I do not believe in God: and I firmly believe that the characteristics assigned to God demonstrate that He is impossible. I am not representative of non-believers, only of myself. Perhaps I am wrong, in which case I welcome any input.
The Divine Command Theory only claims that the theory itself cannot hold true. It says nothing about God existing or not.... Have you gotten a proper education?
I assume you’re referring to this post, in which case I never claimed God did not exist as a result of that post; the post in question was only concerned with showing the theory is impossible to hold to. A consequence was, certainly, that if you hold the theory must be true if there’s a God, then the necessary God could not exist as the theory isn’t true (by contraposition), but that’s rather irrelevant as the general response should just be to reject the use of divine command theory.
I’m not sure where you’re getting “God is impossible because divine command theory is false,” from, I didn’t say that.
One argument for theism out there states that DNA, the building block of life, is identical to a language, and as such must have been designed. The expression of this argument is quite lengthy, so I'll have to go into more detail in a moment.
Certainly, when put properly it can sound like a persuasive argument: and it's a perfect demonstration of why a useful thing to do in any debate, is put the other person's arguments in your own words. Often, simple tricks of phrasing can do a good job of hiding the problems in an argument. The flaws are still there, however.
The first thing to note is the general form of the argument:
DNA is a language
Languages originate from minds
DNA therefore came from a mind, from 1 and 2
Accepting premise 1 (as many biologists etc do happily call DNA a language), and assuming it's not mere analogy, and accepting premise 2 (more on that later), the conclusion seems inescapable. However, the crucial problem is that 2 gives a prerequisite for a language: it's a premise, not a conclusion.
That is, for 2 to hold, then 1 states 'DNA comes from a mind'. It needs to be established that DNA is designed by a mind/God, for anyone to call DNA a language: the argument is circular.
It is not enough to refer to people calling DNA a language, because words can be used in different settings, to have subtly (or radically) different meanings. When people refer to DNA as a language, they refer to the function and complexity, with no reference to whether or not it does come from a mind: so, strictly speaking, premise 2 refers to a different definition of 'language' to premise 1.
Put simply, language coming from a mind, in this case, is something required before you can say that something is a language. You cannot make the argument until you have already shown DNA comes from a mind.
Of, course, there's more to say on this argument. The main route to go down is to try and show DNA must be produced by a mind, due to its contents. Typically, this refers to things such as 'symbolic representation': the fact that the order and presence of certain genetic bases are interpreted to mean certain things, and that this system is what we mean by language: and that this system requires a mind to come about.
If it sounds complicated, that's because it is. Biology isn't something you can pick up in a few hours of internet research, people dedicate years of their life to it, and DNA is still a major topic of study. That alone renders the argument rather absurd.
No matter, we just need to examine what's actually being said. Does DNA require a mind to operate? No, dumb forces are fully capable of understanding 'symbolic representation': we know this from computers who do just that. And certainly, computers are designed, but that's because they're an artificial construct: they don't biologically reproduce. Regardless, no theist I've heard has proposed humans only work because God is maintaining and working on their DNA at all hours.
So the argument is that DNA could not come about because of this 'symbolic representation', and it's immediately apparent that this is just a dressed up argument from design/irreducible complexity.
This should be clear. The argument relies on the idea DNA would not come about by natural causes, and must be designed.
And, to be honest, we need not even go that far. The statement that symbolic representation prevents natural processes creating a being is mere assertion. How could one possibly provide a basis for this not founded in presupposition? The only attempts I've seen show nothing of the sort.
There are only a finite number of arguments for or against theism: often arguments do just end up as re-expressions. Occasionally they may be rephrased and remade to iron out existing flaws rather than merely conceal (such as the numerous variations on the problem of evil, and question of motive), but in this case there is no such change.
The stock response to the argument from the design of life (as opposed to design of the universe) is evolution: acknowledging that irreducible complexity is never as damning as it seems. So, might a language evolve?
The first note is that evolution, in the Darwinian sense, clearly isn't the cause, as this acts purely on more complex life. A trivial variation is obvious, however: so long as some construct is capable of self-replication, mutation (from impurities and even external sources) is obvious. It is also apparent that a so-called language, including the symbolic representation, can evolve: indeed, our language did. Once it was points and grunts, now it's a fully functional system of varying sounds and prefixes and suffixes.
We also note that DNA works irrespective of whether a mind operates it, so as it is successful evolutionary-type process will tend towards it, step by step.
So, the question in the end is whether or not a self-replicating system can come into existence without being designed. This is a very different question to the DNA-language formulation.
Any response will ultimately be based on presupposition, however. Plainly, it takes some evidence to show God is necessary: and I've seen no such argument. This is all we need to establish: without reason to accept God, this argument doesn't lead to his existence.
No one's arguing that this self-replicating object is simple, or common: only that it's possible. The number of planets in the world is all we need to observe it's likely to come about on one of them. Otherwise, the remaining questions just relate to the origin of life.
So, in conclusion, it takes a lot to show that the first premise ('DNA is a language') is meaningful. Also all the discussion of language and 'symbolic representation' is little more than a smokescreen for one of the most overused arguments for the existence of God.
Even such symbolic representations may evolve. Almost all of the processes that govern the world can be interpreted as such: the symbol is a certain action, or presence, and this represents what later occurs. For example, any chemical reaction.
The difference with DNA is that order is interpreted: but this is clearly not impossible for non-sentient forces. Slow development is all that's needed, noting all the while that this 'symbolic representation' works, and is able to be understood by non-minds: which is all an evolutionary-type process needs.
Would it be easy for such a process to develop? No. But that doesn't make it impossible: and impossibility is what you need to show, for this to lead to God.
Of course, the other problem with this argument is that it's very hard to answer. This is because the theist giving it often reads from textbooks making grand scientific statements about nucleotides and telomerase, and all manner of things non-biologists would take months to understand enough to begin to argue against. And, it should also be pointed out, it's unlikely the theist truly knows what they're saying either: they've educated themselves from one book, likely created with bias in mind.
And this is another problem with using this as an argument. No matter how persuasive it appears, if neither party actually has a clue what they're saying, it means nothing.
So, inasmuch as this is a bad argument, it also brings up two important techniques to use in a debate.
First, be able to rephrase what the other person is saying in your own words. Express it as the sum of its parts: or, if you can't, ask them to. These simplifications often are much clearer.
Second, don't be afraid to ask for clarification. if someone's using floods of scientific terminology, the chances are they're either trying to bamboozle you, or don't know what they're saying so just quote.
In conclusion, the argument from DNA doesn't work. The only conclusion it generally ever could lead to is that the non-theist is not an expert on incredibly complex fields of biology. And even if that wasn't the case, it's nothing more than a dressed up argument from the design of life, a famously bad argument which falls easily.
So what you are saying is God is impossible to believe in because His characteristics are impossible?
I'm saying God cannot be possible as the traits assigned to him are contradictory. People can believe in something impossible, but that doesn't mean it's true.
It's common to see arguments that state, in some way, that proving some supernatural event disproves atheism.
This isn't the case. Proof of the supernatural discredits a philosophy commonly held by atheists, yes, but the supernatural does not automatically imply God. And, once that's acknowledged, proof of the supernatural becomes a major problem for theism.
After all, for example, if regular people are capable of premonitions, of what importance is, say, biblical prophecy?
There is no evidence that the supernatural exists. Even if it did, however, this would serve only to make arguments for God even more questionable as you have countless other alternatives to discredit before God can be called responsible for anything.
In short, these arguments are rather pointless.
The concept of justified evil is often vital to explaining the problem of evil. The non-existent free will is used to explain evil stemming from human deeds but, say, natural disasters and the subsequent suffering must be explained by another cause.
The answer is the idea of justified evil: and while it cannot be proven that something is a justified evil, neither can it be proved that it's not. So, strictly speaking, the argument holds. The evil occurs because, ultimately, it's needed.
The problem is the inherent, never acknowledged presupposition: and that is the fact you genuinely hold a loving God would create a universe where evil is necessary. Not much more need be said, that alone is a contradiction. Even if suffering is fleeting and finite, it still exists: no matter what the later consequences are.
Justified evil may exist, but it would not be a path chosen by a loving God. To say God would choose evil is rather absurd.
That holiday which is in of itself proof either that God decided the best time to have his son born was during a Pagan festival, or that early Christians didn't care what was true or not.
Not sure which of those believers are celebrating, but it has to be one.
This is not a 'what created God?' argument, that species of argument is generally meaningless. Presumably, there has to be some termination point: whether it's mindless or not is the question. Why add more levels?
Instead, let's examine a different argument. 'What created God' is typically used to respond to the first cause family of theistic arguments: those that insist the universe must have a sentient Creator.
Let's look at another, very similar argument: those that talk about the seeming design of the universe. It's explainable, but suppose it wasn't, suppose we had no idea how all the various constants came about to make stars and worlds and life possible.
Suppose God is the designer of the universe. Then the question arises: who designed God?
Do not confuse this with the 'what created God?' argument. Treating God as brute fact does not answer it: indeed, it makes the question all the more potent. Why did there just happen to be the brute fact of a being with the power to create the universe, the desire to create life, and the knowledge of how to do so?
Let's look at a possible answer to this question, to demonstrate the real issues.
One obvious answer is to use a variation on the ontological argument: that is, that God is a maximally great being, the embodiment of goodness etc. Fine, but then why did it just happen that the standard of greatness (whatever that might be) somehow made it permissible, and desirable, for God to exist, be powerful, be knowledgeable, desire to create...
Shrugging your shoulders and saying God simply is, is not an answer. It is far, far more unlikely that an eternal, transcendental being just happened to exist, than, say, the universe coming into being.
After all, not only do you have to contend with the probability that it wanted to create our universe, or a universe with life, out of all the possibilities (on the face of it, precisely as unlikely as the universe springing into being with its seemingly-designed appearance), but in addition you have to deal with the unlikeliness of its own existence, and the various traits it possesses unnecessarily.
After all, if you want to look at every possible state of affairs, you have the myriad possible paths the universe could follow unaided. You then have deities who would want to create each and every one of those universes, deities that would want to create them and wouldn't have the ability to, deities who want to create them and don't know how...
No matter how you look at it, the unlikelihood of God can't be ignored. The only reason this isn't noted more often, is because of how often God is spoken of as true, as certain: or, at the very least, equally likely.
Speaking of something doesn't make it so, however: I think that's been quite plainly shown here.
How can you justify supposing such a staggeringly unlikely state of affairs just happens to be the case?
As a final note, I should clarify and point out I'm not genuinely suggesting that there must be some designer of God. I'm simply saying that if you're attempting to use the argument from the design of the universe, you need some good reason for why you define God as the more likely alternative.
Unlike the first-cause argument, the argument from design doesn't rest on existence, it rests on probability. the argument requires God is a more likely explanation.
Even if we suppose God exists however, there is no reason to think it would want to create any universe, much less ours. The question still stands.
Many theists believe in a conscience. It's quite impressive that such a simple device forms a fairly damning contradiction with God.
First, we need to accept a few things. the first, is that writing moral law within humans doesn't impact free will: if it did, we've found an issue already. This is fair enough, inasmuch as free will exists: it's a tendency, not a force.
The next, is that God has some conception of morality. This is also true, by (for example) the Christian model. A simple pair of examples are Thou Shalt Not Kill, and of course the request for people to believe in God. Both of these should, presumably, be included in the conscience's set down laws: if neither was, it's a pretty shoddy conscience, if only one is then that would imply the other was fine, or at least not much of a sin.
The latter point bears examining: can one law be made 'stronger' than the other? In theory, sure. Out of the two mentioned so far (murder, disbelief) then, if they aren't treated equally, which would be worse?
Under a theistic framework, if all sin is a crime against God they would be fundamentally equal in terms of weight. Especially if they both garner the same punishment (ie: hell). On the same note, disbelief (if either) would be worse, as one can theoretically repent from murder (not always true admittedly), but in no denomination can one both disbelieve, and have the faith required to be saved.
So disbelief is worse than murder. Odd to non-theistic ears, maybe, but perfectly logical within the theistic framework. Indeed, if I believed, I'd agree with that statement.
The problem is the conscience.
If this were true, then it would be harder to disbelieve than it would be to murder. Our consciences, our minds, would scream at us to believe, as they resist impulses to harm.
Let's note, now, a third of the world believes in no God: and two thirds reject the most popular religion (Christianity), with more than that rejecting smaller belief systems. We should expect murder to be at least that common. At least.
The fact we're not all dead already is evidence enough.
The conclusion is either than the conscience does not exist (highly unlikely), or that morality stems from a non-theistic source. (Or, of course, God created humanity, even if by proxy, with a source of morality counter to his own. Even as a non-believer, I have a higher opinion of God than that).
A lot of the time, it's very easy to find arguments against atheism stating that some commonly held scientific principle is either untrue, or accepted prematurely. The common targets of this are cosmology (especially the origin of the universe), the age of the earth, evolution, and abiogenesis.
Even going past how refuting science doesn't prove God, there are two ways to respond to these arguments. The first is to go into detail and explain the specifics of the area under question, and why we can be relatively sure of the facts of the matter: this is often the chosen method, and makes a far more satisfying argument. It's also ultimately futile.
The best argument to make in this case, however, is "You're not a scientist."
This is a less satisfying argument, admittedly. It feels a lot like shrugging and taking it on faith, especially to a theist: it isn't.
We have reason to trust scientific consensus. That is simply a fact. While it is possible to find one or two papers that may go against the norm, it's worth looking at the sponsors of those papers. If we look at, for example, studies on obesity, there are papers who suggest (say) that there is not enough evidence to conclude a connection between sugar and obesity. Such papers tend to be sponsored by companies who make money by selling, guess what, sugar.
Even ignoring everything else, it's worth noting how remarkably weak the statement "Not enough evidence for a connection," is.
Does this show scientists can be bribed? Not really. Looking at the overall consensus of scientific papers, the above kind are a negligible fraction.
The point is, we can simply trust science. There is no reason to lie: if there were, surely we'd see people complaining about more than just the few areas that link to religion? Surely we'd have hundreds, if not thousands, of students of science performing experiments and realizing how flawed the current method is?
You either expect a truly astonishing global conspiracy which somehow silences every single student, or you accept that, well, scientists have a point.
Long story short, we can trust what scientists say. And, to pre-empt a common response, reason works. There's just one more objection to tackle.
Even those who understand scientists are not members of a global conspiracy often point out flaws in experiments, or what we've seen. Either that, or they give some reason, some element of the explanation, that they don't trust, or don't fully understand.
The problem is, science doesn't depend on a layperson's understanding: especially on the more complex issues, like the inner details of biology which forms required knowledge if you want to even start fully understanding evolution and methods for abiogenesis.
For an illustration, let's look at mathematics.
Did you know, with a line of a certain length, there is a maximum area you can enclose in that line? Basically, with shapes of a set perimeter, the shape which has the largest area will be a circle.
That's a fact: feel free to look it up. Its proof, however, stems from an application of what's called the "Isoperimetric inequality."
If a layperson wanted proof of the statement "The largest area you can enclose in a set length, is the area of a circle with that length as a perimeter," the only response is "Good luck." The proof of the inequality requires knowledge of Wirtinger's Inequality, which is proven via the Min-Max theorem, and the application alone of that theorem requires knowledge of eigenvalues, let alone proving it.
Chance are, I've just spouted gibberish to most non-mathematicians reading this. And why? Because an educational discipline is not fully accessible to someone with a few minutes of free time and a computer.
If you want to have every element of the Inequality proven, rather than assumed, the basic path will involve: Pythagoras' Theorem (proven by a diagram), decent knowledge of integrals, parameterizing the x and y directions, changing parameter to the arc length, decent knowledge of integrals and variable changing, the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, inherent properties of real numbers, Wirtinger's Inequality, eigenfunctions and eigenvalues, the Min-Max theorem, traits of inner products, Fourier Series, Rayleigh Quotients, trigonometric calculus...
That's from a cursory glance. If a statement of religion required there be a shape with an area greater than that of a circle with the same perimeter, then you would require having all of the above explained to you any time you asked about it.
For a far simpler case, zero times any number is zero. True? True.
Prove it.
It's something that feels right, and people take as given, but the proof isn't exactly easy. It requires knowledge of field axioms, the definition of the real numbers: associativity, and the additive identity and inverses. Once you have that knowledge, x(y-y)=xy-xy=0 falls into place: but you still need a fair bit of knowledge before you can prove something so trivial.
Not understanding the above inequality and proof means only that you haven't studied a certain kind of mathematics for years: it doesn't mean you have laypeople constantly assaulting the foundations of maths. No one expects to become overnight experts.
And yet, somehow, it's perfectly fine to demand scientists explain even more complex problems, in just as much detail, even though it's basically a fact that you'd get bored when they'd barely started.
Long story short:
Scientists are trustworthy sources.
The opinion of someone who hasn't put years of their life into understanding a specific issue means precisely nothing when it comes to such complex processes.
Unless you're willing to pursue a doctorate in related areas of physics and biology, the most damning thing you can say about evolution and abiogenesis and cosmology, and all of it, is "I, personally, don't understand it."
If that sounds remotely close to "It doesn't happen," to you, you really have a problem with logic, and your scientific views are meaningless from that alone.
If you don't believe in God, you're making yourself a god. You're living your life to satisfy your own needs. You make your only purpose in life to live for what you want. Therefore you do, in fact, believe in a god; yourself.
Firstly, no. That’s not how it works. At all. Just because you find it hard to imagine a life without serving a God, doesn’t mean it can’t be done.
Secondly, how weak is your definition of God that your ask made sense to you?
Thirdly, yes, I pay attention to my own desires: everyone does (even you), that doesn’t mean I exclusively live for what I want. And even if I did, living for something is not the same as worshipping it, or treating it like a deity, in any way shape or form.
Having something important in your life does not make said important thing God to, well, anyone. I’m guessing you prize more than just your religion: your family, your friends, any works you’re proud of, books, chocolate… That doesn’t mean you’ll start calling yourself a polytheist (if you’re a monotheist), or add Lord Chocolate to your pantheon (if you’re not).
Looking back, I think my last anon may have been referring to this post, in which case I should clarify:
The point raised in the post wasn't that God sent them, only that more or less every human would agree the morally correct course of action in that situation would be to intervene, and stop those that meant harm. The fact God chooses not to do so, and the fact many theists (who live their lives by his example) would happily go against God in that situation is the question mark.
I saw your comment about the whole "child rapist" thing and am wondering how you came to the conclusion that God sent them? Everything God does is good; before sin (the fruit from the tree), there was no death or suffering. Because of that sin, the connection between God and people would never be the same; at least until His kingdom comes. Anyways, what I'm trying to say is that the only reason there are rapists and what not is because there is sin and death in the world.
I’m not sure the comment you’re referring to: I don’t recall going for such an example, but I have spoken on similar issues.
Explicitly, there’s the initial post of this blog, and less explicitly but probably more persuasively, there’s this post on free will.The shortened version is that saying all God does is good, and he’s not responsible for sin, doesn’t make it so.
Your latest post on morality still fails to get an ought from an is.
(Referring to this post)
True, but it does make that argument pointless. It’s more than secular ethics that struggle with that particular problem.
On the is-ought problem specifically however, it’s meaningless: ultimately the argument comes down to semantics.Regardless, even if it were necessary to gain an ‘ought’ statement, we can do so simply from taking the logical step of defining an ‘is’ statement as a goal: thus the process we ought to do to achieve that goal follows naturally, and we’ve successfully found an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.
One of the most common claims by theists is that their morality is, in some sense, superior to atheistic morality, or any form of morality that comes from a source other than God.
This post is the culmination of multiple observations and arguments, and relies on two essential definitions: those of non-theistic, and theistic morality.
Theistic morality: moral laws, and rules, and ideals that stem from deities, or a deity's essential nature.
Non-Theistic morality: moral laws, and rules, and ideals that stem from some statement or axiom such as 'suffering is bad'.
The first thing to note, is the importance of having an axiom. For the non-theistic case, I'll use the axiom mentioned above: 'suffering is bad'. However, there is also an axiom (however well-concealed) in the theistic case, of 'God is good'.
That axiom is rather misleading however, or at least complicates things unnecessarily, as we can get on to a lengthy debate of ontological arguments, and fundamental properties. Instead, let's change it to 'God is truthful', which ultimately fills the same function: those who believe God is the source of morality either believe God said it, or wrote it in human nature. In either case, if we can't take God at his word, how do we conclude that morality holds?
Now, to examine this axiom.
Do we have any reason to assume God is truthful?
Not really. We could use the ontological argument to show (arguably) that God is the pinnacle of goodness: even accepting that conclusion however, how do we then conclude that being truthful is an aspect of goodness? If God is the source of our moral knowledge, any answer is suspect. If God is dishonest, then any statement of his that truthfulness is morally good obviously cannot be trusted.
This is discussed partially here, though this post will go into more detail.
Similarly, even if we can show unambiguously that truth is the morally good option for humans, how do we so much as touch what is morally right or wrong for a deity? Gods are an entirely different class of creature, and one no one pretends to fully comprehend: how does it follow that, even if honesty is morally good, that it is also the right thing for a deity to do?
This lack of any reasonable comparison between human and God also answers the typical response: why assume a human tells the truth to you?
With humans, we can assume some element of human nature, to say nothing of simple pragmatism (no one wants to be caught out on a lie). None of this is the case with God.
And for more religion-specific arguments, God commanded Abraham to kill Isaac. That would seem to be a moral statement: that, in this case, killing your son is a good thing. It wasn't the case, however: the faith required might have been good (debatable), but the action apparently was not, as God prevented it. At the very least, God here is misleading.
In short, we cannot take for granted that God is truthful.
Can we assume it?
Of course; which makes 'God is truthful' an axiom in the purest sense. Something taken as fact, because it is a necessary first step, and not because it's backed up by anything.
All of this, is simply a long-winded way of putting the theistic and non-theistic axioms of morality on equal footing.
Neither one is better than the other. Any moral statement that appeals to 'suffering is bad', compared with one appealing to 'God is truthful', while the latter may seem more impressive, on fundamental terms they are of equal weight.
This is an unfortunate fact. Morality is, unavoidably, subjective to some degree. Objectivity is unattainable.
For an illustration of this, we'll look at Euthyphro's Dilemma. This is an (admittedly discredited) argument against divine morality, and goes:
"Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it, because it is good?"
In the former case, we have what is, on the surface of it, meaningless morality: on the second we have God who is as much a subject to morality as anything. There are responses to this, but it is better to phrase the dilemma more generally, appealing to a non-specific standard of morality A, which could be God, or could not be:
"Is something good because A contains it, or does A contain it because it is good?"
In the first case, we have reduced A to an axiom. In the second case, we have some other standard of morality, say B, which may or may not be tied to A (for example, the typical answer to Euthyphro is that God's nature is the ultimate arbiter of morality). Regardless, we get:
"Is something good because B contains it, or does B contain it because it is good?"
Using the same example, is something good because it's in line with God's nature, or is God's nature in line with it, because it's good?
And now we have a cycle that can only be terminated by declaring a standard morality, somewhere down the line, as an axiom. Either that, or we appeal to another standard C, and D, and E... Which needs to end sometime, because a moral infinite regress will end up a circular argument.
To sum up what's been said so far, all morality (divine or mundane) is, unavoidably, based on an axiom.
Technically, this is all that needs to be said. Theistic morality is no better than non-theistic morality, it merely does a better job at dressing up the flaws: we can, however, go a step further.
Can we show non-theistic morality is better, in any sense?
Believe it or not, there are a few ways to do this. The quickest is to look at the matter of validation.
It's easy to find a theist arguing that, for example, the Bible's (misnamed) Ten Commandments give incredible moral advice, that everyone will agree with. They then proceed to list 'Thou shalt not kill' and 'Thou shalt not steal' as objective, unquestionable evidence.
Not once have I heard anyone use 'Thou shalt not work on the Sabbath' or 'Thou shalt not take God's name in vain' as a similar example. This is especially noteworthy because many theists hold that God gave all humans a conscience, or some form of internal morality fundamental to each of us: if this isn't explicitly held, there is usually some element of it believed in. If, instead, they believed everyone was inherently evil, why would they give 'thou shalt not kill' as evidence of moral knowledge when, if we were all free of morality, many of those listening would disagree?
In short, we have innate morality. This is a scientifically explained, and otherwise undeniable, fact. (the post linked to is imperfect, but explains enough). Some ignore this 'conscience', true: the many drives that make up a human will occasionally overwhelm each other. This is far more understandable in a non-theistic world where morality stems from unguided evolution, and less so in a theistic world where it's wrought by a divine, perfect hand.
Regardless, theists appeal to innate morality as evidence of God: they never bring up many rules which are equally important to God, but have no such inbuilt agreement.
Why would God make people unwilling to steal, but willing to work on the Sabbath?
We're in the position where morality universally agreed upon, is also the morality supported by non-believers. It makes the theistic arguments that the Bible, say, contains divine morals come across more as seeking validation, by grouping 'thou shalt not kill' (a non-theistic moral statement also) along with 'thou shalt not take God's name in vain'.
This also ties into my next point: the vast majority of religions out there share a central kernel of moral rules, and then add more and more unique to that religion, built around the shared kernel.
Even going right back to ancient cultures who practiced human sacrifice, such atrocities were justified by making it in the name of something good: making the Sun rise, for example.
Every religion is centered around a handful of specific moral rules, many of which would seem to be justified by the axiom 'suffering is bad'. This might be evidence of a deity working behind the scenes, as many Christians (for example) hold, if not for the fact Christianity is built identically.
Around all the thou-shalt-not-kills, there are Sabbath prohibitions and bans on graven images: extras added to the central moral kernel, making it indistinguishable (on this level) from the above mentioned religions.
Back to moral relativism, for a moment, the primary criticism leveled at it is that one person's views are as valid as another's, when it comes to morality. In theory, this might be true: in practice, it is not. Practical applications are always very different to theoretical.
In practice, not only do we have to deal with simple pragmatism: we have to deal with overwhelming agreement.
'Suffering is bad' is as close as we can come to a universal moral statement. Even those that support the suffering of some, almost invariably, are doing it to lessen the suffering of others (even if that other is themselves). A great deal of intellectualizing and thought needs to be put into the axiom to construct a full-fledged system, but that's beyond the scope of the post: suffice to say, it's possible.
And regardless, as shown with the axioms above, all morality must unavoidably, ultimately, fall into this trap.
What makes 'God is truthful' a better axiom than 'suffering is bad'?
I don't expect an answer to this question: it cannot be answered. Any knowledge we have about God, which is required to make some form of response, ultimately would (in the theistic worldview) come from God: and so cannot be trusted to give a good picture of the deity, by the trait under question.
To conclude, we have a moral instinct born of evolution: an axiom precisely as justified as any form of morality can be.
In addition, we have the statement 'suffering is bad', the non-theistic axiom which is agreed on by pretty much every theist out there (in some form), and the vast majority of non-theists. We then have 'God is truthful', an axiom agreed upon by most monotheistic theists, and that's pretty much it.
By the numbers alone, I know which I trust.
After quoting verses from epistles like 1 Cor 15, I see mentioned "we'll come to it later..." and the such.I however don't find any further development on those at all
I assume you’re referring to this post. The continuation promised is later on in that same post, in the section titled ‘The Bible’s Account of the Resurrection Examined,” and 1 Corinthians chapter 15 is directly quoted as an example.
If this isn’t the case you’re referring to, let me know.
I'm pretty much an athiest, but there's still one question that doesn't add up in scientific explanations.. How do people who experience NDE's gain knowledge they couldn't possibly know before? For example, one lady was pronounced dead and during her NDE, she claimed to see her son on an airplane to see her.. It was later confirmed that yes he was on an airplane, coming to say goodbye. Okay thanks! (:
I can think of three avenues to explore offhand: I’ll dwell specifically on the NDE you brought up, but it’s more widely applicable.
First, we need to examine the source material. With the number of organizations and people that have a vested interest in promoting NDEs, the possibility that the story is either fabricated or sensationalized cannot be ignored.
Second, is context. I don’t know the lady’s status before her NDE, whether she was in a coma or conscious, but either way she may well have known her son was flying to see her. People in comas have been known to have heard what’s said over them: all it would take is one doctor idly saying “I hear her son’s coming to visit,” in earshot, and she’d know, and it could well be included in her dream.
Finally, we have a less satisfying point, but one that can’t be ignored: coincidence. It may be impressive to hear of one detail in an NDE being correct, but that’s just the effect of confirmation bias. You didn’t hear of any other mistakes she may have made, or of the countless other NDEs with details unverifiable or proven to be false. A handful of lone facts doesn’t mean much with the volume of events in just one NDE, let alone the thousands that occur.
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