In reblogging this post about propaganda, this person writes:
This also applies to terms like "mythology" or "religion". I study myths for a living and. It impresses me how much people use words like "this is just a myth", to disqualify an opponent's argument, as if it belonged to an inferior mode of thinking, when they themselves use the same thing, use hypothesis that are beyond assessment or criticism, self-evident truths beyond repproach, you know, like a myth.
The point they're making here seems to be:
You think your worldview is based on truth.
Other worldviews seem like myths to you.
Your own beliefs are myths too.
This kind of relativism is built on a foundation of muddy semantics and half-digested postmodernism. It claims that everyone lives by unexamined assumptions and therefore nobody can claim the truth about anything.
This isn't just false, it's a profoundly terrible argument on multiple levels.
As I am fond of repeating:
Words Mean Things. Specific Things.
Myth can refer to:
A symbolic story (e.g., creation myths)
A false belief (e.g., the myth of multitasking)
An unexamined cultural assumption (Barthes)
These are not the same. Treating them as interchangeable is at best clueless, at worst dishonest.
The fact that randomnumbers751650 conflates these makes me doubt their claim to "study myths for a living."
They've also clearly never studied the philosophy or history of science, or they'd know that Scientific hypotheses ≠ myths
A scientific hypothesis is:
Falsifiable
Testable
Provisional and subject to revision from the moment it is proposed
Calling a hypothesis a myth requires ignorance of how both words are defined.
Propaganda ≠ myth ≠ science ≠ religion
Propaganda is deliberate mass persuasion.
Religion (in most cases) is faith-based belief or communal practice.
Science is a falsifiable method.
Myth is symbolic or cultural narrative.
These have different goals, standards, and truth claims. Treating them as the same turns any meaningful discussion into nonsensical gibberish.
What's happening in this argument's rhetoric?
It switches definitions of "myth" mid-sentence
It falsely flattens all truth claims into the same category
It avoids asking whether a belief is true
This perspective, if embraced, removes the tools needed to evaluate any belief at all.
How moral relativism harms the people it claims to protect.
By: Frederick Alexander
Published: Nov 23, 2025
“Let’s be honest – saying some cultures are better than others is just racism smuggled in through the back door”.
You’ve probably stumbled upon a comment like this before, perhaps on the BBC or in the pages of the New York Times. It’s the kind of thinking that flows through the progressive bloodstream, bypassing the prefrontal cortex and heading straight for the emotional centre of the brain – especially the part responsible for virtue-signalling. It’s abject nonsense, of course, but we need to deal with the problem of moral and cultural relativism – that’s what we’re talking about here – because it pops up all the time.
Let’s begin with a simple test that takes five seconds. Would you rather raise your daughter in Norway or Afghanistan? You already know the answer – everyone does. Some cultures are simply better for human flourishing. We know instinctively that South Korea produces happier, healthier people than North Korea. We can measure it empirically, too.
Migration patterns illustrate the point beyond doubt. When people risk drowning in the Mediterranean to reach Europe, they are risking their lives on the promise of a better life in countries like Italy than in places like Somalia. Migration flows one way. Nobody at the North London dinner party is planning on moving to Mogadishu for a better life.
None of this should be controversial because all of this is observable reality. So why does saying as much seem gauche at that same dinner party? “But colonialism”, they’ll say. “Who are we to judge?” intones another. “That’s bigotry!” exclaims Tarquin as he tops up his organic natural wine.
But these are not counterarguments. They’re evasions designed to protect progressive orthodoxy and move the conversation along without further scrutiny. But scrutinise we must.
The Malala test
In 2012, Malala Yousafzai was on her way to school when she was shot in the head by the Taliban for the crime of wanting an education. The fifteen-year-old Pakistani schoolgirl survived, and we know her story today because she went on to advocate for girls’ schooling. Her courage earned her the Nobel Peace Prize two years later.
Her cause was simple: girls deserve to learn.
Cultural relativism has no coherent response to this because it claims that all cultures are equal. For the relativist, education means different things in different contexts; we can’t judge one form by the standards of another.
Here’s where that reasoning falls apart. Because if we can’t measure a traditional Afghan society by Western values, then what exactly was wrong with what the Taliban did? Weren’t they simply enforcing their cultural norms about women’s roles? Protecting their traditions? Who are we, sitting comfortably in Oxford or Boston, to judge?
The relativist has three moves, all of which are fatal to their own position.
First move: “That’s not real Afghan culture”.
But of course it is. A conservative interpretation of Islam has dominated parts of Afghanistan for centuries. To say “that’s not real Afghan culture” is to suggest there’s a better version of it. You’ve already abandoned neutrality. You’re doing exactly what you claim is impermissible: judging between different cultural visions and declaring one superior.
Second move: “We support Afghan women’s own choices”.
Good. Malala and millions like her want education. But now you’ve conceded everything because you agree that Afghan women’s desire for education should override conservative cultural norms. You accept that individual autonomy should take precedence over traditional authority. You’ve admitted that some values – women’s rights, education, choice, autonomy – are superior to others. You’ve abandoned relativism entirely.
Third move: “Violence is the line”.
On what grounds? If no external standard exists, then honour killings and religious violence must count as valid, a legitimate part of the culture. When the Taliban shot Malala, they were enforcing their cultural rules. If you condemn them, you’re appealing to some universal principle that transcends culture. Once you’ve sided with Malala against the Taliban, you’ve granted that some cultures are better than others.
What we’re really measuring
Let’s get the obvious out of the way. We’re not talking about race or ethnicity. No thoughtful and intelligent person is claiming one race is better than another. Let’s leave that idea to genuine fascists. We’re talking about observable, measurable outcomes produced by some cultures in comparison with others – women’s rights, literacy rates, life expectancy, the rule of law, and freedom of religion.
True, history, geography and economics are important variables, but outcomes are largely shaped by how norms and institutions respond to the hand they’re dealt. When we think of cultures as competing solutions to the universal human problems of hunger, disease, violence, and injustice, it’s clear that some cultures produce solutions that help humans flourish; others produce the Taliban.
Literacy rates in the Philippines for males and females are 98% and 97% respectively. In Afghanistan, it’s 52% and 27%. The statistics reflect how cultures think about half their population. It’s not about ethnicity but how societies respond to the challenges they face. We don’t need to compare different countries or ethnicities to see this; we can compare one people divided between two systems. North and South Korea offer a striking contrast – ethnically identical people with one half thriving and the other imprisoned by its own leaders.
Saudi Arabia denies women equal legal status with men. Women need male permission to marry, travel, or leave prison. They’re treated as permanent legal minors. Pakistan criminalises blasphemy; people sit in prison for years, sometimes lynched by mobs, for insulting religion. Iran hangs gay men from construction cranes. The Taliban bans women from public life altogether.
If you condemned what happened to Malala, you must condemn this too. The principle is identical: women’s autonomy matters more than traditional male authority. The only difference is that one involved a bullet and the other involves a legal code. Both are evil.
Relativism’s intellectual bankruptcy
Let’s deal with the central claim of moral and cultural relativism: no culture can judge another. More precisely, judgments about what is right and wrong are not universal but are determined by the norms, beliefs, and practices of each culture.
Read that again. It’s making a particular kind of claim, one that is itself universal, requiring acceptance across different cultures if it’s to make any sense. In other words, it’s self-refuting. If all moral claims are relative to culture then so is that very claim. Why should a non-relativist accept a relativist’s injunction not to judge? They won’t, because it’s nonsense. As Roger Scruton noted:
“A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is ‘merely relative,’ is asking you not to believe him. So don’t.”
Relativism, he argued, is a convenient way for people to avoid taking a moral stand – a kind of intellectual and moral cowardice and “the first refuge of the scoundrel.”
Daniel Dennett made a similar point about postmodernism:
“Postmodernism, the school of ‘thought’ that proclaimed ‘There are no truths, only interpretations’ has largely played itself out in absurdity, but it has left behind a generation of academics in the humanities disabled by their distrust of the very idea of truth and their disrespect for evidence, settling for ‘conversations’ in which nobody is wrong and nothing can be confirmed, only asserted with whatever style you can muster.”
“Ah...” says the relativist, switching gears. “But what about slavery and colonialism? The West did terrible things”.
Yes, of course colonial powers did terrible things. We know they did because we spend a great deal of energy documenting and condemning the sins of our past. It’s also why we introduced reforms. Britain abolished slavery in its empire in 1833 and then spent the next several decades using the Royal Navy to suppress the Atlantic slave trade – at considerable cost in lives and money. This doesn’t erase Britain’s earlier participation in that trade, but it does demonstrate what holding ourselves accountable to universal standards looks like: the defence of human rights, equality and the rule of law.
When the relativist says we must judge Western societies by strict moral principles but not extend the same to other cultures out of “respect for diversity”, they’re obviously invoking a double standard. Moreover, it’s not respectful, it’s deeply patronising. Why fail to apply the same standards to Pakistan as we apply to ourselves, unless you think the former is somehow incapable of meeting those standards? Female genital mutilation (FGM), honour killings, child marriage, death sentences for apostasy – if these things were prominent features of life in Toronto, we’d condemn them immediately. Why do we exempt those practices when they occur in Helmand Province?
The relativist has no answer except to switch the subject back to colonialism. But you can’t have it both ways: either some practices are objectively wrong, or none are. If relativism is true, then condemning anything is impossible because there’s no objective standard.
In any case, this simple moral logic is beside the point for relativists because they don’t actually believe their own doctrine. You wore a sombrero to a Halloween party? That’s cultural appropriation, says Jemima, draped in a keffiyeh on her way to a hate march. A white person in dreadlocks? The Oxford Union will treat it as a hate crime, yet when girls are forced into burqas, it’s a “cultural difference deserving respect”. The incoherence is spectacular; the bigotry of low expectations is contemptible.
Who pays the price
The tenured sociology professor will airily dismiss these arguments from the comfort of his office because relativism comes at no cost to him. But for ex-Muslims facing death threats for apostasy or women fighting for fundamental rights in patriarchal societies, the cost is life itself.
The people who pay for this cowardice are never the academics theorising about decolonisation. They’re the reformers trapped inside these systems.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali endured genital mutilation, forced marriage, and beatings before fleeing Somalia. She later became a Dutch MP and advocated for Muslim women’s rights. Her collaborator Theo van Gogh was murdered in the street – his assailant pinning a letter to his chest with a knife, promising her the same fate. Western feminists should have rallied. Instead, many dismissed her as an Islamophobe.
When Mahsa Amini died in the custody of Iran’s morality police, Iranian women burned their hijabs in the streets. They were beaten, imprisoned, and some were killed. Did the Western progressives who’d spent years defending the hijab as empowerment march in solidarity? Did they don their pussy hats and start a movement supporting the oppressed girls and women of Iran? Of course not. Many went quiet or looked the other way as Iranian clerics beat women and girls whose only “crime” was to want the same freedoms their sisters enjoy in the West – and once enjoyed in Iran before the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
[ Tehran University students in 1971 ]
What moral seriousness requires
Let’s put it plainly. A culture that lets you leave your religion is better than one that kills you for it. A culture that allows women to choose their husbands is better than one that marries them off at twelve. A culture that protects gay people is better than one that hangs them from cranes. A culture that investigates its own failures – slavery, exploitation – is better than one that admits to no flaws because God said so.
None of this should be controversial to say. It merely requires making two distinctions that relativists dismiss.
First: people and practices are not the same thing. Muslims deserve equal protection under the law and freedom from bigotry. But no group gets to smuggle illiberal practices under that cover. You can wear a veil; you cannot beat your daughter for refusing. You can preach your religion; you cannot demand blasphemy laws in a secular democracy. Defending Muslims while criticising conservative Islamic practices isn’t “Islamophobia”. It’s a basic liberal principle.
Second: universalism is non-negotiable. Those who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had just watched what happens when governments insist their “culture” permits treating humans as sub-human. States from every continent signed the declaration. So when Pakistan jails blasphemers or Saudi Arabia executes homosexuals, the correct response isn’t Who are we to judge? It’s You signed. Now keep your word.
A game of pretend
Why do intelligent people maintain this obvious fiction? Because admitting that some cultures produce higher levels of human flourishing means defending their own, and this has become strangely anathema to many in the Western cultural establishment. Saying that our culture is better than illiberal ones is seen as unsophisticated, unrefined, low status – the sort of thing a plumber might say.
Because ultimately this is really about snobbery, a display of moral and intellectual superiority that begins in the academy and percolates through our institutions until it becomes orthodoxy. The irony, of course, is that it claims the culture of progressivism is better than the liberalism it replaced.
It would all be academic except that the posturing and moral evasions have real consequences. The progressive class abandons the vulnerable, emboldens theocrats, and prevents honest discussions about integration and social cohesion. It’s how we end up with the absurd contortions around multiculturalism. It’s how we end up with grooming gangs.
The choice is simple
Either you believe women’s autonomy, freedom of conscience, and protection from violence are universal goods, or you believe they’re culturally relative. If universal, then some cultures are better than others. If relative, then you have no grounds to condemn what happened to Malala.
There’s no third option. The attempt to split the difference – condemning individual acts while refusing to judge the cultures that produce them – is intellectual cowardice. It lets you feel moral while abandoning the people who need moral clarity most.
Some ways of organising society create more human flourishing than others. It’s measurable, observable, and obvious. We know it from seeing the direction people flee when they can.
Some cultures are better than others. It’s not bigoted to say as much, and we’re allowed to notice.
==
Fuck I hate postmodernism. It's not profound, it's not insightful, it's pseudo-intellectual, pretentious nonsense. It doesn't mean anything. It lets low IQ people and dangerous fanatics pretend to be deep and thoughtful while vomiting up words that mean literally nothing.
It truly is the embodiment of the old saying:
“The mark of a true intellect is the ability to explain complex things simply. The mark of a fool is the ability to make simple things unnecessarily complicated.”
"Who are we to judge?" We are the people who live in the places that everyone wants to come to. So, yes, we are completely qualified.
one of the funniest quirks of extremely-online politics is the dual belief that america is a uniquely evil place, but prohibiting people from moving to america is a human rights violation. if it's really that bad in here should't we be keeping people out?
– Mike Solana
This reminds me of the old argument about "God" being the source of objective morality. Except that definitionally, objective morality is just "God's" arbitrary whims.
"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" – Euthyphro's Dilemma
If "God" can change his mind, then it's not objective morality; "God" can decide that slavery is moral. You know, again. If he can't change his mind, then "God" is conforming to a standard outside himself, therefore he is not the source of objective morality. If "he wouldn't do that," well, he did before, so either he got it wrong or he had it right the first time.
"Soft days for evangelical Christians are past, and only a strong view of Scripture is sufficient to withstand the pressure of an all-pervasive culture built upon relativism and relativistic thinking."
Let’s take stock of the story so far. The Enlightenment and its ideological child, liberalism, stand accused of both a corrosive moral scepticism and a tendency to absolutism. We have seen how these charges have curiously similar origins. The pride of reason ripped the individual away from the ‘unconsidered life’ which gave him certainty, leaving him with a kind of maniacal confidence from which have sprung the multiple delusions of rationality he has seen fit to impose on others. The treatment for this pathology is to become modest again: to see that there is no overarching truth, but only local agreements between like-minded people who have no business poking their noses into the business of others down the road. We need to look to our own cultural resources to bind ourselves to one another, as we did in the past.
This is at best an illusion, and at worst a recipe for utter horror. The illusion comes from the fact that to see any past moment as one of unanimity and social peace is to have no knowledge of history (Gray makes this point himself in his critique of communitarian philosophy). By their natures, societies are characterised by sectional interests and conflicts. As both Marxists and postmodernists realise, power gives certain groups the ability to define reality and life for everyone else. The idea of an idyllic kind of shared way of life is no more than a balm, poorly covering repeated eruptions of conflict and repression. The horror kicks in because without some overarching notion of justice, it’s difficult to articulate any defence of those who are on the receiving end of the repression. Thus we can see that the charge of relativism, long levelled at liberals, is actually true of their accusers. The difference is about where relativism starts and ends. For communitarians and conservatives, relativism is only dubious when individuals make individual moral decisions. By contrast, they are relaxed about a relativism at the level of cultures because, for them, there can be no source of moral truth which might authoritatively call a culture’s assumptions into question.
- What's Wrong With the Enlightenment? Phil Badger
“A dogmatism of tolerance has infected the women’s movement. As a dogma, tolerance asserts that there should be no value judgments made about anything. Using the rhetoric of not imposing values on others, women buy into a dangerous philosophy in which they strip themselves of the capacity for moral judgment. What they do not realize is that values will always assert themselves. When women do not take responsibility for generating and representing their agreed-upon values, they become pushovers for the tyranny of others’ values.”
— Janice Raymond, A Passion for Friends: Toward a Philosophy of Female Affection (1986)
When Jesus Christ says, "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone," he’s really saying that no one has the moral standing to decide who is a bad person or not. Of course, there are exceptions, there are people who abuse children for example and we’re not going to be relativistic about that. But outside of exceptional cases, I don’t think anyone has the right to say who is a bad person. Is someone who steals a bad person? Well, it depends on why they steal, right?
A cultural ideology that is based on relativism must inevitably lead to mediocrity. Where there is no criticism, there is increasingly no excellence. For to "excel" is by definition to be distinguished in a positive way from other things. It is a declaration that one thing is preferable to another.
I believe in a few 'radical' (read: not popular) ideas regarding the self, the nature of being, reality, and consciousness. One such idea I hold in high regard is that reality is constructed by the senses, but what does that actually mean? What, in abstract, am I really getting at? Am I saying that we make up reality as we go along and that everything is fake? No, not quite.
(cont.)
To elaborate in a semi-reductive way: imagine the brain and its functions while putting a pin in the above text. In my view, the brain acts as a reality interpreter.
Think of your eyes and vision. You might say, "I can confirm with someone else that we're seeing the same thing." (i.e; a 'red' apple)
And that's true, relatively speaking. You and an outside observer can correspond and compare truths to reach a shared truth: we both perceive the apple as being red. (This concept, generally, is known as the correspondence theory of truth)
But what happens when you look at an optical illusion? Let's say that you're on your phone and see a post regarding a dress that asks what color(s) the dress is: black and blue or gold and white?
My friend might say the dress is blue and black whilst at the same time I perceive it and whole heartedly believe that it's gold and white. Some of the more clever among you might respond to this by saying we can check the hexadecimal color value(s) of the image, which is true. But consider that hexadecimal color is based upon the visible spectrum of light that we (you, I, others) are able to perceive. Is someone who is wholly colorblind wrong if they point out that the dress is actually gray and black? Because they can't perceive the same colors that you and I can?
"Yes!" I can hear the contrarians among you say. Well, alright, let's play that game.
Hypothetically, what if everyone were varying levels of colorblind, and only you and a minuscule percentage of people could see the light spectrum that non-colorblind people can see?
What if they used your logic there and said, "Actually, a majority of people see that it's gray. If we check with hexadecimal color, we can see that it's #00FFFF; objectively extremely gray!"
I hope you see the problem here and where the correspondence theory of truth falls apart.
This line of reasoning is known as The Knowledge Argument, which is often synonymous in conversation with Mary's Room. You can read more about it here (link to Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
Digressing back to my earlier point about the senses and how the brain constructs reality:
By empirical comparisons of this manner on this matter, we can come to realize that what we perceive is not how reality appears, but rather how it appears relative to us. (And our senses.)
Back to optical illusions: surely you've seen a few. Take for example The Checker Shadow illusion (Wikipedia link)
The two squares are the same color. Yes, your eyes and brain are fooling you. Why is this? Well, to put it simply, your brain (the aforementioned reality interpreter) unconsciously takes the qualia (the subjective experience/phenomenon of viewing the illusion) and fills in the gaps based upon contextual information available to you. Thus, resulting in your perception of the squares being different colors.
The brain does this constantly in our day to day lives. And it isn't limited to optical illusions. Olfactory, tactile, auditory, and gustatory illusions all exist. Getting a little spooky, isn't it?
So, we've arrived at a point where we can agree at a minimum that the brain constructs reality based upon our senses. But what about the truth? Before I open that can of worms, let me posit another question to you:
When you perceive daylight and your friend in Australia perceives nightlight, which one of you is correct? And which one of you is lying?
If you believe in an objective truth, then this question will stump you. You'll tell me that I'm being fallacious in my reasoning, but that's not the case. You're encountering a problem here where you're inducting objectivity onto a problem with no objective answer.
The truth in this case, and pertaining to the question, is both dynamic and relative. Your friend isn't lying, and neither of you are incorrect. The truth relative to you is that it's daytime. The truth relative to your friend in Australia is that it's nighttime. The truth is dynamic in that it will eventually shift; you will eventually experience nighttime after experiencing daytime, and your friend will experience daytime after nighttime. Neither of you will experience them at the same time unless one of you moves elsewhere to the same time zone.
Again, neither lying or incorrect.
This is the essence of what I'm getting at. Your reality and how you experience it is just as valid as any other person's, even if you have fundamental disagreements as to the nature of reality and your contrasting perceptions.
In closing: I believe that this posits many questions about the very nature of being and consciousness, and that the world as we experience it is not as black and white as various figures claim it to be. Your experience of the world is just as valid as anyone else's and vice versa.
"There are no facts, only interpretations" —Friedrich Nietzsche.
(If you made it this far, thank you very much for reading. Any and all feedback is appreciated! 🖤🦝)
