#whear

[kicksaddictny]

Nike Air Force 1 High "Flax"

Nike Air Force 1 High “Flax”

  The Fall season is the perfect time for “Wheat” overseas can enjoy these gems now but there’s no official word yet on the US release release. Via ATMOS

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[lostsecond]

Wearable Ring

Fin is a tiny hardware product that you can wear on the thumb of your hand as a ring and it will make your whole palm as a Gesture interface.

[emto-blog]

Experience in the Moral Realm (VII): Experience and History in Germany and Beyond

*Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter* It is a commonplace of early modern thought that its concept of history was broader than contemporary notions of the discipline, including e. g. the sciences and their evidence. Its generic meaning can be loosely defined as "truthful, or supposedly truthful, narrative of the results of an inquiry".[^1] Accordingly, history concerned not only the 'civil sphere', but nature as well (a useful introduction to the concept of natural history can be found in a recent [blog post](https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/emxphi/2011/01/two-forms-of-natural-history/) by Peter Anstey). One early modern instance of such a broad definition of history can be found in Bartholomäus Keckermann's *De natura et proprietatibus historiae commentarius* (1610): >"Historia ergo est explicatio et notitia rerum singularium sive individuorum, eo fine sucepta, ut universalia ex eis evidentius a nobis intelligi et confirmari possint."[^2] History conveys knowledge or awareness of particulars. It serves to confirm our understanding of universals (and, or so we may guess, universal truths). Usually, such awareness of particulars is conveyed by experiences (see my summary [here](http://emto.tumblr.com/post/5388585107/xphi-aristotelians-findings)). So both history and experience convey an awareness of particulars. What 'explanation' means in this context, is, of course, an important question which I will adress below. Since for early moderns the notion of history and the notion of evidence or experience are closely related and since many thinkers [reflected](http://emto.tumblr.com/post/42764482185/experience-in-the-moral-realm-vi-javellus-and) on the question whether young people must be excluded from studying moral philosophy, because they have not made appropriate experiences, it may not be far-fetched to assume that history may be used to 'fill the gaps' in the experiences of young people: Can the study of history compensate for the lack of experiences that hinders young students of moral philosophy? ### Whear on Keckermann and Vossius According to Keckermann, this may be possible. The main task of history is to put knowledge and prudence of its readers on a more solid grounding, so that they may act morally and detest immorality: >"Finis autem principalis [...] est, ut experientia singularium confirmetur in nobis scientia et prudentia. [...] atque adeo ut discamus bona imitari et amplecti, bonorumque praemia consequi, mala autem fugere, et poenas declinare."[^3] We should expect that Keckermann emphasises the aptitude of young people for studying history, so that they may profit from learning about morally relevant experiences, as they can be found in this discipline. But the opposite seems to be the case - at least if we believe Digory Whear, first professor of an Oxford chair for history endowed by William Camden in 1622.[^4] Whear quotes first Aristotle's exclusion of the young from moral philosophy and continues: >"[...] nimirum, Juventus, ignara judicandi, in fraudem facile inducitur et spretis melioribus, vana amplectitur. Quod si recte hac ex parte pronunciaverit Magister noster; quid prohibet, quo minus non etiam, de habili et idoneo Historiarum Lectore, idem sciscamus scitum? quandoquidem, Historiam nihil aliud esse quam Philosophiam exemplis utentem, sapientes statuerunt."[^5] The young are easily deceived, because they lack judgment. They have no reasoned system of values, so they prefer the worse to the better. These shortcomings disqualify them from studying history, because history is nothing but 'applied philosophy', i. e. philosophy by example. But apparently, these examples cannot overcome the more profound epistemic and moral deficiencies of young people. The moral requirements for the appropriate reader of history are as high as those for the proper student of moral philosophy: >"Simili plane modo, Historiarum Lectori facultas adsit, discernendi exempla, quaecunque legerit, et de iis recte judicandi: tum adsit lubido, et animi propensio, ea quae proba fuerint, imitandi; quae secus autem, fugiendi: omnia denique in usum suum convertendi."[^6] Examples cannot be useful, if their audience lacks proper judgment. The ultimate aim of reading history, namely moral action, again requires that the value system of the audience has already been informed by the precepts of moral philosophy proper. A dissenting view is defended by Gerhard Johannes Vossius: history must be studied by the young.[^7] Vossius develops his thesis by criticising Keckermann. Whear gives an account of this controversy, defending Keckermann and quoting him extensively. Whear's Keckermann believes that it is wrong to confront young people with historical summaries or sources, because these texts lack structure (*methodus*) and their readers have not the appropriate concepts (*loci*) to understand them adequately. This is wrong, because it is so easy to seduce students to read history, since it conveys *voluptas* and *iucunditas* (read: history is fun): >"Cum nihil aliud contineant Historiae, quam exempla praeceptorum; habent autem praecepta methodum, exempla vero non habent methodum, nisi eam quae est in praeceptis: error est vulgatus, et valde damnosus juventuti, quae voluptate et jucunditate studii Historici ducta, Historias ex professo incipit legere, plerumque antequam disciplinas, et praecepta ea cognoverit, quibus methodus inest, et loci communes illi, ad quos Historiae reduci debent: quod quidem valde est praeposterum; \[...\][^8] Whear's Keckermann clarifies this stance by using an analogy to other disciplines: >"et facile intelligi potest, ex comparatione aliarum disciplinarum: exempli gratia, Grammaticae, Logicae etc. Sicut enim absurdus fuerit, qui exempla Grammat. Logic. Rhetoricae, velit cognoscere, et notare, antequam dedicerit praecepta: ita absurdissimus haberi debet, qui Historias, id est, Exempla Ethica, Oeconomica, Politica, serio et ex professo velit legere et notare, antequam habeat perspectam Methodum praeceptorum Ethicorum, Oeconomicorum, Politicorum [...]"[^9] In order to understand texts in a foreign language, we must first have learned its grammar. The same is true, if we want to draw moral insights from historical examples: this is impossible, unless we have learned first, how to structure the conceptual space of theories of human action and value. Just to be clear: these are original quotes from Keckermann's text. Nevertheless, I will show that the spin put on them by Whear is somewhat dubious. But before, we should consider Vossius's criticism of Keckermann's position. This is Whear's paraphrase, mixed with original quotations from Vossius: >"Nihil [...] absurdi habet, (uti vult Keckermannus,) si exempla ante praecepta addiscamus: linguas enim optime absque praeceptis addisci posse, notum est: [...] non parvum eos errorem committere [..] cum non satis distinguunt, inter lectionem historiae alicujus, ac Historiam scribendi munus; ad quod, nemo Philosophiae civilis ignarus, applicare animum debet. [...] confundere eos, [...] nudam et simplicem rerum omnium historiam, cum ἱστορικῆ πραγματεία, quae curate in circumstantias et eventuum causas inquirit." [^10] Those who deny that student readers could profit from history do not take into account that knowledge of philosophy may be a requirement for writing about history, i. e. exploring the circumstances and causes of historical events, but not for reading about what has happened in the past (the *nuda et simplex rerum omnium historia*). Keckermann's analogy to learning languages is misleading: of course, it is possible to learn a language without getting to know first its grammar (after all, this is how we all learn our native language). Whear sides with Keckermann: Vossius cannot deny that knowledge about a language knowledge is enhanced, if it is properly taught.[^11] And in the field of history both the author (teacher) and the reader (student) need to be aware of moral philosophy - the reader in order to learn about the conduct of life, the author in order to teach it. The final aim of both is prudence: >"Annon utrique finem quasi eundem propositum, omnes affirmamus? Uni, ut vivendi rationem ab exemplis discat? Alteri, ut ex eisdem exemplis, eandem pariter doceat? Annon illi scopus, ut prudentiam mortalibus, alienos describendo casus, insinuet? Huic ut sibi ipsi, eosdem casus legendo, et observando, prudentiam comparet? Mihi quidem sic omnino videtur."[^12] Whear points out that Vossius himself is implicitly committed to this very view, because he concedes that knowledge of historical *exempla* can lead to prudence.[^13] But since prudence can only be achieved, if we have some basic knowledge of moral philosophy, Vossius is committed to the view that young people should read history, even though they cannot achieve the goals associated with the discipline. So for Whear, history must be philosophically informed, because it has the aim to render its readers more virtuous. He argues against Vossius that this view of history as a discipline justifies the exclusion of young people from studying history. And he believes to be in agreement with Keckermann on both counts. However, this belief is somewhat dubious: Keckermann does believe that history must be philosophically informed. But he does not believe that it should be kept from young people, because he does not believe that young people should be excluded from studying moral philosophy. ### Keckermann in context Why this is so, can best be seen, if Keckermann's remarks on young people studying moral philosophy are put in context. For this, we should keep in mind that the late 16th and early 17th century witnessed the arrival of Ramism in Germany. The negative reaction of Ramus's close collaborator Omer Talon to Aristotle's exclusion of the young from studying moral philosophy has already been discussed in a [previous](http://emto.tumblr.com/post/32959661952/experience-in-the-moral-realm-iv-for-and-against) post. The *status quaestionis* in the German debate can be summarized as follows (using Scribonius's *Philosophia ethica ex Aristotele et aliis methodice repetita*[^14] and Goclenius's *Problemata ethica*[^15] as sources): 1. Ethics is necessary for young people, so that they learn to control their passions.[^16] 1. The main goal of ethics is therefore the bettering of our souls (*cultura animi*).[^17] 1. Some students may even have a natural talent or proper moral education that allows them to fully profit from moral philosophy.[^18] 1. Complete exclusion of the young is uncalled for. It can be conceded that some of them are less than ideal students of moral philosophy compared to those who have either received adequate moral instruction or have a good character.[^19] If we now turn to Keckermann's own *Systema Ethicae*,[^20] we can see that his viewpoint matches quite closely the Ramist attitude articulated by Scribonius and Goclenius: >"Non vult Arist. a studio ethico per se excludendam esse aetatem iuvenilem, sed tantum per accidens, quatenus plerique iuvenes vitio iuvenilis temperamenti Ethica praecepta nolunt ad usum transferre. Qui ergo iuvenes non sunt iuvenes animo et affectibus, sed aetate tantum, atque adeo qui cupiunt praecepta moralia applicare ad usum et actionem, illos Aristoteles ultro aed audiendam doctrinam Ethicam admittit, [...]"[^21] There may be exegetical differences in reading Aristotle (both Scribonius and Goclenius assert that Aristotle was wrong, whereas Keckermann wants to read an acceptable position into the text). But the upshot is clear for all three authors: at least those students who are not constitutively unable to apprehend the teachings of moral philosophy, should not be excluded from studying it. So both Whear and Vossius misunderstand Keckermann's position, because they do not take into account his views on the exclusion of the young in moral philosophy: The crux of Keckermann's argument is not that the young are young, hence they should not read histories. It is rather that reading histories can only be fruitful, if its findings can be analysed philosophically. And Keckermann himself provides a pointer how this philosophical analysis of historical texts should proceed: > "Historia, quantum fieri potest, Logica Methodo et ordine contexenda est: secundum praecepta, quae Logicus tradit de Thematum individualium tractatione."[^22] *Tractatio* and *Thema individualis* are technical terms in Keckermann's logic. And they are discussed explicitly in his *Systema Logicum*.[^23] There, he gives us a list of aspects that must be clarified, when the student has to deal with for 'simple topics' (*themata simplicia*):[^24] * nominal definition * real definition (determination of *genus* and *differentiae*) * determination of causes (efficient and final) * enumeration of effects * enumeration of relations (e. g. circumstances) * division of the thing in question in its parts * enumeration of 'equivalents and opposites' (*enumeratio coniugatorum et pugnantium*) In treating individuals (*persona et res gestae*, i. e. the subject matter of history), the discussion of relations or circumstances is predominant. But that does not mean that in dealing with individuals, other aspects could be completely neglected, as can be clearly seen in Keckermann's exemplary discussion of the passion of Christ as a historical event.[^25] ### Conclusion When Keckermann emphasises the close relation of philosophy and history, he stays true to a basic insight of Ramism: There is no effective apprehension of principles without applying them to concrete cases (*exempla*); and there is no proper understanding of concrete cases without placing them in a comprehensive system of concepts. Both Vossius's criticism and Whear's defense rest on a misunderstanding: only if Keckermann held that young people as such should be excluded from studying moral philosophy, the assumption would be true that he does not want them to study history either. But for Keckermann, the exclusion of the young is at best an exclusion *per accidens*. He merely urges that an assortment of facts can only be grasped by a student, if there is a conceptual scheme for processing these facts. And this conceptual scheme must concern universal truths, hence it is philosophical by nature. So it should not come as a surprise that Keckermann says explicitly that history provides those experiential insights that would otherwise be lacking in the study of practical philosophy: >"In specie vero ad Ethicam, inprimis vero ad Oeconomiam et Politicam tanta est efficacia Historia, ut qui eam velit ab Oeconomicis et Politicis separare, aut putet se posse has prudentias sine accurata historiarum lectione acquirere, is vehementer erret, neque sciat, quid sit prudentia Oeconomica et Politica, [...]"[^26] In my view, this may be an important insight not only for the history of history, but also for the history of moral philosophy. Whereas before Keckermann most authors emphasised the necessity either of first-hand experiences or of a teacher imparting moral insights to his students, Keckermann's view opens up new possibilities. It is possible to substitute books for first-hand experiences, if these books are read methodically. Or, to put it a bit more poignantly: As soon as students are no more obliged to rely either on her own experiences or the authority of a philosophical teacher, they can begin to educate themselves. [^1]: This is how Lorraine Daston puts it in the description of her research project "Historia: Explorations in the History of Early Modern Empiricism", http://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/de/forschung/projects/DeptII_Da_Historia . [^2]: Bartholomäus Keckermann, De natura et proprietatibus Historiae commentarius, Hanoviae 1610, [p. 8](http://books.google.de/books?id=sBIDAAAAcAAJ&pg=PT353#v=onepage&q&f=false) [^3]: Keckermann, loc. cit., [p. 13 sq.](http://books.google.de/books?id=sBIDAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PT358#v=onepage&q&f=false) [^4]: For more on Whear, see Danah Sutton in the [Introduction](http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/whear/intro.html) to her online edition of Whear's 1623 edition of "De ratione et methodo legendi historias". The text was expanded afterwards, I quote an edition from 1684 to be found [here](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ). [^5]: Whear, loc. cit., [p. 171](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA171#v=onepage&q&f=false). [^6]: [Ibid.](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA171#v=onepage&q&f=false). [^7]: Cf. [ibid.](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA171#v=onepage&q&f=false): "quo magis mirari soleo Gerardum Johannem Vossium, inter eruditorum hujus aevi principes meritissimo numerandum, in libello suo eleganti de Arte Historica, firmiter tenere, hoc studium primae etiam convenire aetati; [...]" [^8]: Whear, loc. cit, [p. 172](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA172#v=onepage&q&f=false). The quote from Keckermann is from [p. 9 sq.](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA171#v=onepage&q&f=false) of the 1610 edition of his *commentarius*. [^9]: [Ibid.](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA172#v=onepage&q&f=false) [^10]: [Ibid.](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA172#v=onepage&q&f=false) [^11]: Cf. Whear, loc. cit., [p. 173](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA173#v=onepage&q&f=true): "[...] haud diffitendum linguas posse disci absque praeceptis, sed optime posse disci, pernegandum." [^12]: Whear, loc. cit., [p.174](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA174#v=onepage&q&f=true). In [p. 175 sqq.](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA175#v=onepage&q&f=true), Whear cites Foglieta, Sebastian Fox Morzillo, and Giovanni Viperano as additional authorities for this view. [^13]: Cf. Whear, loc. cit., [p. 176](http://books.google.de/books?id=wXhNAAAAcAAJ&hl=de&pg=PA176#v=onepage&q&f=true). [^14]: Basle 1586, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-113007 [^15]: Frankfurt/Main 1595, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-110672 [^16]: Cf. Scribonius, loc. cit., [p. 3](http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-113007-p0019-4), Goclenius, loc. cit., [p. 186 ](http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-110672-p0190-6). [^17]: Cf. Goclenius, [ibid.](http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-110672-p0190-6). [^18]: Cf. [ibid.](http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-110672-p0190-6). [^19]: Cf. [ibid.](http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-110672-p0190-6). [^20]: Hanoviae 1607, http://digital.slub-dresden.de/id310636477 [^21]: Keckermann, loc. cit., [p. 78]( http://www.webcitation.org/6EQkvCpf0). [^22]: Keckermann, *De natura et proprietatibus historiae*, [p. 41](http://books.google.de/books?id=sBIDAAAAcAAJ&pg=PT386#v=onepage&q&f=true). [^23]: Hanoviae 1601. URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:6-85659548907 [^24]: Keckermann, *Systema Logicae*, [p. 149](http://miami.uni-muenster.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-321/Ga0415_0155.gif). [^25]: Keckermann, loc. cit., []p. 151 sqq.](http://miami.uni-muenster.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-321/Ga0415_0157.gif). [^26]: Keckermann, *De natura et proprietatibus historiae*, [p. 68]((http://books.google.de/books?id=sBIDAAAAcAAJ&pg=PT413#v=onepage&q&f=true).