A country has an election.
The governing party – let's call them the Conservative Party – is out. A Dangerous Radical is in.
Some of the prime minister's appointees sympathize with the Dangerous Radical. To reduce the radicals' influence before their leader takes office, the PM fires them all and appoints his supporters instead.
Two days before the end of the Conservative majority, the PM's office writes and seals the new commissions. One day before the end, his secretary has most of the commissions delivered, but not all.
The next day, Dangerous Radical takes office and brings in a new secretary. His predecessor's commissions, signed, sealed, and undelivered, are on his desk. He orders his secretary to decline to deliver them: they weren't delivered before the end of the Conservative majority, so they're void.
One of the Conservatives who hadn't received his commission – let's call him Sir William – took the new secretary to court, under a procedure specified by a recent court reform law (this will be important later), to get a court order mandating that the Dangerous Radical secretary deliver the commission that the previous Conservative government had made out to him. This causes difficulties for the court.
If the Dangerous Radical loses, the Dangerous Radical will ignore the court. If the Dangerous Radical wins, the Dangerous Radical will be legitimized. Also, the head of the court was previously the Conservative secretary responsible for the delivery of the commissions.
To reach a decision, the court must decide three questions:
Does Sir William have a right to his commission?
If Sir William has a right to his commission, is he entitled to a legal remedy?
If Sir William is entitled to a legal remedy, is a court order directed at the Dangerous Radical secretary the proper remedy?
Their answers to the four questions above are as follows.
Of course. The commission was signed and sealed. Logistical troubles have no legal bearing.
Of course. Every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.
Of course. The recent court reform law specifies that the court may issue orders to any person holding political office. The prime minister's secretary is a political office.
No. The court reform law specifies that the court in question may issue orders to any person holding political office. It does not specify that the court in question may issue orders to an inferior court to reverse its refusal to issue orders to any person holding political office. This conflicts with the specification of jurisdiction contained in an earlier and superior law. Because laws must not conflict, and because no other entity in government is charged with ensuring that laws do not conflict, this court must take it on as its responsibility and void the entire court reform law, including the provision that gives it any power over the Dangerous Radical secretary. Sir William has a right to his commission, is entitled to a legal remedy, and has followed the proper procedure for obtaining a legal remedy, but the execution of the procedure is impossible: the court has judged the law and found it wanting.
This is how the principle of judicial review was established in the United States.
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