty fell from 45 per cent in 1970 to 11 per cent in 1996, life expectancy rose from 47 in 1966 to 67 in 1997, and infant mortality was cut by 60 per cent. His family planning program, while often repressive, was hailed as a success. Likewise, by 1983, primary school enrolment was 90 per cent and the education gap between boys and girls almost closed. No other president of Indonesia has presided over so dramatic an improvement in economic conditions. In 1983, the legislature gave Suharto the title "Father of Development", and in 1985, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation awarded him a gold medal for helping Indonesia achieve rice self-sufficiency.

Tim Lindsey, ‘Suharto: The giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption’, ABC

[indizombie]

The US, which had connived in the extermination of the PKI, poured aid and military support into the new Indonesia. For them, Indonesia showed a better way of "stopping the dominos" (based on the now-discredited theory that a communist government in one nation seed communist takeovers in neighbouring states). Instead of risking American boots on the ground — as in Korea and Vietnam — local communist movements could be stopped by helping local militaries and right-wingers seize power. As journalist Vincent Bevins has shown in his recent book, Suharto's example became known as "the Jakarta method", motivating US covert operations across Latin America in the years that followed.

Tim Lindsey, ‘Suharto: The giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption’, ABC

[indizombie]

Despite initial promises of a return to rule of law, the new regime turned out to be a repressive military-bureaucratic autocracy, with soldiers permeating every level of society, from politics and business down to villages. Their role was principally surveillance and intimidation, but Suharto's regime was always willing to use brutal force if it really felt threatened. Suharto maintained his position by institutionalising corruption and, in time, by stacking the legislature. He closely controlled the three permitted political parties, and imposed tight controls on the media. He was famously able to predict his inevitable election victories to within a few percentage points.

Tim Lindsey, ‘Suharto: The giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption’, ABC