the trouble is with intellectual self-minimization is that there's an incentive for it -- never make any claims that anyone could take issue with and you'll never need to defend them and you'll never need to face-off against power-knowledge. Then again, I am seeing now how self-minimization could also be a more selfish way to protect beliefs that you worry deep down could be refuted by others in a way that you may find convincing. If you're attached to these positions and you're also attached to the identity of being someone with epistemic rigor, then you might avoid bringing these beliefs up in front of other people you trust and who you see as a justified epistemic authority for fear of having them confronted. For fear of either -- being forced to defend them -- even if you have a defense ready there's a social cost there, there's an emotional cost there -- but there's also an epistemic risk of being convinced that certain beliefs aren't justified. and being forced to abandon a position you're attached to, or forced to feel the ego-dystonic awareness that you're not as rigorous and ironclad as you saw yourself to be. and that others can see it too. I think, partly, I hold on to the notion of being a person who cares deeply about epistemic rigor because I hold positions that if seen at low resolution in bad faith could mark me as being part of a camp I don't actually want to associate with.
I also think that chains of logic built to defend positions from attacks (which are themselves motivated in various ways) are markedly different than the chains of logic one actually takes to arrive at a position, which is different again than the chains of logic you might present to teach people in an intelligent way. the pedagogic justification is different from the defensive justification is different than the immanent justification.
titsay
germansingergirl
romaincrisis
s-u-f-j-a-n-s-t-e-v-e-n-s
vaporwave
andulkaphoto
theartofmadeline
prguitarman
