The ninetieth birthday of Jürgen Habermas, the influential social theorist and political philosopher from the second generation of the Frankfurt School, has occasioned a wave of celebratory retrospectives. In this essay by Raymond Geuss,…
Just think of Brexit. I get along with most people better the less I know about what they really think and feel. Anyone who has had any experience of discussions in the real world knows that they can get nowhere and peter out, they can cause people to become even more confused than they were at the outset and that they can lead to the hardening of opinion and the formation of increasingly rigid and impenetrable fronts between different parties. The longer and more intense the discussion, the worse it can get. This is precisely what motivated Habermas in the theory of communicative action to appeal to the topos of an “ideal speech situation” as a means for removing these difficulties. However, it is not at all obvious that anyone who performs a speech act necessarily thereby “presupposes” that his current situation is to be evaluated vis-à-vis what would be decided in an ideal speech situation, nor that in such an ideal situation a consensus would necessarily be reached.
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In the first part of the twentieth century, half a century before Habermas began to write, the American philosopher John Dewey also developed a theory of communication. To be sure, he, in contrast to Habermas, was clear to emphasize that he conceived communication as a “naturalistic process,” and that in problematic situations it is, in the first instance, only human action that could bring about clarification and resolution. Any clarification is a response to a given situation and set of problems and it remains, unless specifically modified, relative to that configuration. Only a set of further actions, in particular specific acts of abstraction, can transform it into something with more general application. In some, but by no means all, situations the action in question can take the form of discussion, but there is no form of discussion which is given a priori as ideal. If discussion does not help, as it often does not, one must intervene to change the situation, and the change required may not be the sort of thing those of delicate sensibility automatically welcome. It may be necessary even to use one’s hands rather than some purportedly more ethereal organ. Many people may find this a hard saying, or even a sacrilege against the very principles of liberalism. Not, of course, that self-confessed liberals have ever really hesitated to act harshly when they deemed it necessary (especially to protect their interests—think of Mill and the East India Company), but they have not usually been rather willing to admit this.
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No amount of human exertion will suffice to permit us to establish within the domain of the natural phenomenon “communication” a safe-zone that is actually completely protected on all sides from the possible use of force, nor can we even realistically anticipate in some utopian sense a form of communication where relations of domination were completely suspended or canceled out. Even if, as Habermas suggests, there is something in the “inherent logic” of speech that “implies” freedom from domination, any particular theory that tries to claim that it is insulated against history and the real existing forms of communication will eventually turn out to do nothing more than absolutize some contingent features of our present situation. The historical precedent for this is Kant’s arguments in favor of eighteenth-century conceptions about capital punishment and against a right to suicide as purportedly following from demands of the very structure of human reason itself.
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So his transcendentalism is not just the shiny ornament of a philosopher who had enjoyed a decent education, but an indispensable instrument for ramming firmly into the ground the border-posts that were to enclose the area within which discussion could take place, and keep out unwelcome topics. That this policy of limitation of discussion was not merely a local phenomenon in Germany is indicated by the fact that Rawls, at about the same time in the U.S., saw himself forced to borrow some similar bits of kit from Kant’s great philosophical drugstore in his attempt to protect the American way of life from alternatives that were considered too radical.
A world utterly without “why” can have one or the other of two very different aspects. It can seem a deeply contemplative, even if not neces
I have what I have always held to be a mildly discreditable day job, that of teaching philosophy at a university. I take it to be discreditable because about 85 percent of my time and energy is devoted to training aspiring young members of the commercial, administrative or governmental elite in the glib manipulation of words, theories and arguments. I thereby help to turn out the pliable, efficient, self-satisfied cadres that our economic and political system uses to produce the ideological carapace which protects it against criticism and change. I take my job to be only mildly discreditable, partly because I don’t think, finally, that this realm of words is in most cases much more than an epiphenomenon secreted by power relations which would otherwise express themselves with even greater and more dramatic directness.
Partly, too, because 10 percent of the job is an open area within which it is possible that some of these young people might become minimally reflective about the world they live in and their place in it; in the best of cases they might come to be able and willing to work for some minimal mitigation of the cruder excesses of the pervading system of oppression under which we live. The remaining 5 percent of my job, by the way, what I would call the actual “philosophical” part, is almost invisible from the outside, totally unclassifiable in any schema known to me—and quantitatively, in any case, so insignificant that it can more or less be ignored.
I think the first warning won’t affect most people but like I started spiraling a little bit. Basically the brother was eavesdropping not being fluent in the language and heard that the the dad gave his brother a bj.
Today I am reading Michael Ellman's Socialist Planning, and I am reminded at one particular juncture of Raymond Geuss' short text Philosophy and Real Politics. Ellman discusses the later periods of socialist planning, saying
Even in those countries where the situation after the reforms were introduced was better than before, there was still widespread dissatisfaction with the economic system. For example, in Hungary in the 1970s and 1980s there was widespread dissatisfaction with the steady increase in the gap between Hungarian and Austrian living standards. In China there was widespread dissatisfaction with corruption, oppression, and environmental deterioration. Similarly, policy makers in Hungary in the 1970s and 1980s were envious of the economic achievements of Western Europe, and in China were conscious both of the lag behind the advanced countries and the need for further economic reforms.
The careful reader may notice (as one would earlier in the text) the relatively unelaborated distinction between "advanced" and "backwards" nations and national economies, but we will leave that aside for now. I remember Geuss' advice to ask the question, after Lenin "Who, whom?" - who is doing what to whom? Political life is often characterized by propositions that hide human action - "unemployment has increased" disguises "some number of employers have chosen to fire some number of employees." The Ellman passage lacks a whom, but it nevertheless brings to mind the question "who is dissatisfied" - policy makers, perhaps? This is not to argue with Ellman on the level of the presence of dissatisfaction - this is not apologetics - but it seems to be a lacking detail that is not necessarily outside the scope of the text.
Trinken… Ja, das sollte ich wirklich mehr. Ich trinke zwar fast nur Wasser aber an manchen Tagen habe ich das Gefühl, dass ich innerlich “vertrockne”. Daher habe ich mir angewöhnt, immer etwas mitzunehmen. Beim Einkaufen bin ich deswegen aber auch schon etwas unangenehm aufgefallen, da ich in meiner Tasche eine Flasche Wasser hatte. Und ja, das Geschäft verkauft sogar genau diese Marke Wasser,…
Summary: Ideology is a term used to answer very different questions, and accordingly has many meanings. In a descriptive sense, ideology is one part of the socio-cultural sphere of any group, it is distinct from the economy and the group's social structure. Ideology usually includes the rituals, art, values, desires, attitudes, and dispositions share within the group, or by some members of the group. In this sense, having an ideology is just a statement of fact, it is not a normative evaluation. Discursive elements of ideology are beliefs, ideas, concepts, and the like. Non-discursive elements of ideology are attitudes, certain activities, rituals, and the like. One may further classify ideological phenomena as implicit/explicit or sophisticated/unsophisticated. In christianity, baptism or the eucharist are clearly rituals, not beliefs, they are non-discursive. These rituals are highly formalised, backed by an explicit theological system of beliefs, and their performances are very similar, even at very different times and at very different locations. However, there may be a number of additional habits, beliefs, and attitudes associated with these rituals, which may vary widely in explicitness and sophistication and how common they are. Habermas sees ideologies as sets of beliefs, and distinguishes their "manifest content", what they are about, from their "functional properties", how they influence actions. In some cases, the differences or relations between the manifest content and the functional properties of an ideology will be illuminating. Some authors speak about "the" ideology of a group. For Plamenatz, this means all normative beliefs; for Cohen, only beliefs which do not directly further material production. Ideologies understood as worldviews are the widely-shared set of beliefs of a group, which connect to form a system, concerning the central issues in life, which are strongly-held by and important to the group members, and thus have wide influence on their behaviour. According to Daniel Bell, an ideology is "a way of translating ideas into action". I will call an ideology in the programmatic sense a plan for action, which is based on a model of society.
In a pejorative sense, ideology is used to criticise a society or groups in a society. In this view, those who have an ideology are deluded, they have a "false consciousness", and they may even act against their own interests. How can a set of beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, that is a form of consciousness, be ideologically false in this sense? A form of consciousness may be false epistemically, if it contains value beliefs which are mistaken for descriptions, or if self-fulfilling beliefs are mistaken for ordinary beliefs. People may falsely belief some social phenomenon to be a natural phenomenon, or confuse some particular interests with the general interest. In all these ways, the epistemic status of the belief is misidentified, the form of consciousness is ideologically false. A form of consciousness may be false functionally, if it furthers domination, especially "surplus domination", that is domination beyond any social or historical necessity (if one believes in such necessity). A form of consciousness may form a barrier to the development of productive forces, or it may mask important social contradictions. In all these ways, the function of the beliefs are criticised, the form of consciousness is judged to be ideological. A form of consciousness may finally be judged false by virtue of their genesis or origin. But why should the origin of a form of consciousness be a reason for its rejection? One would suspect a specific history to warrant suspicion, but not directly give reason for rejection. But the Frankfurt School emphasis on psychoanalysis might lead one to understand ideologies as "collective rationalisations", held for reasons their holders can not admit. In this sense, we can understand ideology as a form of consciousness which necessitates ignorance of the reasons (and perhaps the origin) for believing it. Using ideology in the pejorative sense will thus be a criticism of a form of consciousness, criticised for containing false beliefs, for the way it functions, or for its origin. A criticism of a form of consciousness as ideological may rely on one of these dimensions, or on several of them. The Frankfurt School, for example, often tries to look at the way in which the truth or falsehood of a belief is connected to its function, its history, and its origin.
In a positive sense, ideology is understood as the world-view best fitting a a group or society. A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live, it thus aids the human need for identity, meaning, and participation in a culture. The socio-cultural structure of a society may thus satisfy or frustrate a number of human needs. Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology. Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation. An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests. Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class.
Source: Raymond Geuss (1981) Ideology. Chapter 1 in Geuss (1981) The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
(Full text at autodidactproject.org, English)
This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.
Detailed Summary
Ideology is a term with many meanings.
Part of the reason is that ideology has been used to answer very different questions.
In the following, I want to identify three different ways of how ideology is used.
The first use came about in the empirical study of human groups.
Such a group will feature some socio-cultural phenomena, like technology, values, institutions, beliefs, traditions, and so on.
For any group, we can describe these phenomena and their changes over time.
We can also look at phenomena that are universal among different groups, or look at which phenomena do appear together.
We can then try to classify human cultures.
The socio-cultural sphere can be subdivided further.
Vulgar marxism differentiates between economic base and ideological superstructure.
20th century anthropologists often differentiate between technology/economy, the social structure, and ideology.
In this sense, ideology is a part of the socio-cultural system of a group.
It usually includes the rituals, art, values, desires, attitudes, and dispositions of the group.
In this descriptive sense, all groups have an ideology.
Ideology, so understood, will also include beliefs, attitudes, and the like, that are shared by only some members of the group, but not by others.
There is always some conflict, variety, and diversity in human groups.
In this sense, having an ideology is just a statement of fact, it is not a normative evaluation.
Such a descriptive ideology can further be divided into discursive and non-discursive elements.
Discursive elements of ideology are beliefs, ideas, concepts, and the like.
Non-discursive elements of ideology are attitudes, certain activities, rituals, and the like.
Whereas discursive elements can be exobviously plicit or implicit, it is harder to imagine implicit non-discursive elements. However, it might be possible for, e.g. attitudes to be implicit, in some cases.
Neither the discursive/non-discursive nor implicit/explicit distinction are the same as Plamenatz's sphisticasted/unsophisticated distinction.
In christianity, baptism or the eucharist are clearly rituals, not beliefs, they are non-discursive. These rituals are highly formalised, their performances are very similar, even at very different times and at very different locations.
However, the beliefs and attitudes associated with them may vary widely.
Thus, besides the sophisticated, explicit theological system of beliefs, there might be a number of habits, attitudes, and beliefs associated with the ritual, which vary in explicitness and sophistication.
There are many different ways of further subdividing ideology in the descriptive sense.
One might only call the discursive elements an "ideology", to keep the connection between "idea" and "ideology".
Habermas, breaking with earlier Frankfurt School tradition, uses ideology primarily for beliefs held by social agents.
For him, ideologies (as sets of beliefs) may be classified by what they are about, their "manifest content". We will thus find religious and economic ideologies by looking at whether the beliefs feature economic or religious concepts.
Ideologies (as sets of beliefs) can also be classified by how they influence actions, their "functional properties". We will thus find religious and economic ideologies by looking at whether the beliefs influence economic or religious practices.
Often ideologies which are about some matter also influence behaviour regarding that matter.
Furthermore, religious behaviour may at the same time be economic behaviour, or vice versa.
There might be further differences between an internal and an external evaluation of behaviours or concepts.
While there will often be a connection, we should keep the two senses separate. In some cases, the differences between the manifest content and the functional properties of an ideology will be illuminating.
In this narrower Habermasian sense, groups may have multiple different ideologies at the same time. Also, groups lacking certain phenomena will likely lack ideologies regarding these phenomena.
Sometimes, authors speak about "the" ideology of a group.
For Cohen, this means beliefs which do not directly further material production.
For Plamenatz, this means all normative beliefs.
For Marx, in Deutsche Ideologie, this means beliefs the group's members have about themselves as agents.
Often, ideology is just meant to be synonymous with world-view.
The beliefs held by a group are usually coherent in some way.
Ideologies understood as worldviews are thus the set of beliefs which are widely shared among the group, which connect to form a system, which concern the central issues in life, which are strongly-held by and important to the group members, and thus have wide influence on their behaviour.
These criteria are very loose, and there is no way of weighting them against each other.
Which method one uses to determine groups, and how strictly the criteria are applied will determine whether every group has an ideology as world-view.
According to Daniel Bell, an ideology is "a way of translating ideas into action".
A total ideology, in this sense, is a plan for action, which is based on a model of society, which wants to radically transform the whole society, and is held with a confidence exceeding the available evidence.
The last part about the evidence makes this definition pejorative.
The part about the transformation allows for liberals to deny their having an ideology.
An ideology in the programmatic sense is thus a plan for action, which is based on a model of society.
Ideology is also used in criticism of a society or groups in a society.
Some persons or groups are "deluded" about the nature of their society, their position in this society, or their own interests.
This research program may want to enlighten the deluded, or it may just want to understand the forces causing this delusion.
Such delusions may cause people to act against their own self-interest.
Ideology, in this sense is used negatively, critically, pejoratively.
Ideology is delusion or "false consciousness".
How can a set of beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, that is a form of consciousness, be ideologically false?
The answers given to this question usually single either epistemic, functional, or genetic properties of the form of consciousness.
[I] A form of consciousness may be false epistemically. This may be the case if its beliefs lack support from empirical evidence, or if descriptive beliefs are taken to be normative beliefs, or vice versa.
[1] Early positivism held only empirically verifiable claims were meaningful claims. Granted this view, all of theology is meaningless. Thus forms of consciousness based on theology believing in the possibility of meaningfully discussing theological questions are mistaken in the epistemic status of their claims, they are ideologically false.
Religious beliefs not claiming to be meaningful knowledge are not mistaken about the epistemic status of their claims, they are thus not ideology in this sense.
One need not rely on positivism and verificationism, instead one may believe in a deep epistemic rift between evaluation and description. Then, those confusing a descriptive claim for a value claim, or vice versa, may be suffering from ideology.
[2] People may falsely belief some social phenomena to be natural phenomena. People may even perceive their own actions as being a natural process.
[3] People may further confuse some particular interests with the general interest.
[4] Some beliefs are self-fulfilling or self-validating. Beliefs that are self-fulfilling may falsely be understood to be ordinary beliefs. The form of consciousness relying on such a mistaken epistemic status is ideologically false.
[II] Forms of consciousness may be judged ideological for their functional properties.
[1] Habermas sees Ideology as a "world-picture" legitimising domination. Forms of consciousness can be ideologies if they justify unjust social relations and practices.
Beliefs that justify domination also support or stabilise domination. But not all beliefs supporting or stabilising domination also justify it.
Stabilising can mean "contributing to stability" or alternatively "successfully establishing stability".
None of these mean the same as ideology being a "socially necessary illusion".
When Habermas uses "Herrschaft" (domination), we need to distinguish this further.
[A] Domination means forcibly frustrating human preferences. But given that some preferences need to be legitimately frustrated, a form of consciousness supporting domination in this sense may be an ideology, but not in a critical sense.
[B] Domination takes place within the context of a social or political order. It is a normative form of repression, in that it claims at least some legitimacy. If domination is actually legitimate, there is no reason to criticise it.
[C] Domination is domination of someone over someone else, it is a relation of inequality. Egalitarian societies might be very repressive, but they are not societies of domination. But some form of inequality may also be legitimate, so supporting inequality as such is not a reason to reject a form of consciousness.
Marxism believes in historically necessary forms of inequality. It also believes that legitimacy is always dependent on actual historical context. Thus it might be futile to reject forms of consciousness because they support historically necessary forms of domination.
[D] Habermas calls repression beyond social necessity, which is needed for the reproduction of society, "surplus repression". We can thus slightly alter the definition in (c) and call "surplus domination" domination beyond social or historical necessity.
Ideology, in this sense, could then be a form of consciousness supporting, stabilising, or legitimising surplus domination.
Perhaps there is surplus domination that is legitimate for some reason.
[2] A reading of Marx suggests an interpretation of ideology as a form of consciousness that forms a barrier to the development of the productive forces of a society. There is an obvious connection to "surplus repression".
The only motivation to impose surplus repression in such a situation would be to privilege some over others, leading to "surplus domination".
[3] Ideology may be a form of consciousness that masks social contradictions. Such masking need not necessarily include any false beliefs.
If one supposes the primary social contradiction to be the one between productive forces and relations of production, this definition becomes very similar to the one in (2).
Ideologies in the functional sense can be rejected for their being delusions, or for their being false.
The non-discursive elements of ideologies may be hard to classify as true or false.
Ideologies may be rejected for other reasons than being false, for example for their immorality or uglyness.
An ideology is a delusion in that in some way my ignorance is a pre-requisite for holding it.
[III] Forms of consciousness may also be ideologies by virtue of their genesis or origin.
Runciman claims Engels believed ideologies to result from specific social situations and thus have a specific relation to the interests of those who hold them.
Mannheim held that ideologies express class positions.
The Frankfurt School might understand ideologies as "collective rationalisations", held for reasons their holders can not admit.
Why should the origin of a form of consciousness be a reason for its rejection?
A specific history may warrant suspicion, but not directly give reason for rejection.
If ideologies reflect class positions, some ideologies may be appropriate for some class but not for another. This is different from falsehood. Also, while we may reject such an ideology because it is inappropriate for us, this is not a genetic property.
By knowing the genesis of something, we have not learned anything about truth and falsity.
The psychoanalytic sense, beliefs that one (or a group) can not admit, is also not yet direct reason for rejecting something. One may act correctly or belief the right thing, but for the wrong reasons.
However, we can understand the "can" of "can not admit" in a stronger sense. Some beliefs may be held for reasons, which once admitted, lead to the belief being abandoned.
This notion is not very clear and needs to be further elucidated.
But, in this sense, we can understand ideology as a form of consciousness which necessitates ignorance of the reasons for believing it.
Using ideology in this pejorative sense will thus be a criticism of a form of consciousness. It will be criticised for containing false beliefs, for the way it functions, or for its origin.
We need to analyse criticisms of a form of consciousness in which of these three dimensions serves to ground the critique, or in which proportion these three dimensions are employed.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School tries to look at the way in which the truth or falsehood is connected to its function, its history, and its origin.
To be part of and participating in a culture is connected to the human need for identity and a meaningful life.
A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live.
The socio-cultural structure of a society may satisfy or frustrate a number of other human needs.
We can thus search for the most fitting ideology for a group, which ideology will serve them best in furthering their interest and satisfying their needs.
We can thus speak of an ideology in a positive sense.
Whereas ideologies in the descriptive or pejorative sense are the result of investigation and analysis, ideology in the positive sense is of the future, it still needs to be constructed.
Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology.
Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation.
An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests.
But one might have to restrict some interests or desires that are harmful, or disallow blatant falsehoods. Without such restrictions the distinction between the pejorative and the positive sense becomes unclear.
Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class. The bourgeoisie might profit from holding a form of false consciousness, as their objective prospects for the future are hopeless.
Historically, oppression has been linked with satisfaction of self-interest, identity, and false consciousness. Perjorative ideologies have utilised human needs and aspirations to bring them to accept the repressive ideological form of consciousness.
In reality, the interests, needs, and desires of people are not really fixed, and they are hard to isolate.
A newly created ideology may influence needs and desires, or it may be a reaction to changing needs and desires. Inversely, it might lead to needs and desires being rejected or repressed.
Christianity, for example, both furthered and led to the repression of certain pre-existing needs and desires.
We are probably unable to imagine an abstract or normal person in a particular society at a particular time, and then look in how far different ideologies can satisfy the person's needs and desires.
Raymond Geuss (1981) Ideology in the positive Sense - Summary
THIS IS AN OLD 3-PART SUMMARY. PLEASE USE THE NEW MERGED VERSION INSTEAD. THANK YOU.
Summary: Ideology is a term used to answer very different questions, and accordingly has many meanings. In a positive sense, ideology is understood as the world-view best fitting a a group or society. A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live, it thus aids the human need for identity, meaning, and participation in a culture. The socio-cultural structure of a society may thus satisfy or frustrate a number of human needs. Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology. Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation. An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests. Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class.
Source: Raymond Geuss (1981) Ideology in the positive Sense. Chapter 1.3 in Geuss (1981) The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
(Full text at autodidactproject.org, English)
This summary is licensed CC:BY-SA.
Detailed Summary
To be part of and participating in a culture is connected to the human need for identity and a meaningful life.
A world-view provides ready-made interpretations of major life events, and sanctioned models of how to live.
The socio-cultural structure of a society may satisfy or frustrate a number of other human needs.
We can thus search for the most fitting ideology for a group, which ideology will serve them best in furthering their interest and satisfying their needs.
We can thus speak of an ideology in a positive sense.
Whereas ideologies in the descriptive or pejorative sense are the result of investigation and analysis, ideology in the positive sense is of the future, it still needs to be constructed.
Lenin's "What is to be done?" might be the first conscious sketch of such an ideology in the positive sense. Lenin claims the working class has an inappropriate ideology right now, and he also claims they will never find an appropriate ideology, if they are not guided towards it by the vanguard party. The best they can make on their own is a "trade-union consciousness", a form of bourgeois ideology.
Lenin is looking for and wants to further the best ideology for the working class, the one most appropriate to them and their situation.
An ideology in the positive sense should bring the group to satisfy its needs and desires and further its interests.
But one might have to restrict some interests or desires that are harmful, or disallow blatant falsehoods. Without such restrictions the distinction between the pejorative and the positive sense becomes unclear.
Lukacs believes the "scientifically correct" understanding of capitalism to necessarily coincide with the beliefs empowering the working class. The bourgeoisie might profit from holding a form of false consciousness, as their objective prospects for the future are hopeless.
Historically, oppression has been linked with satisfaction of self-interest, identity, and false consciousness. Perjorative ideologies have utilised human needs and aspirations to bring them to accept the repressive ideological form of consciousness.
In reality, the interests, needs, and desires of people are not really fixed, and they are hard to isolate.
A newly created ideology may influence needs and desires, or it may be a reaction to changing needs and desires. Inversely, it might lead to needs and desires being rejected or repressed.
Christianity, for example, both furthered and led to the repression of certain pre-existing needs and desires.
We are probably unable to imagine an abstract or normal person in a particular society at a particular time, and then look in how far different ideologies can satisfy the person's needs and desires.
