it's official. Wren is the new Maren Voss. but only in proper noun for so far, not the bird.
Xuebing Du
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shark vs the universe
trying on a metaphor

pixel skylines

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roma★
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izzy's playlists!

祝日 / Permanent Vacation
we're not kids anymore.
styofa doing anything
Cosimo Galluzzi
Keni
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will byers stan first human second

seen from United States
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@bambamramfan
it's official. Wren is the new Maren Voss. but only in proper noun for so far, not the bird.
I think it would be hard for a hyper-intelligence to be a biblical-literalist evangelical christian. Nor do I think biblical-literalist evangelical christians would have the same values if they didn't believe the bible was true.
Thus, while it is, of course, possible for an intelligence to have terminal values that happen to align with evangelicals on various controversial issues, the previous paragraph suggests that many ways one might try to build an evangelical hyper-intelligence would result in either a non-hyper-intelligence or a non-evangelical one.
Controversial human values are entwined with material claims about the world often.
And thus, I believe "a sufficiently intelligent mind would discover the true values and do those instead" is at least kinda slightly true.
I feel like all extant human value systems are riven with incoherence, and we should then expect a superintelligence to not find them credible, but the space of consistent-yet-alien value systems is so large that I wouldn't expect 'true values' to be discovered incidentally: avoiding human failures rules out few enough possibilities that I'd expect the novel values to be further away from human-good than the failed value systems of the present.
the historical record is stark: intelligence is used much more to rationalize inconsistent beliefs you already have, than to find beliefs that don't have inconsistencies. only talking about the west here, but some of the most respected books for intelligence of argument are ones defending and explaining the author's religion (augustine, rashi, hegel's phenomenology of spirit.) and from what we've seen of LLM intelligence so far, it's even worse at this not better.
apparently people have been raw-dogging materialist-scumbag posts seeing the entire length on their dash every time. im not THAT rude and i would have been putting in breaks, but I thought tumblr solved that problem. because i've always seen all long posts auto-truncated, and i just assume everyone else saw the same thing too. nope.
i WILL put in breaks in my next round of posts and from now on (there's a lot of rework I need to be doing) but for your own health, you should turn this on
Bryce Canyon floats timed-entry reservations after another record summer — June 2026
Okay so before anything else: Bryce Canyon is not a canyon. No river runs through it. A canyon is what a river does; Bryce is what frost does — the rim of the Paunsaugunt Plateau sits at eight to nine thousand feet, which at that latitude means something like two hundred freeze-thaw cycles a year, water getting into the joints of a fifty-million-year-old lakebed limestone every afternoon and turning to ice every night and prying, two hundred times a year, for a few million years. The hoodoos are the leftovers. It's an amphitheater of demolition debris, and the demolition is ongoing — the rim retreats a couple of feet a century, which means every photograph of Bryce is a photograph of inventory being liquidated. That comes back.
The Paiutes, who were there for centuries before anyone named anything after a Scotsman, had a story that the hoodoos were the Legend People, an earlier race who behaved badly and got turned to stone by Coyote, frozen mid-gesture, which as origin stories go is honestly closer to the geology than "canyon" is. Standing punishment, in rows.
And then the Mormons. You can't skip this and have the rest make sense, because everything after it runs on the same template. The LDS church in the 1850s through 1880s was operating what was basically a centrally planned colonization agency — families were "called" to settle specific valleys the way you'd be called to a mission, by name, from the pulpit, sometimes to grow specific crops (the cotton mission to St. George, the iron mission to Cedar City — these are literally called missions, the church was running an import-substitution program with theology as the HR department). The Paria Valley call was one of the bad draws. High, cold, droughty, flash-flood country. Ebenezer Bryce — Scottish convert, shipwright's training from the Clyde, which made him the most overqualified carpenter in southern Utah — gets there around 1875, settles right under the amphitheater, builds a road up into it to haul out timber and firewood because that's what the pink cliffs were to him: a woodlot with an access problem. The locals start calling the drainage behind his place Bryce's Canyon the way you'd say Bryce's fence line. His one recorded review of the scenery, probably apocryphal and immortal anyway: "a hell of a place to lose a cow."
Five years. That's how long he lasted. By 1880 he's gone to Arizona, and the name stays behind like a coat on a hook. The man the national park is named for looked at the most photographed landscape in Utah and saw a timber haul and an animal-retrieval problem, and then left because you couldn't farm it.
The people who stayed dug the Tropic Ditch, and this one's worth slowing down for. The Paria side of the rim has no reliable water — the East Fork of the Sevier River flows on TOP of the plateau, on the other side, heading the wrong way. So in 1890-92 the settlers of what became the town of Tropic hand-dug a canal that captures the Sevier and pours it over the rim of the amphitheater, down through the hoodoos, into their fields. It still runs. There is a waterfall at Bryce Canyon — tourists hike to it, it's lovely — and it is an irrigation feature, a municipal water diversion from the 1890s doing an Instagram-era second career as nature. The single most-photographed "natural" waterfall in the area is a ditch. Nobody's lying about it, the Park Service signage is perfectly upfront; nobody reads the signage.
So as of 1900 the amphitheater is: backdrop. A thing the cattle wander into and have to be retrieved from (Ebenezer was right about that part). The plateau on top is summer grazing for sheep and cattle, the forest is Forest Service timber land, and the scenery is worth nothing because scenery without transportation is not a product, it's just geography.
Then in 1915 a Forest Service supervisor named J.W. Humphrey gets transferred to the district, gets walked out to the rim by a ranger who tells him he ought to see it, and — by his own account — can't believe nobody's done anything with it. And what he does with it is the part that gives the game away: he doesn't write to Congress, he doesn't write to John Muir's ghost. He gets photographs taken and circulated, gets articles placed, scrapes together a few hundred dollars to make the rim reachable by automobile, and the articles land where exactly this kind of article landed in 1916 — railroad publicity channels. Because the only institutions in America with both the motive and the budget to manufacture scenic destinations were the western railroads, who had transcontinental track through empty country and needed a reason for anyone to ride it. The Northern Pacific had Yellowstone. The Great Northern had Glacier — built the lodges, invented "See America First" as a slogan, which was explicitly a balance-of-payments argument: rich Americans were spending their tourist money in Switzerland, and the railroads wanted those dollars routed through their own dining cars instead. The Santa Fe had the Grand Canyon's south rim. And the Union Pacific, looking at the map, had southern Utah.
What UP builds in the early twenties is a loop — and it's a real piece of network design, not just a lodge. In 1923 they complete a branch line from the main line down to Cedar City, and from that railhead their subsidiary, the Utah Parks Company, runs motor-bus circuits: Zion, Bryce, Cedar Breaks, the North Rim of the Grand Canyon, back to the train. They commission Gilbert Stanley Underwood — the architect who basically invented the national-park-lodge style, he'd go on to do the Ahwahnee — to build Bryce Canyon Lodge a few hundred feet back from the rim, log-and-stone, deliberately rustic, rusticity being at that point a manufactured aesthetic with a design language and a fee schedule. The buses, the lodge, the railhead, the marketing: a closed system. You bought the tour in Chicago and the Union Pacific touched your dollar at every node.
And NOW the federal designations arrive, in exactly the order you'd expect once you see whose capital was already committed. National monument, June 1923 — same year as the Cedar City spur, what a coincidence. Then a 1924 act of Congress to upgrade it to a national park under the magnificently generic name "Utah National Park" (the upgrade contingent on untangling the land, because the plateau was a checkerboard of state school sections and private claims that had to be swapped out — the unglamorous cadastral plumbing that every park's creation myth leaves out). Name restored to Bryce Canyon and the park fully established in 1928, administered at first as a satellite of Zion because it didn't rate its own superintendent. Stephen Mather's brand-new Park Service was openly, happily in partnership with the railroads through all of this — Mather's whole pitch for the agency's existence was parks as economic engines, and the railroads were the engine rooms. The park, as an institution, is the federal government underwriting the Union Pacific's product line. Everyone involved would have agreed with that sentence and seen no scandal in it.
Meanwhile — and here's my favorite person in the whole story — a local rancher named Ruby Syrett had beaten all of them to the rim. Around 1919 he's running "Tourists' Rest" practically at Sunset Point: tents, meals, a dance floor of all things, serving the trickle of motorists Humphrey's road had let in. Then the monument designation lands and the big boys arrive and Ruby gets moved off the rim — the prime real estate now belongs to the public, which in operational terms means it belongs to the Utah Parks Company's concession contract. So Ruby does the smartest thing anyone does in this entire hundred-year chronicle: he pulls back to his own ranch land at the junction where the only road into the park meets the highway, and builds Ruby's Inn there. Outside the boundary. On the bottleneck.
Look at the two positions a second. The Union Pacific holds the inside concession: prestige, architecture, a monopoly granted by the government — and rigid, regulated, and welded to rail tourism. Ruby holds the dirt at the gate: no prestige, no Underwood, and total freedom plus a geographic chokehold that no future change in transportation can route around, because the road is the road.
You know how this goes. The automobile eats the passenger train. The loop-tour model decays through the thirties (the CCC, meanwhile, is building the park's actual infrastructure with federal labor — the rim road, the trails, the stuff the postcards don't credit), limps after the war, and dies properly in the sixties. In 1972 the Utah Parks Company donates its buildings to the Park Service and exits — donates, the polite corporate word for abandoning a position that no longer pencils. Fifty years of railroad empire-building at Bryce ends as a tax-deductible gift.
And the Syretts just… kept compounding. Three, four, five generations now. Ruby's Inn grows into one of the largest Best Westerns in the world, plus the campground, the rodeo, the helicopter tours, the gas, the groceries — at this point a substantial majority of the beds, meals, and souvenirs sold to Bryce's visitors are sold by one family, at the gate, on land Ruby chose in 1923 because the government took his first spot.
Then in 2007 they did the thing that makes the whole structure visible: they incorporated. The Utah legislature had passed a law making it easy to charter tiny towns, and the Syretts chartered Bryce Canyon City — population a couple hundred, nearly every acre and business in it family-owned, the town government and the family enterprise sharing, let's say, considerable overlap in personnel. The point of being a town is that towns collect taxes; the resort and sales tax generated by a million-plus visitors funneling through the bottleneck now accrues to the bottleneck, instead of to the county. Locals in Tropic and Panguitch grumbled, the legislature later tightened the incorporation law, the city remains. A company town, except the company is a family and the industry is the view.
I've been saying it about every one of these places: it's the Mormon settlement call again, run privately, one family deep, except this colony took. A family planted on hard land by an institution, holding it for generations, the institution's name on everything and the family's hand on everything that matters. Ebenezer's colony grew cattle and failed in five years; Ruby's grows visitation and has lasted a hundred. The crop was wrong the first time, that's all.
And the park floats timed-entry reservations for its 2.6 million annual visitors — a number that would have made the Utah Parks Company's accountants weep, their best years moved tens of thousands. Every era of Bryce has had a transportation owner and a bottleneck owner, and the federal designation has always functioned as brand underwriting for whoever held those positions: the railroad and its lodge, then the highway and the motor courts, now the gateway city and, increasingly, the reservation system itself, which is what a bottleneck looks like when it's made of software. The park was certified a Dark Sky place in 2019 and the family compound at the gate now sells astronomy the way UP sold rusticity — packaged absence, the highest-margin product there is, since the inventory restocks every night.
The hoodoos, meanwhile, keep falling down. Two feet of rim a century, every freeze a pry bar, the whole amphitheater in slow liquidation with no restocking mechanism whatsoever — the one party in the arrangement that's visibly going out of business, on a timescale nobody involved has to care about. The Legend People standing in rows while the concessions turn over around them, monument, park, railroad, ditch, hotel, town.
Still a hell of a place to lose a cow. Though the cow was never where the money was.
Letter vs. Object There is a clay tablet in the British Museum that was written around 1750 BCE. A man named Nanni wrote to a copper merchan
There was a period in the mid-2010s when Netflix was releasing dozens of original films per year, many of them competent, watchable, professionally made, and immediately forgettable. The object-model evaluation was fine: decent cinematography, solid acting, reasonable scripts. But something was missing, and the something was the letter. These films were outputs of a system optimised for engagement metrics, and whatever personal vision the directors brought was filtered through so many layers of corporate feedback that the signal arrived diluted beyond recognition. You could enjoy them in the moment (and millions of people did), but they left nothing behind, because there was no sender. No one had needed to make this particular film. It existed because an algorithm determined it should exist. The letter was addressed "to whom it may concern," and you could feel the generic salutation in every frame.
maybe the problem is that people care about other people too much. so if you say, here's a political agenda that'll make you rich, they'll be like, wait, won't this also make other people rich? i don't want that. i'd rather have the other people be poor. i'm very sensitive to the condition of other people, you understand, such as people i read about in the newspaper, and people i hear about on tiktok – and i want them to be poor! ideally i'd be put in charge of making sure that the other people are poor, but someone's got to do it. whereas if you don't care about other people you're like, shit, i want to be rich! sign me up! what's the next thing that's as useful as the refrigerator, i want that. why isn't energy too cheap to meter, i want energy too cheap to meter. i want every disease to be cured because otherwise i might get one, et cetera. and the most politically viable way for me to get what i want is for the political order to make everyone else rich also, which i don't care about
I think the human brain is very smart about social matters, and even if it is explained poorly, it is aware that other people having a lot more usually means they have less. "Decouplers" will say this isn't true, but in any of the specific examples it clearly is, which is why libertarians and rationalists keep using the vague, abstract form.
modernism and poly
Have I ever mentioned that it's polyamory that is the gray, bureaucratic paste of romance in the future? It's a baseline assumption for me, but I may not have described it.
We've all read James Scott at this point, or are aware of Seeing Like a State, and the ubiquitious theme that forward progress smooths out injustices and deprivations of the past, but structures a world in a way that is less impassioned, and harder to put in words or numbers, but is much more conveniently legible for others. Think about finance moving from deals on the golf courses and steak restaurants, to just spreadsheets and quants from MIT.
And this is not an unmitigated good. Almost always the modernist progress is better in many ways, in all the ways you can measure, but something IS lost. Talk about NYC 30 or 40 years ago compared to now.
Anyway.
Because of the current cultural groups, monogamy comes across as "the normal, boring thing to do, done by conformists" and polyamory comes across as the "young, exciting, make-poor-decisions-by-the-seat-of-your-hormones option." But what matters is actually the other way around.
Monogamous marriage is the idealistic belief that one person can be your everything, and when you meet them in your twenties you're ready to be attached to them for the rest of your life. (And earlier on, that it's only possible between one man and one woman.) These things, practically speaking, are foolish absolutes that fence our lives in.
It is much more *reasonable* that you have multiple partners, each one of which satisfies different needs, and none of you are stuck if your feelings change, and that anyone is a possible romantic option, not just one gender or culture. It's the romance that would be designed by any good city planner.
Monogamy, in comparison, sounds more like an essentially fantasy story. Cue Zizek on monogamy, and any polycule on how "sensible" their lifestyle is. Monogamy is just the thing that feels more "magical" in the good and bad connotations of the word.
Not that individuals can't make their own magic, just the "one partner, other gender, rest of your life" is the one that brings Culturally Supported Magic without you having to look for it.
Magical: you cheated on me and now I will kms
Non-magical: you slept with her but I have a boyfriend too so why should I mind.
This is the same divide as "I hunted down this animal in the forest and ripped blood from its veins with my own bare hands" vs "we plant the wheat here once a year and harvest it once a year and we don't have to move constantly." It's kings vs legislatures. And that's why royalty is such a common theme of romances - not because of class aspirations, but because royalty and monogamous marriage are running on the same metaphysics.
It's the arrow of modernism, and on paper it's obvious which one is more rational. And going forward I think that is where more of the divide will come from, rather than social conformism vs not.
Mmm, I think you missed your own obvious conclusion; in Ye Olde Days, men fucked prostitutes and enthusiastic amateurs while traveling, and often had longer term relationships with mistresses and camp followers and so on, while wives less often but never-less had boyfriends and “Jody” and so on. And of course, both husbands and wives might have close same gender relationships that were actually sexual. But all these relationships were supposed to be kept under wraps, at least it was considered gauche to be too public about any of them. Plenty of Olde Tyme marriages were “open relationships” or actually triads by modern standards, but it was supposed to be kept private.
The 1997 publication of The Ethical Slut was a call for the end of this kafabe. It is extremely important to understand that “polyamory/ethical non monogamy” was born in the BDSM community; the authors of The Ethical Slut had previously authored seminal BDSM books, The Topping Book and The Bottoming Book. Not to downplay the impact of the 2002 Jack McGeorge incident in public alternative heterosexual sexualities/relationship formats) Now the only law was honesty… and tbh, both the economic realities of the Recession and the ongoing social repercussions of the AIDS crisis and the “outing” of homosexuality in general, because now adventurous horny mostly straight people were seeing what types of relationships had been proven to be possible by gay and lesbian and bisexual couples.
It's absolutely true that this generation did not invent open relationships, and people have been fucking around since fucking was around. But the formalities around it do matter, in particular I think many of the examples you are discussing did not at all have the same attitudes towards men vs women doing this.
An ethic of free-divorce or even "why bother with legal recognition" and also "every person in your community is a potential legitimate partner" and disdaining any hierarchy in partners is, relatively more rarer.
But also like, modernism is not one linear slope. A lot of cultures have modernized (ie, city-fied) and then reversed. The city is conquered, there's a new wave of religion, libraries burn. A better word would be legiblized, but people don't recognize that as much as modernization. So yeah, there have been times in the past where sexual partners were more approaching this more, but that doesn't mean it's not modernism.
On the one hand, a lot of the talk abt the power and menace of AI-driven facial recognition software is overblown because, to be perfectly frank, none of the software is very good. A lot of the people reporting on it are just repeating the ad copy published by the companies selling the software.
On the other hand, it isn't overblown at all because so-called forensic science has always been pretty shit but that hasn't stopped prosecutors from being able to convince jurors that cops have magic powers
Flirting is like the stock market. There are no definitive laws for it. If there WERE definitive laws, they would get folded into the meta-awareness of it, and immediately be falsified.
modernism and poly
Have I ever mentioned that it's polyamory that is the gray, bureaucratic paste of romance in the future? It's a baseline assumption for me, but I may not have described it.
We've all read James Scott at this point, or are aware of Seeing Like a State, and the ubiquitious theme that forward progress smooths out injustices and deprivations of the past, but structures a world in a way that is less impassioned, and harder to put in words or numbers, but is much more conveniently legible for others. Think about finance moving from deals on the golf courses and steak restaurants, to just spreadsheets and quants from MIT.
And this is not an unmitigated good. Almost always the modernist progress is better in many ways, in all the ways you can measure, but something IS lost. Talk about NYC 30 or 40 years ago compared to now.
Anyway.
Because of the current cultural groups, monogamy comes across as "the normal, boring thing to do, done by conformists" and polyamory comes across as the "young, exciting, make-poor-decisions-by-the-seat-of-your-hormones option." But what matters is actually the other way around.
Monogamous marriage is the idealistic belief that one person can be your everything, and when you meet them in your twenties you're ready to be attached to them for the rest of your life. (And earlier on, that it's only possible between one man and one woman.) These things, practically speaking, are foolish absolutes that fence our lives in.
It is much more *reasonable* that you have multiple partners, each one of which satisfies different needs, and none of you are stuck if your feelings change, and that anyone is a possible romantic option, not just one gender or culture. It's the romance that would be designed by any good city planner.
Monogamy, in comparison, sounds more like an essentially fantasy story. Cue Zizek on monogamy, and any polycule on how "sensible" their lifestyle is. Monogamy is just the thing that feels more "magical" in the good and bad connotations of the word.
Not that individuals can't make their own magic, just the "one partner, other gender, rest of your life" is the one that brings Culturally Supported Magic without you having to look for it.
Magical: you cheated on me and now I will kms
Non-magical: you slept with her but I have a boyfriend too so why should I mind.
This is the same divide as "I hunted down this animal in the forest and ripped blood from its veins with my own bare hands" vs "we plant the wheat here once a year and harvest it once a year and we don't have to move constantly." It's kings vs legislatures. And that's why royalty is such a common theme of romances - not because of class aspirations, but because royalty and monogamous marriage are running on the same metaphysics.
It's the arrow of modernism, and on paper it's obvious which one is more rational. And going forward I think that is where more of the divide will come from, rather than social conformism vs not.
It occurs to me that most folks who have “socialist/communist/leftist/eat the rich” attitudes in the United States would immediately change their tune if they had 1950s style socioeconomic prosperity and hope.
Some want to own houses, get better jobs, have improved prospects for their children. Others want prestigious jobs at colleges and news outlets and publishing contracts. They’d all support The Way Things Are if they thought the socioeconomic system was going to give them the lifestyle the boomers had.
This is absolutely true, but in ways points to a deeper failure.
Capitalism depends on actually giving benefits to people, and if you just ignore it and let capitalism fuck up a generation (2008) so much they demand socialism, then the decision makers chose their greed over the preservation of the system.
And if they forgot that bargain, then getting worse is going to accelerate.
Time was Big Capital would actually say this out loud:
Yes! I almost included that one theory is that through the 90's the capitalist country had to offer a better standard of living in competing ideologically with communism. This put some discipline on capitalists to not let all the resources go to the top, and when the USSR collapsed is when we started seeing ultra-capitalism take off.
Actually reading the whole paper: Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?
I posted an interesting table from this paper a few weeks ago, showing the percentage of time the European great powers were at war by century.
Having now actually reviewed the paper's argument in depth, I can summarize it here.
Hoffman argues that for the rulers of European great powers from 1500 onwards, choosing to fight wars was similar to a tournament - it takes investment (here, military spending) and the winner gets a prize (territory, military prestige). This is also when gunpowder weapons emerge fully onto the scene. Gunpowder, unlike more conventional fighting methods with melee weapons or archery, has vast potential to be improved through dedicated research or improvement on past experience, called "learning by doing." He gives the latter more emphasis in the model:
One reasonable way to conceive of the learning is to assume that it depends on the resources spent on war. Greater military spending gives a ruler more of a chance to learn, and rulers anywhere can do it —it is not peculiar to one corner of the world. We can model the relationship by assuming that each unit of resources z spent gives a ruler an independent chance at a random military innovation x, where x has an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function F(x) with support [0, a].
Emphasis mine. Essentially, spending more on war and fighting more gives you a better chance to learn to fight better. You can also copy others' innovations from previous rounds of warfare, allowing knowledge to disperse, although he allows for frictions in said dispersal later in the paper.
An important point he introduces is that gunpowder weaponry is not effective against every type of enemy. It works against conventional states with fixed populations and fortifications, but is less effective against nomadic armies without cities to beseige and which can continually retreat into their steppe. Western states primarily fought other equivalent centralized states, which was also the case in pre-Tokugawa era Japan, but China primarily fought against nomads, the Ottomans and the early Russian empire fought against a mix of states and nomads, and Indian warfare also featured such battles. These states will mix their spending on gunpowder and horse archer style forces depending on their threat mix. As horse archery holds less potential for improvement, states dependent upon it are prone to falling behind over time.
Skipping the boring model math, we reach some paragraphs worth quoting at length. His model predicts we will see sustained warfare and military development if:
(...) the value of the prize [of winning a war] is higher, when opponents’ costs ci [political costs of military spending] are similar, and when fixed costs b [fixed costs of setting up a fiscal system, military system, and navy] are smaller. Opponents’ costs will be similar if rival countries are of roughly the same size and face similar resistance to tax levies or conscription. The fixed costs will be small if setting up an army, a navy, or a fiscal system does not entail heavy expenses. That would certainly be the case if some of the fixed costs are sunk because a tax bureaucracy was already in place, naval dockyards had already been built, or a system had already been established for drafting soldiers, commandeering ships, or supplying provisions. The fixed costs would likely be modest too if the two rulers’ realms lay near one another, for fighting a distant country would entail setting up a big invasion force. War will persist if the inequality holds for successive generations of rulers.
Without war, there will be no learning by doing and no improvement in military technology. If the fighting halts, so will advances in military technology, and the resources mobilized zi will decline too. War will be likely to stop if the fixed costs rise, or if a ruler annihilates his opponents and conquers their realms. His successors will then have no nearby rivals, and their only potential adversaries will be further away and so entail larger fixed costs. It will simply not be worth fighting them.
This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for continued military innovation. Three other conditions are required:
The resources spent on warfare must be high, which is caused by having a large prize to win by fighting relative to political costs of fighting.
States must use gunpowder weaponry heavily, to ensure enough doing to cause learning by doing.
States must be able to acquire the latest innovations in gunpowder technology from other states at low cost.
He goes through why these conditions failed in various non-western regions.
All three conditions fail in China. It lacked suitable targets to take over; conquering Japan would have required the creation of a large enough navy, a very large fixed cost relative to the prize of conquest. It also fought primarily against nomads, leading to focus on non-gunpowder weaponry. Finally, acquiring many western military techniques such as the creation of modern artillery would have required recruiting large teams of highly-skilled military specialists from Europe, which would have been difficult and expensive.
Japan did see some continuous military development in its warlord phase, but once the Shogunate took over the country it ran into the same factors as China. A brief attempt to conquer Korea turned out to be extremely costly and was abandoned after its main leader died, serving as a sort of exception which proves the rule.
India had some nomad conflicts, splitting effort between weaponry types. As well, its low taxation rates, imply high political costs to taxation, leading to relatively low military spending. As well, dynastic strife within ruling families reduced the value of winning military glory, since a winning ruler might be assassinated by a relative, making his conquests pointless. These factors kept a lid on gunpowder-related military spending. The British East India Company could therefore roll up much of the subcontinent by taking advantage of its low cost to mobilizing military resources and exploiting succession crises.
Russia and the Ottoman Empire diverge partway through the period. Initially, both seem to have high costs of mobilizing resources to fight, and both are splitting their wars between western states and nomadic armies. However, once Russia conquers most of its nomadic enemies, and implements peasant conscription, it focuses more squarely on gunpowder weaponry with greater resources than before. So from around 1700, its fortunes diverge from the Ottoman Empire, and it starts performing better against European enemies while the Ottomans fall behind.
---
Overall, an interesting paper. I'm sure that area experts would be driven to a blind fury seeing their region's fiscal realities simplified as "high costs of mobilizing resources," and pour out thousands of words arguing that lower Chinese tax revenues fail to reflect the true reality on the ground. But the use of even just a simple game theory model allows Hoffman to make his argument mathematically explicit, as opposed to a mushier wordy history argument with many fiddly points left for rhetorical wiggle room.
Historians should try to be more like this:
Oh believe me, many historians want to use mathematical equations, working with math is a hell of a lot more prestigious (compare "economists" and "sociologists"), but they stretch so far any system results are usually mock-worthy.
Anyway, I thought the answer to "why Europe" was just "because it was many medium countries instead of one large empire" (which itself is a result of geography.) Individual countries compete, which forecloses some options and closes other.
For instance the printing press. Every sovereign knows that something like this is going to be used to incite their population and so does not want it for their people. But European rulers would fund presses - in other countries, just to cause trouble for their enemies. (Upcoming materialist-scumbag post about this.)
Same with war. A single polity just doesn't advance technology the way a bunch of competition does: see monopolies. You can talk about resources as variables, but the key is that both the East and Europe had gunpowder, it was Europe that weaponized it.
It occurs to me that most folks who have “socialist/communist/leftist/eat the rich” attitudes in the United States would immediately change their tune if they had 1950s style socioeconomic prosperity and hope.
Some want to own houses, get better jobs, have improved prospects for their children. Others want prestigious jobs at colleges and news outlets and publishing contracts. They’d all support The Way Things Are if they thought the socioeconomic system was going to give them the lifestyle the boomers had.
This is absolutely true, but in ways points to a deeper failure.
Capitalism depends on actually giving benefits to people, and if you just ignore it and let capitalism fuck up a generation (2008) so much they demand socialism, then the decision makers chose their greed over the preservation of the system.
And if they forgot that bargain, then getting worse is going to accelerate.
materialist-scumbag
THE WHOLE OZ MACHINE — every adaptation is downstream of a shoe
The silver shoes are silver in the book. Dorothy kills the Witch of the East by dropping a house on her, inherits the shoes off the dead woman's feet, and they turn out to be the thing that could've sent her home the entire time — Glinda tells her this at the very end, after the whole quest, which is the actual joke of the 1900 book and the part everyone forgets because the shoes aren't silver anymore. They're ruby. They're ruby because in 1938 a Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer screenwriter named Noel Langley looked at the property and realized silver shoes photograph as nothing — gray on gray — and the entire reason to make this picture was that MGM had bet the most money it had ever bet on a single film on three-strip Technicolor, and you do not spend that to put gray footwear in the center of the frame. So the shoes became ruby. A solved color problem. And then MGM owned the ruby slipper as an object that does not appear in the source text, which means the single most recognizable prop in American cinema is the one element of the Oz mythos that was never public domain, and that fact is going to organize the next ninety years.
Start at the beginning, because the beginning is already a rights problem.
Baum and his illustrator W.W. Denslow co-held the copyright on The Wonderful Wizard of Oz — jointly, fifty-fifty, which is itself a tell about how the book got made. The color plates were the expensive part. George M. Hill, the publisher, didn't want to eat the cost of color reproduction and only agreed to publish at all once the manager of the Chicago Grand Opera House committed to staging a musical version as a publicity vehicle. So the book is greenlit on the strength of a stage adaptation that doesn't exist yet, to sell a print run nobody's sure of, with the author and the artist splitting the rights because the artist's contribution is half of why the thing costs what it costs. The 1902 stage musical opens, runs 293 nights on Broadway, tours until 1911, and reworks the book into a "musical extravaganza" for adults, with topical gags about Rockefeller supplying the oil for the Tin Woodman. The adaptation is already drifting from the text in 1902. The text is barely two years old.
Baum dies in 1919. The copyright keeps running, because copyright then is a 28-year term renewable once, and the book published in 1900 is good through — do the arithmetic the way the studios did — 1956.
Hold that year.
Now MGM. By 1938 Disney has had Snow White and every studio wants a fairy-tale feature, and Louis B. Mayer's people go to acquire Wizard and find the rights have already moved — Samuel Goldwyn had them, then they land at MGM — and the picture gets made for $2,777,000, which is 65% over the original budget and the most expensive thing the studio has ever produced. Four directors cycle through it. The Emerald City you remember Dorothy first seeing is a crayon drawing with pinholes punched in the towers and lights flickering behind it. And on first release the film loses money. It earns $3,017,000 against that budget, which sounds like a profit until you add prints and advertising, and then it's a loss of $1,145,000. The Wizard of Oz, the 1939 one, the one that is now shorthand for "beloved American film," did not turn a profit on its initial run and did not turn one on the 1949 re-release closing the gap either — it limps to black years late.
What makes it permanent is television. CBS pays MGM $225,000 a broadcast and airs it November 3, 1956, and it becomes an annual ritual, the thing a whole pre-VCR generation sees once a year on a fixed date, and that ritual is what installs the movie, rather than the book, as the canonical Oz. The ruby slippers, the specific shade of green, Margaret Hamilton's skin, the framing device where the Kansas farmhands turn up as the Scarecrow and the Lion and the Tin Man (also not in the book) — this is the version that hardens into the culture, and it becomes that in 1956.
1956 is the year the book enters the public domain.
So the timing runs exactly backwards from how you'd assume. The text goes free at the precise moment the copyrighted film adaptation becomes the dominant cultural object. Anyone can now print Baum — and they do, editions proliferate the moment the term lapses — but nobody can touch the slippers, the green, the specific faces, because those are MGM's, invented for the film, never in the text that just went free. The public domain opens on the museum and keeps the gift shop locked.
Watch what that does to everyone downstream.
Walt Disney wanted Oz back in the Snow White era, got told MGM had the first book, and did the obvious flanking move: he bought the rights to the OTHER Oz books. There are fourteen Baum wrote and dozens more after — Reilly & Lee kept publishing official sequels by other "Royal Historians of Oz" for decades, the so-called Famous Forty. Disney bought eleven of them in 1954 for a Disneyland TV thing called The Rainbow Road to Oz that never got made, and then sat on those rights for thirty years. The rights are an asset depreciating toward a cliff: the books' copyrights are themselves going to start expiring, at which point Disney's exclusive option becomes worthless because the material is free to all.
Which is the actual reason Return to Oz exists. 1985. Walter Murch — the sound and picture editor off Apocalypse Now and the Godfather films, who had never directed — pitches Disney an Oz movie, not knowing Disney already holds the book rights, and Disney greenlights largely because the option is about to lapse and it's now or never. Murch draws from the second and third books, Land of Oz and Ozma of Oz, makes something strange and frightening — Dorothy committed to a sanitarium for electroshock, a princess with a cabinet of interchangeable heads — and it costs $28 million and grosses eleven and dies. But here is the structural part. Disney needed no permission from MGM for any of it, because by 1985 the books were public domain and the sequel books were Disney's own — except the ruby slippers. Murch wanted the slippers in. The books say silver. So Disney, making a film MGM had zero involvement in, off material MGM never owned, had to write MGM a large check for the one object that was invented to solve a 1938 Technicolor problem. The shoe is still charging rent half a century later.
And then 1995, and the move that eats everything.
Gregory Maguire writes Wicked: The Life and Times of the Wicked Witch of the West, a revisionist novel that takes Baum's public-domain world — free to use, no permission needed, that's the whole point of 1956 — and reads it from the villain's side. Within a week of publication Maguire's getting film offers. The rights get optioned by Demi Moore's production company with Universal attached, and Universal spends about three years and a lot of money developing a screenplay that goes nowhere. The thing is conceived, from day one, as a movie. The book is film bait.
The musical is an accident wedged into the corpse of the dead film deal. Stephen Schwartz reads the novel on vacation, wants it as a stage show, and discovers Maguire has already handed the film rights to Universal — so Schwartz has to make what he literally called an "impassioned plea" to the Universal producer, Marc Platt, to carve out a stage license from underneath the development deal that's already failed to produce a film. The 2003 Broadway musical — the cultural juggernaut, the show that ran twenty years and grossed past a billion — exists as a derivative sublicense Schwartz had to beg loose from a movie that didn't get made. The stage version is the side door.
And then the side door becomes the front door. The musical is so enormous for so long that Universal — which had the film rights the entire time, sitting right there, the original 1990s option that the stage show was carved out of — finally makes the movie it always wanted. Announced 2012. Stalled, delayed, COVID, a director swap from Stephen Daldry to Jon M. Chu. And then, because the show is too long and too beloved to cut, they split it: Wicked in 2024, Wicked: For Good in 2025, the two acts of the stage musical as two films, combined production cost around $300 million, combined marketing around $250 million. The first one grosses about $759 million and becomes the highest-grossing film adaptation of a Broadway show ever made; the second does another half-billion-plus.
So trace the actual chain of title on a billion-dollar film franchise. It's an adaptation (Chu's films) of an adaptation (the 2003 musical) of an adaptation (Maguire's 1995 novel) of a book that went public domain in 1956 — and the only reason there's a stage musical in that chain at all is that the novel's film rights were locked up first and the show had to be pried out as a sublicense. The movie everyone thinks of as "the Wicked movie" is the original plan. The musical that made the movie possible was the detour. Universal spent twenty-five years not making the film it owned, and the thing it did instead got so big it forced the film.
And running underneath all of it, the slippers. Wicked is set in Baum's free-to-use Oz, but the second film has to stage Dorothy's arrival, the bucket, the melting, the journey home — the plot of the 1939 movie that the whole musical is structured around as its negative space — and the visual grammar everyone's measuring it against, including the shoes, is MGM's, now Warner Bros.', invented to photograph in three-strip Technicolor. The most expensive Oz production in history is built in the gap between a book anyone can use and a film nobody can.
The book has been free for seventy years. You still can't have the shoes. Same as it ever was.
French flag turns 232; red still on it (June 2026)
Like, the thing everybody "knows" about the tricolore (liberty, equality, fraternity, one color each, the Revolution distilled into fabric) is a story invented after the fact to explain an accident of municipal livery, and the actual answer to "why is there red on the French flag" starts about four hundred years before the Revolution, with the city of Paris having a corporate identity the way a guild has a corporate identity.
Red and blue were the colors of Paris. Specifically of the Parisian merchant oligarchy, the prévôt des marchands and the échevins, the water-merchants' guild that ran the city the way the Hanseatic patriciates ran their cities, because Paris was a river port before it was anything else and the men who controlled the Seine traffic controlled the town. Étienne Marcel, the cloth merchant who led the Parisian uprising of 1358, put his partisans in red-and-blue hoods. (Marcel, by the way, got his skull caved in at a city gate by his own side, which is the kind of thing that keeps happening to Parisian municipal revolutionaries, file that away.) The colors stuck as civic heraldry the way these things stick, on the barges, on the militia, on the livery of the Hôtel de Ville, for the next four centuries, completely inert, meaning nothing except "property of the city of Paris."
White, meanwhile, was the Bourbon color, the royal color, the color of the king's own cockade and the navy's ensign. So you've got two color systems sitting next to each other in 1789: the city's red-and-blue and the king's white, and neither one means anything ideological yet. They're ownership marks. Brands, basically, in the cattle sense.
Then July 1789. The Bastille comes down, the Paris militia, about to become the National Guard, needs a cockade, and the militia is a municipal institution, so it takes the municipal colors. Red and blue. And here's the part the schoolbook version garbles: Lafayette (or Bailly, the accounts fight about credit the way accounts always fight about credit) inserts the royal white between the red and the blue, which the schoolbook misreads as revolutionary synthesis and which works on the ground as a coalition signal. The white in the middle says: the city has captured the king, or the king has blessed the city, depending on which paper you read, the monarchy held inside the grip of the Paris commune. Louis XVI wears the thing at the Hôtel de Ville on July 17 and the crowd reads it correctly: the brand of Paris stamped on the body of the king.
So red is on the French flag because the water-merchants of a medieval river port used it on their barge pennants. That's the answer. Everything else is decoration applied later. But the decoration is where it gets good, because red was about to have an extremely weird eighteen months.
Because here's the thing. At the exact moment red enters the national cockade as one-third of revolutionary respectability, it has a second job, and the second job is the opposite of the first. Under the Ancien Régime and then formally under the loi martiale of October 1789, a plain red flag was the signal of martial law. You flew the red flag from the Hôtel de Ville and it meant: crowds must disperse, after this point the troops may fire. Red was the color of state violence against the Parisian crowd. The riot-suppression flag. Everyone in the city knew this the way you know what a siren means.
July 17, 1791. Champ de Mars. A crowd gathers to sign a republican petition after the king's flight to Varennes; Bailly, same Bailly, has the red flag run up; Lafayette, same Lafayette, brings the National Guard; the Guard fires into the crowd; somewhere between a dozen and fifty dead, nobody counted the poor carefully in 1791 or since. And in the weeks after, the radical clubs perform one of the great semiotic heists in political history: they take the red flag, the government's own kill-authorization signal, still wet, so to speak, and adopt it as theirs. The Cordeliers carry red flags reading "martial law of the sovereign people against the rebellion of the executive power." You shot us under this flag; fine, the flag is ours now, and it authorizes our violence against you. The red flag of socialism, the one that ends up over the Winter Palace and on about forty national flags and every union hall on earth, is the French crowd-control flag worn inside out. (Temporal rhyme, with its break: the parallel everyone reaches for is early Christians adopting the cross, the execution device as the brand, but the cross took three centuries to flip and the red flag took about six weeks, because print existed and Rome's communications ran at the speed of a donkey. The mechanism is the same; the clock speed is the dye works.)
And the dye works are the literal other half of why red could even be a mass political color in 1789, because somebody has to actually produce red cloth at scale, and the somebody is the madder industry. Garance (Rubia tinctorum, a scraggly root crop) was what dyed European red that wasn't cochineal (cochineal being a Spanish-monopoly insect scraped off Mexican cactus at colonial gunpoint, too expensive for mass anything). France spent the eighteenth century in a state-directed industrial-espionage campaign to crack "Turkey red," the colorfast madder process the Ottomans had and Europe didn't: Greek and Armenian dyers imported to Rouen and Darnétal on royal subsidy, the trade secrets pried loose workshop by workshop. By the Revolution, the Vaucluse and Alsace are carpeted in madder, and red cloth is something a municipal militia can actually afford to wear. The cockade is downstream of the root.
And then the loop closes in the dumbest possible way. In 1829 the July-Monarchy-to-be puts the army in garance-red trousers, explicitly, partly, as agricultural protectionism for the madder growers of the Vaucluse, who by mid-century are supplying a guaranteed state market. The deputy who championed it represented Avignon. The red on the soldier is a farm subsidy. Then in 1868-69 Graebe and Liebermann synthesize alizarin from coal tar, BASF and Perkin race to the patent office (they file one day apart, look it up, it's delicious), and within fifteen years German synthetic alizarin has annihilated the French madder belt; the Vaucluse rips out the root and plants table grapes. So by 1900 the French army's red trousers, originally a subsidy to French farmers, are dyed with German chemicals, money flowing to the cartel of the country they're the uniform for fighting. And when reformers try to kill the pantalon rouge before 1914 (there were trials, gray-green and "reseda" prototypes, the works) the objection that wins is Étienne the former war minister's "le pantalon rouge, c'est la France!" Red has fully eaten its own history: a barge pennant, then a riot signal, then a stolen riot signal, then a farm program, and now it's "France" itself, an essence, the one thing that can't be touched, and it walks into the machine guns at Charleroi in August 1914 visible at two kilometers. They got the bleu horizon uniforms out by 1915, after the madder of it all had been paid for in the usual currency. The color outlived every single material reason it was there, which is the normal life cycle of a symbol; the machinery dies and the paint job becomes sacred. Same as it ever was.
The water at the edge of this is shallow for a long time. You walk in past your knees, past your waist, the tricolore somewhere behind you on its pole, and when the surface closes over your head you find you are not sinking, you are emerging, the sand above you and the sky below, and you have been walking out of the water all along, into a country where everything red is a consequence.
I should tell you what is on the other side of the water. On the other side of the water there is a column of men in red trousers walking into the twentieth century, and they do not stop walking, because the column is very long; it begins at a barge on the Seine in the fourteenth century and it has not ended yet. I have tried to count them. You cannot count them. The medieval Church had a procedure for this, the Bollandists, who spent four hundred years cataloguing every saint, real and invented, arranging the martyrs by feast day like a filing system for blood, and even they never attempted a hagiography of the color red, because red is the one martyr that never dies; it just changes uniform.
Consider what was begotten. The red flag goes up over the Hôtel de Ville in 1791 to authorize a massacre, and within weeks the massacred have it, and in 1832 it's on the barricades Hugo will launder into a musical your aunt has seen four times, and in February 1848 a crowd brings it to the new provisional government and demands it replace the tricolore entirely, and Lamartine, a poet, an actual poet, this is the last moment in European history when a lyric poet stands between a mob and a flag and wins, talks them out of it on the steps, the red flag has only ever gone around the Champ de Mars dragged through the people's blood, he says, while the tricolore has gone around the world. He was lying, in the way poets lie, which is by being accurate. The crowd kept the tricolore. The red went underground, where colors go to become serious. It came up again in 1871 over the Commune, and the men of Versailles shot perhaps twenty thousand people in a week partly to put it back down, and Marx wrote his pamphlet, and a Russian who read the pamphlet put the red over one-sixth of the Earth's land surface, and for seventy years two-fifths of the human species woke up under a color that exists in their sky because the water-merchants of medieval Paris needed to mark their barges. There is a midrash (I am not going to tell you which tractate, partly because you wouldn't check and partly because I may be inventing it) in which the Holy One, blessed be He, shows Adam every generation of his descendants in a single bolt of dyed cloth, and Adam asks why the cloth is red, and receives no answer, and this is considered a complete teaching.
And the trousers. I keep returning to the trousers. Everything modernity believes about itself, that it is rational, that it audits its inheritances, that it would never die for a paint job, was tested at one specific price point in August 1914, when France sent its young men into German machine-gun arcs wearing trousers the color of an agricultural subsidy for an industry that had been dead for forty years, dyed with chemicals purchased from the enemy, defended in the Chamber of Deputies with the argument that the trousers were France. Twenty-seven thousand French soldiers died on the single day of August 22nd. The trousers were visible at two thousand meters. A color that began as a logo had become a soul, and souls, unlike logos, are things men are required to die inside of. (The British had figured this out in time, which is the most British thing imaginable: the empire of shopkeepers did the cost-benefit analysis on glory and went khaki, the color of dust, the color of nothing, and lived.) Afterward the red moved indoors, as survivors do. It became the red of the poppy, which is to say it became memory, which is what a color does when it can no longer be worn: it stops being on the body and starts being about the body.
And then the strangest issue of the whole bloodline, the runt that inherited the estate: somewhere in the last twenty years the red flag stopped flying over anything and started flying over people. He doesn't ask questions on the first date: red flag. She's still friends with her ex, he says "females," his favorite book is by a man you've decided things about: red flag, red flag, red flag. Understand what this idiom actually is. It is the loi martiale of 1789, miniaturized and privatized, the red flag was always the signal that the authorities had assessed the crowd and pre-authorized fire, and that is exactly what it still means, except the Hôtel de Ville is now a group chat and the National Guard is you. The whole apparatus survives intact: the assessment, the warning, the license to treat a person as a hazard rather than a person, the relief of never having to do the slow work of finding out. A civilization that no longer believes in armies or revolutions or God has kept, of the entire vocabulary of red, precisely one term, and it is the one for deciding in advance who may be fired upon. We tell ourselves this is wisdom. It is triage, which is what wisdom becomes when there are eight billion people and you are tired. (I am not against it. I have run up the red flag over men at dinner parties for less than a wrong opinion about Kafka; I am running it up over an entire culture right now, in this paragraph, and you are nodding along, which means you have run it up over the people who wouldn't.) The crowd on the Champ de Mars at least got to see the flag before the shooting started.
But the man at the bottom of the water, and you are at the bottom of the water now, or the top, the directions stopped cooperating when you went under, will tell you the part the historians leave out, which is that none of this was ever about red at all. Red was simply first. It is the first color the human eye resolves after black and white; every language on Earth that has three color words has red as the third; the oldest deliberate pigment we have found is ochre rubbed into a shell in Blombos Cave a hundred thousand years before anyone needed a flag, and ochre is red because blood is red, and blood is red because of one iron atom sitting in a porphyrin ring like a king in a hedge maze, and the iron is there because a star died. That is the full supply chain. The water-merchants, the cockade, the massacre on the Champ de Mars, the Commune, the trousers, the poppy: all of it downstream of stellar nucleosynthesis, a subsidy program older than the Sun. The flag did not choose red. The flag was chosen, the way a riverbed is chosen by water.
When you come up out of the water, and you do come up, walking the wrong way, which is the right way now, the flag is still there on its pole, and the red third of it is moving in the wind, and if you stand close enough you can hear it. It does not sound like history. It sounds like cloth.
literally everyone on earth believes in social policing. we are social animals. everyone believes that there are valid reasons to socially exclude people from certain social spaces. Its just completely embarrassing to call that sort of thing "cop thinking" or pretend you don't believe in it. you do! you just quibble about where the lines are and how to decide who needs to be on the outs. so let's be honest about the fact that that is what we are arguing over - not whether or not people should be socially excluded, but who, for what, and how!
"literately everyone on earth believes in distributing medicine for the benefit of the social whole. everyone believes there are valid reasons someone might not get medicine, like preventing antibiotic resistance. Its just completely embarrassing to call that sort of thing "cop thinking" when the Committee bans someone from receiving medical treatment, or to pretend you don't believe in it. you do! you just quibble about who gets it and who needs to be on the outs. so let's be honest about the fact that that is what we are arguing over - not whether or not people should be be denied medicine, but who, for what, and how!"
So no, there are matters of proportion here and you are trying to elide them by only talking in verbal absolutes. There is a big difference between "everyone finds this person unable to communicate with anyone present, or people have been repeatedly phystically attacked by them" versus "my subgroup of the community said the new rule is that no one who agrees with Bad Political Opinions is allowed around. so please kick out (person who was around well before out) or you're just hypocritically denying that social police exist.
No, you're being a cop, and even if you're right you don't get to run from being a cop. If you are ever demanding someone else DO SOMETHING to punish another person, you are a cop.
you say "quibble" i say shunning is morally cruel, tomato tomahto.
Now, to have a wider vision here, there are DIFFERENT social groups which have DIFFERENT RULES.
This is my favorite article on the internet, and you should read it.
Epistemic Status: Idea Generation One feature of the internet that we haven’t fully adapted to yet is that it’s trivial to create voluntary
For this discussion, let's look particularly at these two:
Civic/Public Norms
Roughly everybody is welcome to join, and free to do as they like in the space, so long as they obey a fairly minimalist set of ground rules & behavioral expectations that apply to everyone.
We expect it to be easy for most people to follow the ground rules; you have to be deviant (really unusually antisocial) to do something egregious enough to get you kicked out or penalized.
If you dislike someone’s behavior but it isn’t against the ground rules, you can grumble a bit about it, but you’re expected to tolerate it. You’ll have to admit things like “well, he has a right to do that.”
Penalties are expected to be predictable, enforced the same way towards all people, and “impartial” (not based on personal relationships). If penalties are enforced unfairly, you’re not expected to tolerate it — you can question why you’re being penalized, and kick up a public stink, and it’s even praiseworthy to do so.
Examples: “rule of law”, public parks and libraries, stores and coffeeshops open to the public, town hall meetings
Guest Norms
The host can invite, or not invite, anyone she chooses, based on her preference. She doesn’t have to justify her preferences to anyone. Nobody is entitled to an invitation, and it’s very rude to complain about not being invited.
Guests can also choose to attend or not attend, based on their preferences, and they don’t have to justify their preferences to anyone either; it’s rude to complain or ask for justification when someone declines an invitation.
Personal relationships and subjective feelings, in particular, are totally legitimate reasons to include or exclude someone.
The atmosphere within the group is expected to be pleasant for everyone. If you don’t want to be asked to leave, you shouldn’t do things that will predictably bother people.
Hosts are expected to be kind and generous to guests; guests are expected to be kind and generous to the host and each other; the host is responsible for enforcing boundaries.
Criticizing other people at the gathering itself is taboo. You’re expected to do your critical/judgmental pruning outside the gathering, by deciding whom you will invite or whether you’ll attend.
We don’t expect that everyone will be invited to be a guest at every gathering, or that everyone will attend everything they’re invited to. It can be prestigious to be invited to some gatherings, and embarrassing to be asked to leave or passed over when you expected an invitation, but it’s normal to just not be invited to some things.
Examples: private parties, invitation-only events, consent ethics for sex
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What we can see is fairly clearly going on in the OP quote, and that type of 2010's cultural discourse writ large, is an effort to blur the boundaries between "civic norms" and "guest norms." Our society welcomes EVERYONE (civic), but if you make certain people feel uncomfortable in an unwritten way, we won't hesitate to kick you out (guest.)
political violence is another example of shit people pretend they believe is completely unacceptable. this one is especially embarrassing when like, Joe American says it. sir you are from political violence nation, so either you both believe that your country shouldn't exist and that slavery shouldn't have ended, or you don't believe political violence is never justified.
I think people don’t tend to see a civil war that occurred on a governmental level rather than a “people killing their neighbors” level as political violence.
The Revolutionary War… look, the Founding Fathers put a lot of effort into framing their rebellion as a legitimate act by other established states, and the violence of the Revolutionary War was mostly carried out on the level of armies clashing. Again, on a state level rather than too much people being violent to their neighbors. Like, the American side for a fair amount of the conflict was an army and local militias; organized and government authorized and funded groups of trained and armed men. (Granted that is partly because the British didn’t want to start shit with urban mobs and so deescalated in urban areas in the leadup to the conflict.)
When people speak of “political violence” rather than “rebellion” I think they generally mean interpersonal violence carried out in a fairly disorganized way by independent actors rather than organized agents of the state.
I actually agree with your general point, but I cannot resist quoting KM here: https://kontextmaschine.tumblr.com/post/162844832678/you-want-to-protect-free-speech-and-privacy/amp
kontextmaschine
During the American Revolution, printer James Rivington’s Gazette was something of a proto-NY Times: Manhattan-based, but with a broad circulation and the most international coverage in the colonies. It was also the biggest newspaper not to tilt to the rebels, first offering a platform to all factions and then increasingly Loyalist.
This was not universally well-received. Isaac Sears, the privateer-trader who organized the merchants of New York into the Sons of Liberty, pushing back against British regulation which cut into their profits and backed by the threat of mob violence, described Rivington thus:
He would appear as a leading man amongst us, without perceiving that he is enlisted under a party as a tool of the lowest order; a political cracker, sent abroad to alarm and terrify, sure to do mischief to the cause he means to support, and generally finishing his career in an explosion that often bespatters his friends.
I have known a Statute of Lunacy taken out, upon a degree of conduct less exceptionable than this I have described: If the relations of our politician, should find his estate wasted by means of his patriotism, and they choose to improve upon this hint, I assure them, it is heartily at their service.
They did not. (A “Statute of Lunacy” was the period version of involuntary psychiatric commitment)
The Sons of Liberty arranged a series of hanging-in-effigies of Rivington, complete with a poem by revolutionary poet Philip Freneau framed as a satisfying confession before the gallows, and he was arrested by the New York Provincial Congress.
This not availing, an angry mob besieged Rivington and his family, driving them to the safety of a British warship, sacked his office and press, and seized his lead type to be melted down and cast into bullets.
They then faced and wheeled to the left, and marched out of town to the tune of Yankee Doodle. A vast concourse of people assembled at the Coffee House, on their leaving the ground, and gave them three very hearty cheers.