Generally speaking, an analysis of animal behavior is not considered scientific unless the animal is assumed, at least tacitly, to be operating according to the same means/end calculations that one would apply to economic transactions. Under this assumption, an expenditure of energy must be directed toward some goal, whether it be obtaining food, securing territory, achieving dominance, or maximizing reproductive successâunless one can absolutely prove that it isnât, and absolute proof in such matters is, as one might imagine, very hard to come by.
I must emphasize here that it doesnât really matter what sort of theory of animal motivation a scientist might entertain: what she believes an animal to be thinking, whether she thinks an animal can be said to be âthinkingâ anything at all. Iâm not saying that ethologists actually believe
that animals are simply rational calculating machines. Iâm simply saying that ethologists have boxed themselves into a world where to be scientific means to offer an explanation of behavior in rational termsâwhich in turn means describing an animal as if it were a calculating economic actor trying to maximize some sort of self-interestâwhatever their theory of animal psychology, or motivation, might be. Thatâs why the existence of animal play is considered something of an intellectual scandal.
Itâs understudied, and those who do study it are seen as mildly eccentric. As with many vaguely threatening, speculative notions, difficult-to-satisfy criteria are introduced for proving animal play exists, and even when it is acknowledged, the research more often than not cannibalizes its own insights by trying to demonstrate that play must have some long-term survival or reproductive function.
Despite all this, those who do look into the matter are invariably forced to the conclusion that play does exist across the animal universe. And exists not just among such notoriously frivolous
creatures as monkeys, dolphins, or puppies, but among such unlikely species as frogs, minnows, salamanders, fiddler crabs, and yes, even antsâwhich not only engage in frivolous activities as individuals, but also have been observed since the nineteenth century to arrange mock-wars, apparently just for the fun of it.
Why do animals play? Well, why shouldnât they? The real question is: Why does the existence of action carried out for the sheer pleasure of acting, the exertion of powers for the sheer pleasure of exerting them, strike us as mysterious? What does it tell us about ourselves that we instinctively assume that it is?
