Which Cultural Powers? Whose Politics?
In the January 2013 issue of First Things, David B Hart underscores crucial distinctions between the relevancy - indeed, we might say 'longevity' - of the achievements of electoral politics and cultural-shaping forces in society:
In the end, politics is the servant of cultural forces, not their master. I often wonder if it is much more than a comforting fiction that, by choosing between two parties that frequently operate like large marketing conglomerates, selling much the same product in different packaging, we thereby take charge of the future. It may make us feel free and powerful, in the same way that shopping does, but the one great lesson to be learned from the social history of America over the past several decades is that culture evolves as it will, and it is not the electoral success of a political party, but the verdict of the culture at large, that ultimately determines the shape of civic reality. A political party can basten or delay the inevitable, volens nolens, but politics is merely an expression of cultural forces far deeper than ideology or public policy can ever reach.
Hart offers the following as an example:
It has often been noted, for instance, that over the past few decades the political "right" has won the argument on economic issues while the "left" has won the argument on social issues. In either case, naturally, things may now and then dash forward a mite too precipitously, which leads to a predictable but only partial retreat--three steps forward, two steps back--but the general drift of culture is quite inexorable.
Hart then goes on to make this interesting point about what may be described as the morality of consumerism and how it shapes a libertarian society:
... Ours is a libertarian society that rests upon an economic foundation of consumerism. Late modernity is the triumph of a kind of polymorphous voluntarism, with regard to both material and immaterial goods. Such a culture must necessarily gravitate towards an ever more indeterminate and minimalist view of civic and private morality; its morality is primarily one of toleration rather than prescription.
Not surprising - and, perhaps, consequentially - there is a paradox to be noted; a paradox that relates to the so-called 'political right' and 'political left' in light of how "politics is the servant of cultural forces":
It may therefore be no more than a poignant paradox that, on account of the vagaries and historical incidentals of political affiliation, many of those who argue most passionately for the unhindered free market are also those who most keenly lament the decay of the moral and social consensus of the past, the rise of an ever coarser and more permissive popular culture, and the disintegration of the nuclear family. But the modern market is sustained by consumerism, and a consumerist culture thrives on the fabrication of an ever greater diversity of desires that may be guiltlessly pursued; such a culture irresistibly demands that the province of inhibition, prohibition, shame, and local loyalties become ever smaller. Not to sound too Marxist (or, perhaps, too "incarnational") about this, but the ideological shape of a society cannot be divorced from its material basis.
The same paradox is present on the other side as well, needless to say, particularly among those who long for the redistribution of wealth, or laws that would seriously inconvenience the investment class, of a withdrawal from free trade agreements, or the abolition of inequities in the global labor market, and so on--all the while casually expecting that society will always continue to generate the kind of prosperity that makes them free consumers wandering at large through a universe of morally neutral goods.
Last year's Occupy Wall Street movement, with its "revolution" against the corporate oligarchy (or whatever it was they were protesting), provides a perfect example of the problem. I think it safe to say that a "revolution" against the investment system that was spread by way of social media, communicated through a variety of affordable but sophisticated handheld devices owned by cosseted dependents of the middle class, was really probably no more than an ironic commentary on its own internal contradictions.
So, according to Hart, how is the course of cultural-political life oriented for the near future? I bullet-point his final paragraph in this column. Our future will likely look like this ...
"a comfortable combination of authoritarianism and libertarianism;
a provident, intrusive, and imperious state allied to a corporate culture that encourages, gratifies, and endlessly amplifies an amoral appetite for the trivial and ephemeral;
extraordinary governmental power wielded peremptorily in the name of endless warfare abroad and of ever more perfect civil order and social justice at home;
culture replaced by advertising, shared custom by private impulse, community by television;
public life reduced to the bare dialectic of state power and individual rights."
Is Hart hopeful? Maybe. His last sentence ends like this:
There may be a path open that leads beyond that state of things--a path not primarily political, but rather cultural and spiritual--but it will not be easy to find, and it will be a very long march indeed.
SOURCE: David B. Hart, "The long march ahead." First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life 229 (January 2013): 72.