Chinese, Russian, and North Korean officials have surely taken note of Washington’s ability to capture Maduro, destroy many of Tehran’s nuclear systems, and kill Iran’s leadership. They are also aware that, unlike his predecessors, Trump is willing to use force against Iran and Venezuela. These facts will bolster deterrence. Although they may take comfort from the security provided by their nuclear arsenals, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would rather not fight a war against the United States—particularly if it might personally endanger them or cost them their lives.
The weaknesses these conflicts have exposed include Washington’s dangerous munitions shortages. The war in Iran has also made clear the U.S. military’s dependence on allies and foreign bases. Most of all, the perception that the United States is willing to settle for far less than its stated war aims after a relatively brief campaign has raised questions about the United States’ focus and resolve.
More munitions will help address these challenges, in part by simply improving Washington’s capacity to fight protracted wars. But the Trump administration will also need to make sure the American military is more broadly structured to fight longer—and in more arenas. The United States’ main adversaries collaborate across the planet: China has made major economic and security investments in Africa and South America, the Ukrainians have found themselves fighting North Korean soldiers who have Iranian drones, and Russia has helped Tehran target U.S. forces. Washington therefore needs to maintain a global presence. American operations in Iran and continued support for Ukraine suggest that the White House recognizes that the United States is a global power with worldwide interests, despite its occasional statements to the contrary.
But to truly embrace its role as a global power, the United States needs to better collaborate with allies. Iran has made it particularly clear just how essential they are. American operations in the country would be nearly impossible without the help of Gulf Arab states, which are home to multiple U.S. bases, and Israel. NATO allies have helped Washington by providing basing, access, and overflight rights for American forces operating in the Middle East. Most poignantly, Ukraine is helping the United States learn how to defend against Iran’s drone bombardments. Yet most U.S. allies have been underinvesting in their militaries for years, despite pleas by multiple American presidents to increase their spending. Over the last year and a half, some allies have let domestic politics or their dislike for Trump overshadow their collective interest in weakening the Iranian regime and ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. They have, in turn, refused to help the United States with its campaign even though doing so would benefit them. In exchange, Washington should do a better job of getting its weapons into the hands of its partners so that they can successfully defend themselves.
The war in Iran—along with the capture of Maduro—has made plain what the U.S. military can and can’t accomplish right now, and what it must therefore do next. It has shown that Washington needs to get its allies to do more and that it needs to do more itself. This does not mean that the United States should emphasize quantity over quality; it will still pay dividends to be the most advanced military on the planet. But in an era of extended conflict, Washington and its allies need to be dominant in all domains and on all fronts. They must be ready to bring everything to bear everywhere, and all at once.
The American Military’s Coming Marathon: The Pentagon Needs Both Quantity and Quality to Win Modern Conflicts