The Kinsey Reports — the Male volume in 1948, the Female in 1953 — get filed in the popular history as a kind of bombshell-of-conscience moment, two big books that told mid-century America what it was actually doing in bed and broke the consensus open. Which they did, more or less, in terms of effect. But the actual story of how those books got made is mostly a story about gall wasps and about how the Rockefeller Foundation laundered controversial research through a series of intermediaries until the political weather changed and they couldn't anymore.
Alfred Kinsey was an entomologist. Not "started as one and moved on" — he was an entomologist his entire career, on the Indiana University zoology faculty from 1920, and what he did, mostly, for the first twenty years of his professional life, was collect gall wasps. The number people throw around is somewhere north of a million specimens, which he measured with calipers, dozens of separate dimensions per wasp, accumulating a dataset on Cynips variation that nobody asked for and nobody ever quite knew what to do with afterward.
They matter because the methodology that produced the sex reports — the in-person interview, the deliberately non-random oversampling of accessible populations, the obsessive coding of every reportable behavior into something like three hundred discrete variables, the famous zero-to-six scale — comes directly out of how you collect and analyze a gall wasp population. You don't try to sample randomly because you can't (the wasps don't cooperate). You collect everything you can get your hands on, you measure every dimension, and you sort by variation rather than by category. The species boundaries are then drawn around what the variation actually looks like, on the ground, in the field, in the cabinet, and not around what the prior taxonomic categories told you to expect.
This is in fact what Kinsey thought he was doing with humans. He wasn't doing sociology. He had no use for sociology. He was doing taxonomy on a species he happened to belong to, and the zero-to-six scale exists because Cynips populations distribute continuously across morphological dimensions instead of falling into clean bins, and Kinsey believed — correctly, as far as the gall wasps were concerned — that the bins were imposed by the observers and the variation was the actual reality.
(The decades of methodological criticism of Kinsey's sampling — that he over-interviewed prison populations, sex workers, sexual-rights organizations, and undergraduates, that his 37% same-sex-experience number for men was an artifact of the sample — are correct on the technical merits and miss the point about what Kinsey thought he was doing. He wasn't trying to produce a population estimate for the United States. He was trying to map the range of variation. From a wasp-collector's perspective, you don't reject a specimen because it isn't a "representative" wasp.)
Where the money came from is the part of this story that almost nobody bothers with, and it's the part that explains everything else.
The Rockefeller Foundation had been funding research on human sexuality, indirectly, since 1921 — through an intermediary body called the Committee for Research on Problems of Sex, run by the National Research Council. The CRPS was a deliberate piece of institutional engineering. Rockefeller didn't want its name attached to research on masturbation or homosexuality or marital frequency, for very obvious reasons given that Rockefeller money also flowed to medical schools, hospitals, public health programs, and a long list of socially respectable causes that any contact with sex research would have contaminated. So the CRPS was constructed as a buffer. You give the money to the National Research Council, the NRC's committee selects the grantees, the grantees run the studies and publish the papers, and Rockefeller's name appears only in the foundation's annual report, three pages deep, under the institutional grant total.
Kinsey came onto the CRPS payroll in 1941. By 1947 he was the single largest line item in the committee's grant portfolio, which the CRPS leadership noticed and grew nervous about — partly because the publication of the Male volume was clearly coming, and partly because the war was over, the country was getting religion again, and the buffer was looking less robust than it had in the 1930s.
The Male volume drops in January 1948 and sells two hundred thousand copies in two months.
Now you have a problem, if you're the Rockefeller Foundation, because the buffer was supposed to make this kind of thing not your problem, and instead the buffer has produced the bestselling work of social science in American history, attributed to a guy whose funding pipeline is now traceable to you by anyone who can read the acknowledgments page. The Female volume in 1953 is even worse — same author, same methodology, but now the subject is the sexual behavior of American women, including American wives, including (it is implied throughout, and stated outright in places) American wives who weren't doing what the magazine columns said they were supposed to be doing. The book sells about half as many copies as the Male volume, which is still extraordinary, but the political response is an order of magnitude more violent.
Then the Reece Committee happens.
The Reece Committee — formally the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations, chaired by Tennessee congressman B. Carroll Reece — convened in 1954 with a mandate to investigate whether large foundations were using their tax-exempt status to fund subversive or un-American activities. A McCarthy-era operation in all but name, and Kinsey was target number one. Not because anybody at Rockefeller was a communist — they obviously weren't — but because the Reece Committee's actual function was to put institutional pressure on the foundations to police their own grant portfolios more conservatively, and Kinsey was the most legible example of things the foundations were funding that the country would not approve of if it knew.
Rockefeller did exactly what the committee was designed to make it do. They cut Kinsey off in 1954. Not formally, not with a press release — they just declined to renew the grant, and the Institute for Sex Research, which Kinsey had built at Indiana on the assumption that the funding would continue indefinitely, suddenly didn't have a runway. He spent the last two years of his life trying to find alternative funding (he couldn't, because the same political pressure that had spooked Rockefeller had also spooked everyone else), and he died in August 1956, probably of a heart condition aggravated by overwork, ostensibly of pneumonia, in any case broke and demoralized and convinced his life's work was about to be dismantled.
It wasn't. The Institute survives at Indiana, now called the Kinsey Institute, and the archive — which is the actual lasting contribution, the millions of pages of interview transcripts, the photographs, the art collection, the diaries he collected from his subjects — is still being worked through.
(Worth pausing on the archive for a second, because it's the part that most resembles the gall wasp collection. Kinsey collected sexual material the same way he collected wasps — exhaustively, without curation, on the principle that you couldn't know in advance what would turn out to be analytically useful. The art and photograph collection is enormous and includes a great deal of material that would now be regarded as legally problematic to have collected the way he collected it, and the Institute spends a nontrivial portion of its operational energy negotiating the legal status of an archive that was assembled under one regulatory regime and is now sitting under a substantially different one.)
The cultural downstream is the part where the story usually gets told.
Hugh Hefner published the first issue of Playboy in December 1953, the same month the Female volume came out, and Hefner cited Kinsey constantly in the Playboy Philosophy essays that started running in 1962 — the magazine's whole editorial position, that American sexual mores were hypocritical and the data proved it, was an argument Kinsey had supplied the numbers for. The 1960s sexual revolution then gets narrated as a kind of Kinsey-Hefner-pill three-step, with Kinsey providing the evidence, Hefner providing the cultural permission, and Enovid (1960) providing the technology, in approximately that causal order.
What gets lost in the three-step is that Kinsey himself was, by every personal indicator, a midwestern Republican Methodist who voted for Eisenhower and would have been bewildered to find himself enlisted as the patron saint of the sexual revolution. He was a taxonomist who happened to be working on humans. The political valence got attached to the data after the fact, by people who needed scientific cover for arguments they were already making, in roughly the way that Darwin got enlisted for social Darwinism without himself being a social Darwinist.
The data does not care what you do with it. The institutional pipeline that produced the data does care, which is why Rockefeller cut him loose the moment cover became impossible.
The deeper rhyme, if you want one, is to the way the Manhattan Project and Bell Labs were running parallel a few years earlier — large institutional patrons funding heterodox research through buffer organizations, getting decades of high-variance output, until the political weather shifted and the buffers stopped buffering. The CRPS was the sex-research equivalent of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, except smaller, older, and built around the wrong topic for postwar America to keep tolerating. The design held until it didn't, and the design held in each case because the patron could plausibly deny direct involvement, and when the denial got too thin the patron walked.
And the part nobody quite knows what to do with: Kinsey's actual data, the interview transcripts, the case histories, has held up better than the methodology critics expected. The gross numbers were artifacts of the sample, sure. But the range of variation Kinsey documented turned out to be roughly the range of variation that more representative surveys, conducted forty and fifty years later under vastly improved sampling protocols, also documented. The wasp method, applied to humans, did not produce a population estimate. It produced a map of what the variation looked like, and the map was substantially correct, and the entomologist who thought he was just doing taxonomy on the species he happened to belong to was, in the end, doing roughly what he claimed to be doing.
Rockefeller pulled the plug because the political cost of association exceeded the marginal benefit of one more grant cycle. Kinsey died thinking he'd been abandoned. The data sat in a building in Bloomington for seventy years and is still being worked through.
Same as it ever was — the patron picks a controversial topic, builds a buffer, gets a decade or two of unusually frank output, and then folds when the heat arrives, and the work persists in the institution the patron built and walked away from.
