Having religious sites in a region does not give your state or your religion ownership over it. By that logic, the Vatican would own half of Europe. The claim that Kashmir “belongs to Hindus” because of Amarnath or Shankaracharya temple is rooted in theocratic ethno-nationalist agenda, not history. Yes, Hindu sites exist in Kashmir because Hindus have historically lived there, just like Muslims, Buddhists, and others. Kashmiris of all faiths have coexisted and contributed to the region’s culture, language, and history for centuries.
Kashmir doesn’t “belong” to Hindus, Muslims, or any religion — it belongs to its people. The indigenous, regardless of what religion they follow today. Conversion doesn’t erase indigeneity. Cultural belonging is rooted in land, language, and memory — not who you pray to. But that is a concept difficult to grasp for you.
Kashmiri Pandits’ lack of return is not the fault of Kashmiri Muslims.
It is the fault of the Indian government, which has used their displacement as a political pawn for decades. The state did nothing for their safe resettlement, didn’t provide real rehabilitation, and still continues to use their pain to fuel communal hate instead of solutions. And fools like you fall for it.
Wow, it's impressive how much misinformation can fit into a single ask—your understanding of Kashmir's history seems to be as shallow as a puddle in the sun.
“Having religious sites in a region does not give your state or your religion ownership over it.”
In many cases, the very establishment and maintenance of a religious site have been acts of statecraft. For example, the 2008 transfer of 99 acres of forest land to the Amarnath Shrine Board wasn’t just a religious accommodation—it was a political decision by both the Indian Union and the J&K government to assert authority over that part of the Valley. Religious institutions often hold de facto governing power over adjacent land and resources (roads, policing, revenue), effectively exercising territorial control even if they aren’t “sovereign” in name. Religious sites can and do establish historical and even legal ties to a community. The existence of a temple isn’t merely “cultural fluff.” In many pre-modern polities, state authority was deeply bound up with patronage of shrines. The Shankaracharya Temple atop Takht-e-Suleiman, for example, dates back to at least the 9th century and was rebuilt by Hindu and Buddhist rulers—evidence that Kashmir’s sovereign identity was inseparable from its Hindu heritage long before Islam arrived. When princely Jammu & Kashmir acceded to India in 1947, the Instrument of Accession specifically guaranteed protection of all existing religious institutions. That document invokes the region’s plural but historically Hindu-rooted polity, not a blank slate. Kashmir’s dynastic history wasn’t exclusively “multi-faith coexistence.”
From the Karkota dynasty (c. 625–855 CE) through the Lohara kingdom (1003–1320 CE), Kashmir was ruled by Hindu monarchs whose geneses and governance were tied to Shaivism and other Hindu sects. The Rajatarangini (12th century chronicle) records dozens of Hindu kings and their endowments to temples—this isn’t a footnote but the core of Kashmir’s classical statehood. While Buddhists and later Muslims certainly contributed to the rich tapestry, that doesn’t negate the fact that Kashmir’s political structures, coinage, land grants (the Shasana inscriptions), and legal codes were shaped by and for a Hindu-majority ruling class for centuries.
2. “By that logic, the Vatican would own half of Europe.”
This comparison fails on two counts. Firstly, the Vatican is a sovereign city-state under the 1929 Lateran Treaty, with internationally recognized borders and extraterritorial rights over multiple basilicas in Italy. Its legal status is unique and does entail actual political jurisdiction—unlike any Hindu temple in Kashmir, which remains under Indian civil law. Second, equating a tiny city-state’s special treaty guarantees with a religious shrine’s cultural importance ignores centuries of regional power struggles over Kashmir.
3. “The claim that Kashmir ‘belongs to Hindus’ because of Amarnath or Shankaracharya temple is rooted in theocratic ethno-nationalist agenda, not history.”
Historical sources show Shaivism was the dominant faith of the early Kashmiri polity. The 8th-century Rajatarangini chronicles rulers patronizing Shiva worship; Queen Suryamati’s 11th-century gifts to Amarnath are recorded in multiple texts. These aren’t modern “ethno-nationalist” fabrications but genuine markers of an ancient Hindu state in the Valley
4. Conversion does alter a community’s indigenous stake when it’s imposed or incentivized politically. True indigeneity is rooted not only in birthplace but in the uninterrupted practice and institutions of a people. While individual conversions are personal, mass conversions under state patronage (e.g., Mughal land-revenue exemptions for converts) did reshape the demographic and institutional landscape, often at the expense of pre-existing Hindu institutions. Erasing the continuity of a faith community does weaken its claim on the public sphere—look at how many old Hindu shrines in the Valley were repurposed or fell to ruin after the medieval conversions. That loss of visible heritage undercuts your blasphemous idea that “conversion doesn’t erase indigeneity.” The demographic shift from ~6 percent Pandit population pre-1947 to under 1 percent today is no mere footnote—it reflects a transformation in who “belongs” in the Valley.
5. “Kashmiri Pandits’ lack of return is not the fault of Kashmiri Muslims. It is the fault of the Indian government…”
The 1990 exodus of roughly 300,000 Pandits was driven by targeted assassinations and mosque announcements from terrorist groups (JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen) demanding their departure—actions directly by Kashmiri Muslims, not New Delhi While the Indian state’s resettlement package has been inadequate, you cannot erase the fact that Pandits fled under threat from local Islamist terrorists, nor that property-destruction and intimidation were carried out at the village level by Kashmiri insurgents. Kashmiri Pandits’ exile was driven by militant Islamist violence, not benign state indifference alone. In 1989–1990, Kashmiri Pandits were systematically targeted: homes marked with “P” for “Pandit,” public threats from JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen, dozens of murders—this is well-documented. While the Indian government certainly botched the security response, the proximate cause of the mass flight was organized communal violence by militant groups, overwhelmingly deriving from the Muslim-majority side. Even today, many Pandits refuse to return precisely because the local power structure remains dominated by the same families and networks that either tacitly supported or actively condoned those 1990 purges. You cannot absolve those actors of responsibility simply by pointing at New Delhi.
6. Blaming only New Delhi for the Kashmiri Pandit displacement ignores the agency of local communities. Local Kashmiri Muslim leaders and civil society had opportunities to shelter and publicly protect Pandit neighbors but largely stayed silent or sided with the terrorists. That collective failure fueled the exodus. True reconciliation requires acknowledging both the state’s failures and the grassroots complicity. Your one-sided “it’s all Delhi’s fault” narrative only deepens the wound.
7. “Free Kashmir <3” “Freeing” any region implies a new sovereignty. But no Kashmir-wide plebiscite has ever been held; two-thirds of the Valley’s voters championed staying with India in the 1951 and 1975 assemblies. Pushing “independence” without democratic mandate simply replaces one form of rule with another-often more violent-and ignores the wishes of millions of Kashmiris who identify as Indian citizens. “Free Kashmir” slogans too often align with Pakistan-backed terrorism, not genuine self-determination. Genuine independence movements prize pluralism; Pakistan’s track record in its own territories (Balochistan, Sindh) and its support for jihadi groups in the Valley make it clear that “Azadi” framed by Islamabad would strip Kashmiri Hindus, Sikhs, even moderate Muslims of basic rights.
Real freedom would be one that guarantees security for every Kashmiri, not just the majority faith. Touting “free Kashmir” without that nuance only signals alignment with forces that intimidated Pandits in 1990—and still do.
Historical sovereignty in Kashmir was deeply tied to Hindu kings and temples.
Demographic change via enforced or incentivized conversion did impact the Hindu community’s stake.
1990’s Pandit exodus was driven first by local Islamist militancy, secondarily compounded by Delhi’s inadequate security.
True Kashmiri freedom must protect minorities—any movement that doesn’t is no ally of pluralism but of the very extremism that drove Pandits out.
It's clear you’re more invested in fueling division than understanding history—maybe try reading up on Kashmir’s actual past before you spout off next time. And i mean some real history, not the version you’ve been fed to suit your narrow agenda.
जनहित में प्रकाशीत, नमो वः 🙏
