The analysis explores the changing bilateral relations between Iran and the U.S. in the context of the war on terror. The bilateral relations in this period were ambivalent, given that cooperation and treacheries coexisted. This analysis addresses how the complexity of the past and regional strategic interests connected U.S. and Iran, together in terms of secret cooperation in the earliest stage of war on terror, it also offers an insight to how the relations between the two changed responding to their strategic interests in the face of a fragile and instable post-Saddam Iraq. Both historical dynamics and political dynamics are examined for a view of the bilateral relations. Three questions are explored: How did the U.S. interests and Iranian interests shape their bilateral relations on war on terrors? And how did the bilateral relations evolve and unfold based on their respective interests? And how the collapse of Saddam regime has changed their relations? These myths are resolved with reference to the historical background of both the Iraq war and the Iran-Iraq war. This analysis is done by descriptive studies with the relevant history as the fundamental frame of reference. The analysis of US-Iranian relations during war on terror will unfold around: Afghanistan, the Iraq war, Post-Saddam era. The goal of the research is to provide U.S. foreign policymakers a basic insight that can inform them in developing more coherent policies toward Iran. The analytical framework is buttressed by its historical background. The central argument of the paper is that the US-Iranian relations relevant to the context of the war on terror can be mainly categorized into two phases: the phase of secret cooperation in the early stage of the war on terror, in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the treachery that ensued their transient cooperation as a grand bargain was offered by Tehran to Washington. The secret ties of amity evinced through the cooperation between U.S. and Iran that derived from their common grounds in early stage of the war on terror were very fragile. Despite the secret cooperation between the two in the early stage of the Iraq war, Bush also defined Iran as a part of Axis of Evil given Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its supports for terrorist groups. The ambivalent relations in this special period will be encapsulated in two analytical narratives in which their changing bilateral relations and their strategic calculations that defined the relations will be illustrated and examined: their cooperation in Iraq, Afghanistan and the turning point.
The Complexity of Hatred: the U.S. , Iran and SaddamThe capricious U.S.-Iranian relations that unfolded with both cooperation and defection started from September 11th of 2001, a day that marks the significant change in the trajectory of the fate of the great nation. The World Trade Towers were relentlessly destroyed among the horror of a series of organized terrorist attacks administered by Al Qaeda with their leader Osama Bin Laden. The American consensus of Iraq as their enemy also took shape in this aftermath of terrorist attacks based on the insistence of Bush that Saddam had been exporting terrorism in conjunction with Al Qaeda, resulting in the war on terror that defined the primary goal of the U.S.. On January 29, 2002, Bush coined the term of ‘Axis of Evil’ : Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the sponsors of terrorism and seekers of weapons of mass destruction. The axis of evil threatens the peace of the world. War against terror, crucial to the international security of the U.S. was launched in 2003. But Iraq also has a long-standing history of rivalry with Iran. On September 22, 1980, a catastrophic decision was made by the opportunistic leader of Iraq, Saddam to invade Iran as the result of persistent border clashes and Iran’s propaganda campaigns. The Iran-Iraqi war broke out in the great ambition of Saddam who wanted to take advantages of a weak and instable Iran, as torn by revolution, sanctions along with international isolation, to achieve his hegemony over the Persian Gulf. Saddam attacked Iran also for that he wanted to gain control of the oil fields as well as the Shatt al Arab waterway. The seeds of Iranian hatred towards Iraq were therefore deeply planted in this war. However, aside from the fact that Iranians find Iraq to be blamed in this unjust war, the U.S. was also integrated in the Iranian grievances. During the Iran-Iraqi war, the U.S. , given its long-standing rivalry with Iran especially in the aftermath of hostage crisis and its desires to weaken its rival in Persian Gulf, inevitably decided to side with Iraq to fight against Iran. Under the Washington’s calculation that it could not allow Iraq to fall under the radical clerical regime, the U.S. gravely undermined Iranians. The American supports to Baghdad came in form of intelligence data, economic aids worth of several billion dollars, non-U.S. origin weaponry, as well as special operation training. Not only did this war confirm Iraq officially as the rival of Iran, it also amplified the Iranian dissensions towards the U.S.. Analysis The Cooperation between the Enemies Afghanistan The relations in the earliest stage of the war on terror were cooperative given their overlapping interests to overthrow Taliban in Afghanistan. Opportunities for unprecedented cooperation between U.S. and Iran emerged out of the war on terror. After the 9.11, Iranians unexpectedly expressed their regrets towards 9.11. Not only did the Majlis set up a commission to review foreign policy and to manage direct talks with the U.S., Tehran also signaled its secret desire to help. Iran was seen as a prime candidate for cooperation given their overlapping interests on the war on terror. Powell commented that ‘ I hope that the Iranian people’s recently expressed desire for a freer, more open, and more prosperous society will give our two countries an opportunity to identify areas where our mutual interests converge and where we can work together constructively for our mutual benefits.’ In the first place, Iran was invited through a message from U.S. via the Swiss to join the ‘War on Terror’ given its significance as a vital regional actor in terms of facilitating the information exchanges and the sharing of tactical information between Washington and Tehran in this special context. Not only in this sense could Washington engage Iran strategically, it could also divert Tehran from its nuclear development. Secondly, after 9.11, Iran devoted deeper commitments in the Afghanistan talks at UN, where the Iranians met with the Americans and agreed on the offerings of search-and-rescue help and information exchanges. In the third place, right after the 9.11, not only did Iran back the Northern Alliance, it also helped the U.S. in Afghanistan to install Hamid Karzai. On the American side, cooperation basically came with the emergence of a more nuanced U.S. approach to Iran. The U.S. kindness manifested itself in form of relaxation of sanctions on Iran and the adoption of phased engagement. The U.S. foreign policy towards Iran was reassessed as Powell believed 9-11 provided a good opportunity to ‘reset the clock’. In the first place, Richard Hass attempted to curb the renewal of the ILSA, claiming that the sanctions were ineffective and unnecessary, trying to forward a two-year extension to the Congress. Further, he also tried to integrate Iran back to world economy by suggesting to turn down the U.S. opposition to World Trade Organization.
IraqThe war on terror not only aims to defend American interests in the Middle East, it also aspires through the liberation of Iraq from Hussein’s terror to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. is capable to dominate Iraq both militarily and politically, warning against other rogue states that might hurt U.S. interests. Saddam Hussein was deemed as a fascist and targeted as a dangerous tyrant who possessed weapons of mass destruction that needed to be gotten rid of from the world stage. Bush claimed that Americans with the Iraq war, for the triumph of democracy and tolerance, were helping the Iraqi people build a decent and democratic society where a place of torture chambers and mass graves would be transformed into a nation of laws and free institution, facilitating at the same time the Middle East to be a region of freedom and peace, curbing international terrorism. Came with the war on terrors was also the best opportunity for Iranians to take on revenges against Saddam for his misdeeds in Iran-Iraq war. This time, the interests of the U.S. and Iran, overlapped and intersected once again. Firstly, the Washington’s calculation was that, it could through the war seek to occupy Iraq to profit itself from controlling Iraqi oil and attempting to install a pro-American government to maximize its strategic influence in the middle east. Secondly, Bush believed that the regime change in Iraq would fundamentally affect the regime in Iran in a way that inspires Iranians to rise up changing their government, further stabilizing the region. Bush believed that it would ‘ result in a change of way of doing things, not only in Iraq but also in Iran’. Iran’s projection of itself as the future regional hegemon as the power balance changes after the collapse of the Saddam regime along with the desire for revenge encourages Tehran to side with Washington this time. Based on the fact that the U.S. was also in conflict with Afghanistan, and Iran was also a fierce opponent of Taliban, given the common enemy, Iran further strengthened its position with Washington. The mutually constituent interests of Washington and Tehran inevitably brought this pair of old enemies at the same table to fight against their common enemy to maximize their political and strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, although at the secret front. Not only were the interests that brought the two enemies together, the Iranian assistance in Afghanistan that was proved both valuable and timely was also a crucial factor that determined the plead for cooperation. Washington was confident in securing the Iranian help given the fact that the Americans believed Geneva talks had fully convinced Iranians that the invasion was not a threat and it was instead very advantageous. Washington also offered Tehran another incentive in terms of eliminating its long-term foe the MEK. Since gaining the cooperation of critical regional actors is seen as a good strategy to defeat Iraq, a message with critical information about Al Qaeda and the Taliban was sent via Swiss by Washington in order to invite Tehran to join the campaign of war on terror, laying the foundation for the sustained cooperation Although Tehran did not have diplomatic relations with Washington, based on the calculation of Tehran that the political vacuum in Iraq would provide a great platform for it to spread its political influence in Iraq to achieve its great ambition, Iran had secretly agreed to help the American forces in Iraq in terms of sharing tactical intelligence as well as aids to American citizens in Iran. It also does Washington a favor to oust the most US wanted a Lebanese to leave the country. In reciprocity, Bush administration assured that the U.S. would respect the territorial integrity if Iran. Barry Rosen commented: “ I believe the US government is doing this only because of the events of September 11.” A Turning PointThe relations between U.S. and Iran in the phase can be defined as treacherous as well. Bush coined the term ‘Axis of evil’ that comprises of Iraq, Iran and North Korean in his State of Union address . Bush defined Iran as a strategic threat the Americans face that is promoting an extreme form of religion and a destabilizing force that creates instability that leads to adverse consequences for the west, especially given its sponsorship for terrorists coupled with its pursuit of the nuclear weapons. First of all, since the beginning of the 2003 war in Iraq, Iran was often identified by the U.S. as the supporter of insurgency movements in Iraq. Dating back to 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld complained about Iran’s provision of financial supports and weapons to the insurgents in Iraq. Secondly, Iran was also recognized by the U.S. as the sponsor of terrorism. In 2002, Israelis intercepted a ship loaded in the Iranian port of Kish that carried 50 tons of arms bound for the Gaza Strip and Palestinian Authority, raising international concerns about Iranian trafficking in arms to terrorists. This accident substantiated that Iran supported the rogue groups, reinforcing its image as a support of other Islamist revolutionary movements. Given Iran as a part of Axis of evil, at the Tokyo donor conference, although the U.S. officials were approached by the Iranians and told that Tehran wanted to continue the cooperation and was willing to improve its relations with the U.S. the Pentagon’s media began to highlight the Iranian transgressions and its growing assistance of Al Qaeda. A sharper turning point came with the fall of Saddam when Iran found itself encircled by America. Bush announced ‘Mission Accomplished’, and Tehran found it imperative to reach out to the U.S. since it just felt that its regime was on stake. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Khatami government tried to explore the conditions for peace dialogues through bargaining with Americans. Iranians set forth a framework agenda for comprehensive talks that was later known as ‘ a Grand Bargain’, in which Iranians brought everything to the forefront, such as its sponsorship of terrorism, its involvement in Iraq, its nuclear development and the middle east peace process, seeking for mutual respect with U.S. This indicated Tehran’s willingness to end its hostility with U.S. and further moderation of its own behaviors. It was very authoritative and authentic. However, Bush administration simply held it that the military pressure in Iraq and Afghanistan could simply force Tehran to reflect upon its behaviors and its relationship with U.S. In this sense, Tehran was seen as containable and vulnerable to external forces. This document was simply dismissed. Americans thought they could simply get what they wanted by removing Saddam and through military pressure. The war in Iraq could be also contagious to Iran. Not only was this document sadly rejected, the Swiss, who delivered the proposal to the American was also punished. A few days after its delivery, Washington rebuked Guldimann and the Swiss government for overstepping its diplomatic mandate. Another reconciliatory opportunity just slipped away. In the face of diplomatic failure between Tehran and Washington, Parsi commented that ‘strengthened the hands of those in Iran who believe the only way to compel the U.S. to talk or deal with Iran is not by sending peace offers but by being a nuisance’ . Responding to the Washington’s rejection for reconciliation, Tehran decided to strengthen its strategic power in Post-Saddam Iraq. Not only has it decided to fill the vacuum in Iraq, the Al Qaeda in Iran also administered terrorist attacks in Riyadh, killing eight Americans and 26 Saudis. The prospects for the improvements of U.S.-Iranian relations were eliminated.
The Rise of Shia in a Post-Saddam Middle EastAlthough the Saddam regime was terminated within three weeks since the start of the military operations, the insurgency in Iraq was still found to be developing. Three years after the initial invasion, the insurgency in Iraq, under the pressure of former Baathists, nationalists and imported Jihad fighters, simply cannot be terminated in spite of the presence of 140,000 US troops. The insurgency was mainly kept going by Sunni Iraqis and foreign fighters, including those from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the middle east. Although the Shias are the majority of Iran and Iraq, they only make up less than 15 percent of Muslims in the world. The militant Sunni community that took dominance in Iraq under Saddam or even before, is both anti-Shia and anti-American, aiming to prevent Iraq from transiting to a US-dominated regime at the same time to restore its power. Saudi reformist Mansour remarked that ‘the most dangerous phenomenon is not the war between Sunni insurgents and American forces in Iraq, but the Sunni-Shiite sectarian strife.’ The instability and chaos in Iraq provided a great opportunity for Iran to project its Shia power to Iraq, not only as a way to retaliate U.S., but also for its own interests. Although Tehran repeatedly denied any meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs, it is still believed that it has strong relations with the new Iraqi Shia leadership in power, including the majority of ministers, the prime minister and the parliament members. On the first official visit of al-Maliki to Tehran, Tehran offered to help the prime minister establish security and stability in Iraq. Thus was reasonable for the Iranians to take advantage of the political instability in Iraq to project their Shia power to establish their security. Ahmadinejad confirmed that ‘We will give our full assistance to the Iraqi government to establish security in Iraq. Strengthening security in Iraq means strengthening security and stability in the region.’ And the Iraqi side responded positively to Teheran ‘The trip is to confirm the establishment of friendly and balanced relations based on common interest and respect of the sovereignty of the two countries without any interference in internal affairs.’ As the Prime Minster Blair accused, Tehran meddled further in Iraq by helping the Shia militias by its sophisticated bombings. The Iranians also stabbed in the back of the American troops through roadside bombs that smashed American troops into pieces. Border aggressions were also reported by the Iraqi Defense Ministry in May 2006. As the chaos in Iraq going and the U.S. troops mired in Iraq, it can be concluded that the void is left by the Americans and Iraqis for the Iranians to fill. The regional order in the Middle East was transformed forever but not the way as Washington had anticipated. The political vacuums in Iraq left by the U.S. were translated into the political power of Iranian Shias. By topping Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration successfully empowered the Shia majority of Iran by providing them with the perfect opportunity to launch a broad Shia revival. The relations between Iran and the U.S. were thus redefined by the legacy of the Iraq War. Since 2003, Iran has officially played a constructive role in Iraq, also being the first country to send an official delegation to Baghdad for talks with the Iraqi governing council, in effect recognizing the authority that the U.S. had put in power. Washington was dissatisfied not only with the Iran’s growth of regional power but also with the fact that Iran was believed to be a supporter of insurgents, criminal gangs, and militias in Iraq; However, it should be Washington’s failure not to anticipate Iran’s influence in Iraq Initially, Washington expected the Iraqi nationalism to serve as a bulwark against Iran. However, the ‘bulwark’ was proved porous to Shia identity in many ways. The demise of Saddam and the collapse of the Sunni wall rescued Iranian Shias from their hostile Sunni neighbor: Iraq. They turned Iraq to a political battle ground where they fought to spread their Shia influence. ‘Today, Iraqi Shiites worry far more about the Sunnis' domination than about Tehran's influence in Baghdad .’ And the Sunni countries used Shia revival as an excuse to resist the domestic political reforms that the U.S. had called for. If bringing democracy to the Middle East means the empowerment of Shias and a more powerful Iran, Washington would have stuck to Sunni dictatorship. Washington changed the power balance in the middle east in a way that hurts its own interests. The achievements of Iran through its Shia revival also complicated US-Iranian relations in my aspects. Although it can be said the Iraq war benefitted the Iranian Shias in terms of the U.S-led regime changes in Kabul and Baghdad, Washington could also hinder Tehran’s greater ambition of consolidating their influence in Iraq. The presence of U.S. troops in the region unfortunately threatens Iran as well. Their short-term interests were in disagreement as well considering the fact that as Washington wants out of the mess, Tehran is happy to see U.S. forces mired there. A policy of controlled chaos in Iraq as a way to keep the U.S. government bogged down and dampen its enthusiasm for seeking regime changes was also developed by Tehran. Initially, Tehran cooperated secretly with Washington in order to take advantages of Washington in the face of a weak, instable and fragile Iraq. Tehran’s calculus changed drastically after the collapse of the Saddam regime. Tehran’s short-term interests no longer aligned with Washington. Iran’s presence in Tehran is also a lot stronger with the presence of Shias. The aftermath of the Iraq war left Washington’s calls for regime changes discredited. Iran has also grown confident enough that it is a stronger power than it was before the Iraq war. The escalated tensions between Tehran and Washington indicate the fact that Tehran believe that the Iraq war had empowered it politically to an extent that it can confront U.S. directly with nuclear threats.But there is still a prospect for the convergence of U.S. and Iranian long-term interests since both of them want lasting stability there. As for Washington, it will need a reason to withdraw. And Tehran holds that only the stability in the backyard will secure its position back home and its influence throughout the region. As Abbas pointed out, ‘Chaos in Iraq does not help Iranian national interest. If your neighbor’s house is on fire, it means your home is also in danger.’ In a word, as Leverett and Mann commented, ‘Tehran is well positioned to defend its interests in Iraq unilaterally as America flounders. Similarly, Iran will not accept strategically meaningful limits on its nuclear capabilities for a package of economic and technological goodies. Iran will only cooperate with the U.S., whether in Iraq or on the nuclear issue, as part of a broader rapprochement addressing its core security concerns. ’ For the stability in Iraq, Iraqi refugees in Iran who act for Iraqi Shiite interests are trying to convince the Iranian leadership to cooperate with Washington, pushing up further negotiations since Washington and Tehran are seen as the pillars of their power. Iranian publics are also concerned with the sanctity of the holy cities in Iraq. However, it is believed that Iran will only seek stability in Iraq when it can no longer benefit from the manipulated chaos there, which is to say, when it no longer perceives U.S. presence as a threat. ConclusionThe U.S.-Iranian relations in the context of war on terror are defined by the coexistence of cooperation and treachery. The relations in this timeframe are found to be very capricious as their strategic calculations varied during different stages of war on terror. As the analysis concluded, it was found out that the decisive factors that determine US-Iranian relations at different stages are mainly their strategic interests. And in the context of the earliest stage of war on terror, given the fact that U.S. interest and Iranian interests overlapped and intersected given their common interests in Afghanistan and their common enemy Saddam, the bilateral relations between the two should be best described as “secret partnership” that is defined by covert cooperation between the two. At the same time, the allegations of Bush on Iran’s possession of WMD and sponsorship of terrorist activities defined their relations as treacherous as well. Furthermore, despite their brief cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the collapse of the Saddam regime, as Bush announced ‘Mission Accomplished’, Iran felt insecure due to the American encirclement around, proposing ‘ A Grand Bargain’, marking a significant turning point of U.S.-Iranian relations. Finally, the regional balance in the middle east changed drastically, giving great advantages to the Iranian Shias who projected their Shia power successful. The rise of Shias in the Middle East was a factor that shapes the post-Saddam U.S.- Iranian relations as well. In conclusion, the special relationship between Iran and U.S. during this period is defined by the coexistence of cooperation and strife. In Afghanistan, they mainly cooperated through information exchanges. In Iraq, they secretly cooperated and defected each other. In the aftermath of the collapse of Saddam, as Iran felt insecure with the American encirclement, Tehran reached out to Washington with a grand bargain for peace dialogues and negotiations. As the grand bargain was declined by Washington, a turning point of the brief friendly U.S.-Iranian relations came. The peace prospects were simply eliminated. Tehran was convinced that they needed to further develop their political power in Iraq as Saddam fell since U.S. was simply unreliable, laying a foundational for the Shia revival in Iraq and the rise of Iran as a regional hegemon. A good diplomatic opportunity for U.S.-Iranian rapprochement was wasted for the wrong calculations of Bush administration. Washington failed to develop a coherent set of policies towards Iran. The research paper offers further implications for U.S. foreign policy decision-makers to develop sophisticated policies towards Iran, defending U.S. interests at home and abroad.
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