The "is-ought problem," also known as Hume's Law or Hume's Guillotine, is a fundamental philosophical issue that addresses the relationship between descriptive statements (what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (what ought to be). The problem was articulated by the Scottish philosopher David Hume in his work "A Treatise of Human Nature" in 1739.
Key Aspects of the Philosophy of the Is-Ought Problem
Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Statements:
Descriptive Statements (Is): These are factual statements about the world. They describe how things are. Examples include "Water boils at 100°C" or "Humans need food to survive."
Prescriptive Statements (Ought): These are normative statements that prescribe how things should be. They reflect values, ethics, or duties. Examples include "People ought to help those in need" or "One should tell the truth."
Hume's Formulation:
David Hume observed that many philosophical arguments attempt to derive prescriptive conclusions from descriptive premises. He argued that there is a fundamental logical gap between statements about what is and statements about what ought to be. According to Hume, you cannot derive an "ought" from an "is" without introducing some additional normative premise.
Implications for Ethics and Morality:
The is-ought problem has significant implications for moral philosophy. It challenges the notion that objective moral truths can be derived from purely empirical observations. This has led to debates about the foundation of moral principles and the role of reason and emotion in ethical judgments.
Responses to the Is-Ought Problem:
Naturalistic Fallacy: Some philosophers argue that attempts to derive moral principles directly from natural facts commit the "naturalistic fallacy." This term, popularized by G.E. Moore, refers to the mistake of defining moral terms in purely naturalistic terms.
Moral Realism: Moral realists argue that there are objective moral truths that exist independently of human beliefs or feelings. They seek to establish a rational basis for bridging the is-ought gap.
Constructivist Approaches: Constructivists propose that moral principles are constructed through rational deliberation, social agreements, or cultural practices, rather than being derived from natural facts.
Virtue Ethics: Some ethical theories, like virtue ethics, focus on the development of moral character and virtues, arguing that moral principles can be grounded in the nature of human flourishing.
Contemporary Debates:
The is-ought problem continues to be a central topic in meta-ethics and the philosophy of language. Philosophers explore whether and how normative statements can be grounded in empirical reality, the role of human psychology in moral reasoning, and the nature of ethical language and meaning.
Conclusion
The philosophy of the is-ought problem challenges us to carefully examine the foundations of our moral and ethical beliefs. By highlighting the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive statements, it invites ongoing reflection on how we justify our moral principles and the ways in which we connect facts about the world with our values and duties.
I guess my contention with one of your arguments is that
I generally think it is ok to restrict other peoples ability to act if they otherwise would harm someone unjustly (In this case the person lying)
I don’t think it would be sexual assault to say you fantasize about that, especially in response to that question.
I don’t see how evil/lesser evil situations imply someone acted wrongly in the past. I guess the idea in this particular case is that they brought about a situation in which they would have to lie to protect themselves but (1. I just don’t feel that an action which you have to conceal is necessarily wrong, see homosexuality, (2. You couldn’t in this case reasonably predict you would have to explicitly deny those fantasies, instead of just never mentioning them.
i don’t quite understand the other arguments, though, and to be honest I’m not sure moral arguments have much effect on my behavior if they don’t emotionally appeal to me, or that morality is even a coherent concept. Anyway, sorry for rambling.
No need for apologies; I have nothing against rambling, and do it quite a bit myself! :]
First off, as you said you don't quite understand the other arguments so I'm not sure if you may have missed this part, I feel the need to clarify that sexual arousal =/= pleasure. When I talk about "fantasizing", I explicitly mean "deliberate (i.e. non-intrusive, controllable) sexual thoughts that you enjoy (i.e. experience positively, not mere 'get aroused by').
I'm not entirely sure what scenario you're referring to here; who is the person doing the restricting and who is the person who would otherwise harm someone unjustly? Is the lying person the former or the latter, and what are they lying about?
2. Okay, we'll first consider a scenario where you're not disclosing it in response to that question:
Would you say it's sexual harassment to go up to an adult and say "I think about having sex with you" or "I jerk off to the thought of your naked body"?
Okay, but what if they did ask "do you fantasize sexually about me?" I would agree that isn't harassment. Still, they're an adult.
Now, if a child asks "do you fantasize sexually about me?", I would consider it sexual abuse to answer in the positive, for the same reason it would be abuse to have sex with a child who approaches you for it.
Okay, but this is about a particular child, not children in general. If someone (esp. an adult) asks you if you fantasize about children in general, why would it be abusive to answer in the positive?
Let's go back to an adult case. Many people have reported that it feels violating to hear people fetishizing their race, or their disability. The person doing the fetishizing isn't talking about them in particular, but it still feels violating. Of course, an adult can consent to hearing people talk about their race/disability fetishes, so I would not consider it abusive to do so in a private space where everyone consents to hearing that stuff.
Similarly, I don't consider it abusive to answer the question "do you fantasize about children" in the positive, in a private space where everyone consents to hearing that stuff. However, if we read the situation I illustrated as a child asking "do you fantasize about children", or an adult asking "do you fantasize about children" in a public space where nonconsenting parties can see/hear your answer, I consider it abusive to answer in the positive.
(I'd be curious about exactly which point(s) of that argument you fall off from. Did you disagree from the very beginning? From the difference between children vs adults wrt consenting to hearing things? From the step from fantasizing about a particular person to fantasizing about a particular group?)
3. Just for a moment, assume my claim in (2) that it would be abusive to answer in the positive (*when children/nonconsenting parties can see/hear your answer; in future every time I say "it would be abusive to answer in the positive", just imagine this asterisk next to it ^^;) is correct. (You don't have to actually agree with it, but the rest of (3) wouldn't make much sense without assuming that premise.)
Then the idea in this particular case is not that they brought about a situation in which they would have to lie to protect themselves, but to protect others.
Thus (1) is not a valid comparison; disclosing your homosexuality is not harmful to others. It may be harmful to you, but there exists a scenario where disclosing it wouldn't be harmful to you either (i.e. when society is accepting). Hence the initial evil would be society being unaccepting; it can't be your gay thoughts because having gay thoughts doesn't inherently lead to a situation where you either lie or cause harm to yourself
Whereas fantasizing sexually about children does inherently lead to a situation where you either lie or cause harm to the child.
... Well, technically not. As you have observed, there does exist a world where you fantasizing sexually about children does not lead to a situation where you either lie or cause harm to the child: if no-one asks.
(2) Then the initial evil could either be you fantasizing about children, or it could be the person asking you if you fantasize about children.
I claim the former is the initial evil, because
- I reject paraphilia theory (that desire-for-children(/animals/etc) is an innate, biologically-rooted, unchangeable inclination to not only be sexually aroused by children(etc), but to regard that arousal with positive valence)
- I like a world where we're free to ask questions
______________________
to be honest I’m not sure moral arguments have much effect on my behavior if they don’t emotionally appeal to me, or that morality is even a coherent concept.
Here's how I define morality:
"You ought value X" = "You will value X as you think about it infinitely"
In math jargon, it's the limit of your values as time approaches infinity. Now no-one has confirmed there's exactly one universal attractor in the space of values so we can't say for sure right now, but most random systems have one.
Talking about nihilism, much less attempting to define and critique it is an exhausting sort of task, akin to talking to a mischievous toddl
On a more practical level, there are game-theoretic strategies that emerge when agents exist in the world with one another. What we call good or bad ways to behave is far from arbitrary, or an artefact of culture, or anything like that:
an interactive guide to the game theory of why & how we trust each other
If you're not a fan of moral arguments though, I'm kind of curious as to why you've been talking about harm, assault, wrongness etc in your ask to being with? ^^;
“Not only does religion offer us an immateriality allegedly shared by God and his heavenly hosts, it also offers us cosmic mattering, and it doesn’t get any bigger than that.”
An absolutely incredible article. For me it is a piece of the puzzle. A bit hard to follow as time, as I haven’t immersed myself in “philosophies” speak.
Of all the theses employed as a theoretical bludgeon, the alleged inferential gap between “ought” and “is” is ubiquitous. The thesis is used to rebut numerous normative claims, but few in popular circles are aware of its pedigree, and because of that, they’re prone to misunderstanding its significance and meaning. Usually, those who employ the is-ought problem in its orthodox guise don’t realize…
Your latest post on morality still fails to get an ought from an is.
(Referring to this post)
True, but it does make that argument pointless. It’s more than secular ethics that struggle with that particular problem.
On the is-ought problem specifically however, it’s meaningless: ultimately the argument comes down to semantics.Regardless, even if it were necessary to gain an ‘ought’ statement, we can do so simply from taking the logical step of defining an ‘is’ statement as a goal: thus the process we ought to do to achieve that goal follows naturally, and we’ve successfully found an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.
They walked in silence for a moment.
'Ah,' said Susan dully, 'Trickery with words. I would have thought you'd have been more literal-minded than that.'
I AM NOTHING IF NOT LITERAL-MINDED. TRICKERY WITH WORDS IS WHERE HUMANS LIVE.
'All right,' said Susan. 'I'm not stupid. You're saying humans need ... fantasies to make life bearable.'
REALLY? AS IF IT WAS SOME KIND OF PINK PILL? NO. HUMANS NEED FANTASY TO BE HUMAN. TO BE THE PLACE WHERE THE FALLING ANGEL MEETS THE RISING APE.
'Tooth fairies? Hogfathers? Little --'
YES. AS PRACTICE. YOU HAVE TO START OUT LEARNING TO BELIEVE THE LITTLE LIES.
'So we can believe the big ones?'
YES. JUSTICE. MERCY. DUTY. THAT SORT OF THING.
'They're not the same at all!'
YOU THINK SO? THEN TAKE THE UNIVERSE AND GRIND IT DOWN TO THE FINEST POWDER AND SIEVE IT THROUGH THE FINEST SIEVE AND THEN SHOW ME ONE ATOM OF JUSTICE, ONE MOLECULE OF MERCY. AND YET -- Death waved a hand. AND YET YOU ACT AS IF THERE IS SOME IDEAL ORDER IN THE WORLD. AS IF THERE IS SOME... SOME RIGHTNESS IN THE UNIVERSE BY WHICH IT MAY BE JUDGED.
'Yes, but people have got to believe that, or what's the point...'
MY POINT EXACTLY.
If there are no final causes, then reason does not have as its purpose the attainment of truth or the knowledge of the good. What we are left with are at best whatever desires we actually happen to have, for whatever reason -- heredity, environment, luck -- but these will be subjective preferences rather than reflective of objective goodness or badness. And the most reason can do is tell us how we can fulfill those desires; since there are no natures or causes or essences of things, not any final causes or natural purposes either, it cannot tell us what desires we ought to have.
Edward Feser, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, 140.
