Egypt Air Flight 990 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean on the 31st of October 1999, killing all 217 passengers and crew on board. The flight was a Boeing 767 scheduled to fly from Los Angeles International Airport to Cairo with a stop at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, before it plunged into the sea. There is controversy over the cause of the crash, with the NTSB and the ECAA reaching vastly different conclusions.
The aircraft involved in the crash - photo taken in Dusseldorf by Konstantin von Wedelstaedt
Flight 990 consisted of two complete flight crews, with a captain and a first officer; EgyptAir designated one crew as the “active” and one as the “cruise” or “relief” crew – it was customary for the active crew to make the takeoff and fly the first five hours of the ten-hour flight, and the cruise crew would take over until an hour or so before landing – the active crew would then take over again to land. On EgyptAir 990, however, the relief first officer, named Gameel Al-Batouti, recommended that he relieve the commanding first officer 20 minutes after takeoff. After initially protesting, he eventually conceded and allowed Al-Batouti to take the controls as first officer.
During the takeoff and climb to its assigned cruising altitude, Flight 990 was completely routine, and was handled by three different controllers as it climbed up in stages. The aircraft was equipped with a transponder that automatically reported the plane’s altitude to ATC radar. As the flight levelled off to its assigned altitude of 33000ft, the last controller to handle Flight 990 suggested the plane change frequencies for better reception. The captain acknowledged on the new frequency, and this was the last transmission received on the flight.
Approximately 5 hours into its 10-hour flight, the captain excused himself to go to the bathroom, and very soon after, Gameel Al-Batouti - the relief first officer - disengaged the autopilot and reduced the throttles on both engines to idle. Both elevators were also moved three degrees nose-down. As the first officer was doing this, he was speaking in Arabic, “Tawkalt ala Allah” – “I rely on God” in English. The plane suddenly and dramatically plummeted downwards into a sharp descent - making 14600ft in just 36 seconds.
At this point, the captain returned to the cockpit and asked the first officer what was happening. The elevators then moved to a split position, with the left elevator up and the right elevator down – this most likely occurred due to the captain pulling up on the control column and the first officer pushing down on his. At this point, the engines were shut off; the captain asked, “What is this? Did you shut the engines?” and the first officer replied with “It’s shut.” The captain continuously asked the first officer to ‘pull [on the control column] with me’, however the elevators remained in the split position up until the plane hit the ocean.
About five minutes after the sharp descent and crash into the Atlantic Ocean, the ATC controller, unaware of the crash, attempted to notify Flight 990 that radar had been lost, but received no reply. Two minutes later, the controller contacted ARINC to determine if Flight 990 had switched to an oceanic frequency too early, but ARINC received no response either. Lufthansa Flight 499, a plane also in the area, was asked to attempt contact with Flight 990 as well, but they were unsuccessful.
Because the plane crashed in international waters, the investigation was handled by the country of registry of the aircraft – in this case, it was the Egyptian government. At their request, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) helped in the investigation alongside the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA).
The NTSB’s investigation determined that there was no possible way for the split elevator that occurred in Flight 990 to occur unless the captain was commanding nose-up, whilst the first officer was commanding nose-down. The ECAA presented various mechanical failure scenarios for this position, but the NTSB concluded that none matched the evidence found. Additionally, a look into the first officer’s personal life revealed motives for crashing the plane – he had been severely disciplined for reports of strong sexual harassment, and he was recently reprimanded by his supervisor, who was a passenger on Flight 990. His supervisor had just revoked Al-Batouti’s privilege of flying to the US and informed him that Flight 990 would be his last on the route.
After initially allowing the NTSB to take control of the investigation into the accident, the ECAA became unhappy with how the NTSB was handling the investigation and decided to launch their own into the crash. The ECAA report concluded that the relief first officer didn’t deliberately crash the plane, and that mechanical failure was the most likely cause of the accident.