Dictionary of Arguments

What is the Dictionary of Arguments? This website contrasts theories and counter arguments.The references are indicated - www.philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com #science #culture #humanities #internet #education

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What are Clean Energy Standards?  - Dictionary of Arguments

Stavins I 159 Clean Energy Standards/Aldy/Stavins: The purpose of a clean energy standard is to establish a technology-oriented goal for the electricity sector that can be implemented cost-effectively (Aldy, 2011)(1). Under such standards, power plants generating electricity with technologies that satisfy the standard create tradable credits that they can sell to power plants that fail to meet the standard, thereby minimizing the costs of meeting the standard’s goal in a manner analogous to cap-and-trade. Stavins I 160 VsClean Energy Standards: Clean energy standards that focus on technology targets do not explicitly price the greenhouse gas externality and thus impose a higher cost for a given amount of emission reductions than a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program. A renewable mandate treats coal-fired power, gas-fired power, and nuclear power as equivalent—none of these technologies create credits necessary for compliance—despite the fact that a natural gas combined cycle power plant typically produces a unit of generation with half the CO2 emissions of a conventional coal power plant, and a nuclear plant produces zero-emission power, as do wind, solar, and geothermal. Thus, mandating power from a limited portfolio of technologies can result in higher costs by providing no incentive to switch from emission-intensive coal to emission-lean gas or emission-free nuclear. 1. Clean Energy Standards/VsVs: A more cost-effective approach to a clean energy standard would employ a technology-neutral performance standard, such as tons of CO2 per megawatt hour of generation. All power sources, from fossil fuels to renewables, could be eligible under such a performance standard. This has the advantage over the portfolio approach of providing better innovation incentives and of enabling all possible ways of reducing the emissions intensity of power generation. Tradable credits promote cost-effectiveness by encouraging the greatest deployment of clean energy from those plants that can lower their emission intensity at lowest cost. Those power plants could then sell their extra credits to other power plants that face higher costs for deploying clean energy. The creation and sale of clean energy credits would provide a revenue stream that could conceivably enable the financing of low- and zero-emission power plant projects. 2. Clean Energy Standards/VsVs: Extending the price on carbon to a broader set of activities could improve cost-effectiveness, but allowing for energy efficiency and other offsets poses risks. As emphasized above, estimating offsets is complex, requires extensive review and monitoring by third parties or regulatory agencies, and risks undermining the objective of a policy because of the additionality problem. Stavins I 161 A clean energy standard represents a de facto free allocation of the right to emit greenhouse gases to the power sector. Suppose that the U.S. government created a clean energy performance standard of 0.5 tons of CO2 per megawatt hour (…) this is roughly comparable to a 50% clean energy standard that allows all technologies with lower emission intensity than conventional coal to qualify (…). As a result, a clean energy standard could not generate the revenues that a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program with an allowance auction could. >Carbon Pricing Strategies/Stavins. 1. Aldy, J. E. (2011). Promoting clean energy in the American power sector (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2011-04). Washington, DC: The Hamilton Project. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

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Dictionary of Arguments

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James E. Hansen on Emissions Trading – Dictionary of Arguments

Emissions trading/climate change/altruism/J. E. HansenVsEmissions Trading/Hansen/Singer, P.: any system setting a general upper limit in a trading system, and divides them into rights for nations, companies and individuals. Problem: such schemes have a negative effect on altruistic behaviour: when I as an individual buy a hybrid vehicle, it does not reduce the total emissions of my country. These are rather cut by the agreed upper limit. My behaviour rather causes the price of conventional fuel to fall and makes it cheaper for other people to drive conventional vehicles. Solution/Hansen: a tax on the carbon dioxide content in fuels. (Carbon Tax). The proceeds from this should be distributed equally among all inhabitants. That is what he calls the fee and dividend scheme. This rewards those who reduce their carbon footprint and this reduces total emissions. (J. E. Hansen et al."Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Shold Humanity Aim?" in: Open Atmosphere Science Journal, 2 (2008), pp. 17-31st - J. E. Hansen, "Cap and Fade", The New York Times, Dec 7,2009). Paul KrugmanVsHansen: Emissions trading will reduce altruism in relation to the climate (like J. E. Hansen), but this altruism will not have the necessary effect anyway. (See KrugmanVsHansen).

Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011. pp. 225-226

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Easwaran Narassimhan on Emissions Trading – Economics Dictionary of Arguments

Narassimhan I 968 Emissions Trading/Emissions Trading System/ETS/Carbon Pricing Mechanisms/Narassimhan: Carbon pricing mechanisms fall into three main categories: cap-and-trade (i.e. emissions trading systems (ETS)), carbon taxation or hybrid mechanisms that combine elements of both. >Emissions Trading/Fankhauser. An ETS establishes a cap either on total emissions or on emissions intensity, as measured by emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). An ETS may include emissions from all GHGs [greenhouse gases] or just some, such as CO2. Governments then provide allowances in the primary market, typically for free or through an auction, equal to the level of the cap (Aldy & Stavins, 2012)(2)(Cf. >Cap-and-Trade Systems/Aldy/Stavins). A hybrid approach of partial auctioning and free allocation of some emission allowances is common in ETS markets. Firms may then trade allowances during a specified compliance period, after which they are surrendered to the government. Firms with lower abatement costs are expected to sell their allowances to firms with higher abatement costs in the secondary market, and overall, emissions reductions are theoretically achieved at least cost. Key design considerations for an ETS include determining which GHGs and which sectors will be regulated under the cap; at what point of regulation emissions will be regulated (upstream or downstream); the stringency of the cap (or the total allowable emissions); costs of abatement, compliance and ETS administration; method of allowance allocation and distribution; monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions and allowances; and impacts on international competitiveness (PMR and ICAP, 2016(3); Schmalensee & Stavins, 2017)(4). Additional considerations include policies that provide system flexibility such as banking credits for future compliance and borrowing credits from future compliance periods, creation of an allowance reserve to stabilize secondary market prices and ensure liquidity, creation of new trading registries to monitor and track carbon allowance markets, accounting for carbon offsets, international linkage, revenue management and stakeholder engagement (PMR and ICAP, 2016(3); Schmalensee & Stavins, 2017)(4). 1. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. 2. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment & Development, 21(2), 152–180. 3. PMR & ICAP. (2016). Emissions trading in practice: A handbook on design and implementation. Washington, DC: Partnership on Market Readiness (PMR), International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), and World Bank. 4. Schmalensee, R., & Stavins, R. N. (2017). The design of environmental markets: What have we learned from experience with cap and trade? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 33(4), 572–588. Easwaran Narassimhan, Kelly S. Gallagher, Stefan Koester & Julio Rivera Alejo, 2018: “Carbon pricing in practice: a review of existing emissions trading systems”. In: CLIMATE POLICY, Vol. 18/8, pp. 967–991.

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Connectionism and learning - Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Learning/connectionism/Mareschal/Kaufman: (i.e., adapting one’s behavior) is accomplished by tuning the connection weights until some stable behavior is obtained. Supervised networks adjust their weights until the output response (for a given input) matches a target response. That target can come from an active teacher, or passively through observing the environment, but it must come from outside the system. Unsupervised networks adjust their weights until some internal constraint is satisfied (e.g., maximally different inputs must have maximally different internal representations). Slater I 94 The key conclusion from this work (Munakata et al. 1997)(1) is the notion of the graded representation of knowledge. That is, rather than existing as an all-or-none concept, object permanence was acquired gradually. Consequently, the representations that underlay this concept existed in graded states, becoming ever more robust with age and experience, and supporting ever more complex disappearance events. 1. Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking infant knowledge: Toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Psychological Review, 104, 686–713. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications. Pp. 93-94

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Economic theories on energy policies – Dictionary of Arguments

Energy Policy/Economic Theory: Apart from the regulatory framework, the discussion on energy policy focuses on possible market failures in the context of energy and measures to correct them, such as in the context of (i) natural monopolies in the field of grid-bound energy sources, (ii) external effects of air pollutants and CO2, (iii) asymmetric information in energy efficiency investments or (iv) learning effects in renewable energies. The complexity of these questions (1). State interventions: are usually justified by the natural monopoly in the case of interventions in the energy supply. (See Natural Monopolies/Neoclassical Economics.) Vs: this is no longer seen as such today. Cf. Ströbele et al. 2012 p. 333 (2) 1. Düngen, Helmut., Zwei Dekaden deutscher Energie- und Umweltpolitik. Leitbilder, Prinzipien, Konzepte. In Energie, Politik, Geschichte. Nationale und internationale Energiepolitik seit 1945, (Historische Mitteilungen, Beiheft 5). Hrsg. Jens Hohensee und Michael Salewski, 35– 50. Stuttgart 1993. 2. Ströbele, Wolfgang, Michael Heuterkes, und Wolfgang Pfaffenberger. 2012. Energiewirtschaft. Einführung in Theorie und Politik, 3.   Aufl. München 2012

 Karsten Mause, Christian Müller & Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 p.432

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Paul Krugman on Emissions Trading – Dictionary of Arguments

Emission Trading/Carbon Tax/Altruism/Climate Change/KrugmanVsHansen, J. E. /Krugman/Singer, P.: 1. Emissions trading will reduce altruism in relation to the climate (like J. E. Hansen), but this altruism will not have the necessary effect anyway. 2. the market mechanism means that emission rights fall to the lowest price. Problem: why should someone then reduce these emission rights by paying a high price themselves, while at the same time someone else can reduce them at a lower cost and also benefits from it by selling them to you? (P. Krugman, "Building a Green Economy", The New York Times Sunday Magazine, Apr. 5, 2010.). Singer, P.: for Krugman and most of his colleagues, the carbon tax is therefore less efficient than a >cap and trade system.

Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011. P.226

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Henry Shue on Emissions – Economics Dictionary of Arguments

Emissions/United States/Shue: (…) if the US has caps on its emissions and other countries with which it competes economically do not, its industries and thus the country as a whole will be unfairly harmed. The counter‐argument depends on a different assessment of the background conditions. In particular, the underlying rationale for the entire #UNFCCC framework of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities,’ reflected in the Kyoto Protocol and other aspects of the convention, is that the extent of poverty in developing countries justifies exempting them from emissions reduction obligations that might reduce their rate of economic growth. Moreover, (…) it is hard to ethically justify the complete (prior to 2009 in any case) refusal of the US to reduce its emissions (Brown 2002(1); Shue 1994(2)).

1. Brown, D. A. 2002. American Heat: Ethical Problems with the United States' Response to Global Warming. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2. Shue, H. 1994. After you: May action by the rich be contingent on action by the poor? Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 1: 343–66. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Robert Stavins on emission permits – Dictionary of Arguments

Stavins I 171

International Tradable Permits/Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: Under an international tradable permit scheme, all participating countries would be allocated permits for “net emissions,” that is, emissions minus sequestration. A permit would define a right to emit a given volume over some time period, such as a year. In each period, countries would be free to buy and sell permits on an international exchange. Initial permit allocations could reflect a variety of criteria, such as previous emissions, gross domestic product, population, and fossil fuel production. Whatever the initial allocation, subsequent trading can, in theory, lead to a cost-effective outcome (Montgomery, 1972)(1), if transaction costs are not significant (Stavins, 1995)(2). This potential for pursuing distributional objectives while assuring cost-effectiveness is an important attribute of the tradable permit approach. From a distributional point of view, developing countries would receive compensation, whereas developed countries would have to pay for their own emission abatement and for permit purchases from abroad to cover the balance of their emissions (Olmstead & Stavins, 2012)(3). An important obstacle to the successful operation of such a system is that by its very nature, the trading would be among nations (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(4). Nation states are hardly simple cost-minimizers, like private firms, so there is no reason to anticipate that competitive pressures would lead to equating of marginal abatement costs across countries. Even if nations were cost-minimizers, they do not have sufficient information about the marginal abatement costs of firms within their jurisdiction to define their own aggregate marginal costs. If every country participating in such a system were to devolve the tradable permits to firms within its jurisdiction, that is, if each country instituted a domestic tradable permit system as its means of achieving its national target, then the trading could be among firms, not governments, both within countries and internationally (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(4). Such a system could indeed be cost-effective. In the near term, this Stavins I 172 trading system could be integrated with an emission-reduction-credit system, such as the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], for countries that do not take on emission caps. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins. 1. Montgomery, D. W. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418. 2. Stavins, R. N. (1995). Transaction costs and tradeable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 133-148. 3. Olmstead, S. M., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). Three key elements of post-2012 international climate policy architecture. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 6(2), 1-22. 4. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (1999). What has the Kyoto Protocol wrought? The real architecture of international tradeable permit markets. Washington, DC: The AEI Press. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

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Arne Naess on Deep Ecology – Dictionary of Arguments

Singer I 251

Ecology/Naess, Arne/Singer, P.: (A. Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement", Inquiry 16 (1973), pp. 95-100): Definition Shallow Ecology/Naess: is limited to the traditional framework of ethics: this is about not polluting water, for example, in order to have enough drinking water and to avoid pollution, so that one can continue to enjoy nature. On the other hand, Definition Deep Ecology/Naess: wants to preserve the biosphere for its own sake, regardless of the potential benefit to mankind. Deep Ecology/Naess/Singer, P.: thus takes as its subject matter larger units than the individual: species, ecosystems and even the biosphere as a whole. Deep Ecology: (A. Naess and George Sessions, "Basic Principles of Deep Ecology", Ecophilosophy, 6 (1984) Principles: 1. The wellbeing and development of human and non-human life on earth have a value in itself (intrinsic, inherent value), regardless of the non-human world's use for human purposes. 2. Wealth and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are values in themselves. 3. People do not have the right to diminish the wealth and diversity of the world, except when it comes to vital interests. I 252 #Biosphere/Naess/Sessions/Singer, P.: Sessions and Naess use the term "Biosphere" in a broad sense, so that rivers, landscapes and ecosystems are also included. P. SingerVsNaess: (see also SingerVsSessions): the #ethics of deep ecology does not provide satisfactory answers to the value of the life of individuals. Maybe that is the wrong question. Ecology is more about systems than individual organisms. Therefore, ecological ethics should be related to species and #ecosystems. I 253 So there is a kind of #Holism behind it. This is shown by Lawrence Johnson (L. Johnson, A Morally Deep World, Cambridge, 1993). Johnson's thesis: The interests of species are different from the sum of individual interests and exist simultaneously together with individual interests within our moral considerations.

 Peter Singer 2001. Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge pp.251-253

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Peter Singer on Environment – Dictionary of Arguments

Environmental destruction/Peter Singer: the economic value that can be acquired today through the destruction of an irretrievable natural resource, such as a primeval forest, will account for only a fraction of this in a hundred years due to inflation. Future generations could not even buy back the lost property if it were available. More:

Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

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Alexei Navalny on Post-communist era - Dictionary of Arguments

Post-communist era/Navalny/Krastev: According to Russia's leading dissident and anti-Putin activist, Alexei Navalny, 'the Russian people have been sold the idea of giving up a normal life for the sake of a completely idiotic and useless confrontation with the West.' Krastev: He is right, but with a twist. Many Russians have indeed been persuaded by the Kremlin that the idiotic and useless collapse of the USSR was somehow orchestrated by the perfidious West in the name of an elusive 'normality'. >Normality/Krastev, >Policy of Russia/Krastev. 1. Alexei Navalny and Adam Michnik, Opposing Forces: Plotting the New Russia (Egret Press, 2016), p. 101.

 Krastev, Ivan & Stephen Holmes 2019. The Light that Failed: A Reckoning. London: Penguin books

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Economic theories on emission targets - Dictionary of Arguments

If the state intervenes in private sector activities, the extent to which certain environmental impacts are to be permitted must be specified. (Zimmermann et al. 2012, p. 500 f.) (1) The preservation of so-called protected goods (e.g. safeguarding life and health, guaranteeing ecological sustainability) requires the definition of "emission targets" (environmental quality standards) for their further specification in relation to individual fields of environmental policy (air pollution control, water protection, noise abatement, etc.). "Emission targets" are then derived from these immission targets, which consist of regulations on the level of pollutant emissions at an individual source of pollutants (e.g. in the form of a limit value for fine dust) or the amount of pollutant input into an individual environmental good (e.g. in the form of the maximum permissible quantity of pesticides per hectare of agricultural land). Among other things, a distinction is made here between the polluter-principle and the principle of origin. In connection with compensation issues, there is also the beneficiary principle. See >Principles/Economic Theory, >Environmental Damage/Economic theory.

1. Zimmermann, Horst, Klaus-Dirk Henke, und Michael Broer. 2012. Finanzwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Lehre von der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft, München 2012.

Karsten Mause, Christian Müller und Klaus Schubert 2018.  Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden.

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Philosophy Dictionary. Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute. Scientific camps , Cross-author indexes and glossaries , Spreadsheets of theses , Synopses

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What is truth?

Truth is a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. Also see >truth conditions, >truth definition, >truth functions, >truth predicate, >truth table, >truth theory, >truth values, >correspondence theory, >coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. Also see >facts, >paradoxes. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. Also see >reality, >correctness, >pragmatism, >idealization, >ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. Also see >emphatic truth, >fiction, >art, >works of art, >truth of art.

    Dictionary of Arguments

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What is Anarchism originally?

Brocker I 19 Anarchism/Kropotkin: Kropotkin's turn towards anarchism goes back to his personal experiences with the egalitarian coexistence of watchmakers on a farm in Switzerland in 1872. Brocker I 20 However, the associated basic concept of communist anarchism existed even before Kropotkin. With his essays and books, he primarily contributed to their historical and scientific foundation, since Kropotkin wanted to provide a scientific explanation for anarchism. It was about free cooperation of individuals without regulation by the institution of the state.

Armin Pfahl-Traughber. „Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt“. (1902) in: Brocker 2018. Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M.

Brocker I 19<br /> Anarchism/Kropotkin: Kropotkin's turn towards anarchism goes back to his personal experiences with the egalitarian coexi

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Filosofia - El Diccionario de los Argumentos - Two-minute demo

www.philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com This short demonstration shows how you can use the Lexicon of Arguments to get quick information about th...

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Professional Lexicon - Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute. Scientific camps , Cross-author indexes and glossaries , Spreadsheets of theses , Synopses - Philosophy - Science - Humanities