Going to Defcon this weekend? I’m giving a keynote, “An Audacious Plan to Halt the Internet’s Enshittification and Throw it Into Reverse,” on Saturday at 12:30pm, followed by a book signing at the No Starch Press booth at 2:30pm!
https://info.defcon.org/event/?id=50826
When it comes to the modern world of enshittified, terrible businesses, no addition to your vocabulary is more essential than "bezzle," JK Galbraith's term for "the magic interval when a confidence trickster knows he has the money he has appropriated but the victim does not yet understand that he has lost it"
First, Stein's Law: "Anything that can't go on forever will eventually stop."
Second, Keynes's: "Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent."
On the one hand, extremely badly run businesses that strip all the value out of the firm, making things progressively worse for its suppliers, workers and customers will eventually fail (Stein's Law).
On the other hand, as the private equity sector has repeatedly demonstrated, there are all kinds of accounting tricks, subsidies and frauds that can animate a decaying, zombie firm long after its best-before date (Keynes's irrational markets):
One company that has done an admirable job of balancing on a knife edge between Stein and Keynes is Verizon, a monopoly telecoms firm that has proven that a business can remain large, its products relied upon by millions, its stock actively traded and its market cap buoyant, despite manifest, repeated incompetence and waste on an unimaginable scale.
This week, Verizon shut down Bluejeans, an also-ran videoconferencing service the company bought for $400 million in 2020 as a panic-buy to keep up with Zoom. As they lit that $400 mil on fire, Verizon praised its own vision, calling Bluejeans "an award-winning product that connects our customers around the world, but we have made this decision due to the changing market landscape":
Writing for Techdirt, Karl Bode runs down a partial list of all the unbelievably terrible business decisions Verizon has made without losing investor confidence or going under, in a kind of tribute to Keynes's maxim:
Remember Go90, the "dud" streaming service launched in 2015 and shuttered in 2018? You probably don't, and neither (apparently) do Verizon's shareholders, who lost $1.2 billion on this folly:
Then there was Verizon's bid to rescue Redbox with a new joint-venture streaming service, Redbox Instant, launched 2012, killed in 2014, $450,000,000 later:
Then there was Sugarstring, a tech "news" website where journalists were prohibited from saying nice things about Net Neutrality or surveillance – born 2014, died 2014:
Vcast, 2005-2012, yet another failed streaming service (pray that someday you find someone who loves you as much as Verizon's C-suite loves doomed streaming services):
And the granddaddy of them all, Oath, Verizon's 2017, $4.8 billion acquisition of Yahoo/AOL, whose name refers to the fact that the company's mismanagement provoked involuntary, protracted swearing from all who witnessed the $4.6 billion write-down the company took a year later:
Verizon isn't just bad at being a phone company that does non-phone-company things – it's incredibly bad at being a phone company, too. As Bode points out, Verizon's only real competency is in capturing its regulators at the FCC:
Verizon has remained irrational longer than any short seller could remain solvent.
Short-sellers – who bet against companies and get paid when their stock prices go down – get a bad rap: billionaire shorts were the villains of the Gamestop squeeze, accused of running negative PR campaigns against beloved businesses to drive them under and pay their bets off:
But shorts can do the lord's work. Writing for Bloomberg, Kathy Burton tells the story of Nate Anderson, whose Hindenburg Research has cost some of the world's wealthiest people over $99 billion by publishing investigative reports on their balance-sheet shell-games just this year:
Anderson started off trying to earn a living as a SEC whistleblower, identifying financial shenanigans and collecting the bounties on offer, but that didn't pan out. So he turned his forensic research skills to preparing mediagenic, viral reports on the scams underpinning the financial boasts of giant companies…after taking a short position in them.
This year, Anderson's targets have included Carl Icahn, whose company lost $17b in market cap after Anderson accused it of overvaluing its assets. He went after the world's fourth-richest man, Gautam Adani, accusing him of "accounting fraud and stock manipulation," wiping out 34% of his net worth. He took on Jack Dorsey, whose payment processor Square renamed itself Block and went all in on the cryptocurrency bezzle, lopping 16% off its share price.
Burton points out that Anderson's upside for these massive bloodletting was comparatively modest. A perfectly timed exit from the $17b Icahn report would have netted $56m. What's more, Anderson faces legal threats and worse – one short seller was attacked by a man wearing brass-knuckles, an attack attributed to her short activism.
Shorts are lauded as one of capitalism's self-correcting mechanisms, and Hindenberg certainly has taken some big, successful swings at some of the great bezzles of our time. But as Verizon shows, shorts alone can't discipline a market where profits and investor confidence are totally decoupled from competence or providing a decent product or service.
I’m kickstarting the audiobook for “The Internet Con: How To Seize the Means of Computation,” a Big Tech disassembly manual to disenshittify the web and bring back the old, good internet. It’s a DRM-free book, which means Audible won’t carry it, so this crowdfunder is essential. Back now to get the audio, Verso hardcover and ebook:
http://seizethemeansofcomputation.org
If you’d like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here’s a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:
“In 1932, Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardner C. Means wrote a book entitled The Modern Corporation and Private Property. A critique of corporate management for being aloof and complacent, out of touch with the consumer and irresponsible to the stockholder, this volume became the bible of Marxists, left wing intellectuals and interventionist politicians. Under the banner of separation of ownership and control, the Berle-Means thesis led to an attack on the corporate structure from which today's top executives are still reeling.
With this background, one would have thought that the people urging a greater role for the public sector would have welcomed the advent of the corporate raider. For this new breed of capitalist has sent shivers down the spines of the denizens of the boardroom. Swooping down, launching "unfriendly" or "hostile" takeover bids, these corporate raiders have succeeded in replacing management from coast to coast in dozens of industries, and in frightening thousands of other out-of-touch chief executive officers into greater responsibility.
At least under the theory of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," it might have been expected that critics of the marketplace, noticeably the followers of Berle and Means, would have rallied `round the cause of the corporate raider.
In the event, however, this expectation has remained unfulfilled. Not only has the activity of the corporate raider been deprecated by the champions of government interference in the marketplace, but it has been roundly condemned by practically all pundits and commentators on public policy. In 1987, the left-leaning film director Oliver Stone distilled the common image of the corporate raider into the supposedly loathsome Gordon Gekko, brilliantly portrayed in an Oscar-winning performance by Michael Douglas. And this is the image of Gekko under which the corporate raider must labor in the present day.
Yet, despite this all-but-universal criticism, the unfriendly takeover bid has benefited consumers and stockholders, and served notice on complacent management across the board. In one celebrated case that unfolded shortly before Stone's film Wall Street was released, corporate guerrilla Carl Icahn put in a bid for a block of shares of Phillips Petroleum. Stung by Icahn's bid, Phillips' executives offered to improve a recapitalization plan they had been forced to put forth in response to an earlier planned takeover, this one by T. Boone Pickens. As a result, Icahn walked away with a cool $50 million, Pickens registered a profit of $89 million on a resale of his holdings to the company, all Phillips' shareholders gained from the better offer, and the oil firm itself was left far leaner and meaner than before.
Needless to say, neither Icahn nor Pickens nor any of the other masterminds of "the 1980s takeover boom," were publicly thanked for the good they had done. On the contrary: both men were not only mocked by Oliver Stone, they were also robbed of the opportunity to do any more such good by a rash of anti-takeover statutes adopted late in the decade. Henry Manne reported that hostile takeovers had "declined to four percent from fourteen percent of all mergers."
The conventional wisdom holds that this outcome is a good one for investors, but the facts show otherwise. No story of the corporate raider can ignore the role of the heroic Michael Milken. Assume there was a hotel worth $20 million as a present discounted capital value. Given an interest rate of 5%, this concern should throw off roughly $1 million to its owners. But stipulate that due to inefficiency, or general avarice, or to the fact that the CEO salary was far higher than justified, or a combination of all such phenomena, the owners were earning far less than that in dividends. And, guess what? The stock was trading at a lower value than might have prevailed, had these tape worm factors not been in operation.
Enter the "evil" Michael Milken. He swoops in, purchases enough of the stock in this corporation to kick out the old board and replace it with his own nominees. This is considered a "hostile" takeover by a corporate "raider." From whence springs the hostility? All Milken did was buy up a mess of stocks. Did he threaten any of these stock owners that they would walk the plank if they did not sell to him? No, of course not; we are talking arm's-length stock market deals here. We can logically infer that the owners of these stocks preferred the price offered them by the "raider," otherwise they would not have sold out. No, the "hostility," instead, stems from the CEO and his cronies who were mismanaging this hotel into the ground.
The Milkins of the world are akin to the canary in the mine; they are the Distant Early Warning Line for the economy.
When they get active, it is in response to something rotten that is going on. And what was the public reaction to this corporate raider? Instead of hoisting him up on their shoulders and holding ticker tape parades in his honor, he was given the back of the public's hand to his face. To wit, he was prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for insider trading, violations of U.S. Securities Laws and other financial felonies. He pled guilty only after the authorities threatened to go after his ailing brother. For shame.” - Walter Block, ‘Defending the Undefendable II’ (2013) [p. 41 - 44]
Michael Milken, in the eyes of the public, enjoys the moral status of a mass murderer, somewhere between Richard Speck and Adolf Hitler.
ProPublica has obtained a vast cache of IRS information showing how billionaires like Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk and Warren Buffett pay little in
From Jessie Eisinger:
NEW: Today @ProPublica presents The Secret IRS Files. We have obtained a vast trove of never-before-seen tax data on thousands of the richest Americans covering more than 15 years. (THREAD)
2/ The data provide an unprecedented look into the financial lives of America’s titans, from Jeff Bezos, to Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Rupert Murdoch, Mike Bloomberg & many more.
3/ Sometimes these guys even paid $0 in federal income taxes. Bezos did it in ‘11 and ‘07. Musk did it in ‘18. Icahn, Bloomberg & Soros did it too in recent years.
4/ But that’s somewhat unusual. What isn’t is that we found that the ultra-wealthy essentially side-step the tax system.
5/We did a calculation no one else has ever done: Comparing how much the top 25 richest Americans pay in taxes compared to their wealth growth. (That can be thought of as income for this group.)
6/ Here’s the summary: A typical American with $70K in income will pay about 14% in federal income taxes. The top marginal income tax rate is 37%.
The top 25? They paid 3.4% of their wealth growth in 2014 to 2018.
7/ In our story today, we explain how this works and why it came about. You’ll learn about a key Supreme Court decision from over 100 years ago. You’ll learn the phrase “Buy, Borrow, Die.”
8/ You’ll find out which titanically wealthy couple was able to report so little in income to the IRS that they could claim the child tax credit. I hope you read it and share it!
9/ We will be doing stories all year about how the wealthy avoid taxes, exploit loopholes and escape scrutiny from federal auditors. If you can help, please contact us here:
Do you have expertise in tax law, accounting or wealth management? Do you have tips to share? Here’s how to get in touch.
Postdoctoral Fellow-genome editing and gene therapy job with The Jiang Lab, The Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai - (Jobs)
The Jiang Lab (https://labs.icahn.mssm.edu/jianglab/) at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York is seeking a highly motivated postdoctoral fellow with expertise in genome editing, mammalian cell culture, and airway cell differentiation. Experience in lung-targeted mouse studies (e.g., intranasal/intratracheal delivery, airway biology) is highly preferred. The goal of our lab is to…
Postdoctoral Fellow-genome editing and gene therapy job with The Jiang Lab, The Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai - (Jobs)
The Jiang Lab (https://labs.icahn.mssm.edu/jianglab/) at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York is seeking a highly motivated postdoctoral fellow with expertise in genome editing, mammalian cell culture, and airway cell differentiation. Experience in lung-targeted mouse studies (e.g., intranasal/intratracheal delivery, airway biology) is highly preferred. The goal of our lab is to…
