Untitled

hislevy

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian cities series: ndola part one — history and identity

the oldest colonial town: ndola was founded in 1904 by john edward "chiripula" stephenson, just six months after livingstone — the second oldest colonial-era town in zambia. established on the site of a former arab trading post and slave market. the slave tree — a mupapa tree under which swahili slave traders held their councils — still stands in central ndola, marked by a plaque. the name derives from the ndola river, which drains into the kafubu river. the lamba people under senior chief chiwala were the area's original inhabitants. the city lies just 10km from the DRC border.

the railway and the rise: the rhodesia railways main line reached ndola in 1907 — and ndola became the distribution centre of the copperbelt and northern zambia. the freight line extended into the DRC, ndola to lubumbashi via sakania. before the road network of the 1930s, the route from ndola to the luapula river was the principal trade route for the entire northern province.

the industrial peak: by the mid-twentieth century, ndola was the largest industrial centre in zambia. copper and precious metals brought from nkana, nchanga, mufulira, and chingola for processing at the ndola copper refinery and precious metals refinery. the indeni oil refinery fed by the TAZAMA pipeline from dar es salaam. land rover vehicle assembly, dunlop tyre manufacture, johnson & johnson, colgate-palmolive, unilever — all with ndola operations.

the night of 17-18 september 1961: dag hammarskjöld — second secretary-general of the united nations — was travelling to ndola to negotiate a ceasefire with moïse tshombe, leader of secessionist katanga province. shortly after midnight, his chartered DC-6B — the albertina — crashed on approach to ndola airport. all sixteen people on board were killed.

three official inquiries (1961-62) failed to reach a conclusive finding. the rhodesian commission dismissed black african eyewitness testimony and concluded pilot error. the UN commission reached an open verdict, not ruling out sabotage. susan williams' 2011 book who killed hammarskjöld? prompted the hammarskjöld commission, which concluded in 2013 that there was "persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat." the UN's most recent 2024 report finds it remains "plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause" — while "specific and crucial information continues to be withheld by a handful of member states."

hammarskjöld never reached ndola alive. the dag hammarskjöld crash site memorial marks where he died. the investigation continues.

the zambian cities series continues. 🇿🇲🏙

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian cities series: chipata — the gateway at the edge

the name and the renaming: the city was known for its entire colonial existence as fort jameson — named after leander starr jameson, whose most famous act was the botched 1895 jameson raid. at independence in 1964, fort jameson became chipata — from the chewa word "chimpata," meaning "large space," a reference to the town's situation in a shallow valley between hills.

the colonial origins: fort jameson was established in 1899 and served as the administrative capital of north-eastern rhodesia from 1901 until 1911. this makes chipata, alongside livingstone, one of only two cities in zambia that can claim to have been a capital.

the geography of the crossing: chipata sits approximately 570km east of lusaka — and approximately 130km from lilongwe, malawi's capital. closer to malawi's capital than to the nearest major zambian city. the mwami border post, 20km east, is one of zambia's busiest land border crossings.

the railway connection: in august 2011, after three decades of planning, the rail link connecting chipata to mchinji in malawi opened — making chipata the zambian railhead for the nacala corridor, running through malawi to the deep-water port at nacala in mozambique. chipata and the lobito corridor together give zambia access, in principle, to both the atlantic ocean and the indian ocean by rail.

the agricultural economy: eastern province accounts for approximately 19-20% of zambia's total agricultural production. chipata is its administrative hub and primary market. the chipata central market — more than 900 stalls — is the daily commercial centre for one of zambia's most agriculturally productive regions.

the nc'wala ceremony: held at mutenguleni village on the outskirts of chipata each february — a first fruits ceremony of the ngoni people, drawing tens of thousands of attendees. at nc'wala time, chipata is one of the most culturally alive cities in the country.

the cycling city: called the "amsterdam of zambia" — the bicycle is the dominant mode of daily transport, more than any other major zambian city. not a hobby. a working vehicle.

chipata is the series' first city defined not by mining but by its position at the edge of one country and the beginning of another. growing because trade crosses borders. mattering because the land around it feeds people.

the zambian cities series continues. 🇿🇲🏙

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian cities series: kitwe — the copperbelt's beating heart

the name: from the nkonde word "itwi" — meaning "place where the soil is black," a reference to the rich copper ore in the area. the alternative name kitwe-nkana — the city and the mine so intertwined that a hyphen is the most honest description of how they came to be.

the founding: kitwe was founded in 1936, not as a mine site — the mine was at nkana, slightly to its west — but as the supply town a mine economy generates around its edges. the rhodesia railways main line reached the town in 1937. when the railway arrived, kitwe's future as a commercial hub was settled.

the mine and the city: nkana mine township and kitwe were formally integrated in 1961. by then, the copperbelt's urban workers — organised, literate, increasingly politically conscious — were among the most important constituencies in the drive toward independence in 1964. kitwe's workforce was not merely a passive economic actor. it was a political force.

the boom years and the collapse: by the 1980s, kitwe's population had grown from 9,000 people in the 1950s to more than 220,000 — a twenty-fold increase in three decades. then the 1973 global copper price collapse. the ZCCM era left deferred maintenance, reduced formal employment, and an informal economy that grew to fill the gap.

the privatisation and recovery: not linear. the mine-adjacent townships lost company-provided services. the transition was difficult. but the underlying economic logic of kitwe reasserted itself as prices recovered and new mine investment began.

kitwe today: population 661,907 (2022 census), metro area approximately 824,000 in 2025. copperbelt university — more than 11,000 students spanning mining engineering, electrical engineering, chemical engineering, computer science, and business.

the economic ecology beyond the mines: the valve and instrumentation supply businesses that serve nkana and nchanga. the engineering contractors maintaining underground ventilation systems. the industrial equipment suppliers, chemical distributors, technical service companies. kitwe is that supply chain's physical home.

the new investment cycle: kobold metals' mingomba in the western forelands to kitwe's northwest. IRH's 366% KCM production surge at chingola — kitwe's neighbour. mopani's 40% output increase at the nkana smelter processing copper since the 1930s.

kitwe is the industrial heart of a country whose copper has shaped the global economy for a century — and whose copper will shape the global clean energy transition for decades to come.

the zambian cities series continues. 🇿🇲🏙

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian cities series: lusaka — the city that became a country

the unlikely capital: when the colonial administration moved its headquarters to lusaka from livingstone in 1935, lusaka was a small railway settlement — a node on the line connecting the copperbelt to bulawayo, notable primarily as a collection point for central province agricultural produce. the decision was strategic: lusaka was more central to the territory's geography and more practically connected to the copperbelt.

the settlement's origins: the earliest evidence of settlement in the area dates to the 6th century AD. the lenje and soli peoples inhabited the area from the 17th or 18th century. the name lusaka derives from a lenje headman, lusaka, after whom the area's borehole — and then the settlement that grew around it — was named.

building a capital: independence brought a large-scale building programme: government ministries, the university of zambia, a new international airport. cairo road's art deco facades remain the city's most distinctive architectural gesture. but independence also brought what no building programme could absorb: large-scale rural-to-urban migration. kanyama, george, matero, ng'ombe — unplanned communities grew on the city's fringes. by the 2000s, 60-70% of lusaka's population was living in compounds — permanent, intergenerational, largely self-built communities that are the actual housing system for the majority of the capital's residents.

the city of contrasts: kabulonga, ibex hill, woodlands — leafy northern suburbs with diplomatic residences. manda hill and levy junction malls. kenneth kaunda international airport connecting to johannesburg, nairobi, london. and: kanyama, where a million people manage daily life without piped water. george, where the market generates economic activity formal GDP statistics don't fully capture.

the transformation story: a city designed for 100,000 now holds more than 3.4 million, growing at ~4.4% per year. but lusaka's story is not only a story of deficits. the entrepreneurial density of its compounds is a genuine economic asset formal statistics consistently undercount.

lusaka is zambia in miniature: its paradoxes, its potential, its progress, and its unfinished business — all concentrated in one fast-growing city on a limestone plateau 1,279 metres above the sea.

the zambian cities series continues. 🇿🇲🏙

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian cities series: livingstone — the city that was zambia before zambia existed

the beginning: before zambia was zambia, there was a crossing point on the zambezi. the old drift — a few kilometres above the falls — was where people crossed: first by dugout canoe, then by iron boat pulled by eight lozi paddlers, then by steel-cabled barge. by around 1897, a small british colonial outpost had grown up there — the first municipality in what would become zambia. mosquitoes ended that experiment. malaria killed enough settlers that the europeans moved to higher ground, and as that settlement grew into a town it took a name: livingstone.

the explorer: david livingstone reached the falls on 16 november 1855 — the first european to see mosi-oa-tunya from the zambian bank, shown there by local chiefs. what he did was document them for a european audience. the victoria falls railway bridge, completed in 1905, placed livingstone at the crossing point of one of colonial africa's most ambitious infrastructure projects.

the capital years (1907-1935): livingstone was the capital of northern rhodesia. of all the towns in northern rhodesia, colonial livingstone took on the most markedly british character — edwardian buildings lining the main street, deep racial segregation. in 1935, the capital moved to lusaka — closer to the copperbelt's economic heartland. but livingstone did not collapse. timber, hides, tobacco, and cotton continued. and the tourist trade became the city's new identity.

the independence era: zimbabwe's post-independence instability from the late 1990s onward was, paradoxically, good for livingstone — visitors who might have chosen zimbabwe's side of the falls began choosing zambia's. a genuine revival followed: new lodges along the zambezi, bungee jumping from the victoria falls bridge, white-water rafting, helicopter and microlight operators.

livingstone today: 177,393 people (2022 census). the livingstone museum — the oldest and largest in zambia — holding five galleries including the david livingstone memorabilia collection donated by the livingstone family.

livingstone is the only city in zambia retaining a non-african colonial name unchanged since independence — because kenneth kaunda, whose father was educated by the scottish missionaries who followed livingstone's footsteps, chose to leave it. the city carries an explorer's name across an independence he never lived to see.

the zambian cities series continues. 🇿🇲🏙

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian innovation series: e-government part 2 — the citizen experience and what full digital government unlocks

the citizen experience today: zamportal's 322 services represent a genuine achievement — but the citizen experience varies significantly. the most important question about any digital government service is not whether it exists — it is whether a citizen can complete it online, from start to finish, without visiting a government office.

the connectivity constraint: the government service bus, zamportal, and zampass are infrastructure designed for a connected citizen with a smartphone and data connection. the data costs, connectivity reliability, and digital literacy that government e-services require are more demanding than a mobile money transaction.

the 2023-2026 NeGP's ambitions: the plan aims to improve zambia's electronic participation index ranking, strengthen data governance through a data protection commission, and achieve digital transformation of government services — while explicitly identifying digital skills as a critical enabler.

what full e-government unlocks:

digital identity at scale: a zampass system genuinely trusted and accessible to most of zambia's adult population creates the identity infrastructure the entire digital economy can build on — mobile money, banks, health platforms, educational credentialing.

data integration: a government service bus that genuinely integrates all government agencies creates the possibility of seeing a citizen's full relationship with the state in a single view — the basis for more effective social programme targeting and less fraudulent state resource claims.

the developer ecosystem: a government that publishes open APIs creates the raw material for a civic technology ecosystem that can build the services government itself cannot build fast enough.

zambia's EGDI ranking improved from 148th to 131st. estonia — the world's most celebrated e-government success story — is 3rd. the distance is not primarily a technology distance. it is institutional commitment, data quality, connectivity, and citizen trust. closeable gaps.

the digital foundation zambia is building is not yet full digital government. but it is the foundation on which full e-government can be built.

the zambian innovation series continues. 🇿🇲💡

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the lobito corridor series: the corridor's impact on zambia's trade balance

the current trade position: copper and copper products account for typically more than 70% of zambia's total merchandise export value — making zambia's trade account exceptionally sensitive to the copper price and export volumes.

the export cost dimension: every tonne of copper exported today by road to durban, dar-es-salaam, beira, or walvis bay carries a transport cost reflected in mine economics and royalties paid to zambia. the lobito corridor — six times faster, at €90-120 per tonne — directly reduces the transport cost per tonne exported, improves mine economics, and increases the net export value per tonne the zambian economy captures.

the import side: european industrial equipment — german pumps, italian motors, french process control systems — currently travels from european ports to durban or dar-es-salaam, then by road or rail into zambia. the lobito route would be shorter by distance and faster by transit time for goods from europe's atlantic ports. the corridor is a logistics cost reduction on the import side as well.

the domestic value addition dimension: a zambian economy exporting copper fabricated products, battery precursor materials, or EV battery components would export a smaller volume at a higher value per tonne. every percentage point increase in local refining is a percentage point increase in the value that stays in zambia rather than flowing to processors elsewhere.

the corridor and the kwacha: a trade account dominated by copper exposes the kwacha to commodity price volatility that affects every zambian household. a diversification of zambia's export base — through agricultural exports via lobito, manufacturing exports from the MFEZs, value-added copper products — would reduce the kwacha's exposure to the copper price cycle. a more diversified trade base means a more stable currency means a more predictable macroeconomic environment for every zambian business and household.

the corridor is not only a logistics story. it is a trade story — and zambia's trade story is one of the most consequential macroeconomic narratives in sub-saharan africa.

the lobito corridor series continues. 🇿🇲🚆

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian investment series: the diaspora investor

who the zambian diaspora investor is: not the international mining company or multilateral development bank. the diaspora investor is a professional — a doctor, engineer, accountant, technology worker — who has left zambia to work in the UK, south africa, US, canada, or botswana, who has accumulated savings in a higher-income economy, and who maintains a deep emotional connection to zambia through family and cultural identity.

three characteristics making them specifically interesting: information advantages — first-hand knowledge of zambia's infrastructure, regulatory environment, and specific opportunities. risk tolerance for zambia that purely financial investors may not have. network access — school, family, and professional networks in zambia giving deal flow and implementation support formal channel investors do not have.

what diaspora investors are already doing: zambian diaspora remittances fund school fees, medical care, and small business working capital. beyond remittances, diaspora professionals are making direct investments — in property (most common), small business equity, and increasingly in zambia's formal capital markets. the dot com zambia IPO attracted strong diaspora-eligible retail participation — the infrastructure through which diaspora capital can participate without requiring physical presence.

the three investment opportunities most suited to diaspora capital: residential property in lusaka, kitwe, and ndola. SME equity — relationship-based, informed, patient capital that early-stage zambian businesses need. LuSE and structured financial products — the GEM portal and mobile-accessible platforms making formal market participation progressively easier from abroad.

the policy gap: the government's diaspora investment policy is less developed than its FDI promotion framework. a specific diaspora investment promotion strategy — modelled on frameworks that kenya, ghana, and india have developed — would convert zambia's diaspora from a remittance economy into an investment economy.

the diaspora investor is zambia's most underutilised source of first-mover capital. they know the country. they believe in it. they are waiting for the infrastructure to make investing easier.

the zambian investment series continues. 🇿🇲💰

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian development series: a development agenda for the next decade

the starting point: the agenda is not built on the assumption that zambia needs to start over. it is built on the assumption that what has worked — the SCT programme, the ART rollout, the mobile money ecosystem, the MFEZ model — needs to be scaled, sustained, and supplemented with specific investments in specific gaps.

priority one — energy: every other development priority depends on energy. the education system, health system, agricultural transformation, and manufacturing industries all depend on affordable, reliable power. the investments underway — 61.8MW of solar in 2024, 600MWh of battery storage, net metering — must be accelerated and complemented by larger-scale solutions: batoka gorge, the angola HVDC interconnector.

priority two — secondary school completion: the gap between 97.2% primary enrolment and 49.9% secondary enrolment is the most direct measure of the human capital investment zambia is currently failing to make at the secondary level. school feeding programmes, targeted cash transfers for continued enrolment, community secondary school construction, and the girls2030 programme.

priority three — water infrastructure: 46% of rural population without safely managed drinking water, 5-7% of irrigable potential under irrigation. a borehole installed is fewer waterborne disease incidents, reduced school absenteeism, and freed hours for women and girls. irrigation installed is two crops per year, insulated from el niño drought vulnerability.

priority four — informal economy productivity: connectivity for mobile money in rural areas, digital literacy for agritech platforms, cold storage and market access infrastructure allowing farmers to sell at market prices rather than distress prices.

priority five — sustained social protection: social cash transfers are not charity. they are human capital investment. the SCT programme at 1.56 million households, with the world bank simulation showing six percentage point poverty reduction from universal coverage, makes the fiscal case as well as the moral case.

zambia's next decade is, if these five priorities are pursued at scale and with sustained commitment, the decade in which the conversion happens — in which extraordinary endowment begins to produce the broad-based welfare that zambia's assets can and should provide.

the zambian development series continues. 🇿🇲🏗

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian innovation series: e-government — what zambia is building

the institutional framework: the SMART zambia institute — a division under the office of the president, established 2016 — coordinates and implements electronic government. the electronic government act no. 41 of 2021 provides the legislative foundation. the 2023-2026 national electronic government plan (NeGP) sets out zambia's digital transformation roadmap.

zamportal and the government service bus: zamportal hosts 322 services on the government service bus — a national platform digitally integrating all government institutions, departments, and agencies. since implementation, zamportal has recorded over 3.7 million transactions. zampost has partnered with SMART zambia to bring GSB services to post office locations across the country, extending digital services to citizens without reliable home internet access.

what citizens can actually do online: apply for national ID cards (zambian citizens, commonwealth citizens, foreign residents). the online passport application and payment system has processed over 1,000 passports. pay ground rent online. the ministry of labour on-boarded 29 services onto the GSB through ZELMIS, allowing citizens to access labour services through their phones in real time.

zambia's EGDI ranking — the UN e-government development index — improved from 148th to 131st out of 193 countries.

zampass: the national authentication and access control service for governmental electronic services — the foundation that makes secure citizen identity verification online possible. the digital zambia acceleration project (DZAP), signed october 2024, specifically targets roll-out of digital authentication and verification infrastructure.

the innovation ecosystem connection: the government service bus creates, in principle, the data exchange infrastructure that civic technology applications can connect to. zampass creates the foundation for private sector digital services needing to verify user identity. zamportal's 322 services and 3.7 million transactions are the government-side infrastructure that, if the API layer is built correctly, becomes the resource zambian developers can build on.

zambia is building the digital foundation. the construction is visible, measurable, and accelerating.

the zambian innovation series continues. 🇿🇲💡

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the lobito corridor series: zambia's positioning

the strategic position: zambia is the corridor's frontier — where the most transformative piece of new infrastructure is being built, where significant new copper production growth is occurring, and where the corridor's success or failure will be most directly determined by decisions made within zambia itself. the $1 billion that the LAR consortium has committed specifically to the zambian section is a commercial investment to serve zambia's mines. zambia's copper is the reason the railway is being built toward it.

the concession terms matter: the most important near-term decision is the specific terms of the concession agreement — freight rates, revenue sharing, obligations for local employment, procurement, and community investment. the angolan section's post-privatisation tariff increases, reportedly reaching ten times previous levels and driving some operators back to road, is the cautionary example.

local content regulations (statutory instrument no. 68 of 2025, in effect 1 january 2026) create the framework within which zambian businesses can participate in the supply chain the corridor's construction and operation will generate.

the construction timeline: the target groundbreaking was set as early 2026. as of july 2026, the project is in advanced preparation. the most important single thing zambia can do is move from preparation to construction. every month of delay is a month in which the DRC and angolan sections proceed without the zambian section keeping pace.

the energy prerequisite: the corridor's freight volumes depend on the mines producing the copper. the mines depend on the electricity that powers them. the green tech, clean energy, and batoka investments are not separate from the corridor's success. they are its prerequisite.

zambia's corridor advantage is real. it is also conditional. the conditions: a well-structured concession, an on-schedule construction timeline, an energy investment programme that powers the mines, and a development co-investment strategy that captures the full range of benefits.

the lobito corridor series continues. 🇿🇲🚆

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian investment series: copper deeper

where zambia stands today: in 2025, zambia produced 890,345 metric tonnes of copper — an 8% increase from 2024, the second consecutive year of growth. the increase was led by konkola copper mines — a 366% surge to 80,215 metric tonnes following its IRH recapitalisation — and mopani, up 40%. the mimbula mine commenced production in 2025, delivering 8,183 metric tonnes in its first year.

the 3 million tonne ambition: the government target — 3 million metric tonnes by 2031 — would more than triple current production, place zambia among the world's top three copper producers, and fundamentally alter zambia's fiscal position and role in the global copper supply chain.

the investment pipeline — approximately $10 billion in committed investments: first quantum's $1.25 billion kansanshi S3 expansion. barrick gold's $2 billion lumwana super pit — expected completion 2028, ahead of schedule as of august 2025. the $600 million sinomine kitumba project in mumbwa — open-pit mining commenced april 2025, production from 2026. kobold metals' mingomba mine — identified through AI-powered geological analysis — in active development with ivanhoe's western forelands exploration programme covering 7,757 km².

the exploration boom: 2,375 mining licences issued in 2025 (9.2% increase). CHRAGS aerial geophysical survey reached 51.7% national coverage by end of 2025, with full coverage expected july 2026.

the challenges that are real: reaching 3 million tonnes from 890,000 in six years requires capital of $17.6-33 billion. electricity of approximately 6,000-9,000 GWh per year. ore grades declined from historical 2% to current 0.5% copper content. the lobito corridor's zambian section must be operational in time to carry the new production.

the demand case: the IEA estimates global copper demand of approximately 30 million tonnes annually by 2040 for net-zero. EVs contain ~83kg of copper compared to ~23kg in a conventional vehicle — a 260% increase. zambia's 3 million tonne ambition is a supply response to structural demand growth the clean energy transition makes inevitable.

the zambian investment series continues. 🇿🇲💰

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian development series: the paradox revisited

the paradox, stated precisely: nineteen posts later, the series can state the development paradox more precisely than the first post did. it is not a paradox of absence. it is a paradox of conversion — the challenge of converting extraordinary natural endowment into broad-based human welfare at the pace and scale that a rapidly growing population demands.

the gains the series has documented: child mortality fallen 61% since 2000. primary school enrolment at 97.2%. ART reaching 85%+ of people living with HIV who know their status. the SCT programme reaching 1.56 million households. mobile money from 14% to 69% of adults in a decade. the LSMFEZ attracting $1.68 billion and 12,500 jobs.

the gaps the series has documented: secondary school enrolment at 49.9%. zambia falling well below the WHO minimum of 44.5 health workers per 10,000 population. mental health treatment gap exceeding 90%. 46% of rural population without safely managed drinking water. 85%+ of smallholder farmers practising rain-fed agriculture. 60-70% of lusaka in informal settlements. youth informal employment at 90%.

the pattern the series found: zambia's development gains have been achieved through specific, targeted interventions that work because they address specific, defined problems with specific, effective tools. zambia's development gaps are concentrated in areas where the same specificity is harder to achieve.

the three conclusions: first — zambia's development story is not a failure. it is a partial success at a pace the opportunity demands should be faster. second — the gap between endowment and welfare has specific, addressable causes and specific, evidence-backed solutions. third — investment creates the fiscal space for development. development creates the human capital that makes investment sustainable. neither story is complete without the other.

zambia's paradox is not permanent. it is the gap between what has already been built and what remains to be built. and the evidence is that the building is underway.

the zambian development series continues. 🇿🇲🏗

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian innovation series: open data and civic tech

what open data is: government-collected information — census data, health statistics, budget records, procurement logs, land registry records, weather data, agricultural production figures — made publicly available in digital formats that allow developers, researchers, and entrepreneurs to analyse, visualise, and build on it.

why this matters for zambia: each of the development challenges the series has described would be accelerated by publicly available data that currently exists within government systems but is not shared — health worker deployment data, school-level learning outcomes, borehole functionality records.

the civic tech applications:

agricultural market price data: made publicly available through a mobile interface, wholesale and retail price data becomes a market intelligence tool for smallholder farmers deciding where to sell their produce.

public procurement transparency: zambia's procurement data — who receives contracts, at what price, with what performance record — made publicly searchable enables accountability, anomaly identification, and reduction of procurement irregularities.

land registry information: making land registry data publicly accessible in a searchable digital format would enable the property market transparency that private housing investment requires.

the constraint: not technical — the same mobile infrastructure delivering mobile money can deliver civic tech. it is institutional: the willingness of government to make data genuinely publicly available, in formats developers can use, on schedules keeping the data current.

the opportunity: the civic tech sector is thin in zambia — few dedicated organisations, few open data developers. the sector is thin precisely because the data has not been consistently available. if the data becomes available, the developers who can build on it are exactly the graduates bongohive is training and asikana network is equipping.

government data, freely available, is the cheapest raw material zambia's innovation ecosystem could receive. it costs the government nothing to share what it already has.

the zambian innovation series continues. 🇿🇲💡

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the lobito corridor series: zambia's copper processing ambition

the value addition gap: zambia currently refines approximately 1.3% of copper products locally. the vast majority leaves as raw or semi-processed material, with value-adding processing happening in china, south korea, and germany.

why processing hasn't happened at scale: power supply — copper smelting and refining are energy-intensive, and zambia's chronic power supply constraint has made it economically unviable to locate energy-intensive processing in zambia when cheaper, more reliable power is available elsewhere. logistics costs — until the lobito corridor is complete, the economics of further value addition are challenging because added processing costs must be recovered in the export price.

the EV battery value chain: the december 2022 trilateral MOU between zambia, DRC, and the US identifies the development of an integrated EV battery value chain — from raw material extraction through processing, manufacturing, and assembly. an EV battery precursor material manufacturer in kitwe, using zambian copper and DRC cobalt, selling to a south korean or european battery cell manufacturer, would create far more economic value in zambia than a copper concentrate exporter selling to the same manufacturer's upstream supplier.

the infrastructure connection: the lobito corridor provides kitwe's manufacturing economy with a shipping route to european and north american markets competitive with routes available to manufacturers elsewhere.

the long timeline: building a copper fabrication or battery precursor manufacturing industry in zambia requires simultaneous resolution of the power supply constraint, logistics cost constraint, skills training constraint, and regulatory and fiscal certainty. the lobito corridor provides the logistics piece. the angola HVDC interconnector provides the power piece, if built. the education curriculum reform provides the skills piece, over time. the mining fiscal regime's stability agreements provide the fiscal certainty piece.

none of these pieces individually is sufficient. together, they create the conditions in which a serious industrial investor could make the case for zambian copper processing at scale.

the corridor is a railway. but what it could unlock — if the other conditions are met — is a manufacturing economy built on zambia's copper that captures value zambia has never captured before.

the lobito corridor series continues. 🇿🇲🚆

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian investment series: the lower zambezi

what the lower zambezi is: approximately 4,092 square kilometres in the zambezi valley, stretching along the south bank of the zambezi river from chirundu eastward to the mozambique border. faces zimbabwe's mana pools national park — a UNESCO world heritage site — across the river, together forming one of africa's largest and most ecologically integrated wildlife areas.

the wildlife experience: built around the river. canoe safari — paddling silently through hippo pods, watching elephant drink from the bank, drifting past crocodile on sandbars — is the park's signature activity, an experience that cannot be replicated anywhere else. one of the premier tiger fishing destinations in africa. excellent dry-season lion, leopard, and wild dog encounters on the narrow floodplain.

the location advantage: chirundu — the park's western entrance — is approximately 130km from lusaka by tarred road, about two hours. the park's main lodges are one to two hours further on dirt roads. total travel time from lusaka: three to four hours by road, or 45 minutes by light aircraft from wilson airport. the most accessible of zambia's major national parks.

the investment opportunity: a small number of ultra-premium lodges (USD 500-1,500 per person per night) occupy the park. below this ultra-premium tier, there is essentially nothing — no mid-range lodge, no quality permanent camping, no self-drive accommodation accessible to the growing domestic southern african leisure traveller market.

a quality mid-range lodge or permanent tented camp in the lower zambezi would enter a market with essentially no competition at its price point, with a wildlife product already proven as world-class, and with the proximity to lusaka that makes the mid-range domestic and regional traveller market commercially viable.

the fishing market: a dedicated fishing camp at an accessible price point would address a specific demand the current supply does not meet at scale.

the lower zambezi is not undiscovered. it is the most accessible of zambia's world-class safari destinations. the investment opportunity is in democratising access to a product the ultra-premium market has validated.

the zambian investment series continues. 🇿🇲💰

[blogmassivewitchbouquetstuff]

the zambian development series: mental health

why mental health is a development issue: a person experiencing severe depression cannot work productively. a child with significant anxiety cannot learn effectively. a young mother with postnatal depression is less able to provide the early childhood nutrition and stimulation foundational to child development outcomes. mental health is embedded in the development agenda at every level.

the scale of the burden: depression and anxiety disorders are among the leading causes of disability-adjusted life years across sub-saharan africa. in zambia's specific context, the mental health burden is shaped by poverty, food insecurity, the grief of HIV/AIDS — which has left hundreds of thousands of orphaned children, bereaved parents, and bereaved communities — and the structural stressors of urban informal settlement life.

the treatment gap: zambia has approximately three psychiatrists for a population of more than 20 million — among the lowest ratios in the world. the treatment gap is estimated at more than 90% — fewer than one in ten people with a serious mental health condition receives any form of treatment.

the cultural dimension: in many zambian communities, mental health conditions are attributed to spiritual causes rather than to medical conditions. this is a coherent response to a health system that has not demonstrated its ability to treat mental health conditions effectively. effective mental health care must work with these cultural realities — engaging traditional healers and religious leaders as partners in early identification and referral, not as obstacles to formal care.

what the development series recommends: task-shifted, community-based, culturally appropriate mental health care — the same logic that produced the community health worker model for physical health, applied to mental health. trained community health workers who can identify common mental health conditions, provide basic psychosocial support, and refer to limited specialist care.

the investment case: the economic return on mental health investment — in reduced productivity losses, reduced alcohol-related harm, improved educational outcomes for children of parents receiving effective care — significantly exceeds the investment required to provide basic community-level services.

the development story is incomplete without this chapter.

the zambian development series continues. 🇿🇲🏗